I don't think I understand your issue here. Of course others exist objectively whether they are part of my 'being-with' or not. — Erik
But how could anyone ever step beyond their own experience in any meaningful way? That seems like a crazy demand to establish the 'objective' existence of anything. We can't transcend our perspective, and therefore solipsism seems incapable of ultimate refutation. I mean, how would you possibly confirm the objective existence of others? Maybe have a chat with them? Kick a ball around with them? What are you looking for here in your use of the term 'objective'? — Erik
Of course others exist objectively whether they are part of my 'being-with' or not. — Erik
It seems that for Heidegger, the existence of others is neither an objective or subjective fact. Heidegger tries to sidestep this realist notion by an analysis of others which places them not in an external or internal world, but rather grounds them in this notion of 'being-with', a necessary part of Dasein's ontological condition.
This leads him wide open to accusations of solipsism. We want the existence of others to be an objective fact, not just a condition of experience.
The question of whether others actually exist independent of whatever Dasein experiences is side stepped by Heidegger. For Heidegger it is unintelligibe to speak of others 'outside' of Dasein, and so one cannot coherently make claims about the objective existence of others - which leads to solipsism. Heidegger's ontology cannot even make sense of claims about other minds existing independently of ones experience.
Heidegger uses the term ontic ... when he gives descriptive characteristics of a particular thing and the "plain facts" of its existence. What is ontic is what makes something what it is.
For an individual discussing the nature of "being", one's ontic could refer to the physical, factual elements that produce and/or underlie one's own reality - the physical brain and its substructures.
...
Something that is ontological is concerned with understanding and investigating Being, the ground of Being, or the concept of Being itself.
For an individual discussing the nature of "being", the ontological could refer to one's own first-person, subjective, phenomenological experience of being.
Is there an *ontological* difference between say the experience of a couch, and the experience of a human?
Also, 'being-with' in Heidegger's ontology seems open to accusations of solipsism? Other people in Heidegger's ontology seems to me, as something which can be reduced to just an aspect of ones experience. As in, others can be reduced to NOTHING MORE than ones experience of 'being-with' others. That there is no actual others out there, rather there's just this ontological mode of experience one is in, which is 'being-with'. Or not, as the case may be - for the desert island person for example. — dukkha
Heidegger avoids placing any value on Being. — darthbarracuda
If kettles only exist with respect to an experiencing self, then what is the ontological status of other selves? — dukkha
But what if say you were born on a desert island and never met or knew about other humans? How could 'being-with' others be a part of your experience? — dukkha
I doubt he uses that phrase. Being with others is part of human existence. Observation tells us that everyone is in contact with someone else at least once in their lifes... No need to come up with people who were breeded by a lost retort in the jungle and then raised by apes later on: The book is not based upon speculation. It takes Dasein as it is and must do so as the whole analysis of Dasein was meant to serve as basis for further investigations into Being itself. Things are how they are, and not how they could be.Other people in Heidegger's ontology seems to me, as something which can be reduced to just an aspect of ones experience. — dukkha
Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein’s Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with... Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one’s own Dasein; Dasein-with characterizes the Dasein of Others to the extent that it is freed by its world for a Being-with. Only so far as one’s own Dasein has the essential structure of Being-with, is it Dasein-with as encounterable for Others. — Being and Time
Heidegger seems solipsistic to me. He grounds the existence of others within ones experience, but other people are more than that, right? Sure, he may insist that ALL experience contains as a necessary condition to exist 'being-with', but we want more than that. I want to say that other people exist as an objective ontological fact, and whether people experience 'being-with' others, or not, is COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT to the existence of others. Other people should not be grounded in a condition of experience - even a necessary one. Others are over and above that - they exist regardless of whatever you experience. Right? — dukkha
So, Being-with, as an existentiale - a constitutive structure of the way Dasein is related to and immersed-in the world - is necessary to Dasein, even if no one else is ever around.
— Dan123
Frankly, I think Dasein simply is not possible under that condition. — Heiko
I think this is spot on. I made a very similar point during a debate in a previous incarnation. The argument extends to all who infer the existence of others from their experience. — Banno
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