Nor am I.

I would point out that if someone's mental state is ineffable, then it is pointless to discuss it.

But then we do discuss mental states - with a degree of ambiguity or uncertainty.

Hence, mental states cannot be ineffable.

How does that sit with you? — Banno

I think you've missed me from the get-go then

I strove- strove - to indicate how the use of things like 'mental states' is unrelated to the people to whom those states are attributed.

[editorial: real people who suffer are not grist for bad linguistic philosophy, they aren't examples for shallow wryness}

but -

I strove- strove - to indicate how the use of things like 'mental states' is unrelated to the people to whom those states are attributed. — csalisbury

Are you asking whether 'mental states' correspond to some actual thing, a mental-state, in the person to whom they're ascribed? My guess is no, not really, tho, if youre familiar with the terms and the settings in which they crop up, you stand a good chance at making valid inferences about someone given the knowledge they've been ascribed mental state x. — csalisbury

Hm. Yep, I've missed you. There is some relation between someone and their mental state, surely.

\ sure and everything you quoted would indicate I agree.

As a side note, the Socratic methodology of just asking, free of context, 'what is X?' is bad methodology. It will invariably lead you to silliness.

I believe to find an acceptable “What” to “a Mental state” definition, we need to start at the base roots of the very words allocated by human language to give understandable or sensible meaning. This has been separated into three distinct words.

Definition of “a”
A Relevant speech/language counterpart of orthographic “a”

Definition of “mental” – All found in Merriam-Webster

Of or relating to the mind; specifically: of or relating to the total emotional and intellectual response of an individual to external reality
• mental health
Of or relating to intellectual as contrasted with emotional activity
• mental acuity
Relating to, or being intellectual as contrasted with overt physical activity
• made quick mental calculations
Occurring or experienced in the mind: inner
• mental anguish
• a mental breakdown
Relating to the mind, its activity, or its products as an object of study: ideological
• mental science
Relating to spirit or idea as opposed to matter
• the distinction between physical things and mental ideas


Definition of “state” - relevant

Condition of mind or temperament.
• in a highly nervous state
Condition of abnormal tension or excitement.

Thus deducting from the aforementioned definitions “a mental state” would be time dependent due to the probability of change thus making the whole condition a variable of a specific frame of reference point, relating to the total emotional and intellectual response of an individual to external reality. An objective measurable state of emotional mental faculties can only be observed and calculated from an external point of view. An unknown amount of emotional dependencies exists subjectively within the individual that is impossible to measure by any means from the external, thus portions are extracted relating to the known thus giving limitational parameters constructed by the collective psychological views on Emotional and mental faculties of the mind. These together with the Time parameter is used to create a referenceable state that could be used in therapy when psycho analysing the origins that gave rise to the referenced.

What about being in pain? It seems wrong to say it is just a state of mind. — Banno

Well, it would be wrong if one's conception of mind was equivalent to only the brain.

What is a mental state? — Banno

It's the state you're in when they put you in a mental institution. :wink: :joke:

No, seriously, I would say it is a more or less complex experiential process that exemplifies one or more cohesive themes.

This, as I understand, is an internal position; mental states are independent of what is going on around us. Not sure if this is like being a priori or like being phenomenal. Either way, we have to avoid it being seen as inexpressible, and hence beyond discussion. — Banno

Well, mental states are semi-independent, I might prefer to say. They are queer in that they aren't totally independent of what's happening around us, and they aren't fully determined either. And perhaps that sliding scale changes from person to person, too -- we can develop a certain amount of independence from our circumstances, but not everyone can do this as much as others, and we are surely never fully independent of our environment in our mental states.

I don't think I'd say that mental states are inexpressible. But there is something worth noting in being tempted to say they are. There is something that seems missing, a lot of the time, in attempting to express our mental states (or whatever they are). Our attempts often fall short, for whatever reason. And there is value in extra-propositional knowledge when it comes to mental states -- we value people who have experienced a certain kind of pain in speaking about said pain over someone who might have read a lot of books about pain.

But I wouldn't say that it's entirely beyond discussion. We do talk about what seems to count as mental states very frequently. It's just very particular to the moment, and so caution is advisable in making generalizations.

Can one know the mental state of another? — Banno

I'd say yes. But I would say that such knowledge is heavily dependent upon listening -- to a point that certainty is always relative to what someone tells us about themselves, rather than relative to our prior experiences with people who seem like such and such. The particularity of mental states makes it so that generalizations are too inaccurate to take as guiding theories of persons, I think.

I find this question of mental state to be very intriguing. It brings up questions like what is mind? What is the relationship between mind and brain?
So far my definition of 'mind' is 'the directive/structural/organizational mechanism of life'. While this definition may not be fully thought through, it does help in explaining a little about how the mind works. The brain, I define as 'the physical interface for the mind'. This is kind of the relationship between software and hardware. The 'mind' is the software while the 'brain' is the hardware.
I see a mental state as something close to an attitude or a character but not yet a personality because while it lacks permanency, there is a distinct persistence/recurrence to its mode of operation. I would then define a mental state as an element of mind ( usually that which is in focus within consciousness). Therefore, while the 'mind' is the 'structural mechanism', a 'mental state' would be an individual 'structure' within the mechanism.

* [JUST FOR CONTEXT => As to 'emotions', I define them as 'the fuel substance for life'; that is, an ingredient which nourishes or catalyses life processes. For example, for a house to exist, there must have been a plan, then afterwards the materials and lastly the builders who perform the actual work. From my perspective, the plan symbolizes the mental aspect, the materials symbolize the emotional aspect, and the builders symbolize the physical/practical aspect. Basically, I don't think there can be one aspect without relation to the others in life, otherwise life would not be.]

I don't know, does this make sense? What do you think?

yikes. I was three sheets and borderline incoherent. mental states are, of course, related to the 'ineffable stuff' despite my confused protests (not sure what my 'editorial' meant).

What I meant was that 'mental states' aren't a thing - they have no ontological heft. The meaning of 'mental states' boils down to complex patterns of behavior and linguistic usage. Or almost: its also grounded in the hodgpodge of values, insitutional, ethical etc, that ground those patterns.

So yes they're effable, mental states, because their substance is effability. They're a way of organizing our speech and behavior in the face of whatever is the cause of that speech and behavior (as mediated by the socio-linguistic game of 'mental states')

(Note that this isn't relativism. You can be wrong in ascribing a mental state, even if mental states don't 'exist'. Linguists talk about felicitous usage. That way of framing is right, here. The ability to tag something correctly, in the right way, in a complex tagging-environment is different than saying something that corresponds or doesnt to a real referent.)

It seems like you're trying to strike a difficult balance where mental states can be understood wittgensteinally (and id agree) while also saying that, yes, in fact, 'mental states' are the atomic constituents of the mind.

This doesn't make sense to me.

(Unless youre just doing a game, for the sake of it, of 'if you speak of it, then its effable [and nothing is left out in the effing]' Which is basically a lingustic stove's gem, isn't it?)

What I meant was that 'mental states' aren't a thing - they have no ontological heft. The meaning of 'mental states' boils down to complex patterns of behavior and linguistic usage. Or almost: its also grounded in the hodgpodge of values, insitutional, ethical etc, that ground those patterns. — csalisbury

I haven't the capacity right now to reply in the detail this deserves, so I will just say that this looks good to me, provided I ignore the problematic phrase "ontological heft".

Further this seems to me to be the same for belief.

(Unless youre just doing a game, for the sake of it, of 'if you speak of it, then its effable [and nothing is left out in the effing]' Which is basically a lingustic stove's gem, isn't it?) — csalisbury

Part of what I am doing is exploring the difference between saying and showing. One can't say stuff about the ineffable - but we do anyway. How does that work? Talk about the ineffable must be showing.

...while also saying that, yes, in fact, 'mental states' are the atomic constituents of the mind. — csalisbury

Not this. The more I think about mental states, and belief in particular, the less solid they become.

One can't say stuff about the ineffable - but we do anyway. How does that work? Talk about the ineffable must be showing. — Banno

Very much in agreement with this.

One of my all-time favorite quotes from literature - its in my bio - deals with this, I think. He (William Gaddis) is obviously using language artistically (like the use of 'truth') but I think he's touching on something very similar:

"When people tell a truth they do not understand what they mean, they say it by accident, it goes through them and they do not recognize it until someone accuses them of telling the truth, then they try to recover it as their own and it escapes."

I think this captures the relationship between showing and saying well (and esp what happens when saying tries to be showing)

Do we need this to be nailed down? I think it works as a vague finger pointing thing - she a bit upset, - his ceramic is cracked. So I'll pull myself together, buck my ideas up and declare it to apply only to other people. The kitchen is in a state at the moment and other people's minds are frequently in a state. Me, I have thoughts and feeling, both of which are wonderful, even when they are miserable. — unenlightened

"When people tell a truth they do not understand what they mean, they say it by accident, it goes through them and they do not recognize it until someone accuses them of telling the truth, then they try to recover it as their own and it escapes." — csalisbury

Hmmm.

By "mental states" do you mean human mental states, or are you aiming for something more general?

What is a mental state? — Banno

States are just a particular set of processes (occurring subjectively or objectively). We come to identify and experience states that are familiar and occur regularly, and we tend to label them for our own practical utility. A mental state is a subjective phenomenon occurring at a particular moment in time.

Is it just experiencing Mental phenomena such as beliefs, desires, intentions , and sensations? — Banno

Yes.

Is it analogous to a physical state? How - what do mental and physical states have in common that makes them both states... That they only last for a limited time? — Banno

Mental states are physical states. Everything is always changing/in flux, and so everything/event/process is temporary.