For me there are different senses of 'know'. First there is the knowing of participation, familiarity. I believe animals do this; it seems obvious. With symbolic language come recursive and discursive forms of knowing which may be more or less 'digital'. But remember, within linguistically mediated forms of knowing there are metaphorical, which is to say analogical, modes as well as more precisely propositional ( digital) modes. And the differences between these modes of knowing do not themselves constitute a sharp dichotomy (although it may be conceived as such) but a series of imprecise locales along a continuum. — John
As to "unreasonable," I think we need a notion of pure reason to ground any notion of pure unreasonableness (I think you'll agree). — Hoo
I see the point with the ship analogy, but here we are concerned with fundamental ontological principles. Can we assume that massive conceptual structures rest on fundamental principles? If so, then when we are examining these fundamental principles, should we judge them according to common sense, and good intuition, or should we judge them according to other fundamental principles, so as to maintain consistency with these other principles, and not to rock the boat? I think the former, if the fundamental principles are not consistent with common sense, and good intuition, then there is a problem with those principles, and that must be exposed, despite the fact that other principles might be destabilized in the process. .Most of "common sense" or our prejudices have to remain intact while we judge and edit a particular prejudice. Pleasure and pain are the hammers that re-shape this edifice. But the pain can be cognitive dissonance, and the pleasure can be a sense of status. It's not at all just bodily. — Hoo
I don't know if this can be called "prejudice". Prejudice implies a preconception. What I refer to is the potential for a method to go beyond conception, to observe, and describe, in an unbiased and objective way. If, the idea that this is possible is considered as a preconception, then I guess there is prejudice here as well. I don't see that it is possible to get beyond all prejudice, even common-sense, and intuition are inherently prejudiced, as there are prejudices inherent within our language.The idea that there is something beyond prejudice can itself be described (though not finally, since description is apparently never final) as one more prejudice. This threatens the distinction itself of course which we need in order to get to this threatening... — Hoo
I'm not sure what you think I'm arguing here. It has been my point that we impose our frameworks of intelligibility on the world.
But then a dialectic or dichotomous logic ensures that this process is rigorous. In being able to name the complementary limits on possibility, we have our best shot at talking about the actuality of the world, as it must lie within those (now measurable) bounds. — apokrisis
So if you want to talk about "time", then it is only going to be an intelligible notion that we can project onto reality in a measurable fashion to the degree we have formed a crisply dichotomous model of it.
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So we have a variety of ways of thinking about time - all of them models that try to impose some kind of fundamental dichotomy that would make time an intelligible, and thus measurable, concept of the thing-in-itself. — apokrisis
This is deep water, because I'm not sure how much of a gap there is between reason and the conception of reason. It's connected to the issue of the world-for-us versus the world-in-itself. But the world-in-itself or the world-not-for-us looks necessarily like an empty negation. It marks the expectation that we will update the world-for-us (which includes the model of the filtering mind enclosed in non-mind that it must manage indirectly, conceptually, fictionally.) Is there a place for reason in this "real" non-mind enclosure? Or is reason a foggy notion distributed through our practices, verbal and physical? As philosophy wrestles with the definition of reason, or reason-for-reason, it seems to be the very fire I was getting at. The problem with reason-in-itself is that we can't say anything about it. It seems to cash out to the expectation that we will keep reconceptualizing reconceptualization itself, you might say.However, that the concept of reasonable is prior to the concept of unreasonable, does not mean that reasonableness exists prior to unreasonableness in nature. So I do not think that you can proceed to your conclusion that "reason itself is on fire", because what you are referring to is the conception of reasonable, and unreasonable, not "reason itself". — Metaphysician Undercover
I think we generally agree. I'd say that we only embrace the destabilization of an investment/prejudice in order to prevent the destabilization of a greater investment/prejudice. We amputate the hand to save the arm, or we trade the old arm for a new arm. It's a model of the modelling mind as a system that seeks minimum dissonance/tension/confusion and/or maximize preparedness, security, the sense of well-being. I think it's useful to think of the mind as a "readiness" machine. We have to act quickly sometimes, so the imagination cooks up detailed responses. If we are terrified by the thought of life in a world devoid of principle X, we will probably throw principle Y under the bus to save it.Can we assume that massive conceptual structures rest on fundamental principles? If so, then when we are examining these fundamental principles, should we judge them according to common sense, and good intuition, or should we judge them according to other fundamental principles, so as to maintain consistency with these other principles, and not to rock the boat? I think the former, if the fundamental principles are not consistent with common sense, and good intuition, then there is a problem with those principles, and that must be exposed, despite the fact that other principles might be destabilized in the process. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know if this can be called "prejudice". Prejudice implies a preconception. What I refer to is the potential for a method to go beyond conception, to observe, and describe, in an unbiased and objective way. If, the idea that this is possible is considered as a preconception, then I guess there is prejudice here as well. I don't see that it is possible to get beyond all prejudice, even common-sense, and intuition are inherently prejudiced, as there are prejudices inherent within our language. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is a mistake to think that the world must fit within our systems of measurement, the "bounds" which we imposed. We must adapt our systems of measurement, shape them to the world. But even this requires a preliminary understanding, which cannot be given by measurement because the system for measurement will be created based on this understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
You equate intelligible with measurable. But measurable is restricted by our capacity to measure. A thing is only measurable in so far as we have developed a way to measure it. However, a thing is intelligible to the extent that we have the capacity to describe it, and description does not require measurement. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is where we really overlap. Rescher likes "methodological pragmatism." The epistemological system is machine-like, a normalized discourse.The system as a whole and not its individual, inter-dependent parts is put to the test as we act on its output: "truths" or (implicitly) rules for action. For instance, this was probably the "living" justification of infinitesimals. They were part of a model of existence that allowed us to control that existence.What actually matters - the only thing that in the end you can cling onto - is the functional relationship you can build between your model of existence, and the control that appears to give you over that existence. — apokrisis
I don't dispute that there are different senses of "know". But I think that they all involve some form of identity. Familiarity involves recognition which is a form of identification. I do not think that it is correct to extend "knowing", right down to primitive life forms, and then restrict "identity" to a function of human language. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is important that the analog or iconic representation already exists on the other side of the epistemic cut - on the side of the symbolic or "rate independent information". It is a distinction made at the level of the mapping, even if it means to be talking about a distinction in the (computational!!) world. — apokrisis
In other words, you can't have your cake and eat it too: if you insist that the analog/digital distinction is made at the level of digital mapping to begin with, the projection of a more primordial ground of vagueness is simply that: a mythological projection that doesn't abide by the very epistemological constraints you ought to be beholden too. — StreetlightX
Weird. The definition of vagueness is that it is the "not yet digitised". Vagueness is that state of affairs to which the principle of non-contradiction fails to apply. And thus it stands orthogonal to crispness, the state where A/not-A are busy doing their logically definite thing. — apokrisis
You're going to have to explain it since you've made up something unusual. — Mongrel
Analog systems are defined by continuous variables, like the distance between points or changes in velocity; rulers, thermometers, or accelerator pedals are all examples of analog systems. Digital systems, by contrast, are defined by discontinuous or discrete variables: as with the ten 'digits' of the fingers, digital systems, unlike analog systems, involve discontinutous 'jumps' between measurement values. — StreetlightX
Well if all this is a mistake, what is your alternative? Can you even define your epistemic method here? — apokrisis
Well of course that's what I want. If you assume that there is an analog continuum in the world, yet you describe, or model it as being digital, would you be satisfied with that? Either your assumption or your description is wrong. Can you live happily, knowing that you are involved in such self-deception?I think what troubles you is this apparent loss of veridicality. You want the kind of knowledge of the world that is literally analogic - an intuitive picture in the head. — apokrisis
In this thread, the terms are being used metaphorically. It's not clear if everybody realizes that, although it's been pointed out several times in the this thread that the metaphor is being stretched pretty far... maybe too far.
It is interesting to ponder that metaphor. It obviously runs straight into philosophy of math because we're talking about continuity vs discontinuity. Looking at it that way, the notion that the digital is parasitic on the analog is just wrong. If we persist in maintaining that the digital is "loose" on the analog, we're stipulating some specialized meaning for the terms. It wouldn't be appropriate to complain that people don't understand the jargon. You're going to have to explain it since you've made up something unusual. — Mongrel
Digital data is typically a square wave (although multi-level digital formats were discussed at one point). — Mongrel
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