What lead me to an interest in Gnosticism, is why Christianity (or 'churchianity') didn't seem to have anything that corresponded with the idea of moksha, spiritual liberation, as it was depicted in books about Eastern mysticism that I had been reading all my life. — Wayfarer

They did, only that it was transcendent. You would never be immanently free (or you would never immanently achieve spiritual liberation, in this life) - the desire for immanent freedom of this sort is, according to Voegelin, exactly the same desire to be found in secularist progressive movements - they too desire a freedom, or liberation achieved in this world. According to Voegelin, you and the secularist progressive share the same consciousness, you just have different means of achieving the desired result (and by "you" I mean the religious gnostic - as opposed to the secular gnostic)

Also very similar to Prometheus who desired man to be like the gods.

You remind me of Feuerbach a little. He wrote that Christianity was dead in fact if not in theory in his times. It was the leg of an uneven table, dangling, bearing no weight. Life is drenched in meaning, buried in meaning, is meaning as investment itself. Life is care, concern, bias, asymmetry. Is that what you're getting at? If so, I agree. But what do you make of this?

2. "HOW COULD anything originate out of its opposite? For example, truth out of error? or the Will to Truth out of the will to deception? or the generous deed out of selfishness? or the pure sun-bright vision of the wise man out of covetousness? Such genesis is impossible; whoever dreams of it is a fool, nay, worse than a fool; things of the highest value must have a different origin, an origin of THEIR own—in this transitory, seductive, illusory, paltry world, in this turmoil of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source. But rather in the lap of Being, in the intransitory, in the concealed God, in the 'Thing-in-itself—THERE must be their source, and nowhere else!"—This mode of reasoning discloses the typical prejudice by which metaphysicians of all times can be recognized, this mode of valuation is at the back of all their logical procedure; through this "belief" of theirs, they exert themselves for their "knowledge," for something that is in the end solemnly christened "the Truth." The fundamental belief of metaphysicians is THE BELIEF IN ANTITHESES OF VALUES. It never occurred even to the wariest of them to doubt here on the very threshold (where doubt, however, was most necessary); though they had made a solemn vow, "DE OMNIBUS DUBITANDUM." For it may be doubted, firstly, whether antitheses exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and antitheses of value upon which metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives, besides being probably made from some corner, perhaps from below—"frog perspectives," as it were, to borrow an expression current among painters. In spite of all the value which may belong to the true, the positive, and the unselfish, it might be possible that a higher and more fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to pretence, to the will to delusion, to selfishness, and cupidity. It might even be possible that WHAT constitutes the value of those good and respected things, consists precisely in their being insidiously related, knotted, and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed things—perhaps even in being essentially identical with them. Perhaps! — N

What I see here is a vision of higher meanings tangled with lower meanings in a continuum of life-enhancing fiction. Since life is meaningful in the sense that we always already care, these fictions are weighty and crucial. But one can learn to shift one's weight from one foot to the other, from the higher meanings or Truths to the "daily detail." I will defend the thesis, however, that self-esteem depends on a "Heroic" investment/identification. To speak "intellectually" on a forum for instance is an implicit assertion of one's own worth and dignity (and even uniqueness). Since we are nothing but abstract thoughts here, our appearance seems to indicate an affirmation of the the abstract thoughts we possess and largely are.

You would never be immanently free (or you would never immanently achieve spiritual liberation, in this life) - the desire for immanent freedom of this sort is, according to Voegelin, exactly the same desire to be found in secularist progressive movements - they too desire a freedom, or liberation achieved in this world. According to Voegelin, you and the secularist progressive share the same consciousness, you just have different means of achieving the desired result (and by "you" I mean the religious gnostic - as opposed to the secular gnostic)

Also very similar to Prometheus who desired man to be like the gods. — Agostino

A complete misreading, in my view, based on an inadequate conception of the nature of the goal.

Secular philosophy transposes the physical universe into the role previously attributed to the divine, and science into the role previously attributed to religion. In this understanding, apotheosis is inter-stellar travel, literally and physically 'going to the heavens'. That is why Stephen Hawkings and others are so committed to interstellar travel. So that is what is Promethean. It's nothing to do with 'gnosis'.

I haven't read it. But offhand my experience is that Gnosticism has several unusual religious elements that make this hard to swallow.

For one, it does not try to convert in quite the same way as the other Abrahamic religions, nor does it tie its identity to any ethnic group or even wider sociopolitical community like the surrounding pagan religions. It is more of a mystery cult writ large: emphasis is on the exclusion and specialness of those in the Gnostic community, which implies their rarity. Thus, 'I will choose one in a thousand, two in ten thousand,' etc. Gnostics are oftentimes even outright discouraged from participating in the world and its affairs ('be passerby') and warned that 'merchants,' which seems to mean anyone who takes its affairs, metaphorically financial affairs, seriously, is going to miss the kingdom.

For two, it often explicitly disavows the coming of a transcendent heavenly force in the future, instead preaching that the 'kingdom' is already present on earth, and that it is ignorance that prevents mankind from seeing it. The emphasis has always been on gnosis, and not on a sweeping change in material affairs. Indeed the implication seems to be that a change in material affairs can't truly change anything, since the world is just a kind of prison, or afterthought, or shadow play.

For three, it doesn't seem consonant with Gnostic theology that any sort of earthly authority or power structure could be a coherent goal. The closest Gnosticism came to having a political, as opposed to a spiritual, influence as when Valentinus almost was elected Pope. Even if he was, I'm not sure how much Gnosticism could seep into the Church – genuinely preaching it would seem likely to shrink the Church's membership. I remember reading that for a very brief period there was actually technically a Gnostic state somewhere in the Middle East, when its petty king was converted by a Gnostic confidant. I can't recall the name, though. That situation does not seem stable.

I agree that totalitarianism has echoes of millennialism, though. At the very least it's messianic.

Secular philosophy transposes the physical universe into the role previously attributed to the divine, and science into the role previously attributed to religion. — Wayfarer

This is great, but you neglect to mention anti-scientistic strains of secular philosophy. A pragmatist can view both physics and theology as instruments. This "higher instrumentalism" is not a worship of the "scientific image" (which is just a tool, not the Truth). It's usually humanist if not individualistic, so I'd call it secular. The point is that not all secular philosophers embrace scientism. We have "truths" versus Truth, whether that Truth is a ghost or a secret or an electron.

you neglect to mention anti-scientistic strains of secular philosophy

But that's 'the left' that do that, although they're as much 'anti-science' than 'anti-scientism'. Like, they will say that physical laws are 'embedded in cultural discourse'. Oddly enough, I am a scientific realist, i.e. I'm not one of those who believes that scientific truths are social conventions. Although I regard scientific truth as 'the truth but not the only truth', that is, limited in scope, because by its nature science excludes many existential truths, so I think there are domains or realms which are out of scope for science, but that doesn't undermine science.

I trust science on its own turf, but I think they're right. Is there a clear line between science and non-science? What sorts of "proof" do we demand from someone who claims to be a scientist? We want to know what institutions he belongs to, who takes his work seriously, whether he is funded, etc. A scientist will judge the work, perhaps, but also in the context of who else (if anyone) has vouched for it. The very prestige of science seems to derive from its work in the "manifest image." I can see skyscrapers and watch space shuttles on TV. I can take an aspirin, log on to a philosophy forum. That seems to be the significant difference between science and some piece of currently useless pure mathematics. That's why we are tempted to say it "models" the Real. Yet it seemingly only predicts and manipulates the manifest image.

I speak against a certain kind of atheism which is popular. I have little to quarrel with the pious atheism of Epicurus for example. I have something against modern atheism which is used as a justification for lack of restraint, for attacking tradition, for demanding radical change, and for inciting people to rebellion. In summary, I have something against that which threatens order and stability, because chaos harms everybody. Instead of slowly looking for ways to reform society to eliminate the problems while minimising the difficulties generated, it hurries with a solution that is most often worse than what it appears to cure. — Agustino

Atheism is the disbelief in the existence of any god or gods. You seem to be against other things which might or might not correlate with atheism in modern times.

A moral person by my understanding is religious even if they are atheists. — Agustino

That's not an understanding; that's a misunderstanding. I shouldn't have to point out that there are people who are moral, yet not religious. If you're intent on equating being moral with being religious, then I doubt I can stop you, but they are distinct, and you'd be mistaken.

This is an abstraction so I am not sure what specific thing you're referring to. I think morality is something universal (hence my usage of natural morality), which can be summarised by the virtues, including humility, yes. — Agustino

I was referring to your use of the word "morality", which I think is quite telling. Regardless of whether or not you think morality is universal, it might well be that you've got it wrong in some respects, and that those who you consider to fall short of meeting your moral standards - some of whom it seems are the target of your criticism - are not in fact immoral or opposed to morality, but merely disagree with your conception of it and what you think that it entails.

Saying that you think that morality is universal doesn't excuse your tendency to use this terminology to give the impression that you have superior knowledge or authority in this regard. It really does irk me when you imply that you are on the side of morality and others who don't share or conform with your views are against it, because I very much doubt that it's as black-and-white as that.

A prime example would be your reply to Baden in which you speak of "the destruction of tradition and morality". Imagine someone from the past who has notably different or more extreme views to your own saying that, and perhaps you'll realise how you come across to others.

All religions promote decency - including by the way the atheism of Epicurus or Hume. — Agustino

Atheism isn't a religion.

It depends on whether their religious belief has anything to do with you, or it just has to do with their own religious community in such a society. — Agustino

No, it doesn't. If they're free to express an objectionable religious belief, then I'm free to express my objection to it. It's a two-way street. The former shouldn't have some sort of privileged status on account of being religious.

Atheist under your definition isn't really atheist. — Agustino

Nonsense. An atheist is simply someone who doesn't believe that any god exists. Ironically, it is you who apparently thinks that it is something other than - or more than - that. So, you should redirect that line at yourself.

David Cameron is an atheist under my definition - probably under yours he's a believer just because he talks about his Christian faith, and calls the UK a Christian nation. — Agustino

Obviously he's a believer if he believes and he isn't a believer if he doesn't. It's as simple as that. Usually talking about your Christian faith is an indication that you believe in God and are a Christian.

Nope - there's two atheisms - one let's call it pious atheism (think about Epicurus, or even that CONSERVATIVE David Hume), and the other one impious atheism. In the former atheism is just a personal belief about the existence of a deity. In the latter it is a justification for permissible moral behaviour, with the intent of overthrowing tradition. I don't accept the latter as moral, to make this clear. — Agustino

No, there's just atheism - which is about belief in the existence of a deity or deities. You're not criticising atheism itself, but rather what some atheists believe atheism entails, and their alleged intent to overthrow certain traditions. I don't accept that that is necessarily wrong, to make myself clear. You'd need to be more much more specific.

The post-modernist's point is that our scientific discourse is cultural regardless of how well it describes the world. It is always our statement of what the world does rather nature itself.

And frequently, that it is not description of the world, but rather an insistence of a particular meaning of the scientific discourse.

Modernist humanism is the same. The generalised "free everyman" takes the mantle of the transcendent, becomes the tradition which is destined to be practiced, such that we will be saved from our finite wretchedness-- technology will create utopia, everyone is a free man able to realise their dreams, etc., etc. It's all wistful fantasy which doesn't take human life seriously. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I like your iconoclastic edge. I like viewing humanism from the outside (I've read Stirner's book closely). But what is this "taking human life seriously"? Do you approve or disapprove of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain? Are you criticizing the assumption of the necessity of the transcendent as a source of needless pain? As an obstacle to pleasure? If so, I can relate. But I don't see how fantasy is bad in itself unless there is a transcendent Truth that we have some duty toward. Why not fantasies if they work? The only strong difference I see between fantasies-that-work and non-fantasy is that non-fantasy is made "the sacred" in Stirner's terms.

Alienness is a criterion of the “sacred.” In everything sacred there lies something “uncanny,” strange, such as we are not quite familiar and at home in. — Stirner

We seem to have fantasies-that-work versus truth-to-be-revered (which also happens to work, as a lucky by-product). What good is truth apart from utility if it's not the "hallowing" of its messenger?

Here we come upon the old, old craze of the world, which has not yet learned to do without clericalism – that to live and work for an idea is man’s calling, and according to the faithfulness of its fulfilment his human worth is measured. — Stirner

That reminds me of what I think is your view. We think we need the "infinite" idea in order to measure up. But I personally think we serve "the sacred" (in a sophisticated form) even as we point it out as a dominating structure. We become (as intellectual personae wearing philosopher's hats part-time) something like pure ideological violence or nothingness.

Therefore I repeat that the religious world – and this is the world of thought – reaches its completion in criticism, where thinking extends its encroachments over every thought, no one of which may “egoistically” establish itself. Where would the “purity of criticism,” the purity of thinking, be left if even one thought escaped the process of thinking? This explains the fact that the critic has even begun already to gibe gently here and there at the thought of Man, of humanity and humaneness, because he suspects that here a thought is approaching dogmatic fixity. But yet he cannot decompose this thought until he has found a “higher” in which it dissolves; for he moves only in thoughts. This higher thought might be enunciated as that of the movement or process of thinking itself, as the thought of thinking or of criticism, for example. — Stirner

I've never said fantasies were not worthwhile, only that they aren't true. My argument extends to the philosophical responsibility of reporting truth. Fantasies are never empty and not necessarily some terrible monster. There are other of ethics than whether someone understands the particular falsehood of Nihilism and the transcendent saviour. My point is fantasies are false, not without meaning or necessarily unethical to hold.

I would argue Stirner is still caught under the spell of the transcendent here. Criticism is veiwed in terms of seeking the "higher" rather than understanding a particular subject itself. No doubt there is a gap in thought between a religion and a criticism which takes it down, but they are different thoughts entirely-- if I call out a religion as fantasy, I cannot even think in terms of the religion. To say the religion is true is impossible for me when understand it as fantasy. There is no completion to thought-- think one way, you give up the opposite, even within instances of doublethink.

Criticism is about different ideas, not "higher" ones. At least good criticism is. When critics speak in terms of "higher" and "lower," they are really only boxing in a popularity contest.

Here the "non-fantasy" is not "sacred," at least in the context of the argument. It's a descriptive. A truth we don't need to follow, but will if we are to tell the truth in this context. We might say there is a "sacred" element in the motivation to talk about it-- if we are talking about it, the we think we ought to, that it's important to recognise fantasy as fantasy, but it's not the point of the argument.

The falsehood of the transcendent means even our "sacred" concern for truth will not save us. We can't reach meaning by telling people they ought to find themselves meaningful. It's not how we save ourselves from meaninglessness. Many meaningful lives are present believing in their fantasy.

Truth is not a soultion to meaninglessness. Meaninglessness was never a problem in the first place, not even for those who think believing fantasy is required for meaning.

I'm asking something far tougher of fantasy than making a call to obliterate it or offering an alternative fiction. My descriptive truth hits our fantasies right at their core: in their cliam of truth. I'm not talking about what we ought to do or offering a way to save us from meaninglessness. My subject is the truth of fantasy regardless of whether we believe them or not.

In this respect, it's all together more powerful than any assertion of how someone ought to think. If I was just saying fantasy was bad for us, it would be easy to counter. I would be a dogmatist demanding we could save ourselves through (the fiction of) truth, a run of the mill cheerleader for one of the many ways of living in this world.

I not doing this though. Believing the truth isn't going to save us because no-one needs saving. My argument doesn't say we ought to give up fantasies, just that they're telling a whopping great lie about our meaning. In this context, fantasy becomes untenable. Not because it is not worthwhile or we ought not be involved with it, but rather because it says something about us which is untrue.

If I am meaningful in myself, fantasy no longer saves because there is nothing that needs saving. Worthwhile or not, it becomes a mere practice I enjoy (or do not enjoy) rather than how I avoid being a meaningless wretch.

I would argue Stirner is still caught under the spell of the transcendent here. Criticism is veiwed in terms of seeking the "higher" rather than understanding a particular subject itself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Actually Stirner was criticizing criticism for being still too pious, albeit something like the final station of (generalized) religion. He thought there was a stage beyond criticism, basically in thoughtlessness, which is maybe like overcoming the will to overcome metaphysics. But we all do that sometimes. For me, Stirner as intellectual persona just isolated pure iconoclasm. (To be sure, this is implicit in "all is vanity" with a much older text.)

If Nietzsche questioned the will to truth in 1886, Stirner wrote this is 1848:

The truth, or “truth in general,” people are bound not to give up, but to seek for. What else is it but the Être suprême, the highest essence? Even “true criticism” would have to despair if it lost faith in the truth. And yet the truth is only a — thought; but it is not merely “a” thought, but the thought that is above all thoughts, the irrefragable thought; it is the thought itself, which gives the first hallowing to all others; it is the consecration of thoughts, the “absolute,” the “sacred” thought. The truth wears longer than all the gods; for it is only in the truth’s service, and for love of it, that people have overthrown the gods and at last God himself. “The truth” outlasts the downfall of the world of gods, for it is the immortal soul of this transitory world of gods, it is Deity itself.

I will answer Pilate’s question, What is truth? Truth is the free thought, the free idea, the free spirit; truth is what is free from you, what is not your own, what is not in your power. But truth is also the completely unindependent, impersonal, unreal, and incorporeal; truth cannot step forward as you do, cannot move, change, develop; truth awaits and receives everything from you, and itself is only through you; for it exists only — in your head. You concede that the truth is a thought, but say that not every thought is a true one, or, as you are also likely to express it, not every thought is truly and really a thought. And by what do you measure and recognize the thought? By your impotence, to wit, by your being no longer able to make any successful assault on it! When it overpowers you, inspires you, and carries you away, then you hold it to be the true one. Its dominion over you certifies to you its truth; and, when it possesses you, and you are possessed by it, then you feel well with it, for then you have found your — lord and master. When you were seeking the truth, what did your heart then long for? For your master! — Stirner

Of course one is hallowed by proximity to (or possession of) this "master." In other words, we allow ourselves to be bound in order to bind in a sort of pyramid scheme.

I'm asking something far tougher of fantasy than making a call to obliterate it or offering an alternative fiction. My descriptive truth hits our fantasies right at their core: in their cliam of truth. I'm not talking about what we ought to do or offering a way to save us from meaninglessness. — TheWillowOfDarkness

But my question remains. In the name of what value or goal do you bother to hit fantasies at their core with this descriptive truth? If you don't want to save others from meaningless, do you want to save them from the illusion that they need saving? It's hard to see how a thinker isn't always offering something useful (beauty is something like pure use if pleasure is value).

In this respect, it's all together more powerful than any assertion of how someone ought to think. If I was just saying fantasy was bad for us, it would be easy to counter. I would be a dogmatist demanding we could save ourselves through (the fiction of) truth, a run of the mill cheerleader for one of the many ways of living in this world.

I not doing this though. Believing the truth isn't going to save us because no-one needs saving. My argument doesn't say we ought to give up fantasy, just that they're telling a whopping great lie about our meaning. In this context, fantasy becomes untenable. Not because it is not worthwhile or we ought not be involved with it, but rather because it says something about us which is untrue.

If I am meaningful in myself, fantasy no longer saves. Worthwhile or not, it becomes a mere practice I enjoy (or do not enjoy) rather than how I avoid being a meaningless wretch. — TheWillowOfDarkness

OK, but why is the "whopping great lie about our meaning" a problem? Why does fantasy become untenable? If the fantasizers aren't happy with their fantasies, then surely they need better fantasies, if you'll allow that fantasies (myths, prejudices, fictions) help people cope.

I really like meaningfulness in one's self. But I tend to view it as an introjection of the archetype of "the sacred," achieved in time dialectically. Because I see this "sacred" as archetype, we always have not only the usual bodily meanings but also 'sacred' meaning, especially through all of those alienating identifications such as God, man, truth, science, philosophy/criticism. A minimum of alienation is seemingly found in declaring one's own mind sacred. There is nothing sacred outside the mind to be sinful or wretched in relation to. Of course this only solves the "spiritual" problem, where "spiritual" is aimed at the urge to sacred. The needs for food, love, etc., are something else. I think constraints on behavior (laws, customs) under-determine most of our beliefs. This culture is largely about persona construction, the "happiness of being envied" or glamour (John Berger). So I connect "status anxiety" with the "spiritual." A person can be happy in a shared fantasy or identification with the sacred. Perhaps it's the anxiety of influence and the thrill of violation that drives the instability of identifications in some of us.

Depends - conservatism generally and historically refers to social policy. Someone can be a conservative with a socialist view of economics, nothing contradictory in that. In fact, my economics are probably slightly left-leaning as well (free education, free healthcare, government restriction of multinational corporations, etc.) Marx had something that he called reactionary socialism (because such a socialism was practiced before) - which is very alike to social conservatism coupled with socialist leaning economics. — Agustino

I'm actually surprised there aren't more people who embrace this combination of social conservatism and leftist(ish) economics. That's become my position in recent years, and it's a lonely place. Well, at least its lonely here in the US, where social conservatism is almost always wedded to neoliberal economics. This being the case, I find myself having much more in common with people on the Left than on the Right, since the former do appear to take ethical considerations seriously. What has begun to separate me from them, in part and amongst other things, is that they stop short of endorsing the idea that any one way of living is, or even could be, superior to another. That theoretical relativism of the Left is belied by passionate protestations against greed, corruption, racial oppression and other things they (IMO rightly) consider social ills.

But getting back to the point, I do think a focus on virtue - and character formation generally - can only benefit the development of genuine 'freedom' as well as a 'progressive' economic agenda. A virtuous person for instance would seem much more likely to treat their family, their workers, and their fellow citizens in ways that would result in more camaraderie, trust and good will than we see at present. Without that ethical grounding, cynicism and hedonism and shortsighted self-interest combine to create a hostile and exploitative social and economic environment.

I'll shamelessly offer myself as an example of how embodying some (admittedly poor) semblance of 'virtue' could be compatible with a progressive social policy - keeping in mind my many personal flaws of course and admitting I was going to go with the old 'I have a friend who...' routine. Long story (somewhat) short, I offered to take a pay cut at work to make sure a couple of my hardworking employees got modest pay increases I felt they deserved. This idea was met by the owners with total disbelief, like how could anyone be so stupid as to volunteer to make less money? The answer for me was pretty simple: taking care of our employees and treating them like human beings rather than numbers would reinforce their loyalty and commitment, which would make my job a lot easier, and would also increase the likelihood of the company's success.

What I didn't say, so as not to give offence, is that I'm not fixated on money or gaining the approval of others through the typical symbols of social success. I would gladly spread the wealth around if it meant others are taken care of too. Being stubborn and shortsighted bean-counters, and seeing our workers as obstacles rather than contributors to increased profits, they couldn't fathom mindset. It was like I was speaking a language they had never heard. I then tried to use their language and reinforce the pragmatic cost/benefit angle (setting aside the moral/ethical aspect) as increased pay (along with other things) would likely improve morale, decrease absenteeism, help us avoid turnover, and improve the overall performance of our staff. With that they started to listen and actually gave the employees raises.

I only bring this story up because I feel it represents, in a very small way, some form of social conservatism aligning with almost communistic economic tendencies. I may have a somewhat antiquated or idiosyncratic view of social conservatism as a cluster of related positions (community-oriented, there's more to life than making money, people should be treated as ends rather than means, virtue is its own reward, awareness of the historical tradition and its exemplary figures, etc...) but it seems reasonable to assume that a virtuous populace would be likely to embrace a progressive social/economic agenda. At the very least, this voice should be represented amongst all the political parties and noise we hear today.



.

A complete misreading, in my view, based on an inadequate conception of the nature of the goal. — Wayfarer

I haven't read it. But offhand my experience is that Gnosticism has several unusual religious elements that make this hard to swallow. — The Great Whatever

First I think it is good to have an introduction of Voegelin's thought for this discussion. On the internet there are quite a few sources. Here. Here (very long, and quite comprehensive. Or here.
Try to remember that what Voegelin focuses on is the consciousness of Gnosticism. He claims that the structure of consciousness for the medieval Gnostic and for the modern secular Marxist is the same.

emphasis is on the exclusion and specialness of those in the Gnostic community — The Great Whatever

Yes, this structure of consciousness where the participants see themselves as special or elite appears in modern movements like Marxism, where the Proletariat is the special class that will bring about the communist paradise for everyone. Modern homosexual movements see themselves in this same light, as special and unique and deserving to show and demonstrate their sexuality to everyone. This is pride, instead of humility.

the world is just a kind of prison, or afterthought, or shadow play — The Great Whatever

Voegelin criticizes this as the Gnostic denial of reality, and seeking to replace it with a more real, second order reality that only they have access to. This bears the character of totalitarianism for several reasons: (1) it seeks to replace reality as empirically accessible, (2) claims infallible direct access to reality that is not open to rational criticism and correction. It's very similar to what @TheWillowOfDarkness does, when he claims that there is nothing necessary about a person - it's an empty abstraction, which carries with it the denial of reality.

That situation does not seem stable. — The Great Whatever

Indeed - which really is an important point. A religion which cannot ensure social stability and order is really no religion at all. I'm not disagreeing with perhaps there being a higher, mystical tradition within a religion, but I disagree with considering something to be a religion which is formed of pure mysticism denied from connection and criticism from authority and tradition. Such is anathema to the purposes of order.

I guess the biggest difficulties with Gnosticism are (1) its infinite moral variations, (2) its lack of respect for authority and tradition, (3) taking and encouraging personal experience and its validations over tradition. For example Gnostics have been across both extremes - completely denying the value of man's sexual nature, or freely indulging in it. Such variety I think arises precisely because there is no respect for authority and tradition AND because everyone is encouraged to their own interpretation, which could very well differ very much from another's. As such, gnosticism is untenable as a social position - much like any other religion that emphasises disrespect for tradition and completely free and dogmatic trust to one's own experiences.

I'm actually surprised there aren't more people who embrace this combination of social conservatism and leftist(ish) economics. — Erik

Yes, I am especially surprised as most conservatives nowadays tend to be religious and yet, I can find nothing in religion which supports rampant capitalism, accumulation of money for its own sake, social ostracization of different races, and other manifestations of greed.

But getting back to the point, I do think a focus on virtue - and character formation generally - can only benefit the development of genuine 'freedom' as well as a 'progressive' economic agenda. A virtuous person for instance would seem much more likely to treat their family, their workers, and their fellow citizens in ways that would result in more camaraderie, trust and good will than we see at present. Without that ethical grounding, cynicism and hedonism and shortsighted self-interest combine to create a hostile and exploitative social and economic environment. — Erik

Yes!

I'll shamelessly offer myself as an example of how embodying some (admittedly poor) semblance of 'virtue' could be compatible with a progressive social policy - keeping in mind my many personal flaws of course and admitting I was going to go with the old 'I have a friend who...' routine. Long story (somewhat) short, I offered to take a pay cut at work to make sure a couple of my hardworking employees got modest pay increases I felt they deserved. This idea was met by the owners with total disbelief, like how could anyone be so stupid as to volunteer to make less money? The answer for me was pretty simple: taking care of our employees and treating them like human beings rather than numbers would reinforce their loyalty and commitment, which would make my job a lot easier, and would also increase the likelihood of the company's success.

What I didn't say, so as not to give offence, is that I'm not fixated on money or gaining the approval of others through the typical symbols of social success. I would gladly spread the wealth around if it meant others are taken care of too. Being stubborn and shortsighted bean-counters, and seeing our workers as obstacles rather than contributors to increased profits, they couldn't fathom mindset. It was like I was speaking a language they had never heard. I then tried to use their language and reinforce the pragmatic cost/benefit angle (setting aside the moral/ethical aspect) as increased pay (along with other things) would likely improve morale, decrease absenteeism, help us avoid turnover, and improve the overall performance of our staff. With that they started to listen and actually gave the employees raises. — Erik

Thanks for sharing your example! We need more examples like this in the world, and I think there should be no shame in sharing examples of goodness. Afterall, if you do not share examples of goodness, then all that will happen is that others will share examples of evil and shamelessness, and make evil cool. A big problem today is that the good men have sat down, and have restricted themselves to a humility which prevents them from having an effect on educating their peers. Instead, people like Lady Gaga, Amy Schumer, and the like spread their vulgarity, rudeness, and selfishness across society, and no one does anything to stop them. Instead they are allowed to make this into a "cool attitude" - whereas if someone tries to make virtue and goodness cool, then there is a problem, then he is an oppressor, and lacks in humility. I think people need virtuous examples to combat the influence that decadence is otherwise guaranteed to have over society - and there really should be no shame in doing it. Those who spread evil have no shame about doing it - why should those that spread good have any shame?

I know. That's why I say he's stuck in the transcendent mode of thinking: criticism is understood as the way we save ourselves, rather than a way of developing an understanding of ourselves and the world. He doesn't envision truth as the living world or logic, which has no role in saving us. Truth is understood as our rescue, despite it being the living world and logical expression which has no role in saving anyone from meaninglessness.

Fantasies do work for those who believe them. Only those who reject the fantasy are concerned with the falsehood of fantasy. Truth's power is not over those who believe fantasy, but those interested in truth-- if you accept the truth things are meaningful in themsleves, then fantasy has no role to serve.

The promises of rescue which make fantasy so profound to its adherents are revealed to be empty. Their claim-- their fantasy is a wonderful truth rescues us from meaninglessness-- is known to be false because no one was ever meaninglessness. It's not an ethical question, but a descriptive one.

If I realise the world is meaningful, I cannot think fantasy is a saviour. It's reduced to a mere cultural practice people enjoy. At best I might say a fantasy "saved" someone from hating the world or themselves, if they were horribly depressed or self-destructive before they followed the fantasy. Fantasies frequently have utility, but they never save us from meaningless.

My argument is saying exactly the opposite. Since nothing in the world is necessary, the absence of necessity has no impact on who or what people are. It doesn't mean that people escape who they are, just that it's not logic which makes them who they are.

Who anybody is a question of their existence, not what philosophers think they must be. Since we are worldly (states of the world), the transcendent realm can neither cause or limit us. Make no mistake, people can't escape being who they are, but it is formed by a state of existence not a logical rule.

Your world constrained by logic shares a denial of reality similar to the gnostics. Insisting the world must be your preferred logical meaning, you ignore the movement of existence itself. You are blind to any part of existence which does not fit your logical rule. Anything which is not your particular tradition is a "shadow play" which doesn't qualify as a meaningful state.

That's why I say he's stuck in the transcendent mode of thinking: criticism is understood as the way we save ourselves, rather than a way of developing an understanding of ourselves and the world. He doesn't envision truth as the living world or logic, which has no role in saving us. Truth is understood as our rescue, despite it being the living world and logical expression which has no role in saving anyone from meaninglessness. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Well, it's hard to imagine a non-dialectical leap from teen angst to world-affirming wisdom. I'd say that criticism, properly understood, is the way we "save ourselves." (We get better at life, some of us). But we don't save ourselves from meaninglessness (though we might pass through death of god angst). We save ourselves from inferior-in-retrospect meanings (worldviews, ego-ideals). Some might claim to have been saved by "meaninglessness."

Christianity took away from the things of this world only their irresistibleness, made us independent of them. In like manner I raise myself above truths and their power: as I am supersensual, so I am supertrue. Before me truths are as common and as indifferent as things; they do not carry me away, and do not inspire me with enthusiasm. There exists not even one truth, not right, not freedom, humanity, etc., that has stability before me, and to which I subject myself... — Stirner

We have here an image of the self-consciously free ego for whom "nothing is sacred" but the tool-using ego itself, or pure post-principle profanity. Let's give this poet his due.

Truth's power is not over those who believe fantasy, but those interested in truth-- if you accept the truth things are meaningful in themsleves, then fantasy has no role to serve.

The promises of rescue which make fantasy so profound to its adherents are revealed to be empty. Their claim-- their fantasy is a wonderful truth rescues us from meaninglessness-- is known to be false because no one was ever meaninglessness. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I can't know what you mean by the words, but I don't see a big difference between fantasy and meaning. "I'm here to be kind." "I'm here to experience lots of things." "I'm here to serve God." "I'm here to serve humanity." "I'm here to forge an original persona." And so on and so on. They are myths or projects. I don't see why either of us (or anyone on the forum) wouldn't be "performing" some version of the (philosophical) hero. Is that fantasy? It's a vision of the real we act on. I get the sense that you're envisioning a non-metaphysical life as the thing we don't need to be saved from, but I think "placing" ourselves via myth is a central part of the human experience.

Your world constrained by logic shares a denial of reality similar to the gnostics. Insisting the world must be your preferred logical meaning, you ignore the movement of existence itself. You are blind to any part of existence which does not fit your logical rule. Anything which is not your particular tradition is a "shadow play" which doesn't qualify as a meaningful state. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I knew you'd say this :) - of course, if you are right, then I'm the gnostic, only that I don't think you have your facts (which ground your understanding of the structure of Being - or lack of it) right :D

Your problem is not in the logic, but in the premises my friend.

On the contrary, yours are incoherent by their content. Being is nothingness precisely because it infinite. If someone is to claim Being as foundation for existence, they are equivocating us with the infinite. Deep down they are saying we are really infinite, that are finiteness is a mere mirage. It is literally to ignore the world as it exists (the finite) to imagine a higher order to which we properly belong (the infinte)--i.e. "nature," "God," "Science," "Utopia," etc., etc.

My position is not informed by some wild speculation of premise. It's reasoned on the distinction between the finite and infinite.

For Being to be anything collapses the this distinction and so amounts to a contradiction.

More like a metaphysics without intention or destiny. A metaphysics which only concerns itself with describing logical relationships, rather than supposing what we ought to be or a destiny of action. One which does not say, "I am here to..." as if it was logically impossible for a person to do anything else, but one that says: "I am here (doing)..."

Or in the terms of you examples: "I am being kind.", "I am experiencing lots of things", "I am serving God", "I am serving humainity," and "I am forging an original personality."

A metaphysics which understands us to be defined in terms of how we exist, rather than by logical necessity. One which recognises who we are ("I am..."), instead of understanding ourselves to be moving ("I am to necessarily be...) to some destiny always outside ourselves.

Oh, that helps. It sounds like you don't want the future to bear so much on the present, or the projected, hoped-for self to bear on the present self.

For me the "I am here to do X" isn't about logical but mythological necessity. I'm positing a "general structure." It can take complex forms: "I'm here to figure out that I'm not here to do anything in particular." Or "I'm here to learn to live without fantasy in the unvarnished real." What especially interests me is the "dialectical" self-modification of this mission. So "I am here to find the truth, even if it hurts" might lead to questioning of the will to truth, in pursuit of the truth about truth. This is all oversimplification, but I think we find role-play in ourselves in others if we keep an eye out for it. This isn't bad unless we are invested in the role of being beyond role-play. Movement (intellectual as well as physical) seems always to be in a pursuit of value. While bodily values are pretty constant, it seems that intellectual values change with the belief system as a whole.

I'm still not exactly sure if you embrace the truth as a value in itself or as a tool for leading a better life. Do you view your metaphysics as a personal solution? That may as a byproduct help others? Or is it presented as a sort of scientific finding? Or as just another perspective? I'm very in to these questions of exactly what the philosopher is up to socially.

I'm a bit unsure of your distinction here. The general structure you talk about seems to be exactly what I'm talking about when I refer to logical (or mythological, if you prefer it) necessity. It forms the idea of a destiny regardless of what's happening in the world. "I am here to" signifies oneself without themselves, a meaning which one (supposedly) expesses regardless of who the are. Whatever we might be, the "to be" is still sitting there, supposedly reflecting who we are, despite us never reaching it. We are meant to be this particular "nature," this meaning, no matter who or what we are. Seems to be a logical necessity all the way through.

This "to be" fantasy is the target here, whether it be about serving God or telling the truth. There is nothing I am "to be." My interest in truth might be gone tomorrow; I could become the most devout believer of fantasy.

In the sense you are talking ("to be" ) I don't hold a value of truth. Truth is just a matter of talking about the world as it exists or logical relationships which are expressed.

Even in ethics context this is true. Let's say I consider we ought to recognise truth (which I do, to some degree, though it is not what I'm arguing here). Is this what the world is "to be?" No, it's just what the world ought to be. There is nothing necessary about it. The world will ignore truth as much as it does.

A mighty defender of truth, such as myself, might wake up tomorrow and support fantasy. No myth ("it's to be") defines what exists.

I should say this point has no bearing on causality. The idea of "to be" works perfectly well as an intention or speculation of what someone might be. Such statements are often part of causality-- I might say "I am going to make a post" before doing so. If I didn't make the statement, I might not have made this post at all. Ideas about the future bearing on the present is entirely possible.

The issue with the mythological use of "to be" is it closes of possibity and so cannot talk about the world. It fails in description of logic and the world, not in causality (myths are perfectly capable of causing particular actions from people). It pretends there is a way the world expresses meaning regardless of its existence.

Movement is not a pursuit of value or meaning ("to be"), but an expression of value or meaning ("it's" "I am")--meaning, caring and ethics are lived actions, not something forever outside that we seek.

Thanks for your reply. I'm still not clear on how you see the value of your ideas. As a pragmatist, I "market" my own words as potentially useful marks and noises. I forge tools. I also identify with the goal of being a "strong poet" in Harold Bloom's sense. I want to put some valuable twist (maybe just in tone or emphasis) on what is otherwise synthesis of my influences more or less for the narcissistic pleasure of having done so. In short, it's a creative act. I mention all of this to show that I'm happy to answer the same sort of question I'm asking. So, anyway, how would you "market" yourself? It's a goofy word. But if you wrote your philosophy in a book, what type of consumer would benefit and why? I can't see how sharing abstract thoughts doesn't imply some dialectical movement in personality. If no one needs to saved in fact, perhaps they need to be saved from the illusion that they need to be saved, etc.