Yes, but it's not just 'when' they have contradictory criteria for what counts as 'wrong', it is virtually inevitable that they will (if only in some small way). These are relatively clever people, they're not gong to present an argument they can see is wrong. It's most likely that they have a different idea of what constitutes wrong. It's the default position rather than an occasion misfortune. — Pseudonym

And it is the painstaking task of setting out the opposing criterion for what counts as being wrong that helps guide understanding and many times will also settle the score...

I've directly addressed the argument you presented. Do you not understand? I'll be glad to help.

I'll be glad to help. — creativesoul

OK, great, give a brief but concise summary of my argument and then show how you have addressed it.

[I'm arguing that]...the truth of metaphysical conjectures is undecidable, the notion that one position is the correct one and the other is the mistaken one is without sense, in other words incoherent and meaningless... — Janus

[I'm]...not arguing that the exchange of metaphysical ideas is meaningless per se... — Janus

I've bracketed my own presumptive portion(that you believe what you write)...

Is that a true account? I would venture to say yes, for it is copied verbatim minus the presupposition of sincerity in speech granted to you by me.

So, regarding the relevancy of my comments. First, your argument presupposes a criterion for what counts as being meaningful, what counts as having sense(being sensible), what counts as being correct, what counts as being mistaken, and what counts as being incoherent. The issue is that you've conflated what counts as being undecidable with what counts as being meaningful and what counts as being coherent. As you've clearly noted by using the "in other words" qualification....

On your view, because of the fact that two opposing camps are working from positions which are undecidable(unfalsifiable/unverifiable), then all charges of being correct or mistaken are based upon incoherent and meaningless usage of the terms "correct" and "mistaken". I'm further supposing that you hold that being correct or mistaken requires being amenable to being decidable.

How is that so far?

I agree with you that metaphysical debates could be decidable in the sense that like-minded people within a certain language game could come to agree with one another, once they had ironed out their differences,confusions, or mutual misunderstandings. I think that is a more relative kind of decidability than the decidability of empirical propositions and theories, though. — Janus

I guess where we differ then is on this notion of empirical propositions. Or maybe possibly differ.

We are communicating in English. I am typing on a computer. My calendar hangs upon the wall.

God exists. I am praying to him. The holy ghost watches over us.

I write these as a kind of parallel. Communicating in English isn't exactly empirical, but it is certain. God is similar, for a particular community. Praying is something we do, as is typing. Not hard to decide. You can see the calendar, and the believer can feel the holy ghost. Quite decidable for a community.

Empirical propositions are decidable. But so are the metaphysical ones. And empirical propositions require concepts to understand, prior beliefs to make sense of, and a web of beliefs to decide the judgements of truth or falsity. Just like metaphysical propositions -- and insofar that we are in agreement with certain beliefs, then they are just as decidable and certain as empirical propositions.

But it is worth noting that there is no ultimate decidability in any domain of inquiry.

Sure. I don't think I'd argue for ultimate decidability. Though there is a kind of regulative belief at play, I'd think, in arguing over what is true -- like, we seem to believe that there is some ultimate answer in arguing over what is better when we believe very differently, even though we would say, upon reflection, that it doesn't seem that there is an ultimate answer.

Mathematics probably comes closest to complete decidability and metaphysics remains the most distant, with ethics and aesthetics and the human and natural sciences located at various imprecise points along the continuum.

I'd just say this is relative to the person or community in question. Consider the Pythagoreans, who believed that all numbers could be expressed in ratios of whole numbers. It was something of an a priori belief, completely decidable -- even though wrong (maybe false?) by our current understanding of mathematics. I'd say that what you propose is something which is relative to a particular background of beliefs -- that decidability is relative to our beliefs, or community, rather than it being a feature of the subject matter.

Heraclitus' position is untenable. — creativesoul

I can't examine it if you don't tell me which of Heraclitus's positions you are referring to.

The God of Abraham and Epicurus' fatal observation of the problem of evil shows inherent self-contradiction. — creativesoul

Are you seriously suggesting that there are no responses to the problem of evil? There's the idea that evil is necessary for the growth of the soul, that evil doesn't even exist, that evil is there to prevent a greater evil, that God only created the universe but them 'became' it and so had his original omnipotence constrained, that evil is the work of humans as a result of being given free will...etc. The argument from evil is a strawman, knocking down a simplistic view of God that no Theologian actually holds. And why does no theologian actually hold such a simplistic view? Because they're not stupid and its not a difficult job to see obvious logical flaws. As I said. I'm not claiming that it is impossible to come up with a metaphysical theory which has the flaws you mention. What I'm claiming is that none of the currently existing metaphysical theories (nor any future ones written by intelligent people) can be decided on this basis.

Methodological naturalism. — creativesoul

Methodological naturalism is not a metaphysical theory, it's a pragmatic approach to scientific investigation. It's not claiming that there are no supernatural causes, only that investigation of them is fruitless.This is an empirical claim - investigation of supernatural causes has so far yielded no concrete results.

But let's, for the sake of argument, presume someone put forward such a claim as a theory of The way things are' - that there are no supernatural causes (causes beyond the ability of science to investigate). I take that to be a single assumption, since it cannot be proven. So what is it's opposite? That there may be supernatural causes. That is still a single assumption. The assumption that it is possible for causes to be somehow permanently beyond out ability to detect them. I'm not seeing the alternative theory with fewer assumptions here.

Many folk who believe in some form of cosmic justice or another will be forced to conclude that bad/good things happened to someone or another, and so they must have somehow 'deserved' it. — creativesoul

No, as I mentioned before, they could also conclude that God is bound in some way by his own choices (say by his preference for free will), that god is 'testing' them to see if they deserve to get in to heaven where they will be rewarded for their perseverance, that God is forced to allow the harm in order to prevent a greater harm, that God is allowing the harm not as a form of punishment, but as a method of spiritual growth...etc. The responses are limited only by the imagination of the responder.

if one holds to the historically conventional epistemological conception of belief that s/he must deny that non-linguistic animals have thought and belief. — creativesoul

Again, this is trivially surmounted. One could hold that our language use supplanted a previous form of belief which animals have, that animals have an internal language which carries their belief propositions, that animals in fact have a language, just one that we can't understand...etc, as earlier, it's really only limited by the imagination of the responder.

It can also be the case that the logical consequence conflicts with knowledge. — creativesoul

Then it would cease to be a metaphysical claim and become a scientific one.

Maybe you're avoiding my initial charge. You are involved in precisely what you've called a meaningless debate. That seems incoherent, at best. I'll let it go though. — creativesoul

I don't see how I haven't directly answered your charge. I submit that this debate is not meaningless because empirical evidence can be drawn into it (such as the complete lack of agreement on metaphysical matters despite 2000 years of debate), that many of the terms used and logic employed are so widely agreed upon that most people involved will agree on what they mean, and that even if there is some difficulty in producing an entirely decidable answer, the effort of using rhetoric to argue the case is worth it because of the consequences. I've also suggested that, even if the debate were completely meaningless, that doesn't in any way preclude me from taking part in it. Why should I restrict my activities only to those which are meaningful?

An entire generation of well-educated intelligent people can be wrong, and history shows that they have been any number of times. — creativesoul

Yes, that's the point. If well-educated intelligent people can be wrong en masse, then in what way does the logical conclusion of an intelligent well-educated person on the question of coherency, self-consistency, enumerating assumptions, and calculating logical consequences have any bearing on how 'right' an argument is. We've just determined that the conclusions of intelligent, well-educated people on such matter can be, and regularly are, wrong. So when you (presumably an intelligent, well-educated person) have finished your analysis of an argument, how do you then know you're right?

Is that a true account? — creativesoul

Yes, although I probably should have been clearer and written: "the notion that it could be established that one position is the correct one and the other is the mistaken one". On the other hand perhaps I am being too generous; perhaps the very idea that metaphysical conjectures could be true or false is a kind of category error; I am undecided on that, since that would itself seem to be undecidable. It would certainly seem to be the case that nothing we could ever observe would strictly entail, for example, that idealism, materialism or nominalism is true; I certainly cannot think of any observation that would do the trick.

I'd say that what you propose is something which is relative to a particular background of beliefs -- that decidability is relative to our beliefs, or community, rather than it being a feature of the subject matter. — Moliere

This is quite possibly true. But I imagine ancient tribes were not in the habit of being involved in complex, logic-based metaphysical arguments. I see no reason to doubt that when it came to ordinary empirical matters of fact observation was relied on just as with us.The decidability of metaphysical beliefs in ancient and premodern cultures would seem to have largely fallen to authority, whether in the form of priestly elites or canonical revelatory texts.

But their decidability is not our decidability, because for us decidability is decided by logical analysis of the arguments and the situation to establish whether there is any possibility of corroborative evidence. I see no reason to belief that the ancients and the pre-moderns were in general sufficiently detached form tradition to undertake such comprehensive logical analyses. I am not denying that there might have been exceptions.

Anway I will put it in the form of a question: How do you imagine we could ever go about establishing that idealism, materialism or nominalism is really the case? I mean we could do a Kantian analysis and establish that it is beyond reasonable doubt that the objects of perception must be mediated by the perceiver, but that doesn't tell us anything about the extent of the mind's role in constructing objects of perception, and it doesn't tell us anything about what mind could be in any "ultimate' sense beyond our ordinary conception of mind in the context that we understand humans and animals to have minds.

The same kind of thing could be said, for other examples, about matter, and about the idea of the reality of universals. When we try to impute ultimacy to mind, matter or universals, do we really have any idea what we are talking about? Is it really legitimate to extrapolate our everyday working concepts into the context of the absolute? Does even the notion of the absolute make authentic sense to us? I think these questions are also undecidable. How could we possibly definitively answer them?

You seem prepared to offer alternative accounts and/or apologetics for historical issues raised across the spectrum here. That's good, and you'll get no argument from me regarding the sheer quantity of such ad hoc alternative arguments and/or corrective measures that produce a more nuanced viewpoint along with avoiding the typical objections. I mean written history shows all of this.

However, the discussion between us involved you asking me what sorts of measures were available to further discriminate between competing metaphysical positions when and if those positions made or worked from claims that were unverifiable/unfalsifiable. I offered a list of those. I want only to remark here that you've done a magnificent job of putting some of those to use individually, but have neglected to put them all to use at once. There has also been no argument asked for and/or offered for why and/or how those measures ought be used.

As you've noted in the last paragraph of your reply above, we're painfully aware of our own fallibility. Isn't that the very point underwriting this discussion? How can we reduce the sheer likelihood of being mistaken? How can we avoid forming and/or holding false belief?

That's not the argument s/he made, so that sort of reply wouldn't be appropriate for me. However, if s/he had made such an argument, then that response would certainly be warranted. In such a situation, someone like yourself, judging from the sidelines, would be poisoning the well solely by virtue of putting such a question to me. It would succeed only if the reader weren't well-versed in spotting fallacy in the wild, because there's not a thing wrong with the response you're aiming to discredit if it follows the claim that all metaphysical arguments are meaningless. — creativesoul

(Just for ease of future writing, I'm a 'he'. It's slightly painful to see it laboured over, I really wouldn't have minded being wrongly assigned, but I know others do so I appreciate the extra effort.)

The claim that all metaphysical statements are meaningless is an entirely falsifiable empirical claim. One only need produce a metaphysical statement which has meaning. If one disputes the meaning of 'meaning', then the alternative claim is also verifiability false, it cannot be the case that all metaphysical statements are meaningful since we do not know what 'meaningful' means. It can only be the case that metaphysical statements may or may not be meaningful, pending our discovery of what 'meaningful' actually means. Either way, the claim that all metaphysical statements are meaningless is either meaningless itself because of the ambiguity over term 'meaningless' (but that in turn would render it true, since all metaphysical statements suffer from the same problem of ambiguity over terms), or its is not a metaphysical statement at all since we can resolve what the term 'meaningful' means and at that point it becomes and entirely falsifiable empirical claim.

For example, it is clear that s/he is working from a questionable conception of thought and/or belief. The evidence for that is in the paragraph above when s/he confirmed that I had understood the argument s/he was making. — creativesoul

You'll need to expand on this, I don't see either the link you're making, nor the relevance I'm afraid.

Both, s/he and Carnap, conflate what it takes to be meaningful with what it takes to be verifiable/falsifiable. — creativesoul

I'm pretty sure I've said probability a dozen times now that I do not consider all unverifiable statements to be meaningless, only those statements containing a word which the party the statement is aimed at does not agree on the meaning of. A statement relying on a word which, for the recipient, does not have the meaning the speaker intended, might as well be meaningless. It would be pointless to apply one's own definition of the term since that would not carry the meaning the speaker intended (you might as talk to yourself). It would be pointless to apply the speaker's own definition because, you have already rejected that and so would gain no meaning from the sentence in your own mind. The only alternative I can see is that the sentence be regarded as meaningless.

Since then Psuedo has taken the reigns from Carnap and argued that all metaphysical debates were meaningless as a result of being unverifiable/unfalsifiable — creativesoul

No, again I have specifically said, in direct communication with you, as well as others, that I consider there to be a gradation from meaningful debates where the metric of decidability is widely agreed on, to meaningless ones where it is not. At no point have I said that all metaphysical debates are meaningless (unless by rhetorical accident, in which case I have made it abundantly clear since that that is not my position).

It is still the case that our discussion here consists of arguing over what counts as being meaningful. My position on that has been neither elucidated nor changed during the course of this thread. It seems that Psuedo's has. It looks like a clear cut case of Psuedo's moving the goalposts. That is, in the beginning s/he worked from a criterion for what counts as being meaningful that required the candidate(a metaphysical debate in this case) to be verifiable/falsifiable. Since then, the criterion for what counts as being meaningful has been expanded to include being decidable. — creativesoul

Decidability and verifiability are relatively closely related. What difference do you see between the two which significantly moves the goalposts? @Janus's introduction of the term was, quite rightly, to show that it is the lack of any method of decidability that renders such debates meaningless (one where one side is trying to 'prove' the other wrong). The only widely agreed on method of decidability I know of is empirical falsifiability, but that's not necessary for the argument. If it is true that metaphysical debates (of the particular sort Janus and I are referring to) are meaningless because they cannot be decided by any agreed means, then it is also true that such arguments over statements which are not falsifiable are probably meaningless, that being the only method of decidability we currently all agree on. We could argue over the minutiae, but I really don't see how it massively moves the goalposts.

The operative underlying general problem is the conflation of truth and meaning. — creativesoul

You'll need to expand on this, I don't see how the notion of truth enters into it, both Janus and myself have consistently (I think) been careful to talk about that which is widely agreed upon. Truth hasn't entered into it.

I don't want to answer for Pseudonym, but only for my interpretation of what Pseudonym appears to be arguing. — Janus

Just to let you know, for what it's worth, that your interpretation of my position is pretty much bang on, so feel free to carry on as if it were, without need for further caveats, if you wish.

I'm pretty sure I've said probability a dozen times now that I do not consider all unverifiable statements to be meaningless, only those statements containing a word which the party the statement is aimed at does not agree on the meaning of. A statement relying on a word which, for the recipient, does not have the meaning the speaker intended, might as well be meaningless. It would be pointless to apply one's own definition of the term since that would not carry the meaning the speaker intended (you might as talk to yourself). It would be pointless to apply the speaker's own definition because, you have already rejected that and so would gain no meaning from the sentence in your own mind. The only alternative I can see is that the sentence be regarded as meaningless. — Pseudonym

Fair enough Pseudo. Clearly there is distinction between holding that all unverifiable statements are meaningless and holding that charges of unverifiable statements containing a word which the party the statement is aimed at does not agree on the meaning of are meaningless.

While I may have first conflated the two, I think that I've since corrected that.

I would still object to calling such a debate meaningless, for it is most certainly not without meaning. Rather, as mentioned heretofore, it would better put as having too much meaning. Pointless perhaps. I mean in order to understand another's argument, one must first grant the terms. That's a primary rule of valid objection is it not? All that said, those kinds of arguments are semantic pedantics in the worst kind of way...

It is still the case that our discussion here consists of arguing over what counts as being meaningful. My position on that has been neither elucidated nor changed during the course of this thread. It seems that Psuedo's has. It looks like a clear cut case of Psuedo's moving the goalposts. That is, in the beginning s/he worked from a criterion for what counts as being meaningful that required the candidate(a metaphysical debate in this case) to be verifiable/falsifiable. Since then, the criterion for what counts as being meaningful has been expanded to include being decidable.
— creativesoul

Decidability and verifiability are relatively closely related. What difference do you see between the two which significantly moves the goalposts? Janus's introduction of the term was, quite rightly, to show that it is the lack of any method of decidability that renders such debates meaningless (one where one side is trying to 'prove' the other wrong). The only widely agreed on method of decidability I know of is empirical falsifiability, but that's not necessary for the argument. If it is true that metaphysical debates (of the particular sort Janus and I are referring to) are meaningless because they cannot be decided by any agreed means, then it is also true that such arguments over statements which are not falsifiable are probably meaningless, that being the only method of decidability we currently all agree on. We could argue over the minutiae, but I really don't see how it massively moves the goalposts. — Pseudonym

Well, verifiability/falsifiability works from observation and repeatability. We're checking to see if what's claimed corresponds to actual events. The events are what makes the claim true/false. Decidability is remarkably different in that we are the ones who decide. We decide whether or not it makes sense to use words in certain ways and not others.

Here again though, even after claiming that you do not equate being unverifiable with being meaningful, you've just called debates over unverifiable statements meaningless. If they are not meaningless as a result of being unverifiable, then what is it that makes them so?

The operative underlying general problem is the conflation of truth and meaning.
— creativesoul

You'll need to expand on this, I don't see how the notion of truth enters into it, both Janus and myself have consistently (I think) been careful to talk about that which is widely agreed upon. Truth hasn't entered into it. — Pseudonym

We're getting there. In due time. We've been skirting around it the entire time. The presupposition of truth has been at work the entire time as well my friend. That's how thought and belief work.

or its is not a metaphysical statement at all since we can resolve what the term 'meaningful' means and at that point it becomes and entirely falsifiable empirical claim. — Pseudonym

Oh really? So you think if one of us made a thread on meaning that we would have agreement? There's been an ongoing debate in philosophy over meaning, so I doubt you're going to have your agreement. There are different positions on the meaning of meaning.

But just for sake of argument, let's say we all agreed on the definition of meaning. That doesn't therefore mean that we're going to all agree on which statements are meaningful, because all one has to do is claim that a statement isn't meaningful and that it hasn't been explained satisfactorily.

This thread is evidence of that.

I'm waiting for an elucidation upon the criterion for what counts as being meaningful.

:cool:

I'm waiting for an elucidation upon the criterion for what counts as being meaningful. — creativesoul

New discussion incoming. This one is probably too far along for others to want to join in, so might as well start fresh.

Decidability is remarkably different in that we are the ones who decide. We decide whether or not it makes sense to use words in certain ways and not others. — creativesoul

If this is decidability then no metaphysical arguments are decidable because "We" evidently haven't decided. and if "we" do decide, then a comparison of the sense the author imputes with the sense that "we" have decided becomes an entirely verifiable proposition.

Here again though, even after claiming that you do not equate being unverifiable with being meaningful, you've just called debates over unverifiable statements meaningless. If they are not meaningless as a result of being unverifiable, then what is it that makes them so? — creativesoul

They are meaningless as a result of their undecidablility, and their unfalsifiability is the reason why they are undecidable. That does not mean that unfalsifiablity is the only reason why a pair of propositions might be undecidable, nor does it mean that all unfalsifiable statements are meaningless.

I'm claiming that statements of the form "Your unfalsifiable metaphysical proposition X is wrong" are meaningless. No other statements, no other debates, just those.

I'm waiting for an elucidation upon the criterion for what counts as being meaningful. — creativesoul

@Marchesk has opened a thread on this, but whilst fascinating, I don't see how it gains its importance here. As @Janus has pointed out, it just becomes a matter of semantics. There is some property of a sentence with a disputed term in it which causes it to have a significantly different utility to a sentence containing only widely agreed on terms. If I say "go to the door", the verb 'to go' is widely understood and the noun 'door' is also The effect on the willing listener will be that they will go to the door. The sentence has the same utility no matter which competent English speaker is hearing it. This is significantly different to my saying "God will guide you on the right path". Depending on whom you are speaking to, this could have any number of effects. There is not a widely agreed upon response to 'God', 'guide', or 'right'. Whether you call this difference a difference in meaning or not is irrelevant, you can call it what you like, but the difference is evidently there, and my contention is that sentences of the form "Your unfalsifiable metaphysical proposition X is wrong" are of the latter sort, so much so that the effect they have is completely unpredictable to the speaker and so of very low utility.

Decidability is remarkably different in that we are the ones who decide. We decide whether or not it makes sense to use words in certain ways and not others.
— creativesoul

If this is decidability then no metaphysical arguments are decidable because "We" evidently haven't decided. and if "we" do decide, then a comparison of the sense the author imputes with the sense that "we" have decided becomes an entirely verifiable proposition. — Pseudonym

Indeed. However, you've neglected the point being made. Let's see if it can be made clearer.

We can verify that different senses of the same term are being used as a means to measure the truth of the opposing argument. That's easy. One side can call the other "wrong" and it would be in line with their own framework, and vice-versa. Hence, the debate consists of two conflicting notions of what counts as being wrong. Both are meaningful. Neither are verifiable. All charges are based upon meaningful constructs. The debate is meaningful, albeit not always reconcilable. In other words, your claim regarding these sorts of debates is false. They are not meaningless.

We can verify that different senses of the same term are being used as a means to measure the truth of the opposing argument. — creativesoul

Yes.

Hence, the debate consists of two conflicting notions of what counts as being wrong. — creativesoul

Yes.

Both are meaningful. — creativesoul

This just seems like bare assertion. How did you arrive at this conclusion from the statements above? What definition of meaningful are you using? What would be an example of a statement which was not meaningful?

There is some property of a sentence with a disputed term in it which causes it to have a significantly different utility to a sentence containing only widely agreed on terms. If I say "go to the door", the verb 'to go' is widely understood and the noun 'door' is also The effect on the willing listener will be that they will go to the door. The sentence has the same utility no matter which competent English speaker is hearing it. This is significantly different to my saying "God will guide you on the right path". Depending on whom you are speaking to, this could have any number of effects. There is not a widely agreed upon response to 'God', 'guide', or 'right'. Whether you call this difference a difference in meaning or not is irrelevant, you can call it what you like, but the difference is evidently there, and my contention is that sentences of the form "Your unfalsifiable metaphysical proposition X is wrong" are of the latter sort, so much so that the effect they have is completely unpredictable to the speaker and so of very low utility. — Pseudonym

Well this is just specious on it's face, my friend. It quite simply does not follow from the fact that the same sentence has different and wide ranging meaning to different listeners that it has very low utility even if the speaker may not be able to predict exactly what the sentence means to all listeners.

Make America Great Again.

So if I were to speak in German to a non-German speaker, my action would still be of high utility?

This just seems like bare assertion. How did you arrive at this conclusion from the statements above? What definition of meaningful are you using? What would be an example of a statement which was not meaningful? — Pseudonym

It wasn't a conclusion, although it could be easily rendered as one. There are no meaningless statements.

There are no meaningless statements. — creativesoul

So what does the word 'meaningless' do if there are no statements for it to be used on. Why do we even have the word?

So if I were to speak in German to a non-German speaker, my action would still be of high utility? — Pseudonym

An appropriate response would be of higher utility. This one is irrelevant.

We were discussing an example of a speaker and a listener who share common language.

So what does the word 'meaningless' do if there are no statements for it to be used on. Why do we even have the word? — Pseudonym

Words don't do things all by themselves. Rather, we do things with words. We use the word "meaningless" to identify that which is without meaning.

Care to get into this?

What is the criterion which - when met by a candidate - counts as that candidate being meaningful.

What would be an example of a statement which was not meaningful? — Pseudonym

Just randomly:

"The water of green flies into vacuum's innocence, giving us a Trump's tweet of hope."

Pomo Generator:

"The primary theme of the works of Smith is a self-justifying reality. It
could be said that the premise of capitalist discourse states that the purpose
of the participant is deconstruction. Derrida uses the term ‘subcapitalist
deappropriation’ to denote not dematerialism, but subdematerialism."

Clinton:

"Depends on what the definition of is is."

Trump:

Take your pick, but Banno posted a good example today.

Movie:

Starlord: "Where is Gamora?"

Iron Man: "What is Gamora?"

Drax: "Why is Gamora?"

The last one is humorous because it doesn't make a lot of sense to ask why is a person, but it was in response to Iron Man not knowing that Gamora was a person.

We were discussing an example of a speaker and a listener who share common language. — creativesoul

There's no such thing as a common language when using ambiguous terms. The commonality of language is based entirely on mutual agreement. Where there's no mutual agreement, there's no commonality. I can honestly say that at times I have no idea what some young people are saying, they're speaking English, but the terms don't mean to them what they mean to me, so they've communicated nothing of any use to me.

We were discussing an example of a speaker and a listener who share common language.
— creativesoul

There's no such thing as a common language when using ambiguous terms... — Pseudonym

Again, this is just plain false on it's face. Almost every word has multiple accepted uses. Each different in it's own way. That is precisely what makes terms ambiguous, and it is also exactly why a listener who doesn't understand ask for clarification from the speaker.

The commonality of language is based entirely on mutual agreement. Where there's no mutual agreement, there's no commonality. I can honestly say that at times I have no idea what some young people are saying, they're speaking English, but the terms don't mean to them what they mean to me, so they've communicated nothing of any use to me.

I hear ya, but that does not support the claim that there is no such thing as common language when using ambiguous words. It can be both, that a listener doesn't grasp the meaning of the speaker and the speaker's words be meaningful.