What is the criterion which - when met by a candidate - counts as that candidate being meaningful. — creativesoul

But I can understand and find meaning in all of those statements;

The first one is metaphorical and describes the draining of pond likening it the draining of hope in Trump's America.

The second one is talking about how capitalism seems to demand that literary works be analysed for their meaning to promote a move away from the a focus on purely material gains.

The third means that the use of the term 'is' is not clearly defined (ie, what it is for something to be.

I mean, I'm well aware that it's all just computer generated garbage, but I think most of Heidegger is just garbage too. What is it about those statements which makes them meaningless? I can find some meaning in them. No less than I can find meaning in Derrida or something.

It can be both, that a listener doesn't grasp the meaning of the speaker and the speaker's words be meaningful. — creativesoul

It seems like we're getting back to the semantic issue again, we're going round in circles. If you want to define 'meaningful' in such a way as to include sentences which, by virtue of their disagreement over terms, actually communicates no information to the listener, then that's fine, but there is some difference in utility between these kinds of sentences and those which are well understood. What you want to call that difference is irrelevant, it's the fact that they're different that means they need to be treated differently.

It seems like we're getting back to the semantic issue again, we're going round in circles. If you want to define 'meaningful' in such a way as to include sentences which, by virtue of their disagreement over terms, actually communicates no information to the listener, then that's fine, but there is some difference in utility between these kinds of sentences and those which are well understood. What you want to call that difference is irrelevant, it's the fact that they're different that means they need to be treated differently. — Pseudonym

The interesting thing here is that what we call such debates is not irrelevant. Rather, I've been objecting to calling them "meaningless" and I've more than justified my objections. That said, I tend to agree with the useless sentiment regarding some kinds of metaphysical debates. Just not all metaphysical positions resting on unverifiable claims.

Speaker A says "X".
Listener B doesn't understand "X".
Therefore, "X" is meaningless.

That is the argument underwriting your contributions here. It's wrong as a result of being based upon an ill-conceived notion of what it takes for "X" to be meaningful. It doesn't require that everyone understand.

Running out of battery on my phone so only time for one more comment, so I'd just like to agree that not all metaphysical positions resting on unverifiable claims are meaningless.

Kudos. Catch you later.

I'll also just try to quickly refer you back to my previous comments. I'm not saying that all propositions of that form are meaningless, it is specifically the ambiguity about the term 'wrong' and what saying someone's position is 'wrong' implies that underlies my position. Phone's literally going to switch itself off now.

So, if no one else on here agrees…

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To repeat:
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1, There’s rampant disagreement here. How many people here agree with eachother about metaphysics?
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2. You’re evidently very socially-oriented, placing social-support over discussion of the topic itself. I don’t agree with those priorities.
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3. My topic (though philosophical and a subset of metaphysics) isn’t what most people here are talking about. You’re mistaking that difference with disagreement with what I’m saying. I’m not tackling the ambitious ultimate-reality topic, but have been limiting my discussion to a much more modest topic of what can be uncontroversially-said.
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2. As I’ve been saying:
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I’m not the only proponent of what I’ve been saying. I’ve named some people who agree. You’re disregarding that, when you say that there’s no agreement. There is, and it goes back at least to 1844 in Euro-American culture. (…and long before that in India.)
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As for people on this forum, litewave has said things that agree with what I’ve been saying. In fact, when I first visited this forum, I was dismayed to find that he’d posted some of it here before I did.
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Just today I ran across this quote from Jim Holt, who wrote a book of his interviews on the subject of why there’s something instead of nothing:
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Holt: I see consciousness and why-something-not-nothing as two facets of a single mystery: What is reality? Although the structure of reality [He means physical reality] is mathematical, the “stuff” of reality is consciousness. In Platonic terms, [physical] reality consists of phenomena (conscious appearances) imitating mathematical Forms. If that sounds daft, try to imagine a world devoid of consciousness--a world “as it is in itself,” one uncontaminated by sentience. All you end up with is an abstract mathematical structure. What sense does it make to say that this structure has an existence [I’ve been saying all along that I don’t claim existence or reality for it] that is robustly physical, as opposed to merely mathematical? So the problem of existence is inseparable from the problem of consciousness.

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I avoid the subject of Reality, and limit my discussion to describable metaphysics, and things uncontroversiallly-say-able. What Holt is quoted saying, above, agrees with what I’ve been saying about physical “reality”.
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Instead of emphasizing a supposed lack of agreement, more meaningful criticism and objection would require addressing the topic itself.
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…with your "one true self-evident metaphysical system" (which is not a metaphysical system at all in any conventional sense…

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Of course it isn’t, and I’ve admitted that.
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1. As Wayfarer pointed out, metaphysics is often or usually defined much more broadly than my more modest topic. I’ve already discussed and admitted that in previous posts.
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2. Strictly-speaking, I haven’t really been proposing a way that I claim things are (even at the describable-level).
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I’ve been repeatedly admitting that I can’t prove that the physical world doesn’t additionally, superfluously, unparsimoniously, unverifiably and unfalsifiably consist of more than what I’ve described it as.
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Wanting to avoid controversial statements, I’ve merely said that there’s no reason to believe that it does.
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Saying that doesn’t amount to proposing a metaphysics. It’s a more modest metaphysical statement.
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…since it relies on no speculative premises)

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Exactly! And that’s been the stated purpose of what I’ve been saying. Avoidance of assumptions, brute-facts, unsupported premises, and speculation.
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…an intention to say only uncontroversial things.
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Earlier, when I told you that I don’t want to say things that anyone would disagree with, you said that that’s because I’m not saying anything.
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What I’m saying is so modest that you said that I’m not saying anything.
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Sure. Here’s a brief summary of what I’m saying:
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There are abstract implications, and complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
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For these systems of implications, there are various mutually-consistent configurations of truth-values for their antecedent propositions. (Of course, in many instances, an antecedent of one implication is the consequent of another implication.)
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Among the infinity of such hypothetical systems and their mutually-consistent configurations of hypothetical proposition-truth-values, there inevitably is one that models your experience. There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that.
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As Faraday pointed out in 1844, there’s no physics experiment that can show, suggest or imply that the physical world is other than such a hypothetical logical system. (Holt said the same in the above quote).
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What’s that you say? That sounds like an “unfalsifiable theory”? No, we apply that criticism only to unverified theories. We don’t apply it to uncontroversially-inevitable things, that aren’t theories at all.
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My emphasis is maybe different, because I speak of that system as an experience-story, with experience primary to it, and with the physical-world being only the setting in that story. …whereas the physicists I refer to have spoken of the system from an objective point-of-view, with the physical world primary in it…as is the natural and customary point-of-view for physicists.
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Anyway, the apparent “disagreement” here, with what I’m saying amounts only to a difference in topics. I’m purposely talking about a much more modest and less broad topic, so as to not say things that someone would disagree with.
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..they are all wrong?

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Of course most other participants in these forums aren’t “wrong” to discuss topics different from mine. But when someone objects to what I say, then, instead of calling him “wrong”, I merely invite him to support his objection with specifics about mis-statements, wrong premises, conclusions that don’t follow, etc.
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Anyway, litewave, and various people outside this forum, have said things that agree with what I’ve been saying.
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Michael Ossipoff

I'll also just try to quickly refer you back to my previous comments. I'm not saying that all propositions of that form are meaningless, it is specifically the ambiguity about the term 'wrong' and what saying someone's position is 'wrong' implies that underlies my position. Phone's literally going to switch itself off now. — Pseudonym

Problems surely arise when there are incommensurate notions of what counts as being "wrong". If we have a debate where what counts as being "wrong" is determined by an unverifiable metaphysical conception, then it is precisely the difference in the conceptions that are used as the measure of being wrong.

If we place irrevocable importance upon the verifiability of such a conception, then we're placing importance upon our being able to determine the truth of such a conception by virtue of observation. We want to be able to check and see if what's said is true. Verification/falsification works from and looks for correspondence between what's being stated and the way things are and/or will be. We look to see if what's said matches up to the way things are. This, in and of itself, presupposes meaning. We must know what we're looking for, in order to look for it. We must know what's being said, in order to look to see if what's being said is the case.

The more important point here is that we must also know what is meant in order to know that it is unverifiable. Thus, being unverifiable does not render a claim meaningless. As a matter of fact, it must be meaningful in order for it to be knowingly and sensibly called "unverifiable". Otherwise, it is a nonsensical use of the term "unverifiable". How would one know that a claim is unverifiable if one does not know what the claim is saying?

To be clear, I'm not charging you with anything here. I'm just further clarifying what we've already agreed upon thus far. What's below is an example of the type of argument that you're talking about, to the best that I've understood you.

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There are certain things which exist in their entirety prior to our becoming aware of them, and prior to language itself. Truth(as correspondence to the way things were and/or are), meaning, and rudimentary thought and belief are such things. Because these things exist in their entirety prior to language, any and all arguments and/or statements which conclude and/or assume otherwise are wrong, by virtue of not corresponding to the way things are and were.

Let's begin there and perhaps this will remain interesting. This set of claims seems to bear all the hallmarks of the kind you're attempting to discredit.

There is a considerable difference between acknowledging that something is logically possible, that it might be physically possible…

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You’re making an un-acknowledged and unsupported assumption of an objective physical reality in addition to and different from the hypothetical logical system that I speak of. My statements assume no such thing, or anything else.
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As I’ve said, there’s no physics experiment that shows, implies or suggests that this physical world is other than a hypothetical setting in an experience-story, a hypothetical logical system such as I’ve been describing.
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What, it wouldn’t be real? I didn’t claim that it is.
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, considering it to be plausible, thinking it is likely and actually believing in it.

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You choose to believe in it (your objectively existent physical world additional to and different from what I’ve described).
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And I'm thinking here of empirical scenarios. The "simulation theory" is an empirical, not a metaphysical scenario.

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The “Simulation-Theory” is based on metaphysical assumptions.
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…but at least it acknowledges a questioning of the objective fundamental and primary existence of our physical world.
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If you can consider the Simulation-Theory, then you won’t have any objection to my statement that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world other than the setting in an experience-story consisting of the hypothetical logical system that I’ve described.
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But the story was/is there without a computer to simulate, portray, illustrate, duplicate it. The only thing that the simulating-computer and its running accomplish is the display of the simulated story for its audience.

Someone's computer, and its running of a program, can't "make" something that there already is.

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Michael Ossipoff

If you can consider the Simulation-Theory, then you won’t have any objection to my statement that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world other than the setting in an experience-story consisting of the hypothetical logical system that I’ve described. — Michael Ossipoff

This suffers the same fatal flaw that the argument from illusion suffers.

A simulation is of something other than itself. The word is nonsensical if not used in a comparative sort of way. An illusion of an oasis necessarily presupposes that there is an actual oasis. A simulation of a universe presupposes an actual universe.

That alone is reason to reject any such argument...

I’d said:
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If you can consider the Simulation-Theory, then you won’t have any objection to my statement that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world other than the setting in an experience-story consisting of the hypothetical logical system that I’ve described.

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This suffers the same fatal flaw that the argument from illusion suffers.

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A simulation is of something other than itself. The word is nonsensical if not used in a comparative sort of way. An illusion of an oasis necessarily presupposes that there is an actual oasis. A simulation of a universe presupposes an actual universe.

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…because what’s the simulation supposed to be a mock-up of, if not a real physical world? Sure, and it’s assumed that there’s a genuinely objectively existent world in which the computer is running…or maybe an infinite regress of them, with each one turning out to be a simulation being run in the next one….
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But that objection doesn’t apply to the hypothetical life-experience story that I suggest. The fact that the experiencer often takes his/her experience to happen in an objectively, fundamentally, primarily, existent physical world doesn’t mean that there is such a world….or any physical world other than the hypothetical story-setting that’s part of that hypothetical experience-story, a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications and some mutually-consistent configuration of the truth-values of their propositions.
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Michael Ossipoff

The more important point here is that we must also know what is meant in order to know that it is unverifiable. — creativesoul

I'll get to your main point next, but I just wanted to explain my position on this one first. I don't think we do need to know what a proposition means in order to induce that it is not verifiable. We can induce that it is not verifiable simply by the fact that it has not been verified, in the time it's been around and no-one can conceive of a method by which it could be verified to the broad satisfaction of the community of speakers.

I infer that the multi-verse theory is not verifiable. I haven't the faintest idea what all the words 'mean' I'm not a physicist and most of them are gobbledegook to me, but I've read that it has not yet been verified, and I've read that there are no experiments anyone can think of that would verify it. Those two empirical facts are enough for me to reach a strong inductive conclusion that the theory cannot be verified without having to understand what a single word of it actually 'means'.

This is very much the case with most metaphysical claims. None have yet been verified (to the satisfaction of the community they are aimed at), and no one has yet proposed a means by which they could be verified (again, to the satisfaction of the community they are aimed at). Therefore, it is entirely reasonable of me to inductively conclude that such statements are unverifiable without my having to understand what they 'mean'.

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To your paragraph. It's a good enough choice because it does indeed represent the sort of statement I'm talking about, but what I'd need also to demonstrate my point, is an example of the statement that the proposer is considering to be 'wrong'. The reason I'd need this, is because what I'm saying hangs on the fact that when meanings of terms become sufficiently vague as to be widely interpretable (as they do in metaphysics) virtually any statement can be interpreted in such a way as to make it fit virtually any criteria. It is for this reason, that 'wrong' becomes meaningless, by presuming that 'the meaning of the statement' and 'the way things are' can be conceived of with such accuracy that they can be seen to have no overlap (ie the statement is 'wrong'). But I don't see any evidence that this is the case. If 2000 years of philosophy has shown us anything, it is that 'the way things are' is very difficult to clearly conceive and that statements about 'the way things are' are very difficult to interpret.

Not for the first time, I'm wishing I could draw on these posts, it would be so much easier to explain what I'm thinking, but I will have, instead, to describe the diagram I want to draw. Imagine a Venn diagram. One circle is 'the way things seem to be'. The centre of that circle is 'the way things actually are', the size of the circle represents the vagueness of any conception we might be able to have of it with our limited brains. The other circle is a statement about 'the way things are'. Again, the centre is the actual meaning of the statement as the author intended (the content of their thought), and the size of the circle represents the vagueness of the terms used, the extent of possible interpretation.

So, with simple empirical facts and treatments of objects we treat as if they were real, the circle of 'the way things seem to be' is quite small. To understand this, I need you not to think in terms of how different theories sound (like Solipsism and Realism, which sound radically different), but how different they are in effect, they way we treat the material universe. The circle representing 'the way things seem to be' in this example is the circle of the way things are treated as if they were. In effect, both the Solipsists and the Realist are going to respond to the material world similarly, so their treatment of it is never far from some central point. With empirical facts, the size of the circle representing a statement about the way things are, is also quite small. "The door is over there", can be interpreted in a variety of ways, but none of them too far from what I intended to mean by it. This is my description of we call science, and the small size of both circles is the reason why its theories are so widely agreed on.

The definition of 'wrong' here is when the two circles either do not overlap, or barely overlap (I pretty much think everything in the world is fuzzy around the edges, so you won't get a sharp definition out of me of anything). Not overlapping means that the statement about 'the way things are' does not correspond at all (or not enough) with any widely held conception of 'the way things seem to be'. If I say "the door is over there" and all you see (and all anyone else sees) is a wall where I'm pointing, then I am wrong to say "the door is over there", at least, that's how we commonly use the word 'wrong'. The circle of reasonable interpretation of my statement, does not overlap with the circle of reasonable responses to the empirical evidence of our eyes (we don't see a door).

Just want to interject at this point to emphasise the fuzziness that is in this description even of empirical science. The circles might be small, but they are of some size and so there is room for a degree of overlap. even at this stage it's not really 'right/wrong' sharply divided like that, but it's close enough to make the terms useful in communication.

Now to metaphysical propositions. Here, both circles are very large. 'The way things seem to be' circle when we're talking about metaphysical concepts is very large, Our conception of 'the way things seem to us (the size of the circle), is vague and varies widely. Our experience of the metaphysical world depends a lot on how we think about it, and our own disposition. Some may 'feel' the hand of God as clear as day, others may feel nothing of the sort, and so have no such feeling to explain.

Also, with metaphysical propositions, the circle representing the reasonable interpretations of the meaning of a sentence is very large. The terms are vague, easily misinterpreted or re-interpreted and do not directly refer to objects that the reader necessarily treats as real at all. All this is empirical fact borne out by the acres of scholastic work trying to interpret what philosophers have said, and the continued disagreement over that project.

So, finally (if you're still awake), the word 'wrong', for me, is used to mean that the two circles don't overlap. The statement circle does not, under any interpretation, overlap enough with the 'way things seem to be' circle. For example, I claim an object is there, it doesn't seem to be there, I'm wrong to make that claim.

What I'm saying, is that with metaphysical conceptions of the way things seem to be, and possible interpretations of statements about metaphysical concepts, the circles are so large that they will always overlap to a substantial extent within the logical space of all that is possible. If we define 'wrong' as meaning that the circles don't overlap (and I think we do), then it is simply nonsensical, or meaningless, to use the term in a situation where we know that the circles are so large that they will inevitably overlap to some substantial extent.

As a personal thought, it maybe is appropriate to think a proposition is wrong, after all, your personal thought represents pretty much the centre of those circles. The way the world actually is for you, and what the statement actually means to you, might be quite small circles (though still not actual points I think). In this sense, and this sense only, I think I would concede that "proposition X is 'wrong'" has meaning, in that it contains psychological information about the speaker. But in public discourse (which all written and spoken language surely is), the circles are too large to allow 'wrong' to mean anything.

There's no such thing as a common language when using ambiguous terms. The commonality of language is based entirely on mutual agreement. Where there's no mutual agreement, there's no commonality. — Pseudonym

But this can't be it. You'd accept something short of a Vulcan mind-meld as communication, yes?

Here's a couple thoughts.

Suppose you're a lifelong faithful Christian, a deacon in your church, you volunteer your time in your church's charities and so on, and some 19-year-old comes up to you on the sidewalk and offers to tell you about Jesus Christ. The right reaction here is "Fuck off!" It has nothing to do with whether you might agree with the kid's likely limited understanding of the gospel. The problem here is that he's broadcasting rather than communicating. You're just a pair of ears for him to talk into.

What's admirable about verificationism was never that it might stamp these words "meaningful" and those words "meaningless", or these propositions "good" and those "bad". It's that verificationism engages. It recognizes that talking is only part of the story and that it can be part of the story of how we learn things and share what we learn. It assumes there might be some practical point to the things we say to each other, and that those connections to our wider cognitive lives might actually inform how we talk.

I'll get to your main point next, but I just wanted to explain my position on this one first. I don't think we do need to know what a proposition means in order to induce that it is not verifiable. We can induce that it is not verifiable simply by the fact that it has not been verified, in the time it's been around and no-one can conceive of a method by which it could be verified to the broad satisfaction of the community of speakers.

I infer that the multi-verse theory is not verifiable. I haven't the faintest idea what all the words 'mean' I'm not a physicist and most of them are gobbledegook to me, but I've read that it has not yet been verified, and I've read that there are no experiments anyone can think of that would verify it. Those two empirical facts are enough for me to reach a strong inductive conclusion that the theory cannot be verified without having to understand what a single word of it actually 'means'.

This is very much the case with most metaphysical claims. None have yet been verified (to the satisfaction of the community they are aimed at), and no one has yet proposed a means by which they could be verified (again, to the satisfaction of the community they are aimed at). Therefore, it is entirely reasonable of me to inductively conclude that such statements are unverifiable without my having to understand what they 'mean'. — Pseudonym

I was speaking loosely. Too much so, apparently.

By "you" and "we" I mean someone has to know what the claims mean in order to know that they are unverifiable. Be careful which source you place your trust in.

To your paragraph. It's a good enough choice because it does indeed represent the sort of statement I'm talking about, but what I'd need also to demonstrate my point, is an example of the statement that the proposer is considering to be 'wrong'. — Pseudonym

Reread the claims. The criterion for what counts as being wrong is clear. Pick one that meets the criterion.

But this can't be it. You'd accept something short of a Vulcan mind-meld as communication, yes? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I've not been clear enough in that comment because, I didn't think it necessary in the context of what CS was saying, but as a statement out on it's own, it should read more like mutual 'proximate' agreement. I don't need a Vulcan mind-meld, but, that's not the point I was trying to make. The point is really contained in the second half of my post above, but broadly, It follows the Venn diagram description there.

The meaning of a word as intended by the language user (the point of saying it) might be the centre of a circle, not a point, because I don't think we're always clear on what it is we mean, but a small circle representing what it is we might mean. The size of the circles represents all the things we could mean within the language game. "Dog" can mean anything from a four-legged furry animal, to a not very nice person, but it virtually never mean a tall square pink box. It has quite a small circle. The boundary of the circle is not clearly defined, it simply gets more transparent until it fades out. The rough position of this boundary is set by common agreement among language users. If what I tend to mean by a word is somewhere in that circle I'm using the term correctly, if it's way out, I might fairly be told I'm using the term wrongly.

So, where, the circle of possible meanings is so large (which is what I mean by no mutual agreement) that the range of possible meanings is not much smaller than the range of "all things its possible to say on the matter" then the word hasn't really done anything, and as you rightly say, there must be some purpose.

So, if I could borrow your Jesus-expounding youth. Notwithstanding his intention, even if he and the deacon had some mutual interest, there is a limited range of things a speaker could possibly (or is likely) to believe about Jesus. The language game they're playing constrains the range of possible beliefs that either is likely to express. If the terms used are so vague as to do virtually nothing to narrow down that range, then the youth's actually saying them has served no purpose, the deacon is no clearer about what the youth believes than he would have been by simply thinking about the constraints of all the things the youth might conceivably believe.

As I'm sure you will have encountered, even such a bold statement as "I don't believe Jesus exists" does not tell you much compared to "I believe Jesus exists". The concept of what Jesus is and what it is for something to exist are so vague that either statement could be interpreted as resulting in almost any state of intentionality. Now consider two statements closer than the polemic example I just gave and you hopefully will have an idea what I meant.

By "you" and "we" I mean someone has to know what the claims mean in order to know that they are unverifiable. Be careful which source you place your trust in. — creativesoul

I'm not sure I see what difference this makes. Even if no one knew what the claim meant it's still inductively true that if it has not been verified despite 2000 years of trying, it is probably unverifiable. The claim doesn't rest on the reason why it's unverifiable. It could be because of the nature of the claim (and you're right to say that you'd have to understand what it means in order for you to know this), or it could be because no one understands what it means. Either way the empirical evidence points to the fact that it's unverifiable.

I'm not sure I see what difference this makes. Even if no one knew what the claim meant it's still inductively true that if it has not been verified despite 2000 years of trying, it is probably unverifiable. The claim doesn't rest on the reason why it's unverifiable. It could be because of the nature of the claim (and you're right to say that you'd have to understand what it means in order for you to know this), or it could be because no one understands what it means. Either way the empirical evidence points to the fact that it's unverifiable — Pseudonym

It's not so much that I'm trying to show a difference. Rather, I'm attempting to ensure where the agreement is so that we can further progress the discussion.

If no one knows what "X" means, let X be a metaphysical claim, then no one can know that it is unable to be checked, for no one would have a clue what they would be looking for. That's the point I'm making, and it seems you've agreed, but I'd like to be sure.

In order to be verifiable, a statement must be meaningful. The same is true with being unverifiable. Thus, in order to know whether or not a statement is verifiable or not, the judge must know what the statement is saying(what it means), for that is precisely what determines what to look for.

Agree?

I think this is nonsense. We can know that ambiguous statements are not verifiable or falsifiable, just on the basis that there is nothing determinable there to begin going about trying to verify or falsify. It is arguable that metaphysical statements are always ambiguous, because they do not refer to determinable empirical processes or entities.

We can know that ambiguous statements are not verifiable or falsifiable, just on the basis that there is nothing determinable there to begin going about trying to verify or falsify. — Janus

It seems we disagree about whether or not knowledge about the determinability of a meaningful statement can be acquired without knowing what is meant by that statement. I am strongly asserting that when there is no knowledge of what "X" is saying about the world and/or ourselves, it is impossible to know what to look for. One must first know what they're looking for in order to know whether or not what we're looking for is something that can be observed/found. This all requires knowing what is meant by the statement.

Are you objecting?

If a statement is ambiguous, as I think most metaphysical statements are, in the sense that they equivocate between ordinary empirical concepts, and the extrapolation of such concepts into an imagined absolute 'context', then we know that the statement cannot be subject to verification, since the meaning of the statement cannot be precisely determined, or the determinate empirical meanings of the terms cannot be established to be rightly extended beyond the empirical domain..

Obviously that does not entail that such a statement is meaningless, in the sense of being without any meaning at all. The problem is the opposite; the statement is perfectly meaningful, but the meaning is being presumed to carry into an indeterminate context, a context outside the one wherein the meaning finds it origin and determinacy.

If no one knows what "X" means, let X be a metaphysical claim, then no one can know that it is unable to be checked, for no one would have a clue what they would be looking for. That's the point I'm making, and it seems you've agreed, but I'd like to be sure.

In order to be verifiable, a statement must be meaningful. The same is true with being unverifiable. Thus, in order to know whether or not a statement is verifiable or not, the judge must know what the statement is saying(what it means), for that is precisely what determines what to look for.

Agree? — creativesoul

No, but @Janus has already replied with pretty much what I was going to say. Basically, not being able to understand what a statement means is a cause of unfalsifiability. A statement which is too vague for it's meaning to be agreed on is unfalsifiable for that reason alone.

If you object to the pragmatic definition of 'unfalsifiable' (something which, in practical terms, does not seem possible to falsify), and would rather have a theoretical definition (something which logically cannot be falsified), then we can use another term. It doesn't alter the argument. There is something about these types of statement which prevents them from actually being falsified which is not so present in more scientific statements, we can call that something whatever you want to call it.

A few more comments about this quote from Jim Holt:
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Holt: I see consciousness and why-something-not-nothing as two facets of a single mystery: What is reality? Although the structure of reality [He means physical reality] is mathematical, the “stuff” of reality is consciousness.

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I agree with that, in the sense that Consciousness, we the experiencer, the implied experiencer of an experience possibility-story, are the most real and existent part of what I’ve described as what describably is.
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(…but I’d stop short of saying what Reality is.)
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Even without invoking meta-metaphysics (the matter of indescribable what-is), we’re fundamental and primary in the describable realm.
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You know what I mean. If, in the describable realm, there’s anything, there’s us.
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The quote continues with a re-wording:
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In Platonic terms, [physical] reality consists of phenomena (conscious appearances) imitating mathematical Forms.

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We feel as if we, Consciousness, the hypothetical story’s implied experiencer, are metaphysically prior to the hypothetical logical experience-story. And it’s true, isn’t it?
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So I should say that, instead that story implying us, we imply it.
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(Alright, I guess I’ve now just crossed the boundary from assertable certainty, to the matter of mention of impressions.)
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So a lot of Vedantists, including at least one that I talked with at these forums, want to say that we’re more than the animal that we are. …that we’re really something more general.
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I don’t think so. We’re the animal, period (full-stop), and there’s no reason to believe otherwise.
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But we the animal are central, primary, fundamental and metaphysically prior to our describable world.
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…as Holt implies or says.
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Michael Ossipoff

If a statement is ambiguous, as I think most metaphysical statements are, in the sense that they equivocate between ordinary empirical concepts, and the extrapolation of such concepts into an imagined absolute 'context', then we know that the statement cannot be subject to verification, since the meaning of the statement cannot be precisely determined, or the determinate empirical meanings of the terms cannot be established to be rightly extended beyond the empirical domain..

Obviously that does not entail that such a statement is meaningless, in the sense of being without any meaning at all. The problem is the opposite; the statement is perfectly meaningful, but the meaning is being presumed to carry into an indeterminate context, a context outside the one wherein the meaning finds it origin and determinacy. — Janus

Too much unnecessary language use only results in adding nothing more than unnecessary confusion to the discussion. There's no need for all this talk of "the determinate empirical meanings of the terms cannot be established"...

Jeez. It's not that hard a subject matter to understand.

There's a bit of irony at hand. You levied a charge of 'nonsense' while simultaneously arguing that you can know that "X" is unverifiable despite your not knowing what "X" is claiming, and hence despite your having no clue what to look for.

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If no one knows what "X" means, let X be a metaphysical claim, then no one can know that it is unable to be checked, for no one would have a clue what they would be looking for. That's the point I'm making, and it seems you've agreed, but I'd like to be sure.

In order to be verifiable, a statement must be meaningful. The same is true with being unverifiable. Thus, in order to know whether or not a statement is verifiable or not, the judge must know what the statement is saying(what it means), for that is precisely what determines what to look for.

Agree?
— creativesoul

No, but Janus has already replied with pretty much what I was going to say. — Pseudonym

Well. Now you're both wrong.

Basically, not being able to understand what a statement means is a cause of unfalsifiability. A statement which is too vague for it's meaning to be agreed on is unfalsifiable for that reason alone.

This is so wrong in so many ways...

If a person does not understand what a statement means, then that person cannot check to see of it's true. It does not follow from that that the statement itself is unverifiable/unfalsifiable.

Do you follow me? I mean, do you understand this?

There are certain things which exist in their entirety prior to our becoming aware of them, and prior to language itself. Truth(as correspondence to the way things were and/or are), meaning, and rudimentary thought and belief are such things. Because these things exist in their entirety prior to language, any and all arguments and/or statements which conclude and/or assume otherwise are wrong, by virtue of not corresponding to the way things are and were.

:death:

Too much unnecessary language use only results in adding nothing more than unnecessary confusion to the discussion. — creativesoul

Well you haven't actually argued against anything I've said and the "confusion" is yours and not mine, or, I think, Pseudonym's, so I can't see any avenue to direct a response beyond addressing this delightful little strawman:

You levied a charge of 'nonsense' while simultaneously arguing that you can know that "X" is unverifiable despite your not knowing what "X" is claiming, and hence despite your having no clue what to look for. — creativesoul

As I've explained a few times, I don't see it as matter of "knowing what "X" is claiming", but rather a matter of knowing that it is not, and could not be, claiming anything empirically determinable, and that this fact is enough to know that no determination of 'X's" truth could decided upon.

Please read more closely, and/ or try to avoid distorting what you have read, so that your interlocutors don't have to repeat the same corrections ad nauseum.

There are certain things which exist in their entirety prior to our becoming aware of them, and prior to language itself. Truth(as correspondence to the way things were and/or are), meaning, and rudimentary thought and belief are such things. Because these things exist in their entirety prior to language, any and all arguments and/or statements which conclude and/or assume otherwise are wrong, by virtue of not corresponding to the way things are and were. — creativesoul

This honestly appears to me to be gibberish. I have tried a few times to read some sense into it and failed. Perhaps our ways of thinking, our presuppositions, are so remote from each other as to preclude the possibility of any meaningful discussion between us. I suspect this is so also based on past experiences with you. Happy thinkin' dude....

Deleted on account of redundancy..

a matter of knowing that it is not, and could not be, claiming anything empirically determinable, — Janus

So now your argument is that you can know that "X" is not and could not be claiming anything empirically determinable without ever knowing what "X" means?

Ok.

How would you know that again without knowing what "X" means? Explain that to me....

I have never said that I don't know what "X" means; that is your own distorted version. Stop wasting my time.

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