The earth's electromagnetic field consists in the deflection of radiation, the movement of compass needles, and the creation of magnetic rocks.

... if not, then what exactly is electromagnetism?

Yep. There is indeed a smell of instrumentalism here.

I hadn't heard of instrumentalism. Are you for or against it?

Not at all.

I'm following various lines of thought here just to see where they might go.

One difference between electromagnetism and belief is that belief is supposedly accessed by introspection; not so much electromagnetism.

One difference between electromagnetism and belief is that belief is supposedly accessed by introspection; not so much electromagnetism. — Banno

What they have in common is that they are both known purely because of their effects.

Why would you think that cause and effect are identical in one case, but not in the other? Or do you?

Actually, that's not true, is it?

Why would you think that cause and effect are identical in one case, but not in the other? Or do you? — frank

Davidson. Can a belief be part of the cause of an act?

At the start of this thread I would have just said "yes", that in a straight forward way we use beliefs to explain actions, and that these are causal explanations.

Now I'm swinging away from that.

What they have in common is that they are both known purely because of their effects. — frank

The claim I am critiquing is that a belief is known best by introspection. That is what I understand is behind Sapientia's position...

My belief that I can open my front door with my front door key does not consist in the actions of me opening my front door with my front door key. — Sapientia

And it's true that Sap can believe that the key opens the front door, regardless of whether the key actually does.

However it seems utterly wrong to suppose that Sap's belief that the key can open the front door has nothing to do with the key or the front door.

Davidson. Can a belief be part of the cause of an act?

At the start of this thread I would have just said "yes", that in a straight forward way we use beliefs to explain actions, and that these are causal explanations.

Now I'm swinging away from that. — Banno

The volitional behavior of a human stands apart from that of other creatures in that it can proceed from reasoned reflection of a more sophisticated variety. Subtract belief from that scenario and you'll just have reflexive behavior. Are you OK with that?

The claim I am critiquing is that a belief is known best by introspection. — Banno

Your own beliefs should be available to you via introspection. Aren't they?

Introspection is existentially dependent upon social constructs...

There is no such thing as introspection... aside from asking others about ourselves.

Introspection is existentially dependent upon social constructs...

There is no such thing as introspection... aside from asking others about ourselves. — creativesoul

The second sentence doesn't follow from the first.

Some linguistic rules are obviously social entities. But children learn to speak in avalanche fashion. There's good reason to believe that much of the capacity is innate.

Agreed.

I was more making the point about the importance of language. Namely, the framework being used and how it will limit and/or delimit what can be said and how. Some are better than others. With talk about belief, the framework needs to be able to draw a few crucial distinctions and avoid dichotomies which cannot account for things that are both, and thus neither. This is one such dichotomy: Internal/External...

There is also a mistake hereabouts regarding the notion of location... Belief is not like keys.

Imagine a circle. There's no way to tell the points that make up the circle apart. They're each the same distance from the center.

But now we place an x-y axes over it and we can have endless fun talking about the distinct points.

Having laid the axes and had all the fun, we struggle to think of the circle without the axes. We're confronted with a lack of distinction, so nothing to talk about.

Inner and outer are like the axes. We lay them over experience and subsequently have endless fun talking about our place in the cosmos. Take away the distinction and speech immediately betrays us because the distinction is built in.

Having realized that the structure of speech can't logically be the structure of the world we're an inextricable part of (and which is part of us), we once again discover endless fun swinging back and forth between unity and disunity.

Your belief consists in your being able to lock the door, pocket the key, give the key to a friend, ponder how locks work...

...if not, then what exactly is your belief? — Banno

No. You've gone from confusing belief and action to confusing belief and ability. Whatever next? My belief consists in my being convinced that I can open my front door with my front door key. And that, in turn, is a result of my being convinced of other related things.

However it seems utterly wrong to suppose that Sap's belief that the key can open the front door has nothing to do with the key or the front door. — Banno

Who's supposing that, though? Not I.

Shadowboxing?

Your own beliefs should be available to you via introspection. — frank

Yes, they should.

There is no such thing as introspection... aside from asking others about ourselves. — creativesoul

That's so obviously wrong it's funny. What's up with you guys? Y'all sayin' some crazy shit.

Your own beliefs should be available to you via introspection. Aren't they? — frank

Well, apparently not. Here we peel off into psychology. There are numerous experiments that show the falsity of our introspections. You have perhaps read of the infamous split-brain experiments.

Philosophically, beliefs do not have the solidity needed to ground explanations for our actions.

I'm going to have to think on that. I dont want to give a quick crappy answer.

My belief consists in my being convinced that I can open my front door with my front door key. — Sapientia

Meh. I could reply that you confuse belief and certainty. Such rhetoric gets us nowhere.

I'm pointing out that beliefs are not simple single things like "being convinced that I can open my front door with my front door key", but rather multifarious.

Indeed; I will appreciate a considered answer.

Another conclusion I'm moving towards is that the analysis in the OP, in which a belief is reduced to a single propositional attitude, is too narrow.

What's up with you guys? Y'all sayin' some crazy shit. — Sapientia

Yet something here keeps drawing responses from you. Something unsettling in the notion of belief.

The obvious, somewhat trite answer is to say belief is holistic; each belief makes sense only in relation to other beliefs.

Imagine a circle. There's no way to tell the points that make up the circle apart. They're each the same distance from the center.

But now we place an x-y axes over it and we can have endless fun talking about the distinct points.

Having laid the axes and had all the fun, we struggle to think of the circle without the axes. We're confronted with a lack of distinction, so nothing to talk about.

Inner and outer are like the axes. We lay them over experience and subsequently have endless fun talking about our place in the cosmos. Take away the distinction and speech immediately betrays us because the distinction is built in. — frank

Some of this actually supports my last claim. It seems we agree on some stuff. Having lived around these sites as long as I have, I'm prone to temper my own expectation.

The framework one uses will limit/delimit what one can say. If the framework one knows were suddenly taken, then one could most certainly be at a total loss for words. This would definitively be the case if that framework were the only one known.

There's no way to talk about the points that make up a circle without using all the talk about the points that make up a circle. There are no points on a circle beyond that particular language game. Points on a circle are themselves existentially dependent upon us; upon language. They do not point to something prior to language. Circles are not perceptible things, they are imaginable things. There are no circles beyond language games. Circles themselves, in all their splendor, are - first and foremost - existentially contingent upon our conceptions. We created all the rules of being a circle. There are no circles where there have never been human beings.

One plus one always equals two because we will not let it be any other way. Talk about the circle is wholly determined by us because circles are human creations. Belief is not. We become aware of and/or discover our own thought and belief via language use. We do not invent it as we did maths. Discovery of something requires something to discover. We did not discover numbers. We did discover non linguistic thought and belief. We cannot get math wrong unless we break the rules.

We can be wrong about how human thought and belief works, and what it is, what takes, what it all consists in/of.

Meaningful attribution. All attribution of meaning counts as thought and/or belief. All difference in kinds of thought and belief is one of complexity. The simple and rudimentary mental act of attributing meaning does not require a creature with common language. It requires a capable creature, surely. It's just that the capability need not include common language.

This is what is necessary for language creation and use to even happen. For us to even be able to talk about our own thoughts and beliefs, these things had to have already been happening. Different creatures draw the same(or similar enough) correlations between the same things. The same things become symbol. The same things become symbolized.

Witt's "Block!" Austin's promise. These are all different ways of performing the same task. They all attribute meaning. As do all of the ways prior to these guys. Referents, designators, variables, etc. All of it is symbolic by it's very nature.







My drake, myself, and any noise I so choose to make - if it is consistent enough - just prior to feeding.

The distinction between looking internally(talking to oneself about oneself and the world) and external(looking towards others' behaviour to show belief) cannot adequately account for belief.

We can find belief when we 1.find something to become symbol, something to become symbolized, and a creature capable of making a connection, drawing a correlation and/or association between the two things and then 2. watching it happen. That is the origen of meaning.

All association, connection, and/or correlation necessarily presupposes the existence of it's own content(regardless of all subsequent qualification). That is the presupposition of truth.

We have meaningful non linguistic belief consisting of things also inherent to all other more complex forms of thought and belief.

What's missing?

We have belief. It presupposes truth. It is meaningful to the creature. None of it requires language.

Well, apparently not. Here we peel off into psychology. There are numerous experiments that show the falsity of our introspections. You have perhaps read of the infamous split-brain experiments.

Philosophically, beliefs do not have the solidity needed to ground explanations for our actions. — Banno

Do split brain experiments show falsity? Or conflict? Conflict is a good thing as long the corpus callosum is intact so as to allow reconciliation.

I can't speak to the solidity of beliefs. What I can point out is one of the philosophical implications of rejecting belief as a cause for action. The act of assertion is generally considered to have some belief as its cause. So we have this:

1, An assertion is an expression of belief.
2. You assert that beliefs cannot ground action.
3. If your assertion is correct, then you are not able to make assertions.

How would you answer that?

Some of this actually supports my last claim — creativesoul

:)

Do split brain experiments show falsity? Or conflict? Conflict is a good thing as long the corpus callosum is intact so as to allow reconciliation. — frank

There are numerous experiments with similar results that apply to folk without damage. Introspection is not what philosophers sometimes take it for.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Introspection_illusion
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/introspection/

The research you mentioned doesn't deny access to mental content through introspection:

They distinguished between mental contents (such as feelings) and mental processes, arguing that while introspection gives us access to contents, processes remain hidden.[8] — Wiki article

I think my argument about assertion has more bite than you think. Maybe I'll work it over to make it a little tighter.

doesn't deny access to mental content through introspection: — frank

No; but it should lead to some doubt as to the certainty of introspection.

Your own beliefs should be available to you via introspection. — frank

Yes, they should. — Sapientia

Not so fast...

; but it should lead to some doubt as to the certainty of introspection. — Banno

Argument from illusion?

Argument from illusion? — frank

I don't see that. The stick looks bent; but the fact is that it is straight.

Beliefs... again, I'm forced to wonder if there is a fact to the matter of what one believes.