Let's see - to sin or not to sin - that's the vulgar understanding of free will. — Agustino

Not everyone who believes in free will accepts that sin exists. Can one believe in sin and yet not have a belief in any God? Or perhaps God does exist, but He Himself doesn't consider any act sinful.

Can one believe in sin and yet not have a belief in any God? — anonymous66

I have difficulty in understanding what you mean by not believing in God - what does it mean not to believe in God? How do you act and go around differently if you don't believe in God, as opposed to if you do believe in God?

Or perhaps God does exist, but He Himself doesn't consider any act sinful. — anonymous66

That is impossible - it would imply that God is not Just.

That is impossible - it would imply that God is not Just. — Agustino

LOL. I could make the equally valid claim that either sin does not exist because God doesn't exist, or that we know so little about God, I could reject any claim that "X is a sin" because there isn't enough evidence to support that conclusion.

If God's existence isn't a foregone conclusion, then how could one be sure that sin exists?
If God does exist, then we can't prove He wants anything, or that He has defined any action as sinful.

I modified my OP to add the following. "Assuming we all agree that the concept of Free Will is a coherent concept, then...."

I do understand there are various ways to describe and define free will. — anonymous66

Because of the latter, simply stating the former doesn't help much. It could be that one concept of free will obtains and another doesn't, or that one account of free will has empirical or rational evidence and another can only be asserted on faith.

Take, for example, the compatibilist. Is he using the same notion of free will that the incompatiibilist uses? Or are they both using the same concept but just disagree over whether or not it is compatible with determinism?

I could make the equally valid claim that either sin does not exist — anonymous66

No you actually can't. You can make a claim though, but that wouldn't mean it's "valid", if by that you mean true. Second of all the existence of sin - the belief in it - is an existential attitude one takes in front of evil. For example, it is sinful to rob a defenceless old man - that means that I take an existential attitude towards the act, placing my faith in the fact that it is objectively wrong for such an action to take place - it is objectively unjust, and deserving of punishment.

"X is a sin" because there isn't enough evidence to support that conclusion. — anonymous66

There is quite a bit of evidence, such that it hurts one or more persons (including the doer of the action), it puts one or more persons at risk of hurt, or it brings about future suffering for one or more persons.

Can there be evidence of free will (pick your own definition)? What would that evidence look like?

That depends on how you define free will. There may be evidence if it's defined one way but not if defined another way.

There is quite a bit of evidence, such that it hurts one or more persons (including the doer of the action), it puts one or more persons at risk of hurt, or it brings about future suffering for one or more persons. — Agustino

The question isn't one of "hurts", the question is, "what does God call sin?"

Well let's see - what do you think God calls a sin?

C'mon now... stop making this so difficult. If you'd rather not participate, just don't participate.

I'm not the one claiming that sin exists. I'm skeptical of God's existence. If Not God, then Not sin.

I'm not the one claiming that sin exists. I'm skeptical of God's existence. — anonymous66

What do you mean you're skeptical of God's existence? How is your day to day life different because of this skepticism that you claim?

I'm not making it difficult. I'm pointing out that it is difficult. You can pretend all you like that there's a simple, unambiguous account of what it means to have free will, but then you're actually going to have to participate in the discussion yourself and explain what that is.

I'm not making it difficult. I'm pointing out that it is difficult. — Michael

:D LOL! >:)

What are you saying is difficult? Deciding which definition of Free Will to take seriously?

Yes, as well as providing the various definitions in the first place, which you seem unwilling to do.

Did you not see the addition to my OP? I'm asking you to assume there is a coherent definition of free will. If you reject the assumption that there is one, then you needn't play along.

And as I explained, there may be more than one coherent definition of free will; some of which obtain and some of which don't; some of which can be supported and some of which can only be taken on faith.

You might as well ask "assuming there's a coherent concept of the soul, is a belief in or rejection of the soul a matter of faith" – in which case the answer (as well as the answer to whether or not the belief is true) depends on which (coherent) concept you're using. If by "soul" I just mean "personhood" then the belief in it would be rational and true, but if by "soul" I mean something supernatural then it would require faith and possibly be false.

So, as I keep saying, you're going to have to tell us what you mean by free will, else the concept, and so the question, isn't clear.

Free will is most (or even perhaps only) coherently thought as the ability to have done otherwise than one has done. It seems to be just on the basis of that assumption that any feelings of responsibility for one's actions could be rationally based, and hence would make any sense at all.

If determinism consists in denying that anyone could have done otherwise than they have done, then I don't see how it could be compatible with what to me seems to be the only genuinely coherent notion of free will.

On the other hand, I don't believe it is possible to show by any empirical means, whether we really could have done otherwise than we have done. Also when we try to analyze how free will could be possible, how we could decide, decide to decide and so on, we come up against an aporia; it seems that free will is not analyzable. So belief in free will must be a leap of faith, based on an intuitive sense that we have about ourselves.

The other consideration is that freedom vs determinism (as well as many other metaphysical issues) is not susceptible of logical analysis, since any attempt will produce antinomies. This means it is a matter to be decided only by individual preference, that is it is a matter of faith.

Surely it is better for our lives to believe that we could have done otherwise than we have done, and so feel responsible for our actions, and also think and feel that the future is genuinely open, than it is to feel that our every action is utterly determined by forces outside our control. On the basis of this practical consideration, it is rational to believe that we are free; especially since this belief accords with our most direct intuitive sense of ourselves.

Free will is most (or even perhaps only) coherently thought as the ability to have done otherwise than one has done. It seems to be just on the basis of that assumption that any feelings of responsibility for one's actions could be rationally based, and hence would make any sense at all. — John

How is this any different to one's behaviour being random? And given the role of probability in quantum effects (and assuming that this isn't just a measurement issue), particles could have done otherwise. Do they have free will?

So assuming that one would want to say that particles don't have free will, and that free behaviour isn't the same as randomly occurring behaviour, this definition of free will wouldn't work.

I was only pointing out that free will cannot be compatible with determinism but only with indeterminism. Of course randomness (in the sense of genuinely indeterministic events) is the necessary ontological basis for the possibility that our actions could have been other than they have been, but this does not mean randomness is sufficient for the kind of free will to obtain that any coherent notion of moral responsibility depends on.

As I have said, free will in its fullest sense, is not analyzable. Perhaps it would be fair to say that no conception of ourselves as being exhaustively physically constituted (at least in any sense in which physicality is currently conceived) is compatible with free will. If our wills are not merely the result of physical processes, whether deterministic or indeterministic, then freedom is possible, but not in any way which can be modeled in terms of causation. It seems fairly obvious that to propose to model freedom in terms of any causal explanation is to propose a non sequitur.

I was only pointing out that free will cannot be compatible with determinism but only with indeterminism. — John

Are you saying that it requires probabilistic causation or that it requires spontaneity (i.e. that our actions are uncaused)?

As I have said, free will in its fullest sense, is not analyzable.

Which seems to amount to what I said at the start; that the concept isn't at all clear.

I was only pointing out that free will cannot be compatible with determinism but only with indeterminism. — John


Are you saying that it requires probabilistic causation or that it requires spontaneity (i.e. that our actions are uncaused)? — Michael

If it be posited that we are exhaustively physical beings then it requires both that causality not be rigidly deterministic, and that our actions are not caused by anything other than our own wills.

If it be posited that we are not exhaustively physical beings then it requires only that our actions are not caused by anything other than our own wills. In that case nature can be rigidly deterministic, but our wills would be understood to be, at least sometimes and to some degree, operating from beyond the ambit of determinism.

As I have said, free will in its fullest sense, is not analyzable. -John


Which seems to amount to what I said at the start; that the concept isn't at all clear.

Many intuitively clear concepts are not analytically clear: time, space and causality itself, for example; so freedom is not alone in this regard.

If it be posited that we are exhaustively physical beings then it requires both that causality not be rigidly deterministic, and that our actions are not caused by anything other than our own wills. — John

So we have free will if reductive materialism obtains, if the relevant brain states are the exclusive causal influence of our behaviour, and if the causal influence of our brain states is probabilistic rather than predictable?

If it be posited that we are not exhaustively physical beings then it requires only that our actions are not caused by anything other than our own wills. In that case nature can be rigidly deterministic, but our wills would be understood to be, at least sometimes and to some degree, operating from beyond the ambit of determinism.

So we have free will if emergent materialism obtains, if the relevant mental states are the exclusive causal influence of our behaviour, and if the causal influence of our mental states is probabilistic rather than predictable?

Many intuitively clear concepts are not analytically clear: time, space and causality itself, for example; so freedom is not alone in this regard.

I question this notion of "intuitively but not analytically clear". I think it's more the case that we (more-or-less) thoughtlessly talk about them without any proper understanding. The same is true of things like obligation and the soul, as I previously mentioned.

So we have free will if reductive materialism obtains, if the relevant brain states are the exclusive causal influence of our behaviour, and if the causal influence of our brain states is probabilistic rather than predictable? — Michael

No, that's nonsense; we have no control over our brain states; we are not even aware of them. You are trying to pas what I have written through the lens of your own presuppositions.

I question this notion of "intuitively but not analytically clear". I think it's more the case that we (more-or-less) thoughtlessly talk about them without any proper understanding. The same is true of things like obligation and the soul, as I previously mentioned. — Michael

I don't agree; we have a very clear idea what is meant by such statements as "I am free to do whatever I want tomorrow", but if we try to analyze the situation and come up with an explanation (and explanation which will necessarily be in terms of causality) of how that freedom is possible, we can't do it. Of course we can't do it, because we are trying to explain something in terms of it being caused that is posited as being uncaused; which is a contradiction.

No, that's nonsense; we have no control over our brain states; we are not even aware of them. You are trying to pas what I have written through the lens of your own presuppositions. — John

I interpreted "if ... we are exhaustively physical beings" as "if ... reductive materialism obtains". How else was I to interpret it?

I don't agree; we have a very clear idea what is meant by such statements as "I am free to do whatever I want tomorrow", but if we try to analyze the situation and come up with an explanation (and explanation which will necessarily be in terms of causality) of how that freedom is possible, we can't do it. Of course we can't do it, because we are trying to explain something in terms of it being caused that is posited as being uncaused; which is a contradiction.

We understand such statements as a matter of ordinary discourse, where being free is contrasted with being physically coerced or blackmailed or drugged and so on, in which case the (meta)physics of the self and causation is irrelevant. However, if we want to address the philosophical notion of free will where such things matter then I would argue that we don't have a very clear idea of what is meant by such statements.

Compare with the fact that I understand talk of the self or obligation in an ordinary context but not in a philosophical context.

I interpreted "if ... we are exhaustively physical beings" as "if ... reductive materialism obtains". How else was I to interpret it? — Michael

Yes, but look at what I wrote; I said the condition was necessary, not that it was sufficient. I also said it would be necessary that our wills not be determined by anything (such as brain states).

Compare with the fact that I understand talk of the self or obligation in an ordinary context but not in a philosophical context. — Michael

Yes, as I said there are many things which are not susceptible to analysis in terms of causality. But we may be able to talk about them in a philosophical context, if we don't restrict philosophical talk to analysis in the mode of causal explanation.

Yes, but look at what I wrote; I said the condition was necessary, not that it was sufficient. I also said it would be necessary that our wills not be determined by anything (such as brain states). — John

If reductive materialism is the case then our wills are brain states, so it's not clear to me what you mean here.

I didn't mention reductive materialism, that's you putting words in my mouth again. I said "if we are exhaustively physical beings" and that makes no necessary assumptions about what the nature of the physical is. As I said earlier our understanding of the physical may change.Presently we understand the physical in terms of the causal paradigm; it is obviously impossible, to understand free will coherently in those terms as I have already pointed out.

Free will can;t be demonstrated so you either choose to believe in it, or not ( the latter if you are genuinely capable of living the believe that you do not have free will). Whether we should believe we have free will according to our intuitive understanding of it or not is a perfectly coherent philosophical question, that does not require that we be able to explain 'what it is'.

I didn't mention reductive materialism, that's you putting words in my mouth again. I said "if we are exhaustively physical beings" and that makes no necessary assumptions about what the nature of the physical is. — John

Reductive materialism doesn't make any assumptions about what the nature of the physical is. What it argues is that mental phenomena can be reduced to physical phenomena – which seems to be exactly what is meant by "we are exhaustively physical beings".

Presently we understand the physical in terms of the causal paradigm; it is obviously impossible, to understand free will coherently in those terms as I have already pointed out.

If free will requires a rejection of causation then it requires that one's actions are uncaused, i.e. spontaneous. Does it really make sense to say that we have free will if our actions occur spontaneously?