Yep, we cannot think the unthinkable. Objectivity is already subjectivity.

However, this third person point of view would be an error in conception. — schopenhauer1

Why do you believe this?

Because the third person point of view is literally a "view from nowhere". If you conceptualize it, then you are back to a subject conceptualizing the object- perhaps in some pseudo-Platonic "removed" sort of way in your imagination. However, in "reality" we cannot know what this "real" third-person view from nowhere is. In fact, maybe it's something like a first person perspective! But what is certainly the case is things aren't just objects as we conceive them in some Platonic realm of just be situated as we would normally imagine it when we imagine things from a third-person perspective.

Often when we think about points of view of the real (objective world, world outside human perception, world as it is, thing-in-itself, etc. etc.), we automatically assume a posture of a third-person point of view. — schopenhauer1

Of course. It's what we're raised to believe, in our science-worshiping culture.

That objective 3rd-person point-of-view is the point-of-view of Materialism.

So, for example, if we think of a quark in physics, we think of some sort of particle or perhaps even a process (as a vibrating string perhaps). However, this third person point of view would be an error in conception. We always have an unintentional bias to conceptualize the objective world/thing-in-itself from some universally objective perspective (what Thomas Nagel might call "the view from nowhere") Why do we take this third person point of view

Because, as I mentioned above, it's what we were taught from elementary school, in our science-worshiping culture.

Your quote from Nagel says it very well. The "scientific" objective 3rd-person point-of-view is, of course, not anyone's point-of-view.

on the thing-in-itself and not assume another point of view? What would that point of view even be?

You know the answer to that, because you've read about Subjective Idealism.

(...which I, myself, subscribe to. Shall I call my metaphysical proposal "Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism" (OSSI)?. ).

Michael Ossipoff

Why do we take this third person point of view on the thing-in-itself and not assume another point of view? What would that point of view even be? — schopenhauer1

The third person point of view is really the search for what is invariant across all possible points of view. So it cashes out as distinguishing between the locally particular and the globally general.

Of course, if you presume that "point of view" is all about some "Cartesian theatre" state of phenomenal being, then you have hardwired in an epistemic confusion already.

Scientific objectivity works because it pragmatic metaphysics. It is willing to go with the useful division of experience into the particular and the general. One is made measurement, the other theory. And so to "see" the world as it is, is simply to extract its general laws - its global invariances ... coupled to the answering ability to make the particular acts of measurement that would then breath fire into the equations.

So ordinary psychology already gives us a third person point of view of the world. As conscious beings, we are already modelling reality in terms of conceptual theories and perceptual measurements. When we are aware, we are taking some particular point of view of some generally understood world. And we get to update that view every half second or so with a fresh act of attentive shift.

But Cartesian dualism creates a different ontic model of what brains are doing. And now the usual confusions enter the picture. The first person point of view is located in its own substantial realm of being. The world is placed outside of that in its own sphere. Gods have to be invoked that would have super-human perception that sees every particular all at once, in omniscient fashion.

What is actually going on in the modelling - the careful division into the generality of concepts and particularity of percepts - gets lost from sight.

Again, the third person point of view is rightfully the invariant generality that would be seen across all possible acts of measurement. And so science turns out to know what it is doing. It is ignoring the Cartesianism which is the philosophical misstep.

t is ignoring the Cartesianism which is the philosophical misstep. — apokrisis

However, the justification for Cartesianism, which has it's roots in ancient philosophy noting the distinction between appearance and reality, is that the way we perceive the world is clearly based on the kind of bodies we have, and not the way the world is. Otherwise, there wouldn't be such a notable discrepancy between appearance and reality.

Again, the third person point of view is rightfully the invariant generality that would be seen across all possible acts of measurement. And so science turns out to know what it is doing. — apokrisis

Sure, but in doing so, it reveals a perspectiveless view from nowhere that is different from how we perceive the world. Science reveals a world beyond perception, or in addition to how we perceive things.

However, the justification for Cartesianism, which has it's roots in ancient philosophy noting the distinction between appearance and reality, is that the way we perceive the world is clearly based on the kind of bodies we have, and not the way the world is. Otherwise, there wouldn't be such a notable discrepancy between appearance and reality. — Marchesk

Yeah sure. But would you conclude from that that brains model worlds or that there is a realm of mind that is somehow getting it all wrong about how the world actually is?

Either way, looks bad for Cartesianism. It is only the pragmatism of a modelling relation approach that not only explains the discrepancy, but predicts it.

Pragmatism says the modelling is driven by its self-interested purposes and a need to produce a reliable system of mediating signs. So the whole point would be to manufacture an epistemic cut in which we do things like "see colours" and "hear sounds". Pragmatism explains why it is effective to replace the noumenal with the phenomenal. It becomes the epistemic feature rather than the epistemic bug.

Sure, but in doing so, it reveals a perspectiveless view from nowhere that is different from how we perceive the world. Science reveals a world beyond perception, or in addition to how we perceive things. — Marchesk

It repeats the same pragmatic trick at a new semiotic level. The evolved brain models the world in its embodied neural language. Then us metaphysicians and scientists model the world in terms of disembodied mathematical or logical language.

So yes, we have double vision once we have the right cultural training. We have our biological experience of the world as embodied creatures. Then we have our social view of existence - the Cosmos or Being in general - to the degree we become absorbed into some depersonalising tradition of human discourse.

Science of course never actually breaks through to grasp the noumenal. It is always still self-interested modelling. And very often it doesn't get any further than seeing Cosmos/Being as some kind of grand deterministic machine, a mechanical pattern.

But we can still appreciate why it is heading in the right direction if modelling is about making a clear division between abstract theory and concrete acts of measurement. We can see how it is extremitising what evolved brains already do - dividing the world phenomenally into the particular and the general as the best way to understand it.

Yeah sure. But would you conclude from that that brains model worlds or that there is a realm of mind that is somehow getting it all wrong about how the world actually is? — apokrisis

This is the naive realism that I was mentioning. The view from nowhere might be nothing like how the mind perceives it. The object needs a subject. Math only describes. Models are only an echo. etc. etc. To take the math or the models as reality because it is how humans translate is anthropomorphisizing the universe. You are taking the human view to be THE view outside all subjective views.

This is the naive realism that I was mentioning. — schopenhauer1

The naive idealist of course only ever sees his own twin, the naive realist. It is the face looking back in the mirror.

To take the math or the models as reality because it is how humans translate is anthropomorphisizing the universe. — schopenhauer1

If you read what I said, you will see that is what I said. And it is the feature, not the bug. It is how the "mind" arises. The mind is a model of the world with us in it. It is an anthropomorphic view.

Even science sticks close to useful knowledge - the kind that gives humans control over nature.

And understand that to be the epistemic game is the way to avoid falling into your idealist trap of forever complaining that "mind" doesn't get explained by science. Science does explain mind to the degree that is anthropomorphically useful.

And if you are not too much worried about that level of neurocognitive detail, then in fact standard theistic/romantic conceptions of the "mind" are the only model you need for day to day life. Cartesianism works as the standard model of everyday living for the ordinary person. Why make things more complicated?

We have a soul. We exist as mental objects in our mental worlds of mental experience. Stick with that simple conception. A whole weight of social machinery depends on us having that kind of straightforward view of our being. It is how systems of laws, and morality, and self-regulation all work. Humans buy into a Cartesian model so they can act in rational Cartesian fashion - a sharp social division between mind and world, and my mind and other minds. That little triad of first, second and third person points of view!

Sure, some people then get really bent out of shape when they realise this Cartesian cultural model leads to a conflict with a more informed scientific view of nature. Something has to give eventually. But rather than getting stuck in that phase forever, you either have to step across, get to grips with what science is actually saying - and how that is a process philosophy view - or just go back to ignoring the issue in general. Live life the way most people do - as if Cartesianism were true.

To take the math or the models as reality because it is how humans translate is anthropomorphisizing the universe. You are taking the human view to be THE view outside all subjective views. — schopenhauer1

But the models are about something which is outside all subjective views, or at least human/animal ones, because as Apo mentioned, it's invariant across all such views. The mass of a table is not relative to any view. It's true that the concept of mass is human, but the property mass is about is not. It's real.

But the models are about something which is outside all subjective views, or at least human/animal ones, because as Apo mentioned, it's invariant across all such views. The mass of a table is not relative to any view. It's true that the concept of mass is human, but the property mass is about is not. It's real. — Marchesk

Yes, and what is the point of view of mass?

And understand that to be the epistemic game is the way to avoid falling into your idealist trap of forever complaining that "mind" doesn't get explained by science. Science does explain mind to the degree that is anthropomorphically useful.

And if you are not too much worried about that level of neurocognitive detail, then in fact standard theistic/romantic conceptions of the "mind" are the only model you need for day to day life. Cartesianism works as the standard model of everyday living for the ordinary person. Why make things more complicated? — apokrisis

I notice you never really explain the mechanism of mind. You mention the error of Cartesianism a lot, semiotics, and your profound distaste for pan-experientialism vs. your model, and then say your model is neither pan-experiential (because its triadic and that negates it somehow?) and that it does not fall into the fallacy of the Cartesian theater (even though, at some point mind "feels" like something). Anyways, these arguments are a bit beside the point of this particular thread which is the question of what is the point of view outside of the subject object relationship we know.

Anyways, these arguments are a bit beside the point of this particular thread which is the question of what is the point of view outside of the subject object relationship we know. — schopenhauer1

So have you given up your Cartesian framing of the question - the one where the view would emanate from some now unlocated "mind" having "feelings of what it is like to be a third person"?

My point is that this is all about modelling the world for a reason. So a reason gives the over-arching starting point. The world is then seen in terms of that. And can there be any point of view - first, second or third - which is not a model motivated by a purpose?

The natural general purpose of a model is to gain control over the world. Why else would a model evolve or persist?

So just keep following the pragmatic line of thought and the various questions answer themselves with no great drama.

What we call a scientifically or metaphysically general model of the world ends up being that division into theory and measurement. The objective third person perspective is the one that most clearly sees the Cosmos in terms of its universal invariants - its greatest generalities. That is why we end up talking about the laws or symmetries of nature.

The third person objective point of view is the one that can afford to ignore every particular fact, every contingent fluctuation ... at least to the degree that is efficient for constructing a lived model of the world.

There is not much point knowing about neutrinos and quarks unless you can potentially do something with them. And there is absolutely no point in knowing the individual state of every neutrino and quark in the history of the Cosmos as what possible good purpose would that serve? Efficient modelling prefers to get by on making the least effort. So it is how much we can ignore - by summing reality up in t-shirt equations - which is the useful measure of our "objectivity".

F=Ma is the epitome of saying almost everything while saying almost nothing. It is about the least particular fact of the Cosmos we ever learn. Although E=MC^2 is even more generic.

The third person point of view then becomes some actual physical model of the world - an equation plus some set of measurements that will pump out a prediction.

And we find this third person model useful even if it doesn't itself contain anything but the most generalised kind of reason or telos - the thermodynamic imperative that is its maximally generic "point of view", the anchoring locus from which its description of the Cosmos emanates.

So have you given up your Cartesian framing of the question - the one where the view would emanate from some now unlocated "mind" having "feelings of what it is like to be a third person"? — apokrisis

For this question it is required.

The third person objective point of view is the one that can afford to ignore every particular fact, every contingent fluctuation ... at least to the degree that is efficient for constructing a lived model of the world. — apokrisis

Why would there be a constructing going on? The view from nowhere has a point of view of modelling? What is doing the ignoring?

There is not much point knowing about neutrinos and quarks unless you can potentially do something with them. And there is absolutely no point in knowing the individual state of every neutrino and quark in the history of the Cosmos as what possible good purpose would that serve? Efficient modelling prefers to get by on making the least effort. So it is how much we can ignore - by summing reality up in t-shirt equations - which is the useful measure of our "objectivity". — apokrisis

What is the perspective of every state in the history of the cosmos? You jumped right back into the modelling done post-facto. Tsk tsk.

The third person point of view then becomes some actual physical model of the world - an equation plus some set of measurements that will pump out a prediction. — apokrisis

This is yet another error in conception. The models become a stand-in for the third person perspective. The view from nowhere, has no models.

And we find this third person model useful even if it doesn't itself contain anything but the most generalised kind of reason or telos - the thermodynamic imperative that is its maximally generic "point of view", the anchoring locus from which its description of the Cosmos emanates. — apokrisis

I'm not sure where this fits into the debate.

For this question it is required. — schopenhauer1

Fine. You have presumed a state of unlocated and omniscient mind. All the usual confusions will follow. Don't expect much sympathy. :)

The view from nowhere, has no models. — schopenhauer1

LOL.

LOL. — apokrisis

Nervous laughter that I'm right? :razz: . If you have a rebuttal, let's hear it.

You don't rebut nonsense. You laugh at it.

You don't rebut nonsense. You laugh at it. — apokrisis

Ridiculous response. You also use "modelling" as a kind of weasel word that stands in for anything including mental and non-mental processes and it allows for the slipperiness of your argument. Can't catch a fish with too much slime.

it allows for the slipperiness of your argument. — schopenhauer1

An argument is a model. Your problem lies in grasping the arguments.

Yes, the so-called "view from nowhere" is really better named "the view from nowhere in particular", or "the view from everywhere". This renaming eliminates the incoherent notion of a perspectiveless perspective.

The God's eye view makes more sense too as that emphasises the view is all about seeing the general purpose, the general necessity, that is cosmically in play, everywhere at all times.

So the view from nowhere is already rather too focused on the notion that a world is simply a set of material objects. And then the problem for a mind is to see these particular located things as they "actually are" - in a material/efficient sense of existence.

And my point is that science naturally moves towards the abstraction of generality in seeking out the objectively dispassionate view of existence. For good reason, the local particulars just don't matter much. They are nature's accidents. What theory has to pursue is the global necessities. What has to be "seen" from a point of view is the formal/final causes of being.

And thus, it ain't quite so dispassionate after all. It is all about the search for some cosmic-level purpose or reason in fact. It is about the necessary constraints that regulate all acts of material individuation.

So the problem is very often framed in reductionist or logically atomistic terms. What vantage point, what God-like mind, is capable of making every possible measurement of reality? How do we know every accidental detail that composes existence all at once, in its entirety, the complete data set with nothing left out.

And yet that way of framing the issue is utterly wrong. The cosmically general viewpoint that can "see it all" is the one that is everywhere but nowhere in that it is only contemplating the absolute bare essentials of existence.

It all boils down to the reason or purpose that there is such a thing as existence. After that, the rest is just the unfolding of a creation, an accumulation of some further history of accidents.

A God would shrug His shoulders, and say Who cares? I got the fundamentals right. The rest followed of its own accord. I've no need to sweat the details. That wasn't how it was meant to work.

So the problem is very often framed in reductionist or logically atomistic terms. What vantage point, what God-like mind, is capable of making every possible measurement of reality? How do we know every accidental detail that composes existence all at once, in its entirety, the complete data set with nothing left out.

And yet that way of framing the issue is utterly wrong. The cosmically general viewpoint that can "see it all" is the one that is everywhere but nowhere in that it is only contemplating the absolute bare essentials of existence. — apokrisis

Of course, the "god-like mind" would not need to measure every difference that makes no difference. But such a mind would need to take account of everything that does make a difference and be able to discern the difference between differences that make no difference and those that make a difference in order to eliminate the former and arrive at 'the cosmically general viewpoint".

I don't think the notion of simply "nowhere" is apt, because even the "absolute bare essentials" are not absolutely nowhere at all, but rather everywhere, and "nowhere" only in the sense of being nowhere in particular.

But such a mind would need to take account of everything that does make a difference and be able to discern the difference between differences that make no difference and those that make a difference in order to eliminate the former and arrive at 'the cosmically general viewpoint". — Janus

You would be talking the mind that has to climb out of ignorance, so not now really God-like and all-knowing?

I would of course be happy with that as we are now talking the proper Peircean cosmic view. Mindfulness becomes that very mechanism which is the development of habits of conception, routines of constraint.

If you want to go that further step, that's great. In the beginning there is just vagueness - neither a point or view nor its absence. And then what self-organises is the foundational temporal distinction between the general and the particular.

You can have differences that make a difference as there is also the embodied purpose in play that determines the differences that don't. General necessity emerges from the fog of the indeterminate, along with the accidental particulars it is determining to be such.

So Schop's Cartesian confusion is thus completely dissolved. Mindfulness - as semiosis - is already everywhere in existence from the start. But it only develops a fully crisp expression by the end. By which time history will be over and no longer matter at all. All the accidents won't make a difference.

This is exactly the kind of ontology modelled by self-organising physics - for instance, Feigenbaum's universality, the point where the definite transition to chaos is achieved. Every possible path winds up at the same Heat Death limit. The details no longer matter. And they never really did.

The third person point of view, the scientific version of the God's eye view, really has to see the whole of creation in a single unifying sweep. And what it would see is this extreme simplicity, and not some complicated world of medium-sized dry goods that seems to us the epitome of material existence.

The Universe began as a featureless radiation bath. All you need to know to describe it in every detail were a few basic parameters - the cosmic equivalent of a temperature and pressure. There just wasn't anything more to say.

Then after an excursion through an era of somewhat more complex and localised turbulence - our small window of observation - it will get back to that original bland state. It will have merely transitioned from one state of ultimate vague simplicity to a matchingly definite state of equivalent material simplicity.

Some deep mathematical possibility, an ontic state of structural possibility, will be fully expressed. But the Universe will be now just again a featureless radiation bath - albeit of maximum possible coldness and extent.

So again, the objective scientific view is the one that sees the essential formal structure and ignores the accidental material particulars which happen along the way.

There is a good metaphysical reason for why scientific modelling winds up with the kind of character it has - one based on the unavoidable mathematical symmetries. It is exactly how the true third person point of view would look.

You would be talking the mind that has to climb out of ignorance, so not now really God-like and all-knowing? — apokrisis

Yes, a Hegelian God or Whiteheadian process God rather than a traditional all-knowing, all-powerful changeless God.