You seem to be saying that it is possible that all this evil exists for the greater good. I'm not disputing that. What I'm saying is that the "best explanation" (i.e. applying abduction) for the evil in the world is that there is no 3-omni God. i.e. based on what we can know and perceive about the world, it appears unlikely that such a God exists. As I've said several times, I don't suggest this will change the mind of a committed believer - and that's because of the possibility you bring up. However, if someone is willing to entertain the possibility of God's non-existence, then this constitutes a reason to think God might actually not exist.I simply do not understand the validity of the argument. Given the omnipotence of God, He could create a world in which evil exists and there is a greater good created by the evil that exists. Let's just say that if He did create such a world, then the argument, the 'problem of evil' will not apply.
You seem to be saying that it is possible that all this evil exists for the greater good. I'm not disputing that — Relativist
What I'm saying is that the "best explanation" (i.e. applying abduction) for the evil in the world is that there is no 3-omni God. i.e. based on what we can know and perceive about the world, it appears unlikely that such a God exists. — Relativist
As I've said several times, I don't suggest this will change the mind of a committed believer - and that's because of the possibility you bring up. — Relativist
However, if someone is willing to entertain the possibility of God's non-existence, then this constitutes a reason to think God might actually not exist. — Relativist
What I'm saying is that the "best explanation" (i.e. applying abduction) for the evil in the world is that there is no 3-omni God. i.e. based on what we can know and perceive about the world, it appears unlikely that such a God exists. — Relativist
If we can't conceive of an offsetting good, why should we believe there is one? — Relativist
Both God's existence and his nonexistence are epistemically possible, so clearly we need more than mere possibility to justify belief. — Relativist
but mere possibility is insufficient grounds for rational belief in something. — Relativist
My statement refers to believing something solely on the basis that it is possible and without considering evidence. Do you really disagree with that? — Relativist
There is no evidence of an offsetting good to the evil of the black death, so why believe there is an offsetting good? — Relativist
On the contrary, "There is no evidence of an offsetting good to the evil of the black death"
is a statement of fact, if true. Why think it false? — Relativist
The belief "there is no evidence" is justified by the fact that I am aware of no evidence. Similarly, take any ad hoc possibility X: I am aware of no evidence for X, and that is sufficient to believe there is no X. — Relativist
There is no evidence of an offsetting good to the evil of the black death, so why believe there is an offsetting good — Relativist
The argument from evil is an inference that a 3- omni God cannot exist, because this is inconsistent with the presence of so much evil in the world. Theists reject this with the "free-will" defense, which suggests that God "had" to allow evil because it is a necessary consequence of free will. My argument defeats this defense based in Christian doctrine:
1. Logical contradictions do not exist.
2. If x exists then x is not a logical contradiction (converse of 1)
3. Omnipotence entails the ability to directly create any contingent entity whose existence is logically possible.
4. There exist contingent free-willed souls in heaven who do not sin (e.g. the departed souls of faithful Christians). (Christian doctrine).
5. Therefore God's omnipotence entails the ability to directly create free-willed beings that do not sin.
6. Therefore God could have created a world of free-willed beings who do not sin
7. In this world, evil befalls the innocent due to the sinful acts of free-willed individuals
8. God created this world instead of a world of free willed beings that do not sin.
9. Therefore God chose a world with needless pain and suffering.
10. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent. — Relativist
.“Anyway, when the "problem of evil" is stated, there's over-emphasis on this physical world and its importance. Sure, this life matters, in the sense that how we conduct ourselves in it matters.
.
But this life and this world are a blip in timelessness. In fact, the long but finite sequence of lives that you're in is likewise only a blip in timelessness.”
.
The physical world’s existence is a universally held belief.
.The same cannot be said for the immaterial.
.Your claim that “this life and this world are a blip in timelessness” is an assertion that needs support – why do you believe this? Why should I believe it?
.“That’s an expression of your unsupported belief in the objective existence (whatever that would mean) of the objects that you believe in.
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What you’re claiming has nothing to do with verifiability or observation. It has everything to do with unsupported assertion of doctrinaire, dogmatic principle.”
.
Ontology is the branch of philosophy that deals with what exists. “Objective existence” just means it actually exists
., rather than merely hypothetically existing.
.That there exists an external, physical world is a properly basic belief, an epistemological foundation for all else.
.We are not taught that there is an external world
., we naturally recognize a distinction between our self and the external world of our perceptions.
.In other words, it is innate – practically everyone believes it.
.It is irrational to abandon a belief arbitrarily, or just because it is possibly false. Do you have an undercutting defeater for this belief of mine?
.Were you born with the belief that the external world is an illusion, or was your prior belief in an external world defeated by some fact you encountered?
.“you believe that there’s some (undisclosed by you) “ontic-reality” that can’t be explained by my explanation.”
.
I can’t judge that, since I haven’t assessed the ontology that you have hinted at.
.However, I question why you should believe your ontology is true.
.For example, you asserted “this life and this world are a blip in timelessness” – why think that?
.“Alright, what ontic-reality that be? Can you verify that there is that ontic-reality?”
.
I apply the principle of parsimony.
.The evidence for the existence of a physical world is extremely strong
., so that is a strong starting point for an ontology.
.I can’t rule out non-physical things existing
., but there’s no reason to believe it unless a good case can be made for it.
Verification of what? That your life and this physical world are real in the context of your life? No one denies that (…as I’ve said many, many times.)Regarding “verification” – I rely on my sensory input, and the instinctual way my brain processes this input such that I can sufficient sense of it that I (and my ancestors) have managed to survive to procreate. That’s enough verification for me.
.“there are abstract implications, at least in the sense that we can speak of them”
.
Sure, we can speak of them, but that doesn’t imply they have some sort of existence independent of the states of affairs in which they are instantiated.
.I know circular objects actually exist in the world. I do not know that “circles” exist independently of 1) circular objects
.[…or independently of…]
.
2) minds to contemplate states of affairs with the property “circular”.
.““objectively real”, whatever that would mean.”
It means that it actually exists as an entity.
.Ontology deals with what exists.
.“You’d have to be specific about what kind of “reality” or ontic status the physical world has”
.
Specifically: the physical world exists (the is probably the least controversial ontological claim anyone can make).
.“and isn’t had by the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story built of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and a mutually-consistent configuration of truth-values for those propositionswhich isn’t had by the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story built of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and a mutually-consistent configuration of truth-values for those propositions.”
.
Are you asking me to prove your ontology false?
.For the sake of argument (since I don’t know much about your ontology)
.I’ll assume your ontology is as coherent. That doesn’t make it true.
.I’ve examined D.M. Armstrong’s “States of Affairs” physicalist ontology and it also seems coherent. His seems much simpler, and more consistent with intuition than yours. Why should I accept yours?
.
“You’re the one advocating some undisclosed special ontic-reality or ontic-status for something (this physical world). I make no such claim about anything that can be described.”
.The physical world is the only thing I’m certain of.
.I don’t rule out the possibility that non-physical things exist
., but it seems irrational to believe something just because it is POSSIBLY true.
.A case must be made for it, not merely a set of assertions.
.“It isn’t clear what you think I’m claiming that logic is.”
I’ll refrain from guessing.
.Why don’t you tell me if you agree with the statement I made (“logic is an epistemological tool”)
.and tell me if you think there is anything more to it than that.
.– it entails no contradictions.
.What other abstract facts of logic do you have in mind? [in regards to physics]
.But yes, of course, I believe that the operation of the universe throughout its history have been consistent with this idealized physics. But I think you’re overlooking the key point: physics (as generally discussed) is descriptive. The fact that 2 electrons repel each other is not dependent on an abstract law that makes it so; rather, it is due to the intrinsic properties of the electrons.
.“I don’t claim the objective existence of our surroundings independent of us, the experiencer, the protagonist of our life-experience story. I’ve already clarified that. You’re repeating an already-answered objection. I’ve been saying that Consciousness, the experiencer, the protagonist, is primary, fundamental, and central to the logical system that I call your “life-experience possibility-story”.
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Good for you. I disagree. Shall we agree to disagree…
.…, or do you think you can show that your view is more worthy of belief than mine?
“Your objection about what they merely are, seems to be a way of saying that you believe that abstract facts would need to be something more ontologically powerful, in order to produce the objectively-existent “ontic reality” that you think that this physical world is. Is that your objection?”
.
.I’m saying that I believe abstractions are causally inert…
.and they actually exist only in their instantiations and in the minds of intelligent beings as a product of a mental exercise.
.“I suggest that this life and the physical world in which it is set, are completely insubstantial”
.
Why do you believe such a thing?
.This seems similar to someone claiming to be solipsist – one can’t prove them wrong, but there’s not really a good reason to abandon the basic world view that we have innately.
.one can’t prove them wrong
.“it would be meaningless to speculate about whether there’d be those abstract facts if there were no beings to whom for them to be apparent.”
It is relevant when discussing the nature of abstractions. Some people think triangles exist as platonic objects in a “third realm” or in the mind of God; others believe they exist only in their instantiations. These controversies may, or may not, be relevant to you – but they are not inherently “meaningless".
.Relativist:
“Your assertion isn’t the least persuasive, and in fact it merely seems dismissive – since you aren’t actually confronting the issues. “
.
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Michael: ” I confronted the “problem of evil” by pointing out that the evil societal world to which you refer is only one of infinitely-many hypothetical possibility-worlds, which are settings for infinitely-many life-experience-stories.”
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At best, you are giving me a reason why you reject the argument from evil. You have given me zero reason to reject it, and I doubt you could persuade anyone because your position depends on accepting some rather unconventional beliefs.
.“As I said, all that is a blip in timelessness.”
From my point of view, that is an incoherent statement.
.Timelessness is a term that I’ve seen applied to God and to abstract objects.
.Even if we assume those things exist, that doesn’t make the physical world a “blip in timelessness.”
.I accept that it probably makes sense in your world-view, but TBA…
.– I don’t see anything of interest in it, since it seems pretty far fetched.
8. God created this world instead of a world of free willed beings that do not sin.
9. Therefore God chose a world with needless pain and suffering.
10. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent. — Relativist
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