Is existence created from random chance or is it designed? — xxxdutchiexxx

This is not a philosophical question, but mathematical, since you are trying to find out what is the probability between two options. We can use Bayesian probability method to find the answer.

Based on generally accepted observations we have about our reality, there is either practical or an absolute 0% chance that we exist, ultimately, as a result of randomness. (Idea of macro evolution in a reality without God is ultimately a random process of creation, or in other words, result of randomness.)

"Based on generally accepted observations we have about our reality, there is either practical or an absolute 0% chance that we exist, ultimately, as a result of randomness. "
The prior probability of any specific world existing is infinitesmal (not strictly zero) and yet some world would have to exist, since SOMETHING has to exist.

The prior probability of any specific world existing is infinitesmal (not strictly zero) and yet some world would have to exist, since SOMETHING has to exist. — Relativist

The issue is about probability for created unit of reality to exist. We are created unit of reality, meaning we are created through a process, we don't exist as is in eternity.

With any other potential world, the issue is the same. Was that world created through a process or does that world exist as is in eternity? In any case, though, we exist and we are created. That means that there is practical or an absolute 0% probability that we are created through some random unconscious act of some other prior potential world.

If something has to exists, as you say, that includes possibility for God to exist, not exclusively some undefined world or worlds. And then, just taking into account randomness in our reality, we can conclude that there is practical or an absolute 100% chance that God, conscious creator of our reality, exists, since there's opposite probability that we exist as a result of randomness.

First, thank you for the kind words.

Platonism in mathematics is the view that abstract objects such as numbers are real independently of any act of thought on our part, but can only be grasped by the mind; ergo, real but immaterial (which is why Platonism poses a conceptual challenge to materialism). — Wayfarer

Yes. This is the view that Aristotle shows to be due to confusion in his definition of "quantity" in Metaphysics Delta. There he notes that there are no numbers in the physical world, only discrete realities, which are countable, and extended realities, which are measurable. So, numbers arise as a result of counting and measuring operations.

We teach children numbers by counting various kinds of things. When they realize that counting does not depend on what is being counted, they have abstracted the concept <number>. This seems very simple, and does not require us to posit unobservable, Platonic numbers with an ill-defined relation to enumerated objects. (Note that which object is #2 depends on the order in which we count the objects.)

This does not make the concept of number material, as the concept is result of a mental act (being aware of counting), and not merely a physical operation.

what Kant called the synthetic a priori - 'a proposition the predicate of which is not logically or analytically contained in the subject—i.e., synthetic—and the truth of which is verifiable independently of experience—i.e., a priori'. — Wayfarer

Kant was trying to avoid Hume's sound analysis of time-ordered causality as having no intrinsic necessity. Hume's conclusion was well-known to Aristotle. to Avicenna (Ibn Sina), and to Scholastic philosophers who called this kind of causality "accidental." Kant appears to have been ignorant of this tradition and thought that the idea that earlier states necessitate later states was universally accepted and so a synthetic a priori. As far as I can tell, everything we know is a posteriori wrt to the experiences underwriting it, even though if it is applied a priori thereafter.

Of course, there is a truly necessary kind of causality, called "essential causality" by the Scholastics. Aristotle's paradigm case of essential causality is: The builder building the house, which is identical with the house being built by the builder. In time-ordered or accidental causality we are dealing with two separate events, which, being separate, can have no necessary connection. in concurrent or essential causality we have a single event (the builder building the house) which can be distinguished into a cause (the builder building) and an effect (the house being built), which are are necessarily linked by identity.

The failure to grasp this led Kant to postulate a speculative structure that continues to distort philosophy. As accidental causality has no necessity, there is no sound argument for determinism in human choice. As essential causality is intrinsically necessity, Kant's critique of the cosmological argument fails when applied to the forms employed by Aristotle and Aquinas.

excellent mathematicians are able to see things that I simply cannot; and I don't think this is a matter of experience but of innate intellectual ability. — Wayfarer

I agree that we have diverse talents, but talents are not innate knowledge -- only an ability to deal with knowledge.

The issue is about probability for created unit of reality to exist.

I assume you're using "created" in the sense of a contingent being that is the product of causation.

With any other potential world, the issue is the same. Was that world created through a process or does that world exist as is in eternity? In any case, though, we exist and we are created. That means that there is practical or an absolute 0% probability that we are created through some random unconscious act of some other prior potential world.

Eternity can simply mean existing at all times, which is consistent with a finite past. A finite past implies an initial state, and cannot have been created: because for a thing to be created, it had to have not existed prior. There is no "prior" to the existence if time.

If something has to exists, as you say, that includes possibility for God to exist, not exclusively some undefined world or worlds. And then, just taking into account randomness in our reality, we can conclude that there is practical or an absolute 100% chance that God, conscious creator of our reality, exists, since there's opposite probability that we exist as a result of randomness.

I agree it is epistemically possible that god exists - this is just another of the "random" possibilities. I see no basis for claiming a god is more probable than a brute fact that results in our coming into existence. In fact, by your reasoning, it seems that "god" is nothing more than this brute fact that entails our existence.

The FTA is a probability argument that says what is more likely. For life as we know it to exist the odds of all the requirements happening as the did is astronomical on the orde of 52! For a cool explanation on how big that is go here.

https://czep.net/weblog/52cards.html

So here is the comparable thought experiment. You come into my house and see me sitting at a table with a deck of cards in front of me. You pick up the cards and begin to turn them over, and they are in order. Ace,2,3 etc all by suit. I give you 2 options of how that happened.

Option 1. I spent the last 10 minutes actively putting them in that order.

Option 2. I randomly shuffled the deck, and they ended that way.

I ask you decide which is a more likely event.

There are only two possibilities here, not a random amount of possibilities. Either process of creation is random or it's not random. And when we observe our world, I think that the only true conclusion is that it's either practically or absolutely impossible that creation of our reality is, ultimately, random, meaning without consciousness that drives the process of creation.

The only consciousness, ultimately, that can drive the process of creation of our reality is God, because that's what God is - eternal conscious creator of our reality. God is the reality, and then God creates a reality. Since God is, by definition, completely conscious from eternity past, meaning God was completely conscious always, God is not a result of randomness. We cannot understand how God can exist for eternity, as is, without creation through some random process of unconscious evolution, but there is no natural law that says that we have to understand everything about reality.

One can argue over God's identity, whether God has this or that characteristic, and make up billion possibilities, but all those possibilities would still be God. We could also make a theory about billion possible universes that randomly existed prior to ours, but all those possibilities would be uncounscious entities, random drivers of creation, and as such there would be practical or absolute 0% chance that any of those possibilities are the ultimate source of our reality.

It is not only possible that God exists. If we take into consideration accepted observations about our reality, God exists with highest certainty. If you don't want to take such consideration, it is still impossible to reasonably come to conclusion that there is more chance that God doesn't exist than that God does exist.

"The FTA is a probability argument that says what is more likely. For life as we know it to exist the odds of all the requirements happening as the did is astronomical on the orde of 52! "

The problem is that it's post hoc reasoning. Here's another post hoc analysis: you would not exist had your parents not gotten together and produced you. Each of your parents wouldn't exist had their parents not gotten together and so on- back through the generations of both your human and nonhuman ancestors. The odds are extemely low that all those specific pairs of indiviuals would have gotten together and produced the line of offspring that resulted in you. Your existence is therefore extremely unlikely.

The existence of life is similar: post hoc analysis show how unlikely it is, but had life not come to exist, other things would have existed. What's so special about life? It's special to us (just like your existence is special to you), but life (nor you) is not objectively special.

Your analysis depends on the assumption there is something objectively special about life. It's true that the odds are against the existence of life (unless there is a multiverse, which can't be ruled out), but the odds of any specific sort of existent is also extremely low.

Your analysis depends on the assumption there is something objectively special about life. — Relativist

I don't see it that way. My analysis here comes from applying probability thinking, defined within mathematics, that results in conclusion that there is almost or absolutely no chance that life is a result of random process.

That means that there is practically or absolutely 100% chance that source of our life is, ultimately, something other than randomness.

One can argue whether opposite to randomness is only God or there are some other possibilities. But I don't see what those other possibilities would be. I think that when we go through the issue, we come to only two possibilities - either randomness or God. Mind you, God here is not identified outside of fundamental meaning for God - eternal conscious creator of our reality.

"I don't see it that way. My analysis here comes from applying probability thinking, defined within mathematics, that results in conclusion that there is almost or absolutely no chance that life is a result of random process."
Life is not the result of a random process. It is the result of complexity arriving through stages of increasing complexity.

Consider the old claim that monkeys banging away randomly at keyboards would eventually produce the works of Shakespeare. The probability is low that monkeys hitting on keyboards will randomly produce Hamlet, but it is highly probable that they will accidentally produce some words. Imagine randomly selecting sets of words: it is improbable that random collections of words will organize into a play, but less improbable that phrases and then sentences will be produced, and so forth. As long as each stage of increasing complexity is viable, able to exist and be combined, further organization becomes inevitable.

disagree with your logic. Here is your scenario in FTA terms. I exist. What is the more likely reason for that observation. that my parents and grandparents did also exist, meet, etc. Or the stork brought me.

Secondly, for the purposes of FTA it is unimportant if you say we exist because of all these incredibly specific criteria. Or because of all these incredibly specific criteria we exist.

Again, FTA is not an argument that is a proof God exists. It is just taking verifiable observations, and testing those observations against possible hypothesis, and making a judgment on which you find more likely.

It actually doesn't work as a theistic prof, because it is inconsistent with sceptical theism. As a theist, I only like it because it shows a bias in atheism of discounting any argument that shows God as a possible answer, solely on a faith based belief that God does not exist. It is a juxtaposition I enjoy.

I agree that we have diverse talents, but talents are not innate knowledge -- only an ability to deal with knowledge. — Dfpolis

Thank you for the very clear explanation. I am not entirely persuaded by it, but it's given me a much better idea of the problem, and also where to look for further reflection on it.

The probability is low that monkeys hitting on keyboards will randomly produce Hamlet, but it is highly probable that they will accidentally produce some words. — Relativist

I think it's highly unlikely that they would produce anything at all unless they were trained to perform the action of pressing keys on the keyboard - which would undermine the point of the experiment. Otherwise there would be no reason why a chimp would perform any action whatever. Even then, the chance of them even producing a word would be very small.

You might just as well say: create an algorithm which produces random strings of alphabetical characters and then set it to run indefinitely. I can envisage such an algorithm running for millions of years without it producing a single phrase, let alone an entire play.

It is not only possible that God exists. If we take into consideration accepted observations about our reality, God exists with highest certainty. — Henri

There is a terminological issue which is frequently overlooked in discussions of whether God exists; which is whether the very word 'exists' is correct in respect of God in the first place. That is dealt with by the use of analogical language in Aquinas - that the manner of the existence of God is different from the manner of the existence of humans. So to say that 'God exists' is to reduce God to the level of phenomena; a point that was central to the theology of Paul Tillich.

' "Existence" refers to what is finite and fallen and cut of from its true being. Within the finite realm issues of conflict between, for example, autonomy and heteronomy abound (there are also conflicts between the formal/emotional and static/dynamic). Resolution of these conflicts lies in the essential realm (the Ground of Meaning/the Ground of Being) which humans are cut off from, yet also dependent upon ('In existence man is that finite being who is aware both of his belonging to and separation from the infinite' Therefore existence is estrangement.'

All that said, I agree with the comments in this thread that the 'fine-tuning argument' doesn't constitute a proof of God, as I don't think it is something that can ever be proven. But it is 'evidentiary' i.e.suggestive . The fact that many scientifically-inclined atheists are so eager to embrace the concept of the multiverse as an alternative is itself an indication of its effectiveness.

You might just as well say: create an algorithm which produces random strings of alphabetical characters and then set it to run indefinitely.

You are missing my point. There's a tendency to incredulouly look at life as magically appearing from primitive substances. But this overlooks the development of increasing complexity. So while it is highly unlikely that a living creature would come to exist from random processes applying to simple things, it is not unlikely for something more complex to arise from something that is somewhat less complex.

"The fact that many scientifically-inclined atheists are so eager to embrace the concept of the multiverse as an alternative is itself an indication of its effectiveness."
Hardly. Can you show it to be more probable that an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omnipresent being exists than a multiverse? My impression is that theists jump to the conclusion they already "knew" to be correct, while dismissing all alternatives. Earlier, someone said "yeah, but there's no evidence of a multiverse" - and yet they have no problem suggesting the answer is something else that lacks evidence: God.

"As a theist, I only like it because it shows a bias in atheism of discounting any argument that shows God as a possible answer, solely on a faith based belief that God does not exist. It is a juxtaposition I enjoy."

It reflects bias to dismiss one possibility due to lack of evidence, while embracing another that also lacks evidence. So it would be poor reasoning for an atheist to claim there must be a multiverse, and equally unreasonable to claim it must be God. We should therefore agree that both are possible, as far as we know. Right?

There's a tendency to incredulously look at life as magically appearing from primitive substances. But this overlooks the development of increasing complexity. So while it is highly unlikely that a living creature would come to exist from random processes applying to simple things, it is not unlikely for something more complex to arise from something that is somewhat less complex. — Relativist

And I think the counter to that is for anything to emerge, there has to be at least some order. Given that there is some order, then all kinds of things are possible. But if there were really no order, then the appearance of order would indeed be magical. And the point of the fine-tuning argument, as far as I understand it, is that the order that is observed in the Universe ultimately derives from a very small number of fundamental constraints - 'just six numbers', as has been said. So a natural theologian will always be able to argue that these constraints are pre-sets - and science really has no counter to that, as it's not a matter for science. Science can't get behind the order of nature, it can only theorise on the basis of the order that already exists.

Here's an interesting story. 'Big Bang' theory was originally developed by Georges Lemaître, a physicist who happened to be a Catholic priest. He first published it in an obscure journal and it didn't get a lot of attention. But as people began to take notice, there was a lot of push-back because it sounded too much like 'creation ex nihilo'. 'by 1951, Pope Pius XII declared that Lemaître's theory provided a scientific validation for Catholicism. However, Lemaître resented the Pope's proclamation, stating that the theory was neutral and there was neither a connection nor a contradiction between his religion and his theory. Lemaître and Daniel O'Connell, the Pope's scientific advisor, persuaded the Pope not to mention Creationism publicly, and to stop making proclamations about cosmology. While a devout Roman Catholic, he opposed mixing science with religion, although he held that the two fields were not in conflict' (Wikipedia).

I also noticed recently that Vera Rubin, the brilliant but under-rated cosmologist who first floated the idea of 'dark matter', 'was Jewish, and saw no conflict between science and religion. In an interview, she stated: "In my own life, my science and my religion are separate. I'm Jewish, and so religion to me is a kind of moral code and a kind of history. I try to do my science in a moral way, and, I believe that, ideally, science should be looked upon as something that helps us understand our role in the universe." (Wikipedia).

So in both these cases, here are religiously-minded scientists, who nevertheless have no wish or desire to argue the case for their faith on the basis of their scientific work, and also see no conflict between them. Whereas popular modern atheism is nearly always rooted in the argument that there is an inevitable and real conflict between science and religion - that it's either one or the other. But this is mainly based on a misunderstanding, which is the subject of a book by Karen Armstrong, The Case for God - not a Christian apologetics book but an analysis of the different 'ways of knowing' represented by 'mythos and logos', and how this distinction became lost in the early modern natural philosophy.

Can you show it to be more probable that an omniscient, omnipotent, omni-benevolent, omnipresent being exists than a multiverse? — Relativist

No, but I do suspect that those terms are essentially meaningless in this context.

As I said in the comment above this one, 'existence' is the wrong term for 'God'. Even if 'God' is real then God is not 'something that exists' in the sense that you're naturally inclined to understand by the term 'existence'. There is not anything 'out there' that answers to the name. This is the meaning of 'transcendent'.

As for 'lacking evidence' - this is really based on the question 'how can theists believe in "something invisible"? You know, the fairy-at-the-bottom-of-the-garden, the flying spaghetti monster, and all the other memes of Internet atheism. The point is, again, 'God' is not one term in an empirical hypothesis, not a cause in the sense that fire is the cause of heat or water the cause of rust. So, an appropriate theistic answer to the question of what evidence there is for God, is the fact of existence - that God is the reason that anything exists whatever. Not up there in some design lab, fashioning beetle wings or bacterium flagella, which again, is an unfortunate consequence of early modern natural philosophy.

Dawkins speaks scoffingly of a personal God, as though it were entirely obvious exactly what this might mean. He seems to imagine God, if not exactly with a white beard, then at least as some kind of chap, however supersized. He asks how this chap can speak to billions of people simultaneously, which is rather like wondering why, if Tony Blair is an octopus, he has only two arms. For Judeo-Christianity, God is not a person in the sense that Al Gore arguably is. Nor is he a principle, an entity, or ‘existent’: in one sense of that word it would be perfectly coherent for religious types to claim that God does not in fact exist. He is, rather, the condition of possibility of any entity whatsoever, including ourselves. He is the answer to why there is something rather than nothing. God and the universe do not add up to two, any more than my envy and my left foot constitute a pair of objects.

From Terry Eagleton's review of The God Delusion; and Eagleton is also not a religious apologist, but a British leftist literary critic.

The long and short is, that for anyone who doesn't accept the literal truth of biblical creationism, the fact that it's not literally true doesn't add up to much of an argument for anything, other than personal conviction.

It reflects bias to dismiss one possibility due to lack of evidence, while embracing another that also lacks evidence. So it would be poor reasoning for an atheist to claim there must be a multiverse, and equally unreasonable to claim it must be God. We should therefore agree that both are possible, as far as we know. Right? — Relativist

I think you are missing the main concept of FTA. It is not a proof, and does not present any evidence in support of any particular hypothesis. The only facts in it are the observations. We exist, these are the physical conditions that allow us to exist. It is just a question of does that system of events is designed is more or less probable than they were random, or some other explanation.

That there is a high degree of order and predictability to the universe seems beyond reasonable debate.

The usual argument is whether there is any degree of freedom or chance involved in the universe and to that I would argue the preponderance of evidence in modern science including quantum mechanics is there are degrees of freedom and unpredictability albeit quite small.


"The difference between no freedom and a little freedom is all the difference in the world" Charles Hartshorne process philosopher


Whether one attributes the order in the world or even existence itself to chance or to some concept of "God" does not seem a scientific question at all.

"I think you are missing the main concept of FTA. It is not a proof, and does not present any evidence in support of any particular hypothesis"

Do you understand that it is still an argument intended to persuade someone that God exists? Arguments needn't be deductive to do this. The FTA is presented as an abductive argument- an inference to the best explanation. God is an explanatory hypothesis, offered to explain "fine tuning". That is a reasonable approach, but to be persuasive it must be shown to be a better explanation than alternatives. In this case, an alternative is a multiverse. Of course, if you approach it with the prior belief that God exists - you will see no need to look further. I have no objection to that. But if you are going to claim this has some power of persuasion, you have to show why it's a better explanation.

I think the counter to that is for anything to emerge, there has to be at least some order.

The best explanation for the order is the existence of laws of nature.

the point of the fine-tuning argument, as far as I understand it, is that the order that is observed in the Universe ultimately derives from a very small number of fundamental constraints

That is not correct. The FTA is based on the obsevation that life as we know it would not exist had the constants been different.

Relativist: "Can you show it to be more probable that an omniscient, omnipotent, omni-benevolent, omnipresent being exists than a multiverse?

No, but I do suspect that those terms are essentially meaningless in this context

Then you should agree that the FTA has no persuasive power.

'existence' is the wrong term for 'God'. Even if 'God' is real then God is not 'something that exists' in the sense that you're naturally inclined to understand by the term 'existence'. There is not anything 'out there' that answers to the name. This is the meaning of 'transcendent'.

This seems a nuance one might consider after deciding there is a God.

The point is, again, 'God' is not one term in an empirical hypothesis, not a cause in the sense that fire is the cause of heat or water the cause of rust. So, an appropriate theistic answer to the question of what evidence there is for God, is the fact of existence - that God is the reason that anything exists whatever.

That's great rationalization for the absence of evidence for a God if he exists, but it doesn't provide a reason to think God, rather than (for example) multiverse is the reason for the alleged fine tuning for someone who is open to both possibilities (God's existence and nonexistence).

Regarding Dawkins: I have no interest in discussing his polemics.

That's great rationalization for the absence of evidence for a God if he exists, but it doesn't provide a reason to think God, rather than (for example) multiverse is the reason for the alleged fine tuning for someone who is open to both possibilities (God's existence and nonexistence). — Relativist

The point is, if God does exist, then the kind of difference it makes might really matter. I mean, I'm not a church-going type, but have nevertheless had Bible readings at my son's wedding and do reflect on what they mean. The whole Judeo-Christian heritage has become the focus of much of the philosophy of the Western tradition, and it's more than just a physics theory, or an internet argument for that matter. It's a basis for ethics and indeed the basis of Western civilization up till now. Whereas science as such doesn't and cannot provide a basis for values in that its concern is wholly and solely with quantitative data; bracketing out 'values' is part of its methodology.

Furthermore scientists can't even agree on whether 'the multiverse' is a legitimate theory at all. There is a huge controversy raging over this very point, which was kicked off by an OP in Nature called defending the integrity of physics. This article notes that the very idea of falsifiability is being called into question by string theory advocates. And the critics of these speculative metaphysical models say it makes no testable predictions and may never be either validated or falsified. Whereas, there are indeed first-person methods for ascertaining the truth-claims of religion.

One of the authors of the above OP also wrote a Scientific American cover story about 'the multiverse', DOES THE MULTIVERSE REALLY EXIST? By: Ellis, George F. R. Scientific American. Aug2011, Vol. 305 Issue 2, p38-43. It includes among the 'questionable arguments for the multiverse' this:

Fundamental constants are finely tuned for life. A remarkable fact about our universe is that physical constants have just the right values needed to allow for complex structures, including living things. Steven Weinberg, Martin Rees, Leonard Susskind and others contend that an exotic multiverse provides a tidy explanation for this apparent coincidence: if all possible values occur in a large enough collection of universes, then viable ones for life will surely be found somewhere.

Don't you think there is at least a slight inconsistency in declaring speculative model of trillions of universes a 'tidy explanation' for anything at all? It seems more like desperation to me.

But, I do agree it's a pointless debate, because it really does come down to dispositions. Some people have a religious or spiritual outlook on life, and some do not, and that is very rarely changed by discussion and debate.

Notice that in his conclusion, Ellis says:
"Nothing is wrong with scientifically based philosophical speculation, which is what multiverse proposals are. But we should name it for what it "

i do not claim belief in God is irrational, but I do think many of the arguments for God's existence (including the FTA) are problematic. It is problematic to claim that multiverse should be dismissed because it's "just" metaphysical speculation, when consideration of God is also metaphysical speculation.

That said, it can still be reasonable for a theist to look at fine tuning as the point at which God's hand in our existence can be seen. But recognize that this interpretation follows from a belief in God, it doesn't establish such a belief.

Life is not the result of a random process. It is the result of complexity arriving through stages of increasing complexity. — Relativist

The logical conclusion to make, exclusively based on probability, is that life is not the result of random process because God created it.

If you want to claim that "life is not not the result of random process" in a reality with no conscious creator of that life, no God, then that's absolutely not true. In such case life is absolutely the result of, ultimately, randomness.

In order to set one level of complexity, random materials are randomly working with other random materials, through randomly set "laws of nature", with the probability for that random process to result in a new, more complex and consistent unit of reality being near 0% or an absolute 0%. If it is even possible that new, more complex and consistent unit of reality comes into existence this way, that unit of reality now faces even greater hurdle of fighting the odds that newer, even more complex unit of reality will come out of it, through the next cycle of randomness.

With each next stage the already impossible odds diminish even more, exponentially.

When we get to a human, a highly complex being with highly complex consciousness, odds that such being came into existence through history of practically innumerable stages of gradual increases in complexity, driven by randomness, is practically or absolutely 0%.

There are various basic problems with the idea of macro evolution in a reality without God.

For example, we haven't observed a single case where a non-human being evolved into a human or other being with 100% observable and demonstrable human-like consciousness and abilities that result from that level of consciousness. So, based on our observations, nobody can claim that such feat has to be possible. In other words, not only is there a small chance for it to happen, it actually might not be even possible. The only way to claim that it has to be possible is to assume 100% chance that creator of our reality doesn't exist, but that's extremely bad assumption, because it is impossible to logically show that there is more chance that God doesn't exist than that God does exist.

Or the whole idea of "natural selection", for example. "Nature" doesn't consciously select anything, so the term is either directly or indirectly intended to deceive. But not only doesn't nature select things, natural environments themselves are an unconscious result of previous random processes (in a reality without God).

Much more importantly, what's ill labeled as "natural selection" is, within macro evolution paradigm, only a consequence of observable law of our reality which says - randomness produces new, more complex units of reality at the rate of near or an absolute 0%. The consequence of this law is that most random connections are either failures or status quo. Hence, "natural selection". Since it's a consequence of the nature of assumed possible change, it's not a driver of said change. As such, it is not a factor that should be taken into account, in any capacity, to explain the existence of change. In other words, what's deceptively labeled "natural selection" can only, theoretically, show the rate of proposed change, not the change itself.

There is a terminological issue which is frequently overlooked in discussions of whether God exists; which is whether the very word 'exists' is correct in respect of God in the first place. — Wayfarer

I get your point. What do you propose as solution? If not to say "God exists", what to say then? Maybe I missed it in your post...

For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power. — Relativist

Clearly, it does. To quote mathematician and astronomer Bernard Carr, "If you don't want God, you better have a multiverse!" This shows both the persuasive power of the FTA and the shabby motivation for positing a multiverse.

The fact that you bring up intentionality demonstrates that you aren't judging the FTA apart from your related beliefs. — Relativist

Of course I hold related positions. However, I'm not relying on the fact that i can prove the existence of God in a number of sound ways to judge the FTA. Examine the arguments I gave, and you will find no such dependence. Further, I reject a number of arguments for the existence of God as both unsound and as making bad cases, e.g. the Kalam cosmological argument and Anselm's ontological argument. So, please avoid red herrings and stick to my actual reasoning.

it is also possible that the world is simple a brute fact — Relativist

Only if you reject the fundamental principle of science, viz. that every phenomenon has an adequate, dynamical explanation. If you start allowing exceptions to this principle, science becomes impossible. Imagine Antoine Henri Becquerel presenting his discovery of radiation at a scientific conference. He says that the image of a key appeared on a photographic plate kept in his drawer with a sample of pitchblende, and concludes that it is caused by a new aspect of reality, which he is calling "radiation." Someone in the back of the hall stands up and says, "But, my dear Professor, this may be one of those phenomena that has no explanation -- a brute fact." What is Becquerel to say but, "All phenomena have an adequate cause. The idea of brute facts est tout simplement fou!"

1) How is it not arbitrary to label any state as a "definite end" or "final state", if every state will evolve to another through a potentially infinite future? — Relativist

As I tried to indicate in my original statement, "final state" is a term of art in physics. It need not, and generally does not, name what happens at the "end of time" or infinitely far in the future, but only the state at the end of the process we're considering. In the same way, my arrival at the store is not the end of intentional guidance in my life, but only the end of the segment we're considering.

2) How would one distinguish a non-intentional state from an intentional one? I ask because your claims seem based on the assumption of intentionality ("knowing" that God did it) rather than demonstrating it. — Relativist

I did not use the existence of God as a premise in arguing that the laws of nature exhibit intentionality. If you read what I wrote, I started with Brentano's analysis of intentionality in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. showing that it is characterized by "aboutness" and then showed that the laws of nature have the same kind of aboutness.

So, we distinguish aspects of reality into those possessing "aboutness" and those not possessing "aboutness." A stone is not about anything. It doesn't "point" to anything beyond itself -- it's just a stone. An idea is about its real and potential instances. A commitment is about what we commit to.

There's also no scientific support for intentionality or God. — Relativist

Right -- if by "scientific" you mean "in the purview natural science." As I said in another post, (1) the fundamental abstraction of natural science leaves it bereft of data on intentionality, and (2) no science proves its own premises. Examining the foundations of physics belongs to metaphysics, just as examining the foundations of arithmetic belongs to metamathematics. It is metaphysics, in examining the foundations of physics, that deduces the existence of God.

You seem to be doing exactly what I anticipated: only considering metaphysical possibility to admit God into consideration, and refusing to admit it for anything else. — Relativist

1. I do not use metaphysical possibility to argue the existence of God. I only use actual being.

2. I do use the logical possibility of a multiverse as one reason to say that the FTA is not a sound proof, only a persuasive case.

3. As I have pointed out a couple of times recently, possibility is not information. Information is the reduction of possibility.

We only have to consider actual evidence

Then this removes God from consideration. — Relativist

No, it does not. The point of discussing the FTA is to consider whether it points to evidence for the existence of God, and if so, how strong that evidence is. To say flatly that there is no evidence is to beg the question under consideration.

More broadly, there are sound, evidence-based deductive arguments for the existence of God. I give one in my video: #15 God & Scientific Explanation - Existence Proof (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJUIxaSDfU0). I provide a more formal proof in the appendix of my book, God, Science and Mind: The Irrationality of Naturalism.

Possible worlds is just a semantics for discussing modal claims. — Relativist

Yes, it is. Nonetheless, it's ill-defined and lacks an adequate epistemic foundation.

ou are inconsistent in your use of modality. What exactly is the modality you propose to use to "baselessly" (without evidence) propose God as the solution? — Relativist

I can't make sense of this. You don't give any example of my modal errors. You assume that my discussion of God is "baseless." Finally, you speak of a solution without specifying the problem.

For God to be the answer, God must be "possible" and possibility entails a modality. — Relativist

Yes, but since we can show that God existsl, we know that the existence of God must be possible, as nothing impossible can be actual. My philosophical claims about God are categorical, not conditional.

But whatever modality you use, consistency demands using the same modality to consider multiverse. — Relativist

I do. I demand evidence of actual existence to credit a multiverse, just as I do for the existence of God.

Snowflakes depends on a variety of elements — Relativist

The last time I looked, snow is a form of H2O and sand is mostly SiO2. There is nothing about a planet that requires heavier elements for its formation.

it is epistemically possible that a metaphysically necessary God exists. — Relativist

For some people; nonetheless, it is metaphysically certain that God exists and is metaphysically necessary.

The issue is that "essence" is a concept based on a primitive analysis of human-ness and dog-ness (etc). — Relativist

"Primitive" is not an objection, but a term of irrational derision. The relevant question is, is there an objective basis for the fact that you evoke my concept <human>, and Fido evokes my concept <dog>? If there is, then by Aristotle's definition, you have an "essence,"i.e. a foundation in reality for the species concept you evoke. The fact that you also have DNA, a blood type, neural activity, an evolutionary history, etc. does not change the fact that when I see you, I think <human>.

If everything that makes us human or dog is an accident (as genetics and evolution suggest) then there is no reason to think there IS such a thing. — Relativist

Our nature is not "an accident" in the sense of being random. Physics sees all unobserved processes (including the evolution of species) as fully deterministic -- not random.

On the other hand, if you're opposing "accident" to "substance," these are not opposing concepts. Aristotle defines a substance (ousia) as an ostensible unity -- a whole we can point out. Your whole being includes all of your "accidents" -- all of the things that can be said of you -- your height weight, hair color, genetic code, etc., etc.

Finally, whatever our genesis or mode of analysis, it is an experiential fact that billions of individuals have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human> -- while trillions more do not.

my original issue is that the existence of "essence" is an assumption. — Relativist

It's "an assumption" that the billions of people on earth have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human>? I can't agree. For me, it is an experiential fact.

Again: every metaphysical theory depends on assumptions. — Relativist

Thank you for sharing your faith.

You denied the concept is related to DNA — Relativist

You seem confused. DNA encodes out physical structure, and that structure goes into evoking the concept <human>. Still, to know that you're human, I don't need to know about your DNA. So, while DNA is a cause of what you are, it's not part of most people's concept <human>.

As I have also said, there is nothing predetermined about our concepts. They arise from our individual and cultural experience. So, it might well be that some people's concept <human> includes having the right DNA. Still, I doubt that anyone would reserve judgement on your humanity until they got your lab results.

Seriously, do you not understand that this is a postulated pardigm? — Relativist

It depends what you mean by "postulated." If you mean fundamental concepts abstracted from reality, I agree that essence and existence, potency and act, substance and accident, etc are such concepts. If you mean put forward as unjustified speculative starting points, then that is far from the case.

Earlier I referenced Armstrong's ontology. He accounts for existents differently, and it's every bit as complete and coherent. — Relativist

I have already agreed that we may project the same reality into different conceptual spaces. So if you want to project reality into the conceptual space of physics, interpersonal dynamics, networks of events, sequences of states of affairs, etc., etc, I say go for it. I don't see that any conceptual space, including those of Aristotle or Aquinas is "complete," i.e. capable of exhaustively spanning human experience.

I do demand, however, that whatever conceptual space we use, it has a foundation in reality. That it's not the result of speculative postulation a la Kant's transcendental idealism.

one can't "prove" any particular "conceptual space" is true. — Relativist

Conceptual spaces are like vocabularies. Vocabularies are not true or false, though they may be more or less adequate to expressing what we know is true or false.

What is properly true or false is judgements we make about reality, and the propositions that express those judgements. Whenever we prove anything, we need unproven premises as starting points. Still, "unproven" need not mean "unknown." We can know some truths directly, by reflecting on experience. And we can show other people their truth by leading them to look at their corresponding experiences in a similar way.

So, we can have a structured knowledge that is not merely possible, but known to be true -- but only if we are open to reality.

Relativist: "Life is not the result of a random process. It is the result of complexity arriving through stages of increasing complexity. "

The logical conclusion to make, exclusively based on probability, is that life is not the result of random process because God created it.

I am addressing the argument from incredulity that arises from considering only the two endpoints: the quantum fields (as an example of what may be fundamental) and the existence of conscious life. It's hard to imagine how life could have just "happened" from random behavior of quantum fields. However, if one considers the natural processes that give rise to increasing complexity, it's not so incredible after all.

In order to set one level of complexity, random materials are randomly working with other random materials, through randomly set "laws of nature", with the probability for that random process to result in a new, more complex and consistent unit of reality being near 0% or an absolute 0%.

Laws of nature are not "randomly set, " they just are what they are, although they may manifest themselves differently depending on the context.

A metaphysical investigation should start with what we know (in the loose sense of "know"), and we know that there are laws of nature. There is nothing impossible, or even surprising, about the fact that these laws of nature (as we know them) led to the existence of complex, functional entities. Hydrogen is more complex than the quantized quark and electron fields from which it arises. Stars are more complex than the hydrogen of which they are mostly composed. The heavy elements produced by novae are more complex than the lighter elements that fuse to form them. Planets are more complex than the individual elements that coalesce into them. ... No laws of nature are broken anywhere in the chain, and yet complex functional units arise. And it's wrong to call this a product of randomness - because they occur as a consequence of the laws of nature.

For example, we haven't observed a single case where a non-human being evolved into a human or other being with 100% observable and demonstrable human-like consciousness and abilities that result from that level of consciousness.

You're going from a bad argument to a worse one. I'm not interested in debating evolution with someone who is so ill-informed.

You don't have to engage. You still don't have any good argument for your position.

Again, it is impossible to logically show that there is more chance that God doesn't exist than that God does exist. That can be the starting point in understanding anything else.

You presume that because small change within a unit of reality is observable (skin color, for example), an undefined high degree of change must be possible (one that includes going from non-life to human life as the idea of macro evolution states, for example). That's not logically correct. I could use the same "argument" as yours - you are going from a bad argument to a worse one, and I'm not interested in debating evolution with someone who is so ill-informed - and at least it wouldn't be empty.

By the way, laws of nature are certainly randomly set, if they weren't set by conscious creator. That's the definition of random. You can't explain reality with "it is what it is" as an argument.

If not to say "God exists", what to say then? — Henri

'Is' might suffice ;-)

Dfpolis: "We only have to consider actual evidence "
Relativist: "Then this removes God from consideration."

No, it does not The point of discussing the FTA is to consider whether it points to evidence for the existence of God, and if so, how strong that evidence is. To say flatly that there is no evidence is to beg the question under consideration

Your wording is loose. The FTA doesn't point to evidence, it fits a hypothesis to a set of facts. This is abductive reasoning, specifically: inference to the best explanation. A reasonable abduction requires that other explanations be considered - you have to test how well the facts fit the alternatives.
If there's a God, it's reasonable to infer that the "finely tuned" constants may be an act of intentionality by God. But if there's no God, there are two sub-possibilities: 1) there are many universes, each with different constants, so it's reasonable to expect some would be life permitting. 2) life is an accidental byproduct of the nature of this universe, with no objective significance or importance.

Your response to #1 is that multiverse is not entailed by known physics. Obviously, neither is God, so this fact doesn't serve to make God more likely. With regard to #2, the only response I've noticed is your claim that life entails a coincidence - but you haven't specified anything that life is coincident with.

Relativist: "For the FTA to have any utility, it needs to have some persuasive power."

Clearly, it does.

Assertion without evidence. You quoted Carr, but all he does is to put the God hypothesis on par with multiverse - indicating both are metaphysical claims. Carr hasn't even considered #2, so I'll give you another quote:

“If you imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This is an interesting world I find myself in — an interesting hole I find myself in — fits me rather neatly, doesn't it? In fact it fits me staggeringly well, must have been made to have me in it!" (Douglas Adams)

Relativist:" it is also possible that the world is simply a brute fact"
Only if you reject the fundamental principle of science, viz. that every phenomenon has an adequate, dynamical explanation.

Every phenomenon is explainable because there is natural law. How do we explain natural law? That's a metaphysical question, who's answer depends on the metaphysical assumptions you make (despite the fact that you deny there are metaphysical assumptions, but more on that later). Physicalism with the assumption of a finite past entails an initial, uncaused state, a state that entails the natural law that determines the subsequent states of the universe. That initial state, inclusive of its properties, would be a brute fact.

I started with Brentano's analysis of intentionality in Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt. showing that it is characterized by "aboutness" and then showed that the laws of nature have the same kind of aboutness

All this does is to show that the God hypothesis fits the facts, as I described in the first portion of this post. You have to show this more likely than the two "not-God" alternatives.

It is metaphysics, in examining the foundations of physics, that deduces the existence of God.

That deduction is contingent upon metaphysical assumptions. Obviously, physicalist metaphysics does not entail God.

1. I do not use metaphysical possibility to argue the existence of God. I only use actual being.

You have made no such argument in this thread, so this seems moot.

2. I do use the logical possibility of a multiverse as one reason to say that the FTA is not a sound proof, only a persuasive case.

The persuasiveness of your claim is similar as Johnny Cochran's persuasive case for O.J.'s innocence: convince the jury to ignore the full picture. "if the glove does not fit, you must acquit"; "God provides an answer, so look no further." Your challenge is to show that the God possibility is a better explanation for each of the not-God possibilities I presented.

3. As I have pointed out a couple of times recently, possibility is not information. Information is the reduction of possibility

I have no idea what you're talking about.

More broadly, there are sound, evidence-based deductive arguments for the existence of God.

Perhaps there are, but we're discussing the failure of the FTA specifically.

I can't make sense of this. You don't give any example of my modal errors. You assume that my discussion of God is "baseless." Finally, you speak of a solution without specifying the problem.

Here's the problem: Removing multiverse from consideration because it's not entailed by accepted science is equivalent to saying the multiverse is (narrowly) physically impossible (a modal claim). Then you proceed to claim this makes a persuasive case for the God hypothesis, despite God also being physically impossible (your solution must be implicitly "possible" to be considered, but clearly it's not the same modality of possibility). I admit you hadn't couched it in these terms, so I'm happy to rephrase the error as a special pleading if you prefer.

Yes, but since we can show that God exists, we know that the existence of God must be possible, as nothing impossible can be actual. My philosophical claims about God are categorical, not conditional.

We can show God exists?! Are you referring to some other, unstated argument? I'd be happy to discuss these at some point, but let's first complete our FTA discussion, and clearly one can't assume God exists if one is to claim the FTA makes a persuasive case for God's existence - that would be circular. We have to approach it abductively, but then you need to meet the challenge of comparing it to the 2 "not-God" hypotheses.

I demand evidence of actual existence to credit a multiverse, just as I do for the existence of God

That would be interesting to discuss, but I'm discussing an evaluation of the FTA without presumption - and it is presumptive to assume God exists when approaching the FTA. If you're willing to agree the FTA fails such an evaluation, then we can move on to the evidence you have for God outside the FTA.

The last time I looked, snow is a form of H2O and sand is mostly SiO2. There is nothing about a
planet that requires heavier elements for its formation.

Regarding snowflakes: snow and liquid water are not in the form of individual snowflakes any more than humans are just a hodgepodge of water and hydrocarbons. Regarding sandstone: Silicon and oxygen are only produced through fusion in large stars, in novae; quartz (silica) particles are the predominant mineral in standstone, but the quartz has been particalized and compacted over time- which depends on a series of activities and environments.

It's "an assumption" that the billions of people on earth have the objective capacity to evoke the concept <human>? I can't agree. For me, it is an experiential fact.

It is a concept that's vague, in the context of evolutionary history - as I pointed out.

Relativist: "every metaphysical theory depends on assumptions. "

Thank you for sharing your faith.

I'm stating an belief that I'm pretty confident of, but I invite you to prove me wrong by agreeing that physicalist metaphysics does not depend on assumption.

You seem confused. DNA encodes out physical structure, and that structure goes into evoking the concept <human>. Still, to know that you're human, I don't need to know about your DNA. So, while DNA is a cause of what you are, it's not part of most people's concept <human>.

If you can't draw a sharp line between human and non-human in your ancestral line, then your concept of "human" is flawed.

It depends what you mean by "postulated." If you mean fundamental concepts abstracted from reality, I agree that essence and existence, potency and act, substance and accident, etc are such concepts. If you mean put forward as unjustified speculative starting points, then that is far from the case.

The postulates are well thought out, but they are postulates nonetheless. Here's a postulate of Armstrong's ontology: everything that exists consists of a particular with properties. i.e. properties do not exist independent of the particulars that have them. Causation is a spatio-temporal relation between particulars (due to laws of nature). Under this account "pure act" cannot exist, because it does not entail particulars with relations between them. See what I mean about assumptions?

Again, it is impossible to logically show that there is more chance that God doesn't exist than that God does exist. That can be the starting point in understanding anything else.

You're reversing the burden of proof. The FTA purports to show God's existence is likely. It fails to do that. It's failure has no bearing on whether or not God exists, and I've made no claim that it does.