It seemed quite clear to me, so perhaps you could point me to the parts which seem unclear to you. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sure, organisms are "agents", but we need an agent which acts as the cause of the organism. If the material body is an organism, and semiosis is responsible for the existence of this living material body, then the agent which practises the semiosis which brings this material body into existence must be immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why do we need "an agent which acts as the cause of the organism" as opposed to the physical conditions that give rise to the organism. — Janus
Why do you say that semioisis independently of (presumably) physical conditions are "responsible for the existence of this living body"? — Janus
Are you rejecting the idea that semiosis could be part of the physical conditions or the idea that physical conditions themselves just are signs? — Janus
What else could physical conditions be but signs? — Janus
Do you agree that the organism, as a physical body consists of semiotic activities? — Metaphysician Undercover
We describe physical conditions by interpreting things, but the things themselves, the physical conditions, are not described as an interpretation of signs, they are described as "what is". — Metaphysician Undercover
I'll agree that all physical conditions are signs. But do you understand that this necessitates the conclusion that something non-physical existed prior to the first physical condition, to create the first physical condition as a sign? — Metaphysician Undercover
If all physical processes are counted as being semiotic activities, then yes. — Janus
In fact they are not described at all, but merely defined as what is. All that can be described are processes, signs. What reason do we have to think there is a brute in itself physicality apart from the in-formed things we experience, and which are signs; that is, can only be understood as relations and processes. — Janus
This is just the old familiar 'first cause' or 'unmoved mover' argument. — Janus
It presumes that nature must conform to the demands of our logic, which is not something that is capable of demonstration. — Janus
You are assuming that the physical cannot be self-caused, but what argument can you offer to support that assumption? — Janus
When you ask me to tell the truth, you are asking me to be honest, to tell you what I truly believe, and not be deceptive. You are not asking me for an account relative to your concern, it is strictly my concern which you are asking for, what I believe. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is being honest with oneself. — Metaphysician Undercover
But now you're using "truth in a completely different way, to refer to a relationship between our knowledge and reality. Above, truth is to honestly represent one's own experience — Metaphysician Undercover
then reality must be experience — Metaphysician Undercover
GIven your biological interests, I wonder if you would like to read in my article, "Mind or Randomness in Evolution"...As a physicist, I would like a biological perspective. — Dfpolis
But if you assume that the agent is part of the non-living physical existence, then you just defer the problem such that the agent must be prior to all physical existence. Dfpolis seems to be arguing in this direction, assuming that the agent with the attribute "desire", inheres within matter itself. So when matter came into existence it already had the agent which is responsible for giving it form inherent within it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now we have the 'dynamic interaction' problem, which seems insoluble. — Janus
I also don't agree with you that physicality is manifestly "brute", — Janus
The problem is that modern monists reintroduce this so-called "dynamic interaction" problem without a proper understanding of dualist principles, therefore without realizing that it really isn't a problem at all. — Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps I don't know what you mean by "brute", but I think that this term is generally defined in relation to matter, "brute matter", meaning without mind, like matter. — Metaphysician Undercover
Nothing you have said explains how the problem of interaction is purportedly dispelled. — Janus
Yes, but the way you talk about it is in tendentious terms that already imply the reified notion of mind as substance which is separate from matter. — Janus
When Aristotle mentioned this in Physics Bk.1, ch.9, he is talking about how others, specifically Platonists, described the existence of contraries. — Metaphysician Undercover
But later Platonism, and Aristotle redefined "matter", such that it is entirely passive. — Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle's Metaphysics you'll see that matter receives form, form being the active part of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
matter is defined as the underlying thing which does not change when change occurs — Metaphysician Undercover
This produces the separation between material cause and final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
I've noticed your YouTube channel, and am interested in becoming somewhat familiar with your views on intentionality and mind as time permits. — Galuchat
My understanding of intentionality comes from the Scholastic tradition via Brentano. A key to my approach is the recognition that, as the laws of nature and human acts of will are both species of intentionality, they are in the same theater of operation. — Dfpolis
By "subjective awareness" do you intend to posit something radically separate from the physical? What if the objective and subjective accounts of human nature are simply two incommensurable accounts of the one thing? — Janus
If I make a statement and we are to judge the relation between the reality of what's in my mind, and the representation (the statement) for adequacy, how are we to judge this? — Metaphysician Undercover
Do we judge it as adequate for my purpose, or adequate for your purpose? — Metaphysician Undercover
As I said at the beginning of the post, when someone asks me to tell the truth, I think they want me to refer to my experience. You think that they want me to refer to reality. So I think you've reduced reality to experience — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you panpsychist? — Metaphysician Undercover
This is not neutral monism, because real substances -- people like you and I -- are never "neutral." We are wholes that act both intentionally and physically. This does not imply the existence of an underlying neutral "stuff." — Dfpolis
So until you tell me exactly what you think the problem is, I can't tell you where your misunderstanding lies. — Metaphysician Undercover
I wouldn't say that the terms are tendentious, they are just the terms by which an understanding is reached. If you deny the usage you will never develop an understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no evidence of anything self-caused, that is an instance of allowing your logic to go off into phantasy land, not being constrained by the evidence of brute physicality. The notion of "self-caused" is actually contradictory and ought to be dismissed as such. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you have a reference in Aristotle for this? And, how can a completely passive matter solve the problem he discusses in Physics i,9? — Dfpolis
In artifacts matter does receive its form passively from the artificer, In natural processes the role of matter is very different. — Dfpolis
Aristotle defines nature (physis) as an intrinsic principle of activity and tells us that matter (hyle) is a kind of physis -- and so a principle of activity rather than passivity. If you say matter is passive in natural processes, you confuse natural objects with artifacts, while Aristotle takes great care to distinguish them. — Dfpolis
So, where in the Metaphysics do you see the matter of a natural process passively receiving form? — Dfpolis
Only substance (ousia) changes -- substantially or accidentally. — Dfpolis
He notes that the original form cannot explain it, because then it would have to work for its own destruction, Nor can the new, contrary, form explain it, because it's not actual (=operational) yet. So, all we have left is hyle, which must act to bring about the new form. — Dfpolis
If you can tell me how dual substances are thought to interact then I'll be keen to hear it. — Janus
Why would it be any stranger to say the universe might be self-caused than it is to say that God is self-caused? — Janus
Were the first cause not uncaused, it wouldn’t be called ‘the first cause’. That's what makes it, you know, special. — Wayfarer
You'll have to tell me where you see a problem first. It is a common occurrence that one substance acts on another, so you'll have to be more specific. Here's an example, you tell me where the problem lies. Suppose it rains a lot, and the water washes out the ground. The water is one substance, and the ground another. It's called "erosion", one substance acts on another substance. Why do you think that interaction between dual substances is a problem? — Metaphysician Undercover
I've never seen it said by a knowledgeable theologian, that God is self-caused. If I saw that, I would say it's contradictory, and reject it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Are you playing the sophist now? Clearly i have been referring to the two purportedly fundamental substances of dualism. I haven't said there is an interaction problem when it comes to so-called physical substances. In fact I have said precisely the opposite. — Janus
Again, I believe you know very well what I meant and are indulging in sophistry. Why would it be any stranger to say that the universe is uncaused than it is to say God is uncaused? — Janus
the two opposing contraries are both of the formula, i.e. formal. This is evident in logic, being and not being, is and is not, has and has not. Matter cannot be opposed to form, so it is categorically different. — Metaphysician Undercover
Matter, being categorically different is therefore passive — Metaphysician Undercover
I do not see this difference between "matter" in an artificial thing, and "matter" in a natural thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see how you could argue that Aristotle claims that there's a different concept of "matter" for artificial things from the one for natural things. That would be blatant inconsistency, which Aristotle avoids. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why don't you read some of this stuff? — Metaphysician Undercover
I think where he actually says matter receives form is prior to this — Metaphysician Undercover
substance consists of matter and form, and it is the form which changes. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, hyle is not all we have left — Metaphysician Undercover
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