Maybe you can answer the question he is not answering then. :lol:

What is experience if not information; and conversely what is information if not some kind of experience? Information in-forms entities, that is changes them, and so all change is relational. Change is experienced in different ways by different entities, and talk of interiority even in the case of biological entities, even humans, is a relative matter, not an absolute one. I am not a "Whiteheadian"; I am not claiming his philosophy is the "absolute truth": I find his perspective on things interesting, is all. I find it puzzling that you are so dismissive of it, becoming almost shrill at times, more apo-plectic than apo-kritical. :rofl:

But we have good reason to credit humans with "experience", even if it is just a folk psychology term. We know what we mean by the word, and we know what to expect of organisms with the kind of complex nervous systems to have it. — apokrisis

We know what we mean when we says things like "The cliff experienced the erosive force of the wind and rain" , or "the electron experiences the attraction of the nucleus". Human experience is a difference of degree not an absolute difference of kind. Of course I am not denying the relative difference of kind between biological and non-biological experience.

What is experience if not information; and conversely what is information if not some kind of experience? — Janus

Great. First step taken. Now how are you going to continue on to show they are two ways of talking about the same thing?

Information in-forms entities, that is changes them, and so all change is relational. — Janus

You mean like the standard Batesonian definition - the difference that makes a difference?

Change is experienced in different ways by different entities, and talk of interiority even in the case of biological entities, even humans, is a relative matter, not an absolute one. — Janus

So change is experienced in different fashions. But let's not suddenly abandon the position you were starting to develop. What does all such experience have in common? You seem to think it might be ... life ... and interiority.

I would say semiotics agrees. But pan-experientialism wants to say something else.

Apparently electrons are also alive and have minds according to Whiteheadians. A baffling leap indeed.

Well, @prothero's angle is that the kind of experience enjoyed by electrons is the non-conscious kind. And so we should indeed expect it to make no difference to their physical behaviour.

And yet the great advantage of Whiteheadian experiential physics is that it does away with the usual dualistic charge of epiphenomenalism. Somehow. Even though the non-conscious experience of electron now makes their experience as epiphenomenal as it could get.

Gee. This Whiteheadian metaphysics really seems something. If you contradict a contradiction, do you arrive at the truth? ;)

We know what we mean when we says things like "The cliff experienced the erosive force of the wind and rain" , or "the electron experiences the attraction of the nucleus". — Janus

Yeah. We don't mean the cliff or the electron are alive, model their worlds in terms of some interior system of sign, and hence felt something one way or the other.

So we can all cope with anthropomorphic analogy in everyday language. Just because we talk like the animists of old, doesn't mean we are metaphysical animists.

Human experience is a difference of degree not an absolute difference of kind. — Janus

That would be news to a lot of folk. If they experience erosion, they tend to go "ow". We would understand their behaviour as telling us something that is a lot more than just the physics of friction and fragmentation.

Now how are you going to continue on to show they are two ways of talking about the same thing? — apokrisis

Information is a difference that makes a difference. Making a difference is producing a change. In the broadest understanding of experience it just is change.

You seem to think it might be ... life ... and interiority. — apokrisis

That is one kind of experience and the experience of a rock or electron might be another kind of experience, but, as I said earlier the difference in kind between life and non-life is a relative one, on Whitehead's view, not an absolutely radical one. So, in this view there would be a continuity all the way form non-life to life.

Anything that is affected has some kind of "interiority"; rocks will be affected according to their internal constitution, and so will electrons. This is not animism, though, since it acknowledges the almost negligible sense in which things like rocks and electrons could be said to have an "interiority".

And that's why this is wrong:

Even though the non-conscious experience of electron now makes their experience as epiphenomenal as it could get. — apokrisis

Because their experience, though of course non-conscious, and however minimal, and which is determined by their own constitution, is not epiphenomenal precisely because it is what determines how they will respond to any affect.

That is one kind of experience and the experience of a rock or electron might be another kind of experience — Janus

OK. So define this other kind. What would be its difference that makes it a difference, while also not being different?

You keep waving a hand vaguely. I am asking for a reason to take this seriously as some form of counterfactual-based claim.

but, as I said earlier the difference in kind between life and non-life is a relative one, on Whitehead's view, not an absolutely radical one. — Janus

Handwaving.

I made a clear distinction between biosemiosis and pansemiosis. To the degree that the physical world is constrained by an informational model, all the information is on the "outside" of any supposed entities. Whereas with life and mind, it is actually encoded inside the organism as information stored in a memory.

So I provide the story that underwrites the continuity - semiosis as a generalised causal mechanism based on the information~entropy distinction. And also the story that accounts for the discontinuity - the epistemic cut which distinguishes the actually living and mindful from the non-living and non-mindful.

And it is not as if biosemiosis is not already being incorporated into science - https://link.springer.com/journal/12304/11/1/page/1

If you want Whitehead to be granted a similar respect, you would need to start being specific about how it is actually suppose to work.

Everyone knows that life and mind arise from the physical realm that is nature. So there is a continuity somehow. But also a discontinuity somehow. To say that it is a relative divide - that it is a mix of the continuous and the discontinuous - is thus utterly vacuous. We already know this is the case. I am asking you how all this waffle about "non-conscious experience" takes things any further.

Semiosis clearly does take current physicalism further. That is why it is catching on in science.

Anything that is affected has some kind of "interiority"; rocks will be affected according to their internal constitution, and so will electrons. This is not animism, though, since it acknowledges the almost negligible sense in which things like rocks and electrons could be said to have an "interiority". — Janus

Waffle.

Because their experience, though of course non-conscious, and however minimal, and which is determined by their own constitution, is not epiphenomenal precisely because it is what determines how they will respond to any affect. — Janus

So what is experience when it is also non-conscious? C'mon. Seriously now. Address my actual question.

Of course rocks have some kind of internal structure. But in what sense does that structure model anything?

And are you saying electrons have internal structure? This might be news to particle physics. You best explain.

Of course rocks have some kind of internal structure. But in what sense does that structure model anything? — apokrisis

You have to define what you mean by modeling, and specifically what is "happening" during this "modelling".

Yes. Sorry to drop such arcane concepts into the conversation. For all those without access to google, here's a link that might just help - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_modelling

Right, so from your source here:

Scientific modelling is a scientific activity, the aim of which is to make a particular part or feature of the world easier to understand, define, quantify, visualize, or simulate by referencing it to existing and usually commonly accepted knowledge. It requires selecting and identifying relevant aspects of a situation in the real world and then using different types of models for different aims, such as conceptual models to better understand, operational models to operationalize, mathematical models to quantify, and graphical models to visualize the subject. Modelling is an essential and inseparable part of many scientific disciplines, each of which have their own ideas about specific types of modelling.[1][2]

So, modelling doesn't have a "feels like". In fact, it doesn't have a metaphysical anything in the "real world". It is all abstracted information, so that it can be quantified or simplified for epistemological reasons. Again, you are mixing the map for the territory. You are waffling between words. Is it the definition you sent me, or are you cramming other concepts into this word?

So, modelling doesn't have a "feels like". — schopenhauer1

Again, now that you have actually read the thread, you will appreciate that your old hobbyhorses are irrelevant.

Again, now that you have actually read the thread, you will appreciate that your old hobbyhorses are irrelevant. — apokrisis

It's relevant- I mean it's down to the level of talking about whether erosion is "experienced" by the rock, but it's the same thing. In this case, you are juxtaposing modelling with experience and again, I am explaining how modelling never even touches the metaphysics of an event, only map of what is going on, thus losing the actual-ness (actual occasion perhaps?) of the event.

You know what? I can't be bothered any more. I have no investment in Whitehead's philosophy, or Peirce's philosophy and semiosis for that matter, beyond finding them to be interesting different ways to look at things, which I think can be understood to share some commonalities, and I certainly have no investment in trying to convince you of anything or bothering to discuss anything with someone displaying such a combative and dismissive kind of attitude, either; so have a nice life, dude.

Where's that world's smallest violin emoticon when you need it.....

The world's smallest mind should be able to find it somewhere nearby in the world's smallest world... :joke:

Or is an individual occasion like the present moment, of zero duration, therefore not actually existent?

"No duration" does not mean non-existent. Time can be defined as the number of events between two events. Events themselves have no duration. (Not necessarily related to Whitehead. Personally, I would stay away from Whitehead and most of the so-called process philosophers since they do nothing but introduce noise.)

What defines an event? You have made event sound as though everything came to a stop between periods of “duration”.

Time, as I see it, is a method of measuring motion. Motion does not cease.

“Events” are really just points of a duration which impress more so upon memory.

So, modelling doesn't have a "feels like". In fact, it doesn't have a metaphysical anything in the "real world". It is all abstracted information, so that it can be quantified or simplified for epistemological reasons. Again, you are mixing the map for the territory. You are waffling between words. Is it the definition you sent me, or are you cramming other concepts into this word? — schopenhauer1

It is in thinking that our mathematical models represent the complete "real world" that we commit the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". Such models are only ever idealized, abstract, partial and incomplete representations of the "blooming, buzzing, confusion" which is nature. They largely leave out the feelings and experiences of their creators.

It is in forgetting that it is a thinking, feeling creatures with value judgements about the world that engages in observation, measurement and empirical science in the first place that one creates an artificial "bifurcation of nature".

The way we think about the world influences how we act in the world. If we think we are only physical-chemical machines in a valueless, purposeless, largely insentient universe we will act accordingly and the results will be in neither the best interest of the planet or of ourselves.

(Not necessarily related to Whitehead. Personally, I would stay away from Whitehead and most of the so-called process philosophers since they do nothing but introduce noise.) — Magnus Anderson

If by noise, you mean they introduce questions of experience and values into discussions about the "true" nature of reality, then by all means.

“A philosophic outlook,” writes Whitehead, “is the very foundation of thought and of life…As we think, we live.”
As Whitehead argues, the dominant philosophy of every age “moulds our type of civilization” (Modes of Thought, 63).

: “…the science of nature stands opposed to the presuppositions of humanism. Where some conciliation is attempted, it often assumes some sort of mysticism. But in general there is no conciliation” (MoT 136)

At least Whitehead had a little humility and an open minded approach to speculative philosophies.

Philosophy begins in wonder,” he tells us. “And, at the end, when philosophy has done its best, the wonder remains” (MoT 168). “How shallow, puny, and imperfect are efforts to sound the depths in the nature of things,” he tells us elsewhere. “In philosophical discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement is an exhibition of folly” (PR xiv).

He also had great respect for science, although an appreciation of its limitations as well.

None of this is to say that Whitehead ignores the importance of science: “I assume as an axiom that science is not a fairy tale” (The Concept of Nature 40).

"No duration" does not mean non-existent. Time can be defined as the number of events between two events. Events themselves have no duration — Magnus Anderson

This seems to imply that time could be constructed from events of zero duration, which is about as sensible as space being composed of points of zero extension. I fail to see the logic in either assertion.

This seems to imply that time could be constructed from events of zero duration, which is about as sensible as space being composed of points of zero extension. I fail to see the logic in either assertion. — prothero

What does it mean to say that a point has no size? Does it mean that it has zero size i.e. that it does not exist? Or does it perhaps mean that it has no specific size?

↪Magnus Anderson What defines an event? You have made event sound as though everything came to a stop between periods of “duration”.

Time, as I see it, is a method of measuring motion. Motion does not cease.

“Events” are really just points of a duration which impress more so upon memory. — raza

Motion is one of those frequently abused terms. Motion simply means change in position. No concept of position, no concept of motion. It's a high-level concept.

Time is more fundamental than motion. Time is simply one of the properties of objects of experience. Time does not imply motion. Just because there is time does not mean there is motion. You need change, i.e. difference between points in time, in order to speak of motion. And not any kind of change but change in position.

It is in thinking that our mathematical models represent the complete "real world" that we commit the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness". Such models are only ever idealized, abstract, partial and incomplete representations of the "blooming, buzzing, confusion" which is nature. They largely leave out the feelings and experiences of their creators. — prothero

True

It is in forgetting that it is a thinking, feeling creatures with value judgements about the world that engages in observation, measurement and empirical science in the first place that one creates an artificial "bifurcation of nature". — prothero

True

The way we think about the world influences how we act in the world. If we think we are only physical-chemical machines in a valueless, purposeless, largely insentient universe we will act accordingly and the results will be in neither the best interest of the planet or of ourselves. — prothero

I kind of disagree here. It is mainly an insentient universe. Even if there is "something of what it is like to be an event", that doesn't change much for ethics. It is just as motivational as other reasons to think a certain way.

Apologies for dropping out of a conversation I started ... but the material started to go over my head at some point. I'm'a hafta read all the postings a few times and do some research to (possibly) catch up.

No answer.. The thing is, you don't take as legitimate, any explanation that is not in terms of scientific modelling. However, scientific modelling is just a description that is refined to make it easier to understand and relevant to a certain aim. It is not the event itself. To describe that might take neologisms and language that can convey the complexity of what is going on. This is perhaps why philosophers have a hard time putting into words their metaphysics and it sounds jargony.

No answer. — schopenhauer1

Where was the question that was cogently expressed and relevant to the discussion?

Where was the question that was cogently expressed and relevant to the discussion? — apokrisis

That was cogent and relevant to this whole thread. I believe it to be the main issue underlying all of these arguments with the Whiteheadians and other process philosophies that are not explicitly in the terms of your triadic system.

Pfft.

Seems to me you're talkin' tiger shit, buddy! :joke:

You keep on thinking of things in terms of predictions and verificationism. That is simply not the "actual occasions", not the events, that is the translation into mathematical models. The math is not the actual event though. So, where it cashes out in pragmatic usefulness to humans in understanding, it is silent in what is the metaphysical case of what the event IS.