To what extent can one reduce the 'essence' of an object to that of its fundamental parts? — rachMiel
How deep/close is the relationship between an object and its most fundamental building block? — rachMiel
To what extent can one reduce the 'essence' of an object to that of its fundamental parts?
(To paraphrase a well-known metaphor:) Let's say you have three solid gold rings. One is an old family heirloom, handed down through five generations. One is a simple flat band sold by a jewelry chain store. One is a striking piece of wild ring art made by a local craftsman.
To what extent are these three rings all just (different shapes of) gold? — rachMiel
A whole is not identical to any of its parts. A whole and its part are two different objects. A whole is a collection of its parts. — litewave
The fundamental parts must exist in their entirety even when they are not in the combination of the thing being reduced. — creativesoul
To what extent is it 'valid' to say: Their forms are different, but in essence they are both just marble. — rachMiel
See the below
The fundamental parts must exist in their entirety even when they are not in the combination of the thing being reduced. — creativesoul — Wayfarer
There’s an analogy in holograms - take a holographic image and divide it, and instead of two pieces with half the image in each, you end up with two smaller [and lower-res] pieces of the same image. Very important principle. — Wayfarer
"The (apparent) variety is merely different names and forms of consciousness."
What I'm trying to get at in this thread is the viability of the above sentence. An elephant, a rock, and a memory of childhood ... can they all be reduced to being merely different names and forms of the same thing, consciousness? Or do objects possess an ultimate (essential) uniqueness that goes beyond this underlying sameness? — rachMiel
"The (apparent) variety is merely different names and forms of consciousness."
What I'm trying to get at in this thread is the viability of the above sentence. An elephant, a rock, and a memory of childhood ... can they all be reduced to being merely different names and forms of the same thing, consciousness? Or do objects possess an ultimate (essential) uniqueness that goes beyond this underlying sameness? — rachMiel
Does it make sense to say: "X is really just Y" ? — rachMiel
How deep/close is the relationship between an object and its most fundamental building block? — rachMiel
One could argue that once the parts cease being the parts of a particular whole, they are no longer the same objects they used to be; they stopped existing when the whole they composed stopped existing. That's because their relations to other objects have changed, and when an object's relations change, its identity changes too. — litewave
An object's identity is inseparable from how the object is different from other objects and these differences constitute the relations of the object to other objects.
I dont see why, a priori, identity couldnt be considered a relation. A is identical to A, thats the basis for the determination of all further relations, no?
The solution to the ontological question is simply to considerna object and its attributes and relations to be correlated, and not coconstitutives. — Akanthinos
A is identical to A, thats the basis for the determination of all further relations, no? — Akanthinos
That's just not true. Take an apple out of an apple pie:It's still an apple despite it's no longer being a part of an apple pie. The apple pie is still an apple pie as well. — creativesoul
No. Differences do not constitute relations. To quite the contrary, relations are existentially dependent upon different things. — creativesoul
This is what I'm trying to get at in this thread: Is it valid to say that an elephant and a rock and the feeling of looking at a sunset are all merely different names/forms of X (consciousness in this case)? Or do these things 'possess' some sort of essence/identity that make them ultimately unique, despite their all being sublated by consciousness? — rachMiel
You can't derive differences (in thought or in the physical world) from identity. If you have differences, it is because there is some real difference giving rise to them. — Dfpolis
The problem is that - all by itself - "A=A" is utterly meaningless at best and nonsensical at worst. Laws cannot be either. — creativesoul
The law of identity is a metacognitive tool that when used properly facilitates clear, meaningful, intelligible, and coherent language use. — creativesoul
The law of identity is a metacognitive tool that when used properly facilitates clear, meaningful, intelligible, and coherent language use. Metacognitive tools are existentially dependent upon language itself, for there can be no thinking about thought and belief if there is not already something to be isolated, named, and subsequently talked about. Thinking about thought and belief is an activity that is existentially dependent upon something to think about(pre-existing thought and belief).
Brute fact: The law of identity owes it's very existence to language.
p1.Whatever does not owe it's existence to language cannot... owe it's existence to language.
The law of identity does.
Not all relations do. — creativesoul
A and A' are not different because they are identical, but because they are made of different atoms and occupy different locations. — Dfpolis
You've offered only gratuitous assertions. — creativesoul
Where there has never been language, there has never been the "law of identity"... — creativesoul
Not interested. Valid objection against the argument I've presented or a valid argument for your position. Nothing else will suffice. — creativesoul
The law of identity doesn't owe its existence to language, language owe its existence to the law of identity. — Akanthinos
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