I don't see why neutral monists would need to be self-proclaimed Scottists. The only one who I can think of who might be ( although this is really a question for the Deleuze scholars) is Deleuze. What I will say is that I was simply pointing out that it is logically consistent to think of being as substance, in which case a monist would be one who thinks there is only one kind of being (although there are obviously many kinds of beings). Heidegger speaks to this need to distinguish between being and beings with his ontological distinction (although it is not clear that he thought that being is univocal as, for example, Deleuze avowedly did).Thanks for the comment on the relation of neutral monism to the philosophy of being. I have two questions:
(1) Do you have an example of a self-proclaimed neutral monist who is a Scottist in ontology?
(2) Given than Descartes calls both his substances "res," wouldn't he by classed as a monist by this definition? — Dfpolis
I'm not playing sophist. I want you to tell the problem you apprehend, with two substances interacting, so that I can address this problem directly. — Metaphysician Undercover
But that's not what you said, you said "self-caused", not "uncaused". One implies a cause, the other does not, so they refer to completely different things. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see why neutral monists would need to be self-proclaimed Scottists — Janus
None of this tells us that Aristotle thought hyle in natural processes was purely passive, gives a reference supporting that claim, or says how a purely passive matter can solve the problem of Physics i, 9 — Dfpolis
But as potentiality it does not cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be. For if it came to be, something must have existed as a primary substratum from which it should come and which should persist in it; but this is its own special nature so that it will be before coming to be (For my definition of matter is just this -- the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and which persists in the result). And if it ceases to be it will cease to be in the last, so it will cease to be before ceasing to be.
This is a non sequitur. Another way to be different is to be potential, but potential need not mean passive. To make your case, you need to show that potential (dynamis) implies passivity -- a difficult case to make given that the primary meaning of dynamis is "power." — Dfpolis
One is defined as a kind of physis (nature = "an intrinsic principle of activity") and the other is not. Aristotle distinguishes artifacts by their lack of an intrinsic principle of activity. — Dfpolis
I believe that discussion is about artifacts. That is why I want the specific reference. — Dfpolis
1032a
-12 Of things that come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, some spontaneously. Now everything that comes to be comes to be by the agency of something and from something and comes to be something.
-20 --all things produced either by nature or by art have matter; for each of them is capable both of being and of not being, and this capacity is the matter in each--and, in general both that from which they are produced is nature, and the type according to which they are produced is nature (for that which is produced, e.g.a plant or an animal, has a nature), and so it is by which they are produced --the so-called 'formal' nature, which is specifically the same (though this is in another individual); for man begets man.
33 --but from art proceed the things from which the form of the thing is in the soul of the artist.
1033b
5-10 Obviously then the form also, or whatever we ought to call the shape present in the sensible thing, is not produced nor is there any production of it; for this is that which is made to be in something, else either by art or by nature or by some faculty. But that there is a brazen sphere, this we make, For we make it out of brass and the sphere: we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a brazen sphere.
Ch.9, 1034a, 33,
Things which are formed by nature are in the same case as these products of art...
Strictly speaking, form does not change. It is replaced by a new form. In Physics i, 9 Aristotle is asking, "where does the new form come from?" Your view does not provide a satisfactory answer. — Dfpolis
In the discussion of Physics i, 9 there are precisely three principles, and hyle is the only one we have left after eliminating the original and contrary form. — Dfpolis
I have already said that we have no model for any interaction between the mental and the physical. If these are considered to be different substances then we must suppose that they must interact, even though we cannot form any idea of how that would be possible. — Janus
And you have so far failed to answer that question. — Janus
Notice, how matter is defined as outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be, such that to speak of it in these terms causes the contradictions indicated. It is an underlying substratum which does not change between before and after. — Metaphysician Undercover
Potential is the capacity to act. As such it is not itself active. If it were active it would not be the capacity for action, but action itself. This is why potential and actual are categorically different. And, since it is other than active, we can say that potential is passive. — Metaphysician Undercover
Living things have an intrinsic principle of activity, the soul, and it is clearly a form — Metaphysician Undercover
Ch.9, 1034a, 33,
Things which are formed by nature are in the same case as these products of art...
Therefore as essence is the starting-point of everything in syllogisms (because syllogisms start from the "what" of a thing), so too generation proceeds from it.
And it is the same with natural formations as it is with the products of art..
So, as described in Bk.7, in the case of art, the form comes from the soul of the artist, and in the case of nature, the form comes from nature. — Metaphysician Undercover
Perhaps your question is left unanswered at that point, until he proceeds to discuss efficient cause and final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, hyle is a principle of continuity that helps us understand change. It does not, itself, change. All of this fits my account. How does it support your idea that it is passive and devoid of anything analogous to desire? — Dfpolis
Let me clarify. A potency can be passive -- like clay waiting to have a form impressed on it. Or, it can be active -- like an acorn able to become an oak tree. In neither case does the potency actualize itself. — Dfpolis
Each kind of potency needs an efficient cause to actualize it (a potter in the first case, moisture and other environmental conditions in the second). One important difference between them is that, while clay receives its new form from an extrinsic source (the potter) and so is an artifact, the form of the oak is immanent in the acorn and so its germination and growth into an oak is a natural process. — Dfpolis
Yes, so organisms are natural. Still, we aren't analyzing beings, but substantial change. — Dfpolis
Again, what a thing is now is based on its form. Its tendency to cease to be what it is now, to become something else, (e.g. to germinate or to die), is not explained by being what it is now (its form), but by an intrinsic tendency (hyle) to become the new thing (e.g., an oak or decaying matter). — Dfpolis
This is in ch. 7, not 9. If you read chapter 7 from the beginning, you'll find Aristotle explicitly rejecting your view that matter is always passive: "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ..." — Dfpolis
Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized.
...
That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it.
1033b
5-10 Obviously then the form also, or whatever we ought to call the shape present in the sensible thing, is not produced nor is there any production of it; for this is that which is made to be in something, else either by art or by nature or by some faculty. But that there is a brazen sphere, this we make, For we make it out of brass and the sphere: we bring the form into this particular matter, and the result is a brazen sphere.
The similarity between substantial changes in nature and in art is not the matter, as you suggest, but that "generation proceeds from [essence]." — Dfpolis
No, my question is addressed when he says that "in some cases the matter .. can initiate its own motion." — Dfpolis
That was not what I was asking. I was asking for a philosopher who calls himself a "neutral monist" and, as you suggested, follows Scotus in ontology. — Dfpolis
My question with regard to Descartes was based on taking res (thing) as possibly convertible with "being" with "thinking" and extended" as modifiers. Personally, I don't see being as a prior substrate that can be modified. — Dfpolis
Read some Aristotle, — Metaphysician Undercover
I answered that. To position the universe as uncaused would imply an infinite regress of temporal activity, an infinity of time before now. And infinite regress is repugnant to the intellect because it fails as an explanation. Since God is placed outside of time, being the cause of temporal existence, it is unreasonable to ask about the cause of God, "cause" being a temporal concept. I guess you didn't read my brief discussion of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
So, the alternative would be to think of the universe as being not in time, but as holding the spacetime continuum in toto, within itself; as being the eternal "provider" of the temporal, so to speak. — Janus
I don't see how "universe" could be conceived of in this way. "Universe" generally signifies the collective existence of all physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover
No, "universe" signifies all things that have ever been or will be. The universe is not any particular collection of things at a time, otherwise it would be meaningless to talk about the origin of the universe or the infinity or eternality of the universe. — Janus
In [a] new paper, three scientists argue that including “potential” things on the list of “real” things can avoid the counterintuitive conundrums that quantum physics poses. ...At its root, the new idea holds that the common conception of “reality” is too limited. By expanding the definition of reality, the quantum’s mysteries disappear. In particular, “real” should not be restricted to “actual” objects or events in spacetime. Reality ought also be assigned to certain possibilities, or “potential” realities, that have not yet become “actual.” These potential realities do not exist in spacetime, but nevertheless are “ontological” — that is, real components of existence.
“This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extraspatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility,” write Ruth Kastner, Stuart Kauffman and Michael Epperson.
Considering potential things to be real is not exactly a new idea, as it was a central aspect of the philosophy of Aristotle, 24 centuries ago. An acorn has the potential to become a tree; a tree has the potential to become a wooden table. Even applying this idea to quantum physics isn’t new. Werner Heisenberg, the quantum pioneer famous for his uncertainty principle, considered his quantum math to describe potential outcomes of measurements of which one would become the actual result. The quantum concept of a “probability wave,” describing the likelihood of different possible outcomes of a measurement, was a quantitative version of Aristotle’s potential, Heisenberg wrote in his well-known 1958 book Physics and Philosophy. “It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality.”
Are you saying that the things which will be will not be part of the universe? — Janus
Obviously I am not speaking about the totality of the universe at any particular time, but rather the totality of the universe, logically speaking. So, of course what will be is not a part of the universe now, but what the universe is now is not the whole of the universe. — Janus
I think that "matter" as used and defined by Aristotle signifies something completely passive, and that is potential, or potency. — Metaphysician Undercover
My argument is that in all the cases where he uses "matter" in this way, it is in reference to living things, and he has clearly attributed this activity which appears to inhere within matter, to a form, the soul. — Metaphysician Undercover
Unfortunately, Aristotle thinks "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ...".
Until you can explain this statement on your theory, the case is closed. — Dfpolis
He uses living things as his primary source of examples of natural (as opposed to artificial) processes. I've already said that matter passively receives form in the creation of artifacts -- just not in natural substantial changes. — Dfpolis
Unfortunately, Aristotle thinks "in some cases the matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion [italics mine], and in other cases it is not ...".
Until you can explain this statement on your theory, the case is closed. — Dfpolis
I already explained this. In these cases there is a form inherent within the material body, a source of activity called the soul. It's quite well explained in "On the Soul". — Metaphysician Undercover
Where he makes the statement you quoted above, he goes on to compare this type of movement with that of a stone. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry, that doesn't explain the text. He does not say that an associated form acts, but "matter .. is such that it can initiate its own motion." — Dfpolis
My understanding is consistent with the whole Aristotelian corpus and its historical context. I think we've exhausted this subject. — Dfpolis
Several things are at issue here. You made the claim that what changes is the form. The quoted passage from On the Soul shows that this is false. — Πετροκότσυφας
Also, anwering to Yanus, you wrote that the universe as uncaused and the idea of an infinite time is repugnant. Yet, Aristotle held that time didn't have a beginning and the universe and motion were eternal. — Πετροκότσυφας
What interests me about that article, however, is the idea of 'potentia' as 'real but not actually existing'. 'The unmanifest' was tacked on by me at the end, it might be misleading - that's not the main point of the article. — Wayfarer
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