It's raining outside is true if and only if it's raining outside. — Marchesk
What is it about the RHS that makes the LHS true? — Marchesk
is just ill-formed.It's raining outside is true if and only if it's raining outside. — Marchesk
The cat on the mat is true if and only if the cat is on the mat. — Marchesk
Why do you think the right hand side makes the left hand side true? That strikes me as an odd notion. — Banno
Rather (again, depending on the account) will mean that truth is really all and only about the linguistic conventions governing the predicate "is true". — MindForged
And that's a totally trivial observation that nobody ever disagreed with. — Marchesk
To capture what he considered to be the essence of the Correspondence Theory, Alfred Tarski created his Semantic Theory of Truth. In Tarski's theory, however, talk of correspondence and of facts is eliminated. (Although in early versions of his theory, Tarski did use the term "correspondence" in trying to explain his theory, he later regretted having done so, and *dropped the term altogether since it plays no role within his theory*.) The Semantic Theory is the successor to the Correspondence Theory. It seeks to preserve the core concept of that earlier theory but without the problematic conceptual baggage.
[...]
We can rewrite Tarski's T-condition on three lines:
The proposition expressed by the German sentence
1) "Schnee ist weiss" is true
2) if and only if
3) snow is white
Line 1 is about truth. Line 3 is not about truth – it asserts a claim about the nature of the world. Thus T makes a substantive claim. Moreover, it avoids the main problems of the earlier Correspondence Theories in that the terms "fact" and "correspondence" play no role whatever.
Are you serious? I just said that on the deflationists account there is *nothing* more to truth than the conventions that govern it's usage as a predicate. — MindForged
1) <p> is true
2) if and only if
3) p — MindForged
1) "Schnee ist weiss" is true
2) if and only if
3) snow is white
Line 1 is about truth. Line 3 is not about truth – it asserts a claim about the nature of the world. Thus T makes a substantive claim. Moreover, it avoids the main problems of the earlier Correspondence Theories in that the terms "fact" and "correspondence" play no role whatever.
Because questions about how we know that the snow is white are going to rear their head at this point.
Consider we're inside and the weather report says it's snowing out side. So I say,
"The snow is white".
You go out and look and say: "Nope, it's actually yellow."
And I"m like, "Bro, snow is white, stop lying!"
But then I go and look and I see that it is yellow, because you took the chance to unburden your bladder there. — Marchesk
As such, the RHS (the disquoted side) is what makes the sentence true or false. — Marchesk
Why do you think the right hand side makes the left hand side true? That strikes me as an odd notion. An animal has a heart if and only if it has kidneys; therefor the kidneys make it true that the animal has a heart? Jim likes chocolate if and only if it does not contain nuts; therefore not containing nuts makes Jim like chocolate? — Banno
Okay, I mean nobody disagrees with saying that true and false are linguistic conventions we agreed to. That's not what's of importance. We could have used any word to denote the meaning behind true and false. And it's the meaning that's at stake.
What the defalationist is saying amounts to there being no meaning other than the lingustic convention, which sounds prima facia absurd, and what I'm trying to argue against. — Marchesk
So I'm not sure what the deflationist is trying to say here. Are they denying anything else needs to be said about the relationship between Line 3 and Line 1?
It is not surprising that we should have use for a predicate P with the property that “‘_ _ _ _ _’ is P” an d “_____” are always interdeducible. F or we frequently fin d ourselves in a position to assert each sentence in a certain infinite set z (e.g. w hen all the members of z 11 O n the preceding page Soames makes clear that he takes Tarski to be com mitted both to sufficiency an d to necessity. T he point here is that the “must” obscures the fact that the claims about partial definition can support only the claim that implication of the biconditionals is sufficient.Theories of Truth and Convention T share a common form); lacking the means to formulate infinite conjunctions, we find it convenient to have a single sentence which is warranted precisely when each member of z is warranted. A predicate P with the property described allows us to construct such a sentence: (x)(x ∈ z → P(x)). Truth is thus a notion that we might reasonably want to have on hand, for expressing semantic ascent an d descent, infinite conjunction and disjunction. And given that we want such a notion, it is not difficult to ex plain h o w it is that we have been able to invent one: the Tarski sentences, which axiomatize the notion of truth, are by no means a complicated or recondite axiomatization; the possibility of moving from this axiomatization to the explicit truth definition was always latent in the logical structure of language, though it took a Tarski to discover it. Truth is useful, we may say, as a device of (what Quine calls) disquotation … . To explain the utility of disquotation we need say nothing about the relations between language and the world.
'<Snow is white> is true' has the same truth value as 'snow is white', because each implies the other. — MindForged
The truth schema allows you to choose whichever meaning you like based on your metaphysical or pragmatic preferences. Which is to say, it's not an issue about truth. — Andrew M
Alright, but that's false, because snow is not always white, just like the cat is not always on the mat. You need something else to make the two equivalent. — Marchesk
To avoid that, deflation is proposing an identity between making a statement and that statement being true. — Marchesk
Whatever truth means, it is not given to us by the T-scheme because, if you read it, the T-scheme uses truth in its biconditional. It just tells me how I can use the predicate. — MindForged
"Snow is white" is true only if snow is white
is true even if snow is polkadot? — Banno
X is true iff x is true.
Is that all we've been arguing about? Because that tells me nothing that I didn't already know. Of course a statement is true if and only if it's true — Marchesk
Okay, so it then has nothing to do with the question of what truth is? — Marchesk
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