It's intended to be a necessary feature of a good truth theory, basically. That's why it's unclear if you ought to characterize Tarski's theory of truth as deflationary or correspondence, because the T-scheme works for both. — MindForged

I see. That sounds right. But "What is truth" is asking something else. It's asking what makes a statement true or false, not the proper usage of the term.

Just go read up on T-sentences.

Perhaps that is because you have not grasped the T-sentence.

Wha is it that makes a statement true, such that the cat is on the mat is not false or meaningless?

I'm failing to see how deflation addresses that question. — Marchesk

Regarding "p" is true iff p, the statement on the left-hand-side is true (or false) if and only if the condition on the right-hand-side obtains (or not). It's a logical relation.

If the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true then that entails that the cat is on the mat (the condition). Conversely, if the cat is not on the mat, that entails that the statement is false.

It's a logical relation. If the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true then that entails that the cat is on the mat (the condition). Conversely, if the cat is not on the mat, that entails that the statement is false. — Andrew M

Right, so no disagreement there.

What is truth?

If truth is just (always, for all statements) a logical relation, then there is a separate question to be asked.

What is it that makes, "The cat is on the mat", true? Because it's not a logical relation that does that. Not if there is reference to a cat and a mat in the world.

Now if the statement is just a logic statement, then these three are equivalent.

The cat is on the mat.

The blorg is on the korg.

X is on Y.

Because cat and mat are just variables that can stand for anything.

Which is fine for logic, but it tells us nothing about whether it's true or false that it's raining outside today in Lisbon.

What is it that makes something true?

Is asking about the relationship between a statement and what makes it true or false, outside of logic, because that's where the whole truth issue gets interesting. That's my understanding of the issue.

In ordinary usage, "The cat is on the mat" is not expressing a logical proposition, but rather is making a statement about a situation in the world. And it is that situation which makes the statement or false, not logic. That's how true and false is used outside of logic.

What is it that makes, "The cat is on the mat", true? Because it's not a logical relation that does that. Not if there is reference to a cat and a mat in the world. — Marchesk

It is simply a schema for what it means for a statement to be true. In this case, it is the cat being on the mat in the world that is the condition that would obtain (or not).

Now if the statement is just a logic statement, then these three are equivalent. [...] — Marchesk

The statement is any meaningful declarative sentence that can be expressed in some context. The logical relation is the two-way entailment between the statement and the truth condition.

Which is fine for logic, but it tells us nothing about whether it's true or false that it's raining outside today in Lisbon. — Marchesk

If you want to know whether a statement is true or false, then you need to go out and look. The truth schema won't help you with that. It just tells you what condition needs to obtain in order for the statement to be true.

In ordinary usage, "The cat is on the mat" is not expressing a logical proposition, but rather is making a statement about a situation in the world. And it is that situation which makes the statement or false, not logic. That's how true and false is used outside of logic. — Marchesk

Yes, the statement can be an ordinary empirical statement. But the relation between the statement and the truth condition is a logical one.

If you want to know whether a statement is true or false, then you need to go out and look. — Andrew M

Right. It's the going out and looking which is important.

The truth schema won't help you with that. It just tells you what condition needs to obtain in order for the statement to be true. — Andrew M

But it's only giving a logical definition for truth. It's not specifying the actual condition that would make a statement true or false.

Yes, the statement can be an ordinary empirical statement. But the relation between the statement and the truth condition is a logical one. — Andrew M

However, that relation doesn't make the statement true or false. It's whether the condition was satisfied or not.

The correspondence theory is saying that what makes statements true is their correspondence to something else, which would be something about the world for empirical statements. The deflationist is saying, nah, truth is just the logical relationship between a statement and truth.

But the deflationist is leaving the satisfying of conditions off their account of truth.

The cat is on the mat is true if and only if there exists a specific cat in the world on a specific mat in the world being referred to, when making an empirical claim.

You are talking about quite narrow class of statements. What about
" I love you" or "Make America great again!"? What is their relation with truth?

But the deflationist is leaving the satisfying of conditions off their account of truth. — Marchesk

A deflationist does not attempt to define truth.

A deflationist does not attempt to define truth. — frank

What is a deflationist trying to accomplish or say?

By comparison, a proponent of the Correspondence Theory of Truth is trying to account for statements being true in virtue of them corresponding to something else, such as a state of affairs in the world.

What is a deflationist trying to accomplish or say? — Marchesk

That truth doesn't involve all these other metaphysical commitments and ought not be involved in explanations of meaning because it serves no explanatory function.

That truth doesn't involve all these other metaphysical commitments and ought not be involved in explanations of meaning because it serves no explanatory function. — MindForged

Right, but how does that work?

If I want to know whether a specific cat is on a specific mat, then what makes the cat is on the mat true or false under the deflationist understanding of truth?

What is a deflationist trying to accomplish or say? — Marchesk

That truth is an unanalyzable concept.

If you attempt to present a definition, you assume your audience already understands what truth is because it's an aspect of the act of assertion.

It's too basic to communication to define.

Well, your deflate the truth predicate. If to say 'x is true' is just to say that 'x' (and x being true is just that x), then deflationists are going to say that your definition of truth need only be implicit. Whatever justifies or lends warrant to accepting "the cat is on the mat" gives exactly the same warrant for accepting "It's true that the cat is on the mat".


It's why the theory is sometimes taken to treat truth as "redundant" (in a certain sense) or as a "no-truth" theory. Deflationists are, often, fine with the correspondence intuition (whenever p obtains, the proposition that p is true), but not the correspondence theory because it requires too many implausible ontological commitments, and end up creating what is essentially a more complex version of deflationism. They need to reify facts, states of affairs and fundamentally need an explanation for this "reflecting the world" relation (even when defined as an isomorphism it's unclear how it's supposed to work).

Whatever justifies or lends warrant to accepting "the cat is on the mat" gives exactly the same warrant for accepting "It's true that the cat is on the mat". — MindForged

So basically there is no overall "thing" that makes statements true, only particular conditions being met, which very for each statement. Truth is just a generalization overall all those.

But some condition does have to be met, otherwise the statement is false or not truth-apt. So in the case of the cat on the mat, there has to be some cat on some mat that's being talked about. Same for snow being white and it's raining outside.

One thing to note about those is there seems to be a general condition that's being met for the empirical domain, which is that the condition is something being a certain way in the world. That's where the common correspondence intuition comes from.

...truth doesn't involve all these other metaphysical commitments and ought not be involved in explanations of meaning because it serves no explanatory function.
— MindForged

Right, but how does that work? — Marchesk

By virtue of truth being necessarily presupposed in all meaningful thought, belief, and statements thereof...

By virtue of truth being necessarily presupposed in all meaningful thought, belief, and statements thereof... — creativesoul

That's what I'm thinking.

Yep.

That truth is an unanalyzable concept.

If you attempt to present a definition, you assume your audience already understands what truth is because it's an aspect of the act of assertion.

It's too basic to communication to define. — frank

Double yup. For the reason I've just put forth...

And yet we have three main concepts of "truth"... Coherence, Correspondence, and Pragmatism.

What is the difference between saying '"The cat is on the mat" is true iff the cat is on the mat', and saying that "the cat is mat is true" if the state of affairs we call 'the cat being on the mat' obtains?

I think your quandary is because you are thinking of the further 'problem' of the relationship between the everyday empirical 'cat being on the mat' and some purported 'metaphysical' or absolute 'cat being on the mat', that the empirical state of affairs should correspond to.

But you can't answer that question in the way you seem to want to, because it would involve the incoherent attempt to conceptually relate something absolutely pre-conceptual to the always already conceptually shaped state of affairs of the cat being on the mat. I think the most that can be said is that we have no good reason to suppose that the everyday states of affairs we experience are not manifestations of pre-conceptual mind-independent nature.

You are simply running up against the limit of coherent human knowledge; we can never be omniscient in the way you (and everyone else, naturally :grin: ) would like.

these are justifications, not theories of truth.

According to the deflationary theory of truth, nothing is added to the assertion, "The cat is on the mat.", by saying the "The cat is on the mat is true.", since to assert it is to say it's true.

can we see the cat on the mat? :)

Right. It's the going out and looking which is important. — Marchesk

In this case you would be talking about assertability conditions rather than truth conditions. That is, those conditions that would warrant someone asserting (or believing) that a statement is true.

Assertability is related to knowledge/evidence/justification.

But the deflationist is leaving the satisfying of conditions off their account of truth.

The cat is on the mat is true if and only if there exists a specific cat in the world on a specific mat in the world being referred to, when making an empirical claim. — Marchesk

There does need to be a use for the statement. But the referents need not be in the actual world. The cat and mat might be in a Harry Potter book. Or you might be considering a hypothetical where it is stipulated that the cat is on the mat.

A true (or false) statement requires a concrete truth condition. The truth schema abstracts away the specifics of that truth condition.

these are justifications, not theoriesnof truth. — Banno

Yeah, in a way. We justify our claims by virtue of using those three(and other) notions as a means to convince others to assent/agree with what we're saying... if that's what you mean.

But some condition does have to be met, otherwise the statement is false or not truth-apt. So in the case of the cat on the mat, there has to be some cat on some mat that's being talked about. Same for snow being white and it's raining outside.

I've given the (or at least one) condition that has to be met: the conditions which lend warrant to assertion, or belief, or knowledge. Correspondence can be one such condition. But as a type of inflationary theory, correspondence theory requires more than just accepting the T-scheme to define truth.

One thing to note about those is there seems to be a general condition that's being met for the empirical domain, which is that the condition is something being a certain way in the world. That's where the common correspondence intuition comes from.

The intuition is fine, but the theory given to try and put it on firm ground has a lot of issues as mentioned above. Facthood in particular is a real problem for the correspondence theorist. Are there negative facts? Facts relating to conditionals and implications? These must, by their lights, be made true by something in the world but they're clearly not the sort of things that have a correspondence in the world, which conflicts with the reification of facts or states of affairs in this that theory.

Facthood in particular is a real problem for the correspondence theorist. Are there negative facts? Facts relating to conditionals and implications? These must, by their lights, be made true by something in the world but they're clearly not the sort of things that have a correspondence in the world, which conflicts with the reification of facts or states of affairs in this that theory. — MindForged

I don't see why this is the case. If I have a mat in front of me with no cat on it, then "the cat is on the mat" is not true, provided I stipulate that I am talking about the mat in front of me right now. That would not seem to be a problem; perhaps you have some other kind(s) of thing(s) in mind; if so, could you offer an example?

Sure. Negative truths are often taken to be a very bad ontological commitment. Take this:

It is true that Clinton did not win the election.

Is that made true by the fact that she didn't win the election or by the non-obtaining state of affairs that she did win it in? It's strange, because the latter sounds like a commitment to Meinongianism (which is interesting) since it's reifying a non-existent thing to make something a fact. The former seems plain unacceptable to the correspondence theorist because facts are about how the world is (states of how things really are) not how it isn't. Facts relation to disjunction and modality may also be quite strange (more so for the former).

Related to that is the notion of counterfactuals.

If Clinton had won the election then ...

Is that made true by some non-obtaining state of affairs?

The former seems plain unacceptable to the correspondence theorist because facts are about how the world is (states of how things really are) not how it isn't. — MindForged

I can't see the problem; the "state of how things really are" is that she lost the election.

Related to that is the notion of counterfactuals.

If Clinton had won the election then ...

Is that made true by some non-obtaining state of affairs? — Michael

Is what made true by "some non-obtaining state of affairs"? Do you mean that if she won the election then she would have been president? That is made true by definition (assuming that some other intervening state of affairs hadn't prevented it).