On the face of it, it's true that "I speak" doesn't generally function as a performative because it doesn't really commit one to anything. But, one can imagine situations where it could function performatively - perhaps as a response to "if anyone objects, speak now or forever hold your peace". Here, "I speak" would have the illocutionary force of an objection, and not merely some kind of indexical declaration. In general, the line between constatives and performatives is, I think, better cashed out in terms of pragmatics, rather than by any principled distinction.

"It does not really commit one to anything" - Could you imagine somebody speaking without involving a kind of illocutionary commitment? There is no illocutary force without some related commitment.

Yeah, all language involves commitment at some level. Like I said, it's about pragmatics.

Could you imagine somebody speaking without involving a kind of illocutionary commitment? — Number2018

Specific commitments can be negated by the speaker, at least in many cases. (Moore's paradox an apparent exception.) But some commitment?

I doubt you can say anything that couldn't be taken as making some kind of commitment. And that's not irrelevant since having your words taken in a particular way is a key element of commitment.

I would lean toward speaking at all indicating a commitment to a shared framework of communication using language. The trouble though would seem to be defining speech here -- there are uses of word-sounds that aren't exactly speech, and not just among young children, the mentally ill, and parrots. Competent rational speakers use words for signaling too. So my idea appears to be circular. Hmmm.

Actually, " I speak" is a kind of artificial construct and for better
understanding we need to relate this utterance iwith a concrete situation. But how can we state
that "the result of the utterance is mere information" as Lazzaroto did? What kind of information?

Actually, " I speak" is a kind of artificial construct and for better
understanding we need to relate this utterance iwith a concrete situation. — Number2018

I know you didn't mean it this way, but isn't that true of all sentences?

(I have no idea what Lazzaroto is talking about.)

About Lazzaroto there is a quote above.
" I speak" has a special privileged status, different from any other statement; it can support or destroy the whole theory.

" I speak" has a special privileged status, different from any other statement; it can support or destroy the whole theory. — Number2018

What whole theory is that?

For Paolo Virno " I speak" is an "absolute performative" which has a function of foregrounding the "event of Language". Another example is Foucault's theory of parrhesiastic enancuation.

Not my area then, and any comment I could make would be uncharitable.

If you haven't read Austin yet, I'd recommend doing so.

What is your area?

I only meant that terms like "performative utterance" and "illocutionary force" originated in a philosophical tradition I know a bit about (Austin, Strawson, Grice) and found a home later in ("as" might be more accurate) the linguistic field of pragmatics, about which I know less.

Since you don't seem to be talking about either of those, I doubt I can be any help.

Anyway, thank you.

Maurizio Lazzarato in his book "Signs and Machines" wrote: " In fact, " I speak" cannot be a performative since the result of the utterance is mere information from which no obligation follows.
It institutes no "right", no convention, no role, no distribution of powers. Even if it accomplishes what it states, it is never dales not a performative". " I speak" is an utterance that communicates something but it does not act on the "other"." Can we consider "I speak" as having just simple communicative function? — Number2018

That's a brilliant example of how crucial context and tone are to the function and meaning of a speech act. 'I speak' be anything from a Dadaist's deliberate inanity to to an announcement of a life-changing development to a risky political declaration.

Scenario 1:
Plantation in Virginia, 1850. Slave owner has been shouting at the slaves 'You will speak only when I ask you to, and you will answer every question with "Sir"'.
A slave steps forward and loudly proclaims

'I speak'.

Scenario 2:
Jess has been mute for two years, following a brain injury. She has just had surgery hoping to rectify some of her problems. She awakes in the recovery room, looks at her father and says in a quiet voice, with tears in her eyes:

'I speak'.

Scenario 3:
A self-help group of people with anger management problems has been discussing what strategies they have been trying to help prevent anger arising or boiling over into violence. Raju says he counts to ten. Fiona says she digs her nails into her palm. Ping says he imagines a majestic mountain with beautiful glaciers. Brunhilde says:

'I speak'.

Short version: the meaning of speech acts cannot be sensibly analysed without context.

Nevertheless, it is still possible to try to analyze " I speak" relating it to different philosophical traditions and theories of language.

I think that's the difference between us. I don't believe that analysing sequences of words devoid of context can deliver any useful insights.

Is it possible to find a link between "I lie" and "I speak"? Both can be split into two interdependent propositions.

Is it possible to find a link between "I lie" and "I speak"? Both can be split into two interdependent propositions. — Number2018

Not sure what you mean here. Are you thinking of versions where these are taken to be self-referential? (You'd have to say, because to my ear these both sound more like "habitual present tense" or whatever the right term for that is.)

One thing I was wondering about was whether we're to take your "I speak" as being spoken in a specific language. As I suggested above, I'd be tempted to see any utterance in a living language as also carrying a commitment to a linguistic community, which carries with it certain rights that can be claimed and certain responsibilities that ought to be met. If you want to abstract away the specificity of the language so that no linguistic community is implicated, not even an abstract one, you either want a private language -- and someone will be along shortly to tell you you can't have one -- or maybe a Whitman-like "barbaric yawp". Is a barbaric yawp speech? Unlikely. Is it a signal? I'd like to say unlikely as well, because once signaling became voluntary (on the way to becoming speech) it also became possible to make a noise for the sheer pleasure (or at least sensation) of noise-making. This is plain in small children. But of course we've drifted away from the linguistic now...

"The meaning of the speech acts can not be analyzed without context".You are right. Yet, what do you mean applying the word " context"? You list of examples can be continued
infinitely, so some abstraction and generalization is unavoidable.

" To take your "I speak" as being spoken in a specific language",
" To see any utterance in a living language as also carrying commitment to a linguistic community".
Is that possible to pose the problem of " I speak" using resources of your tradition? (Austin, Strawson, Greese) I would like to specify "the language and the linguistic community " following the lead of French thinkers. They tried to broaden the concept of illucative forces, so that "I speak" would become
a powerful and flexible analytical tool.

No, "speak" in English isn't a conventionalized performative.

As points out, you can coerce it into sounding like a performative in some contexts, but even this strikes me as a rather strained and creative use of language, and certainly not conventionalized (like, say, "I object," or "I resign").

Foucault problematized " I speak" as having the two propositions hidden in the statement ( " I speak" and I say that I speak"): " They are in no way compromise each other. I am protected by the impenetrable fortress of the assertion's self- assertion, by the way it coincides with itself, averting all danger of error, by saying no more that I am speaking. Neither in the words in question nor in the subject that pronounces them is there an obstacle or insinuation to come between the object- proposition and
the proposition that states it. It is therefore true, undeniably true, that I am speaking when I say that I am speaking".

" I object", I resign", I love", " I promise" - all of them are dependent
indirectly on " I speak".

But I don't think you can build this fortress yourself.

There's an episode of "Barney Miller," an old sitcom, in which an old man is about to be taken off to an asylum because he seems to be babbling gibberish, but Sgt. Dietrich finds another old man who speaks the dialect of Ukrainian the supposed crazy man has been speaking all along.

" I do not think you can build this fortress yourself" - Foucault's project was about general cultural situation in 60s., it is not about somebody's individual situation.
Also, it looks like Foucault tried to oppose Austin's theory of performative enancuation. In short, in a very simplistic way, his concept is neither linguistic, nor psychological - Foucault's "I speak" is about automization and oppression of Cogito - it is just an appearance of independent self- affirmation.

[Foucault's] concept is neither linguistic, nor psychological — Number2018

Then you'll want to say something like this:

By 'speak' I don't mean [[speak]], by 'proposition' I don't mean [[proposition]], by 'true' I don't mean [[true]], and by 'assert' I don't mean [[assert]].


Which I would see as directly related to my point that in speaking you accept certain responsibilities to your linguistic community. See Humpty-Dumptyism.

Thank you for taking part in discussion with me!:smile:
Probably we belong to different linguistic communities.:lol:

Indeed.

Good luck with your work.

Yet, what do you mean applying the word " context" — Number2018

You are right that we can never get a perfectly accurate sense of the meaning of a speech act without knowing all possible context, which would involve being the person that makes the speech act. Even that is sometimes not enough, as I often find myself saying things that I did not expect, and I don't know why I said them, let alone what they meant, if anything.

For most speech acts, the context of knowing the events in a short period before the act, in the immediate vicinity, is sufficient. In the examples I gave, the context I provided in a short paragraph was sufficient to understand the significance of each act to a satisfactory level.

An example where much greater context is needed to sufficiently understand meaning would be a bitter argument between people that have been married to each other for many years. In that context, every word and phrase can be loaded with subtext that would be completely lost on an observer, even if they witnessed the whole conversation. That's another situation in which each party will say things whose meaning is buried in their subconscious, and was not intentional.

I suppose I'm saying that I absolutely agree that some generalisation is unavoidable. But that generalisation is done when one feels pretty confident of what was meant. For the sentence 'I would like to buy an Oyster card with a ten pound balance please' I feel confident I know what the meaning is, and am happy to generalise. But if told that some person unknown, in some unknown time and place said 'I speak', I would have no idea and would reply 'I don't understand that. Tell me more.'

You made good points about what is "context"! Yet, if I take a risk to develop them farther, you argue that each situation of each speech act is unique and singular.
If so, it is impossable to theorize and philosophize about language! Yet, individuation and singularization of
each speech act are realized through the set of pre-personal affective forces and post- personal ethico- political forces external to language. It looks like Austinian speech acts theory does not consider all of them.