You may be right - I am painfully aware (and frequently reminded) of my own lack of knowledge of both Aristotle and physics. However Heisenberg, who is mentioned in that article, was, in addition to being one of the founders of quantum mechanics, also quite philosophically well-educated, and his book On Physics and Philosophy, is overall well-regarded, as I understand it. And Ruth Kastner, who is one of the authors, is also a tenured academic in philosophy of science with degrees in both physics and philosophy.

I must say what interested me in the concept was the notion of 'degrees of reality' - that the (so-called) elementary particles are not truly existing entities until they are measured. It's not as if they're at some place that hasn't been determined but that they really don't exist in any place until they're measured. So the probability wave represents the likelihood of any particular outcome but it doesn't describe some definite thing in a definite place. So the so-called 'particle' doesn't really exist, but only has a tendency to exist, so to speak. Kastner says 'The new [i.e. her 'transactional'] realist understanding may not be in terms of causal, mechanistic processes. It may instead encompass a fundamental indeterminism at the heart of nature, but one which is well-defined in terms of the conditions under which it occurs - in contrast to prevailing "orthodox" interpretations which suffer from an ill-defined micro/ macro "cut". The new understanding offered here is a rational account, in the sense of being well-defined and self-consistent, even while it lacks certain features, such as determinism and mechanism, that have been traditionally assumed to be requirements for an acceptable scientific account of phenomena.'

The Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, 2012, p.33

The Transactional Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, 2012, p.33 — Wayfarer

Thanks. Since I am not familiar with the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics, I downloaded the new paper by Kastner, Kauffman and Epperson. At first gloss, it seems to me like the best features of this approach are shared by the relational/pragmatist approaches favored by Heelan, Rovelli and Bitbol. The relational/pragmatist interpretations, though, appear to me to better comport with Aristotelian metaphysics, and to more radically jettison the foundationalist and reductionist prejudices of modern scientific thinking than the transactional interpretation appears to do. But I'll have to read the paper more carefully to see if my worries are warranted and before expressing more precise objections.

This seems like nonsense to me, probably in an attempt to cover up your previous statement, but feel free to tell us where in De Anima Aristotle says this. — Πετροκότσυφας

Did you read earlier in the thread where I quoted Aristotle's primary definition of the soul. It's Bk.2 Ch.1

Now the word actuality has two senses corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge and the actual exercise of knowledge. It is obvious that the soul is actuality in the first sense, viz that of knowledge as possessed, for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul...

That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality, of a natural body having life potentially in it. The body so described is a body organized.

You seemed to be arguing that if the soul is an actuality it is necessarily in motion. So to say that the soul is an actuality would be inconsistent with what he said earlier, that the soul does not move. But as you see, Aristotle allows for two types of "actuality", and this is why his philosophy supports dualism.

These are activities of the soul which involve change. Desires change", it really seems like you're now just making stuff up and contradict yourself. And Aristotle... — Πετροκότσυφας

If you knew Aristotle you would know that he defines the soul as an actuality, a form. That's what I quoted above, It's stated as the primary definition of the soul, so it's pointless for you to argue that this is not how he defines "the soul".

Yet, a couple of pages back you wrote about how complete and consistent Aristotle's system is. Also, I thought that Aquinas held that the eternity (or not) of the world could not be demonstrated and his belief in the newness of the world was an article of faith. — Πετροκότσυφας

It is complete and consistent. But upon presentation of the cosmological argument, in which it is demonstrated that actuality is necessarily prior to potentiality, in an absolute sense, he proceeds to speculate about that "eternal actuality". He comes up with an the idea of an eternal circular motion, which is consistent, but I disagree with. The reason why I say that this is repugnant to the intellect is because it does not provide an explanation, or a reason for existence, in any way. The intellect, seeking to know, desires the reason. So it is as Aquinas says, an article of faith, it is to have faith that such and such is intelligible, and therefore we continue to inquire and to seek the answers. But if we simply assume an infinite regress, we create the assumption that the beginning is unintelligible, therefore we cease inquiry, and cease to seek answers.

So the faith is related to the intelligibility of the unknown object. We cannot know that it is intelligible until we know it, but when we approach it we do not know it. So we have faith that it is intelligible and this inspires us to come to know it. If the unknown object is difficult to understand, so we simply assume that it's an infinite regress of causation, or that it emerges from random chance, then we designate the object as unintelligible and we give up the faith which is required to inspire the inquiry toward understanding. And that's why these assumption, which kill the faith to inquire, are repugnant.

This idea doesn't mesh with Aristotle's idea of there being first and second actualities, since first actualities, themselves being kinds of potentialities, would have to exist both within spacetime and outside of it. Some person's property of being sighted, or of being able to speak French, for instance, are first actualities, while the exercise of sight, or the act of speaking French, are second actualities. When a doctor restores the ability of sight in a formerly blind person, it would be weird to say that this restored ability is something that exists both outside of spacetime (qua potentiality to see) and inside of it (qua first actuality). — Pierre-Normand

This is the point I am trying to make to Πετροκότσυφας here, what is well expressed by you as the notion of first and second actualities. This is what allows Aristotle to say that the soul is an actuality, but also that it is not a motion. It supports dualism because motions are physical actualities while the soul is a non-physical actuality.

The need to assume secondary actualities is the consequence of the cosmological argument. What we understand concerning physical actualities is that the potential for any particular physical actuality precedes in time, that particular actuality. However, the cosmological argument demonstrates that it is impossible that potential is prior to the actual in an absolute sense. Therefore we have to assume a secondary level of actualities which is prior in time to what we observe as physical (spatial-temporal) actualities. These are non-physical actualities.

What I think is the important point in relation to your discussion with wayfarer, is that potentialities cannot be given the proper validity of real existence without the assumption of secondary actualities. Without secondary actualities, potentialities are all reducible to logical possibilities, things apprehended by the mind. There is nothing to ground them as real, other than logical axioms, which may just be pragmatic assumptions themselves. So if a physicist wants to hand reality to potentialities, then without turning to secondary actualities to support this reality, all there is axioms, which may be stipulated for reasons varying between practicality and aesthetics.

We need to agree to disagree on what Aristotle means by "hyle.

It appears like you have not read "On the Soul", if you think that the movement of living things is due to the activity of matter, and not the form which is called "the soul". — Metaphysician Undercover

1. I have read De Anima a number of times and parts in Greek.

2. You are confusing our understanding of life with our understanding of substantial change (aka generation and corruption). The context in which hyle as a determinate, active potency appears is substantial change -- in which one kind of thing becomes another kind of thing. The soul, which Aristotle defines as "the actuality of a potentially living thing" is the form of a single, living kind of thing -- not the principle of dynamic continuity in substantial change.

How can you be theist and not believe in the soul? — Metaphysician Undercover

God and the soul are distinct issues. One can affirm one and deny the other. I happen to affirm both the existence of God and that of the soul, defined as "the actuality of a potentially living thing." Clearly, every living thing can be alive and is actually alive.

We need to agree to disagree on what Aristotle means by "hyle. — Dfpolis

I think we've already agreed, implicitly, to that.

2. You are confusing our understanding of life with our understanding of substantial change (aka generation and corruption). The context in which hyle as a determinate, active potency appears is substantial change -- in which one kind of thing becomes another kind of thing. The soul, which Aristotle defines as "the actuality of a potentially living thing" is the form of a single, living kind of thing -- not the principle of dynamic continuity in substantial change. — Dfpolis

Let me see if I can understand what you mean here, and why I have difficulty with it. First, I see that "active potency", if we adhere to Aristotelian principles, is contradictory. You are claiming that in certain types of change, "substantial change", there is a need to assume this "active potency".

In this instance, when one kind of thing becomes another kind of thing (substantial change), the principle of continuity, matter, or hyle, cannot be passive, you are saying that it must be dynamic. This is what we've been discussing, what Aristotle was calling the coming into being of things. And what you are not seeing, in those passages, is that Aristotle describes those instances of coming into being, by referring to the creativity. In the case of artificial things, the source of substantial change is in the soul of the man who creates. In natural living things, the source of substantial change is the soul of the living being. Therefore there is no need to do as you do, and assign dynamism to hyle. This only produces an inconsistency in Aristotelian principles.

The point of disagreement between us therefore, is in the relationship between "substantial change" and the soul. My interpretation is that substantial change, generation and corruption, whereby one thing ceases to be, or another thing begins being, requires a soul. Your interpretation is that there is no such necessary relationship, substantial change may occur independently of any soul, so long as hyle may be an active potency, a principle of dynamic continuity..

Shouldn't we define "substantial change" such that we can make an informed judgement on this matter? Does "substantial change" imply that either a substance ceases to be, or that a new substance begins being, or both? If so, then isn't this necessarily a discontinuity of substance? With "substantial change" we are referring to a discontinuity of substance. Matter, or hyle, is the principle by which the continuity of substance is understood, but now we are talking about a discontinuity of substance, so we can no longer refer to matter as our principle of continuity. If your intent is to seek a principle of continuity, such that the generations and corruptions of substance may be understood as "changes" rather than as instances of coming to be, and ceasing to be, then we must refer to something other than matter, or hyle. Can you agree to this?

You are claiming that in certain types of change, "substantial change", there is a need to assume this "active potency". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, Aristotle is claiming that. I'm merely agreeing.

In natural living things, the source of substantial change is the soul of the living being. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, Aristotle considers this possibility in Physics i, 9 and rejects it, because the form of a thing is simply its actuality and what makes a thing actual (its form) can't be the same thing that makes it not actual when it ceases to be. That would be a contradiction.

Nor can it be the new form, because the new form doesn't exist yet.

My interpretation is that substantial change, generation and corruption, whereby one thing ceases to be, or another thing begins being, requires a soul. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, when coal burns and becomes CO2 and ash, where is the soul?

Matter, or hyle, is the principle by which the continuity of substance is understood — Metaphysician Undercover

No. It is the principle of continuity in substantial change. You need to read Aristotle's discussion of the kinds of change. In it, substantial change and accidental change are equally changes.

Your ramblings are rather meaningless until we define substantial change. I've offered you a definition of substantial change. "Does "substantial change" imply that either a substance ceases to be, or that a new substance begins being, or both?" You reject it. Care to offer a better one?

Your ramblings are rather meaningless until we define substantial change. — Metaphysician Undercover

By "substantial change" Aristotle means generation (in which a new form comes to be), and corruption (in which a form ceases to be), as opposed to accidental change in which a thing retains its essence while its accidents change.

I rejected your earlier definition because it allowed discontinuity.

When something ceases to be, or comes to be, this is, by definition, discontinuity. One is when a thing which was, now is not, and the other is when a thing which was not, now is. To say that there is such a thing as ceasing to be, or coming to be, without discontinuity, is contradiction. We cannot say that something has come to be, or that something has ceased to be, unless we allow that this is a discontinuity of being. That's what "beginning" and "ending" signify, a discontinuity.

When something ceases to be, or comes to be, this is, by definition, discontinuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Only a discontinuity in form, not in all relevant aspects of being. There is a continuity in the underlying dynamics (dynamis = hyle),

Only a discontinuity in form, not in all relevant aspects of being. — Dfpolis

OK, I agree with this, the discontinuity is with respect to form. Now the question which Aristotle asks, is where does the new form come from. It cannot come from the old form, due to this discontinuity. It cannot come from the matter because then the matter would have both the old form and the new form, at the time prior to the substantial change, and this would be contradictory. Aristotle says that in the case of art, the new form comes from the soul of the artist, and in the case of nature it comes from nature. Please acknowledge that the new form could not come from the matter, because this would mean that the matter had both the old form and the new form, at the same time prior to the substantial change, and this is contradictory.

Remember, in describing matter and potential, Aristotle is explicit in his claim that the law of non-contradiction ought not be violated. Instead, he opts to violate the law of excluded middle. So he describes matter and potential in terms of what may or may not be, rather than in terms of what is and is not. But this creates a separation, in principle, between matter and form, such that the new form cannot come from within the matter which already has the old form. The matter only provides the potential for the new form, as it provided the potential for the old form. The new form must actually come from something other than the matter.

You seem to be expressing an ontology of dialectical materialism, within which it is customary to allow for the violation of the law of non-contradiction, to account for the existence of matter. But Aristotle is strictly opposed to allowing for the violation of the law of non-contradiction. So the dialectical materialist cannot claim to adhere to Aristotle's principles.

It cannot come from the matter because then the matter would have both the old form and the new form, at the time prior to the substantial change, and this would be contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is the argument of Parmenides that Aristotle answers with the concept of dynamic potency in hyle. Matter is never either the old or new form. It is always a principle of potency, never a principle of actuality -- that is what form is. Thus, there is no violation of the principle of contradiction.

There is a continuity in the underlying dynamics (dynamis = hyle), — Dfpolis

Which accounts for the possibility of the immortality of the soul, does it not?

Incidentally at this moment on the way to the library to borrow The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought, Joseph Owens et al. I figure before wading into neo-Aristotelianism, I ought to study the original first, and this seems a particularly good starting point.

The problem of being is central to Western metaphysics. Etched sharply in the verses of Parmenides, it took on distinctive colouring in Aristotle as the subject matter of a science expressly labelled 'theological.' For Aristotle, being could not be shared in generic fashion by other natures. As a nature it had to be found not in various species but in a primary instance only. The science specified by the primary nature was accordingly the one science that, under the aspect of being, treated universally of whatever is: it dealt with being qua being.

There is a continuity in the underlying dynamics (dynamis = hyle), — Dfpolis

Which accounts for the possibility of the immortality of the soul, does it not? — Wayfarer

Hyle is a principle of physical continuity. Arguments for the immortality of the soul point out that there are human operations that do not depend on matter. The idea is that the Agent Intellect, which I am identifying with subjective awareness, makes intelligibility actually known. There is nothing in the actualization of intelligibility that necessarily depends on matter. Thus, we have a power (our awareness) that can continue to operate after our body decays.

In my person view, this is confirmed by mystical experience. I think that a very good case can be made for a direct awareness of God. If so, we have examples of awareness that do not depend on neural processing.

The science specified by the primary nature was accordingly the one science that, under the aspect of being, treated universally of whatever is: it dealt with being qua being.

Yes. Aristotle calls First Science "theology." We only call it "metaphysics" because the book appears after the Physics in the corpus. First Science or theology is concerned with the most fundamental subject possible -- being as being.

I can't see how a science of being as being is possible, except perhaps as a phenomenology which would have to start, as Heidegger did, with dasein: human being.

Collingwood also has good arguments to support the view that metaphysics can only be a science of the absolute presuppositions which underpin the fields of human science and inquiry. Pure being is, as Hegel points out, coterminous with nothingness, and how could we have a science of nothingness?

Perhaps it could be said that mysticism is a science of nothingness; but in the domain of mysticism there would seem to be no possibility of the kind of definitive intersubjective corroboration that is necessary for a domain of inquiry to count as a science.

That is the argument of Parmenides that Aristotle answers with the concept of dynamic potency in hyle. Matter is never either the old or new form. It is always a principle of potency, never a principle of actuality -- that is what form is. Thus, there is no violation of the principle of contradiction. — Dfpolis

To say both, that matter is a "dynamic potency", and, "never a principle of actuality", is itself contradictory. Your second statement is a correct representation of Aristotelian principles, matter is "always a principle of potency, never a principle of actuality". Your first statement, "the concept of dynamic potency in hyle" is not. You appear to have allowed the modern concept of energy, which allows for "dynamic potency" to influence your interpretation of Aristotle. For Aristotle matter is "always a principle of potency, and never a principle of actuality". Therefore "dynamic potency" is excluded as contradiction, regardless of whether he considers this possibility in passing, as indicated by your quotes..

Which accounts for the possibility of the immortality of the soul, does it not? — Wayfarer

According to Aristotle's cosmological argument, no potency can be eternal. The soul is a form, actual, it is not material, or a potency. Potencies are what the soul has. If there is "underlying dynamics", which underlie the potency of matter, as dfPolis claims, they must be formal in nature, just like the soul is a form, and not of the matter itself. Df is trying to negate the need for the underlying Forms, which is illustrated by Neo-Platonism, by assigning dynamism to matter. This clearly contradicts Aristotelian principles.

Strange, cause I quoted a passage where it is argued that the soul can't be moved (only incidentally) and I quoted this passage because you said that the soul changes, which means that it's in motion. — Πετροκότσυφας

I don't think I said that the soul is moved. It is said to be "actual", or active. Change and motion are descriptions of material bodies, the soul is immaterial. Aristotle's cosmological argument demonstrates the need to assume an actuality which is prior to the material body to account for its existence, as the cause of the of the particular form which the body has. This is what makes any individual thing the thing which it is rather than something else. Neo-Platonists assume immaterial Forms, and the Soul is of this category, an immaterial thing. So the soul is active, in the sense of being actual, yet it is not in motion, nor is it changing, as these are terms which describe material existence.

If this is what you wanted to say, I think you failed, — Πετροκότσυφας

The failure was my fault. This is not an easy topic to discuss, and apparent contradiction abound in any attempt. One can read Aristotle, and quote numerous contradictions, one after the other. The challenge is to make sense of the apparent contradictions, work them out such that they are not contradictions, making for consistency in your interpretation. This requires great effort.

Words fail to express the intended meaning sometimes. The difficulty here involves our conception of time. If the concept of time is derivative from changing material existence, then it appears like time requires change in material existence. But in reality, if all change in material existence requires time, then material change is dependent on time. This allows for time outside of change in material existence. If time is passing, yet no material change is occurring, there could be something like the soul which is active, or "actual", without any change in material existence occurring.

So, yes, there are different actualities, but, no, there aren't different forms. There's one form, the soul, and it does not change. Aristotle does not seem to allow for formal change in De Anima. — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes, there are different forms. Let me attempt an explanation again.

A material body is described by Aristotle as a composite of matter and form. An individual thing, a particular, such as a man or a horse, being "substance" in the primary sense of the word, changes as time passes. These changes are said to be "accidental", because the individual thing continues to be the same thing, a man or a horse, despite the changes. Nevertheless, these changes are changes to the individual thing's form, as each thing, each instance of substance, has a form which is proper to itself. The form of the thing is "what" the thing is, so that each particular, or individual thing, has a form proper to itself, making it what it is, and not something else. This "form" must consist of all the accidentals, and this is the basis for Aristotle's law of identity.

On the other hand, when we say "what a thing is", in the sense of its essence, we also refer to its "form", but this is not it's particular form, but a universal. In this case, "form" indicates the essence of the thing, such as when we say that it is a man, or a horse, we refer to the thing's essence. When we refer to the thing's essence, as its form, "what it is", i.e., a man or a horse, we allow that the thing's form (its essence) remains the same, despite accidental changes to the form of the individual.

Therefore the thing has two forms, the particular form, which is the form that is proper to the individual, by the law of identity, making it what it is and not something else, which also changes in the case of accidental change, and also the universal form, or "essence" of the thing, making it the thing which we call it, a man or a horse, which is not changing in the case of accidental change.

As you can see, we must assume two distinct forms for each individual thing (substance), a universal form (its essence), and a particular form (its identity). This allows for accidental change, which is change to the thing that does not make it into a different thing altogether. The form of the individual, being a composite of matter and form (substance), is changing as time passes. Yet the individual's "form" in the sense of its essence, remains the same despite these accidental changes.

When you write "Change is described as an altering of the form, via the contraries, from has to has not", you merely seem to repeat what Aristotle argues against. — Πετροκότσυφας

It appears like you are not respecting this fact, that Aristotle refers to "form" in these two completely distinct ways. One form of the thing changes in the case of accidental change (the form of the substance), while the other form of the thing (its essence) does not. This is causing you confusion in your interpretation of what I am saying, making it appear as if I contradict myself because you do not separate these two distinct uses of "form".

I can't see how a science of being as being is possible, except perhaps as a phenomenology which would have to start, as Heidegger did, with dasein: human being. — Janus

I think of being in terms of what i call "Dynamic Ontology" in the hope of reducing confusion by being more explicit in the meaning of my terms. I was inspired in this by a suggestion of Plato in The Sophist 247e:

I suggest that anything has real being that is so constituted as to possess any sort of power either to affect anything else or to be affected, in however small a de-gree, by the most insignificant agent, though it be only once. I am proposing as a mark to distinguish real things that they are nothing but power — Plato

Cornford points out that this is only a mark (horos) of being that would be acceptable to a materialist, not a definition (logos) of being, and that the question of what reality is remains open later in the dialogue. Still, I think we can make good use of it after a little refinement.

First, adding “or to be affected” to “to affect anything” is redundant. If I claim to be acting on x, but no effect is produced in x, then however much I am exerting myself, I am not acting on x at all. If I am not acting upon x, x is not being acted upon by me. Unless x is capable of re-acting in some way when acted upon by something, it is incapable of being acted upon by anything. So the condition “or to be affected” does nothing to increase extension. Second, “else” in “any sort of power either to affect anything else” is unnecessarily restrictive. If something can act on itself, then it exists, even though we may be unable to know its existence.

Being, then, is convertible with the capacity to act. Every thought of an existent involves some ability to act: to reflect light, to occupy space and so resist penetration, to affect thought. In fact, any “thing” unable to affect thought would be unknowable, and would never be considered an entity. Since this contrasts sharply with our unreflective concept of a minimal existent as a passive blob, it may help to recall that quantum field theory reveals all matter as constantly oscillating and abuzz with virtual particles.

In classical ontology, existence is the basis in reality for our saying that a being is, and essence that for our saying what a being is. In dynamic ontology, existence represents an unspecified capacity to act, and essence specifies an individual’s possible acts. Given these definitions, any act by an object (1) evidences its existence and (2), by being a specific act of which the object is capable, projects its essence.

If we can agree on these starting points, then at least some minimal science of being qua being is possible.

Collingwood also has good arguments to support the view that metaphysics can only be a science of the absolute presuppositions — Janus

I reject the notion of a priori knowledge, however fundamental. All that we know can be explained in terms of our awareness of interacting with reality. If I am aware of something acting on me, I am aware that it exists. Since it is acting on me in a specific way, I know it can act in that way and so have some minimal projection of its essence -- of its possible acts. In reflecting on my experience of existence, I see that existence entails principles such as identity, the impossibility of both being and not being at one and the same time in one and the same way, and that a possible being is either actual or not actual.

Then, I see that if my thinking is to apply to being, it must reflect these characteristics of being. These are not laws of thought. They are laws of thought about being. I can think that there is a plane figure that is both a triangle and a square, but there cannot be a plane figure that is both a triangle and a square.

Pure being is, as Hegel points out, coterminous with nothingness, and how could we have a science of nothingness? — Janus

No, being is not coterminous with nothingness. That's unreflective word play. No-thing has no properties, including terminal boundaries. Since it has no boundaries it cannot be co-terminus with anything.

Perhaps it could be said that mysticism is a science of nothingness; but in the domain of mysticism there would seem to be no possibility of the kind of definitive intersubjective corroboration that is necessary for a domain of inquiry to count as a science. — Janus

Being trained as a physicist, I used to poo-poo anything "mystical." Then I read W. T. Stace's Mysticism and Philosophy which provides a detailed phenomenology of mysticism. Since then, I have read extensively on mysticism and its cognitive value. While each experience is personal, many are tokens of a common transcultural typology.

St. John of the Cross, in reflecting on his mystical experience characterizes God as "todo y nada" (all and no-thing), and Eastern mystics frequently speak of and experience of "nothingness." I think mystics mean by this that that object of their experience cannot be classed as a phenomenal thing. Stace points out that one type of experience is completely free of sensory qualia, while his other type adds no sensory content to our perceptions. Both involve a profound awareness of unity.


To return to your basic thesis, could you give an argument for the impossibility of a science of being?

I see no point in continuing to beat the poor, dead equine.

You finally see the contradiction then? Matter for Aristotle is "never a principle of actuality", that we agree on. Yet under your interpretation, Aristotle also says matter is a "dynamic potency". You interpret Aristotle as contradicting himself. I deny "dynamic potency" as your misinterpretation, and find Aristotle to be consistent.

Being, then, is convertible with the capacity to act. Every thought of an existent involves some ability to act: to reflect light, to occupy space and so resist penetration, to affect thought. In fact, any “thing” unable to affect thought would be unknowable, and would never be considered an entity. Since this contrasts sharply with our unreflective concept of a minimal existent as a passive blob, it may help to recall that quantum field theory reveals all matter as constantly oscillating and abuzz with virtual particles.

If we can agree on these starting points, then at least some minimal science of being qua being is possible. — Dfpolis

I would agree that "being is convertible with the capacity to act", but I would say that refers to specific being, being as some kind of being and not to "being as such" or 'pure being". The "unreflective concept of a minimal existent as a passive blob" I agree is unhelpful and couldn't count as 'pure being'. The inability to say just what pure being is, is the reason that Hegel equates the idea of pure being with the idea of nothingness. Nothingness is no-thing-ness, and pure being is no-thing; passive blob or otherwise.

In fact it is exactly on account of science being restricted to the knowledge and understanding of the actions of existents upon one another that Collingwood rejects the possibility of a science of pure being. He says that metaphysics is only viable as a historical science which examines, explicates and analyzes the 'absolute presuppositions' upon which the sciences, from the ancient to the modern, have been based. I must admit i find it hard to disagree with this.

I reject the notion of a priori knowledge, however fundamental. All that we know can be explained in terms of our awareness of interacting with reality. If I am aware of something acting on me, I am aware that it exists. Since it is acting on me in a specific way, I know it can act in that way and so have some minimal projection of its essence -- of its possible acts. In reflecting on my experience of existence, I see that existence entails principles such as identity, the impossibility of both being and not being at one and the same time in one and the same way, and that a possible being is either actual or not actual.

Then, I see that if my thinking is to apply to being, it must reflect these characteristics of being. These are not laws of thought. They are laws of thought about being. I can think that there is a plane figure that is both a triangle and a square, but there cannot be a plane figure that is both a triangle and a square. — Dfpolis

I agree with you in one sense in rejecting the idea of a priori knowledge. It is not a priori in Plato's anamnesic sense. It only comes, as you say after 'reflecting upon my experience'. The a priority, of a priori knowledge, though, consists in the fact that once I have realized "that existence entails principles such as identity, the impossibility of both being and not being at one and the same time in one and the same way, and that a possible being is either actual or not actual", I know a priori that all subsequent existents I could encounter must obey these principles.

Kant himself acknowledged this, that synthetic a priori knowledge is dependent on experience in order to be first gained (obviously nothing at all can be gained without any experience), but once gained particular experiences do not need to be examined to confirm that the knowledge is vindicated as true knowledge. And it is in this latter sense that a priori knowledge can be distinguished from a posteriori knowledge.

I agree with what you say about mysticism. mysticism in its affective aspect is the most profoundly personal of dimensions, but of course in its symbolic aspect (as expressed) it obviously makes use of inter-subjective conventions and associations. What else could it do if its purpose is to communicate and evoke the nature, the color, the flavor, the substance of the experience, however approximately? This characteristic is shared by the arts generally (at their best), I would say.

I have shown you the texts and the logic of the case. There is nothing more I can do.

I have shown you the texts and the logic of the case. — Dfpolis

Actually what you have shown me is illogical. Rather than accept Aristotle's definition, and his general overall usage of "matter", which renders it impossible that matter is "dynamic", you impose an interpretation on specific sentences which you think imply that matter is dynamic. Since you clearly indicate that you recognize Aristotle's definition of matter as "never a principle of actuality", yet you insist that he says matter is dynamic, you are asserting contradiction, which is illogical.

Furthermore, there is no logic which indicates that we must consider matter to be dynamic. The proper conclusion to the problem you presented is that of the Neo-Platonists, that there are immaterial Forms which account for the apparent dynamism of matter. This is the direction which Aristotle pointed when he compared coming-to-be in the case of artificial things, where the form comes from the soul of the artist, and coming to be in the case of natural things, where the form comes from nature.

I would agree that "being is convertible with the capacity to act", but I would say that refers to specific being, being as some kind of being and not to "being as such" or 'pure being". The "unreflective concept of a minimal existent as a passive blob" I agree is unhelpful and couldn't count as 'pure being'. The inability to say just what pure being is, is the reason that Hegel equates the idea of pure being with the idea of nothingness. Nothingness is no-thing-ness, and pure being is no-thing; passive blob or otherwise — Janus

I think "being as such" (being qua being) is not the same as what you're calling "pure being." When I say being qua being, I am thinking of any instance of existence, not considered as a specific kind of thing, or as having specific properties, but only insofar as it exists. On the other hand when I am thinking of "pure being," I am thinking of undelimited being, not of delimited beings insofar as they exist. In other words, I am thinking of God.

I touched on the idea that God is no-thing earlier. Denying the the kind of delimiting specification which characterizes things does not imply that undelimited being (no-thing) is nothing. Nothing can perform no act, while undelimited being can perform all logically possible acts -- so Hegel (or his sister) seems hopelessly confused.

In fact it is exactly on account of science being restricted to the knowledge and understanding of the actions of existents upon one another that Collingwood rejects the possibility of a science of pure being. He says that metaphysics is only viable as a historical science which examines, explicates and analyzes the 'absolute presuppositions' upon which the sciences, from the ancient to the modern, have been based. I must admit i find it hard to disagree with this. — Janus

Of course, our limited intellect and representational capacity, makes it impossible to form any proportional concept of undelimited or infinite being. Nonetheless, we can entertain a well-defined ostensive concept, i.e. one that points, uniquely, at infinite being. As the words "undelimited" and "infinite" indicate, this can be done by the via negativa. By asserting an ability to act while denying limiting characteristics, we form an indexical that points uniquely to pure being (God).

I have no idea what an "absolute presupposition" would be. As I have said, I think all so-called a priori proposition are a posteriori with respect to their foundational experiences, but may be applied "a priori" (without detailed reflection) thereafter -- this because they apply to all beings insofar as they exist.

Reading further, you seem to agree with me on a priori propositions, which leaves me wondering what kinds of things you see as "absolute presuppositions"?

We also seem to agree on mystical experience and its expression. I suspect we each have a lot more to say on the subject.

Reading further, you seem to agree with me on a priori propositions, which leaves me wondering what kinds of things you see as "absolute presuppositions"? — Dfpolis

I don't have a lot of time today, but I'll just try to answer this. For Collingwood an absolute presupposition is not a proposition that is claiming to be true or false. So, for example if i ask you whether you would like to accompany me to the cinema, today, there are several absolute presuppositions involved; that you and I exist, that there is a cinema, that it is playing films today, and so on. This is a just a simple example.

Collingwood believes that there are absolute metaphysical presuppositions involved in the practice of any science (in the broadest possible meaning of the word 'science') whether the science be ancient, medieval or modern. So, for example there is the absolute presupposition that nature is governed by invariant laws that is fundamental to the practice of the modern natural sciences.

For a much more detailed account you might want to look at the SEP entry on Collingwood:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/collingwood/

Perhaps it could be said that mysticism is a science of nothingness; but in the domain of mysticism there would seem to be no possibility of the kind of definitive intersubjective corroboration that is necessary for a domain of inquiry to count as a science. — Janus

I have been reading about allegorical interpretations of Plato and Pythagoreans. At various times, it has been fashionable to deprecate allegorical interpretations; at other times, it is said that the dialogues really are in the main allegories. Proclus argues generally that:

Writings of a genuinely profound and theoretical character ought not to be communicated except with the greatest caution and considered judgement, lest we inadvertently expose to the slovenly hearing and neglect of the public the inexpressible thoughts of god-like souls.

Proclus claims that the Parmenides generally communicates its meaning through allegory or 'undermeanings' (i.e. implicit or unstated meanings). A teacher, he says, does not 'speak clearly, but will content himself with indications; for one should express mystical truths mystically and not publicize secret doctrines about the gods'. The dialogue's method of instruction is 'to employ symbols and indications and riddles, a method proper to the most mystical of doctrines ...' (from here.)

Furthermore, the original definition of 'mysticism' is 'an initiate of the mystery religions' - of which Plato was almost certainly one. I say that, to distinguish the proper use of the term 'mysticism' from its casual use, which can mean almost anything (likewise with 'metaphysical').

But the point I'm getting to, is that the reason mystical teachings are kept secret or only given out to the properly qualified, is because they assume capacity or readiness on the part of the listener to take in or comprehend what is being communicated. In other words, they're esoteric. (I recall reading that Leo Strauss said that there is a kind of hidden layer of meaning in much classical philosophy:

'Serious [philosophical] writers write esoterically, that is, with multiple or layered meanings, often disguised within irony or paradox, obscure references, even deliberate self-contradiction. Esoteric writing serves several purposes: protecting the philosopher from the retribution of the regime, and protecting the regime from the corrosion of philosophy; it attracts the right kind of reader and repels the wrong kind; and ferreting out the interior message is in itself an exercise of philosophic reasoning.')

And that is because, in keeping with the view of philosophy in that context, part of task of philosophy is 'ascent' of the understanding, which is the Platonist 'meta-noia' or the conversion of the understanding.

So, perhaps the reason mystical texts appear to be about 'nothing' is actually because they're about something we can't see; we can't make sense of them, we have no reference points to approach them through. Or, as the saying has it: 'It's all Greek to me.' :razz:

I touched on the idea that God is no-thing earlier. Denying the the kind of delimiting specification which characterizes things does not imply that undelimited being (no-thing) is nothing. — Dfpolis

I understand this distinction - no thing, in the sense of 'not any thing'. I think the problem is that we instinctively try to conceive of whatever exists as being situated in some place or location - which is what 'reification' means i.e. 'making a thing'. That is a consequence of our 'instinctive naturalism', you might say. Whereas transcendent being(s) are not locatable in terms of time or space (a thought which I'm sure most will find most uncongenial). But that, again, is why I drew attention to the passage about Augustine and 'intelligible objects', another explication of which is here.

And returning to this point:

in the domain of mysticism there would seem to be no possibility of the kind of definitive intersubjective corroboration that is necessary for a domain of inquiry to count as a science. — Janus

Note from the SEP entry above:

In spite of the dualistic implications [i.e. of the sensible vs intelligible], this is clearly not intended to be a dualistic alternative to the moral dualism of the Manicheans and other gnostics. Instead, the divide is situated within what is supposed to be a larger, unified hierarchy that begins with absolute unity and progressively unfolds through various stages of increasing plurality and multiplicity, culminating in the lowest realm of isolated and fragmented material objects observed with the senses.
Thus, for Augustine, God is regarded as the ultimate source and point of origin for all that comes below. Equated with Being [Confessions VII.x.16], Goodness [e.g. De Trinitate VIII.5], and Truth [Confessions X.xxiii.33; De Libero Arbitrio III.16], God is the unchanging point which unifies all that comes after and below within an abiding and providentially-ordained rational hierarchy.

Augustine, especially in his earlier works, focuses upon the contrast between the intelligible and the sensible, enjoining his reader to realize that the former alone holds out what we seek in the latter: the world of the senses is intractably private and isolated, whereas the intelligible realm is truly public and simultaneously open to all; the sensible world is one of transitory objects, whereas the intelligible realm contains abiding realities; the sensible world is subject to the consumptive effects of temporality, whereas the intelligible realm is characterized by an a-temporal eternity wherein we are safely removed from the eviscerating prospect of losing what and whom we love.

Science itself was (although perhaps it's no longer feasible) a quest for the original unity or the one source of all. That is why it proceeds from the particular to the general, why scientific laws are held to be higher or prior to the particular. But that now seems a forlorn hope, with the 'knowledge explosion' and the consequent fragmentation of the many disciplines of science.

Maybe its immaterial, because it's an Idea. We are nowadays used to thinking that ideas are 'in the head' or 'in the mind'; for us, they're subjective, personal, artifacts of mere thinking; at any rate, the material form is what is real, and ideas are the product of that. Whereas in the Platonist (including Aristotelian) understanding, Nous was prior to any material particular, i.e. it had ontological priority, a higher degree of reality that mere matter. That's the sense in which the modern view is an inversion of their view (and that is not simply polemics.)

wonder if that "form of the individual" is anything else than the individual (the substance) and if it is, what it is (and where in De Anima Aristotle talks about it), and if it's not, why fail to say just that. That substances change. — Πετροκότσυφας

This topic is discussed in Metaphysics. As Aristotle described, when an individual thing changes, the form which comes to be in the material object, must come from somewhere. In the case of artificial things it comes from the soul of the artist. In the case of natural things it comes from nature. He states that we ought to question "why is there what there is rather than something else".

When anything comes to be, it is necessarily the thing which it is and not something else. This is fundamental to logic, the law of identity, and non-contradiction, while the law of excluded middle is supported by the thing being something rather than indeterminate. It is impossible that the thing comes to be as something other than what it is. We can conclude that the principle, the Form, which determines what the thing will be, is prior in time to the material thing which displays that form to us.