What constitutes a 'natural motive'?

Since I am not the best at explaining acquired knowledge, here's an example of what I was referring to:

"If we grasp Being, we will clarify the meaning of being, or "sense" of being (Sinn des Seins), where by "sense" Heidegger means that "in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something."[9] Presented in relation to the quality of knowledge, according to Heidegger, this sense of being precedes any notions of how or in what manner any particular being or beings exist, and is thus pre-scientific.[10] Thus, in Heidegger's view, the question of the meaning of being would be an explanation of the understanding preceding any other way of knowing, such as the use of logic, theory, specific regional ontology.[11] At the same time, there is no access to being other than via beings themselves—hence pursuing the question of being inevitably means questioning a being with regard to its being.[12] Heidegger argues that a true understanding of being (Seinsverständnis) can only proceed by referring to particular beings, and that the best method of pursuing being must inevitably, he says, involve a kind of hermeneutic circle, that is (as he explains in his critique of prior work in the field of hermeneutics), it must rely upon repetitive yet progressive acts of interpretation. "The methodological sense of phenomenological description is interpretation."[13]"

Sourc(es):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Being_and_Time

Dasein is his idea; the being that has being as a question. Dasein has as an existentiele being-in-the-world as well as thrownness, ahead of itself, constituting a totality as an in-itself only as the whole that it would be if it were not in the world anymore, as in... Dead.

The reason why prostitution may be exploitative is not found in the nature of sexuality itself, but in the specific relation established between the actors. As such, prostitution may be exactly as exploitative as a sexual relation within the context of a longterm relationship.

Exploitation is but another aspect of an event seen as part of a beings umwelt. As such, what may seem exploitative on one side for you might not be for the actor you feel is being exploited. Thats why universal subjectivity is but a contradiction in terms. There is no such thing. I have often bitched at Wittgenstein's 'even if lion could talk, we would not understand them' on this site in the past, but comparatively to your position, he is much closer to the truth.

If you're referring to what I said, a natural motive is any motive that follows a natural law or princip-le. From the of 'natural law' or 'primitive law'. We can elaborate on how a natural motive usually constitutes a mode of existence that correlates to different objects. However, as the previous comment pointed out, different forms of naturalism exist for certain objects.

But what is a natural law or motive, as it relates to human intention?

"The reason why prostitution may be exploitative is not found in the nature of sexuality itself, but in the specific relation established between the actors. As such, prostitution may be exactly as exploitative as a sexual relation within the context of a longterm relationship."

That would be a correct proposition, if it weren't for the further extension of thought, in which certain forms of sexual gratification, even if not prostitution which is settled for material benefit on one party, are also exploitative. Then there's the idea that prostitution is not just material and therefore exploitative, but prostitution extends to the immaterial. This means that prostitution is not just involved with the factor of money, but is also involved with sexual gratification that is in a long-term relationship-. However, this gratification may be unnatural, and contain perverse actions.

"Exploitation is but another aspect of an event seen as part of a beings umwelt. As such, what may seem exploitative on one side for you might not be for the actor you feel is being exploited. Thats why universal subjectivity is but a contradiction in terms. There is no such thing. I have often bitched at Wittgenstein's 'even if lion could talk, we would not understand them' on this site in the past, but comparatively to your position, he is much closer to the truth."

A form of universal subjectivity which does not posses an equal distribution or balance on both sides, is not a universally subjective concept. Universal subjectivity, would apply between two parties of a similar natural disposition. If one p-arty is entirely different, then it cannot therefore be universally subjective.

A natural law or faculty of motivation for man, would involve a historical process, very similar to Hegel's concept of Hegelian Dialectics. The thing about natural motivation, is it must however, connect to something that is positive or negative to man. History is always either the two of those sides, and thus, is a natural process. In order for something to always remain a natural motivation (like history), it must always be in progression (not in the societal sense, or the ethical sense).

What was previously said may have sounded like an informal false dichotomy. However, i'm not taking the position that man can not cultivate in history a middle position, but the outcome of this position will always have a positive or negative consequence.

In addition, naturalism as a motivation, can be divided into natural cognitive judgments, and natural material judgments. The former is a judgement of how the mind progresses and determines real world natural things i.e,. philosophy, ethics, logic, etc. Real world physical representations, must be purely natural and not distorted by human intervention in their natural existence. E.g,. plants, animals, etc.

So this epistemology is one of realism?

Does not an object exist for me? How can it be said to exist in itself as a chair apart from the intentionality that designates 'it' as chair, apart from it falling into the nothingness that would be the undifferentiated everything?

So subjectivity suddenly becomes universal simply because it is shared by two actors? Is intersubjectivity some transcendantal gateway?

I think at this point its fair to assume that we resides in different realities. Crap, does that also mean modal logic actually has some use? :groan:

An object exists for you in the sense that you apply cognition into the tools necessary to define and construct the object in question. The conception of an object depends entirely on its creator (for man), and is in that sense, man-made of course. In questioning whether a chair in excluding the intention of its man-made conception, cannot be an absolute if this is what you are referring to. If it remains an absolute, simply because of its ability to satisfy human needs, then it would rather be an object of human purpose. However, it would fall into nothingness due to its uses as an object not being properly represented in cognition. This means that it could not exist objectively as a char as a chair has various meanings.

Transcendentalism, is rooted in our mental processes and cognition. Things that are rooted in cognition, may posses a natural rational interpretation behind them. Two objects that are not universally subjective because they share a common understanding, but groups of things that are united in some way, share a common understanding. This is what would be universally subjective. the intersubjectivity aspect, which can be sub-divided by the subjective group-s that share different preferences, is still subjectively universal. This is due to the simple fact that they share similar elements of understanding that unite them, which is irrelevant from the smaller molecular differences in their structures.

Yes, this epistemological examination would be introducing the position of realism.

I think it would be a good idea for the future to start a new thread on realism and naturalism as concep-ts.

I am essentially between idealism and realism, having premised my epistemology upon intentionality; the fact that consciousness is always consciousness of something, which reconciles the split between idealism and realism, which both posit the knower as separate from any object of knowledge. The question is now, for me, a question of knowledge itself; relating to the authenticity of knowledge--how one can be sure that they know anything at all. I have myself witnessed in analysis the infinite regress the result of not distinguishing between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance; however, I am uncertain whether or not this distinction is itself necessary to understand knowledge. I have reached conclusions myself, but I am trying to take it further. The inseparabilility that is the result of intentionality, which would be the knower versus the known, seems to me to render knowledge an interaction of being-in-the-world and a relationship as opposed to a pure apprehension of something separate. Regardless, another question has materialized for me...
If the realist valuation of epistemology is accurate... How could the true object be at all if all that is apprehended is the perception or conception of it? Would this not suffice to represent that truth?

I believe that in the realist valuation of the world, the conception of an object can only be true through man p-lacing his own judgments of cognition on the object or subject of question. However, where a conjecture arises, is whether an aesthetically beautiful object of taste, which provides its own colorful outline and geometrical outline can be perceived differently. An object that is organ as formerly regarded, can posses certain naturally beautiful features, however, it is only our perception that we are seeing the same colors, and not the absolute. Anything that is apprehended can also share a similar error in nature. However, natural objects do have an object form of attractiveness, which irregardless of the aesthetical form we perceive it as possessing, holds objectivity in nature. If the perception of an object as representation is held in nature, the natural form must always be held in cognition and physical representation. This diversion creates a distinction between one world of Cognition and Physical. If both of these aspects are shared in one, then it is absolute truth. However, if one is missing from the other, then it cannot complete itself, and is therefore an inaccurate representation of the real world and apprehension of truth.

money is merely a false material representation of value. — Noah33

This is wonky in two ways. In the first place, economic value is subjective, marginal utility. In the second place, in representing ratios of exchange of (subjectively) valued goods, money can't be "false," it either does its job or it doesn't (e.g. if the currency is inflated, etc.)

Value appears objective only because the multitude of economic actors, exchanging stuff according to their individual scales of preferences, results in relatively stable prices most of the time, but the system constantly adjusts to shifts in those preferences (e.g. something new is invented, lots of people now want it, and consequently some hitherto-valueless resource now has a value; people were sitting oblivious on top of coal and oil reserves that had no great value until various kinds of machinery were invented that everyone suddenly wanted to use).