for example there is the absolute presupposition that nature is governed by invariant laws that is fundamental to the practice of the modern natural sciences. — Janus
I have been reading about allegorical interpretations of Plato and Pythagoreans. At various times, it has been fashionable to deprecate allegorical interpretations; at other times, it is said that the dialogues really are in the main allegories. — Wayfarer
But the point I'm getting to, is that the reason mystical teachings are kept secret or only given out to the properly qualified, is because they assume capacity or readiness on the part of the listener to take in or comprehend what is being communicated. In other words, they're esoteric. (I recall reading that Leo Strauss said that there is a kind of hidden layer of meaning in much classical philosophy — Wayfarer
We can conclude that the principle, the Form, which determines what the thing will be, is prior in time to the material thing which displays that form to us. — Metaphysician Undercover
Aquinas would say that the human mind is ordered to the understanding of material being. — Dfpolis
Here I disagree strongly; I think that all such notions of esoteric or hidden knowledge are, to put it bluntly, elitist bullshit. — Janus
Where does the phrase between the commas ("being a composite of matter and form (substance)") refer to? It either refers to the form of the individual or to the individual. — Πετροκότσυφας
Right, this is "form" in the sense that any particular material thing has a form which is proper to it, making it the particular material thing which it is, and not something else. It is not the "form" in the sense of the essence of the thing.*This is the second form, the non-soul form. — Πετροκότσυφας
In time? I think it has ontological priority, i.e. prior in terms of the hierarchy of being, but not temporally. — Wayfarer
It [the form] must necessarily be temporally prior... — Metaphysician Undercover
No one, not even the Buddha or Christ, could have any way of knowing for sure that what they might think they know is not a delusion — Janus
I guess it all depends on what one thinks "love of wisdom" means. It depends on how one defines and thinks about wisdom. — Janus
And you know this how?
Seriously, though - the name 'Buddha' means precisely 'one that knows', and whilst I certainly don't think that anyone ought to feel compelled to accept that the Buddha did really know, I think the blanket claim that 'it simply could not have been the case' that he knows, is too much. — Wayfarer
Unfortunately, I suppose, I am never going to change my view on the matter but at least here we have come to some understanding of where the difference lies. — Wayfarer
But if 'the form' is located in time, then presumably it's also located in some place. Or, perhaps it is something that unfolds or evolves, in modern terms? But then, absent 'telos' - some end to which organisms are directed - then how is the form anything other than adaptive necessity?
But then - maybe this is exactly why Aristotelianism has made a comeback as 'neo-Aristotelianism'. One of the main drivers for that, seems to be the necessity of accomodating 'telos'. — Wayfarer
The so-called "vertical dimension" you allude to is rightly fallen out of favour, because it is based on the idea that there are truths which have rational import, and yet cannot be rationally demonstrated or even articulated, which is a contradiction, an inconsistency and an incoherency. — Janus
placing the intelligible as prior in time — Metaphysician Undercover
I have read Hadot, and I don't agree that he sees philosophy the way you do — Janus
Pierre Hadot, classical philosopher and historian of philosophy, is best known for his conception of ancient philosophy as a bios or way of life (manière de vivre). ...According to Hadot, twentieth- and twenty-first-century academic philosophy has largely lost sight of its ancient origin in a set of spiritual practices that range from forms of dialogue, via species of meditative reflection, to theoretical contemplation. These philosophical practices, as well as the philosophical discourses the different ancient schools developed in conjunction with them, aimed primarily to form, rather than only to inform, the philosophical student. The goal of the ancient philosophies, Hadot argued, was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing. To cultivate philosophical discourse or writing without connection to such a transformed ethical comportment was, for the ancients, to be as a rhetorician or a sophist, not a philosopher.
Askesis of Desire
For Hadot, the means for the philosophical student to achieve the “complete reversal of our usual ways of looking at things” epitomized by the Sage were a series of spiritual exercises. These exercises encompassed all of those practices still associated with philosophical teaching and study: reading, listening, dialogue, inquiry, and research. However, they also included practices deliberately aimed at addressing the student’s larger way of life, and demanding daily or continuous repetition: practices of attention (prosoche), meditations (meletai), memorizations of dogmata, self-mastery (enkrateia), the therapy of the passions, the remembrance of good things, the accomplishment of duties, and the cultivation of indifference towards indifferent things. Hadot acknowledges his use of the term “spiritual exercises” may create anxieties, by associating philosophical practices more closely with religious devotion than typically done. Hadot’s use of the adjective “spiritual” (or sometimes “existential”) indeed aims to capture how these practices, like devotional practices in the religious traditions are aimed at generating and reactivating a constant way of living and perceiving in prokopta, despite the distractions, temptations, and difficulties of life. For this reason, they call upon far more than “reason alone.” They also utilize rhetoric and imagination in order “to formulate the rule of life to ourselves in the most striking and concrete way” and aim to actively re-habituate bodily passions, impulses, and desires.
They most certainly can, within the appropriate 'domain of discourse'. — Wayfarer
This is what I had in mind: — Wayfarer
None of that speaks to any specific metaphysical beliefs about transcendence, — Janus
The point is that after all these exchanges we have had over the years I still have no clear idea of what it is exactly that you actually want to argue for. — Janus
it’s because you don't understand it. — Wayfarer
I really do try and offer my perspective, and it's met with, not so much criticism, as what seems to me to be uncomprehending hostility — Wayfarer
I'm still having a problem with this. In my view, 'the intelligible object' has an ontological rather than a temporal priority - like, it is 'before' in the sense of 'a priori' or 'prior to', not in the sense of linear time, but in terms of being nearer to the origin or source of being. So - not prior in time, but prior to time. — Wayfarer
I understand then that this other form is not a composite of matter and form. What is it? Is it immaterial? If it's immaterial, how can it change, since movement and change belong to material bodies? If it's not immaterial, then how is it even a form? — Πετροκότσυφας
I understand then that this other form is not a composite of matter and form. What is it? Is it immaterial? If it's immaterial, how can it change, since movement and change belong to material bodies? If it's not immaterial, then how is it even a form? — Πετροκότσυφας
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.