it can if there is a mirror :yum:

what is your take on sythentic a priori judgments? Or propositions based upon them?

what does that mean? What is the difference between saying an infant is dependent on the mother and an infant is existentially dependent on the mother? What is the difference between being dependent and existentially dependent? It just seems superfluous. — Blue Lux

A thing can be dependent upon something else for all sorts of things aside from it's own existence.

But wouldn't something's existence be the whole of all the things about it? And if one aspect of the whole is dependent on something that it is not, wouldn't that whole thus be existentially dependent as well?

what is your take on sythentic a priori judgments? Or propositions based upon them? — Blue Lux

I'm with Quine here.

But wouldn't something's existence be the whole of all the things about it? — Blue Lux

No. See the five rules of existential dependency..

And if one aspect is dependent on something that it is not, wouldn't it make it existentially dependent on it?

No.

It would make it logically impossible - to be nice.

Something cannot require that which it does not require. That is incoherent and/or self-contradictory. It is also existentially impossible.

But wouldn't something's existence be the whole of all the things about it? — Blue Lux

Our knowledge is about it. Our knowledge of it is not equivalent to it.

Don't they teach you these sorts of basic common sense principles in school anymore?

:wink:

Didn't you assert yourself as in your early twenties in another thread here recently?

Remind me of apokrisis... Or rather, a friendlier version thereof.

Is there such a thing as apriori knowledge, and if so how can we acquire it, and/or know about it?

Witt spent much time researching answers to this sort of questioning.

This thread is relevant...

We can acquire knowledge of that which exists prior to language. If that doesn't count as getting beneath language, then nothing can, and it is an utterly empty concept - this - "getting beneath language".

If we're looking to acquire knowledge of that which exists prior to language, we must use language for it's the only means available. It quite simply does not follow from the fact that we must use language in order to acquire knowledge of that which is prior to it, that we cannot get beneath language.

Initial(rudimentary) thought and belief is prior to language acquisition.

If truth is presupposed somewhere along the line within every example of thought and belief, then we've adequate ground to hold that all thought and belief presupposes truth... pre-linguistic thought and belief notwithstanding.

That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.

Initial(rudimentary) thought and belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language acquisition. Our knowledge of it most certainly is. Initial thought and belief is not existentially dependent upon our knowledge of it.

Let's revisit the liar...

A statement's ability to be true/false is existentially dependent upon drawing meaningful correlations between different things. The liar is utterly inadequate.

I thought I would add the following Creative...

There is some agreement between my position on this subject, and what Creative is inferring. However, there is also significant disagreement on some of these issues. For example, we agree that without prelinguistic thought and belief there would be no language. However, we disagree in terms of what things are pre-linguistic. For example, Creative seems to believe that justification, truth, and knowledge are prelinguistic. My position is that all epistemological constructs are necessarily dependent on language. So, when we talk about truth, justification, and knowledge, these are all necessarily dependent on language. Why do I infer that this is the case?

First, some concepts, such as belief, are both non-linguistic and linguistic, i.e., beliefs can be shown to exist in these two forms. They can be shown by our actions, i.e., by opening the door my actions show that I believe there is a door; and they can be stated as part of a language, “I believe in such-and-such.”

Second, another key feature of non-linguistic beliefs is that they can have existence apart from language, i.e., they are not rule-dependent, and this is key to understanding my position. Any belief that can have existence apart from language, is not dependent on language. You can think of it this way: The word Mars has a referent quite apart from the concept Mars, so the referent is not dependent on language, i.e., the referent is not rule-dependent. Don’t confuse this with using the word Mars linguistically, i.e., there are rules that govern the use of the concept in a linguistic setting. However, this is quite different from the referent itself, which exists quite apart from any linguistic consideration. This is also true of non-linguistic beliefs, which can have an existence (a referent) independent of language. The referent that manifests itself in terms of non-linguistic beliefs, are the actions associated with the belief. In fact, this is what makes some or all of these kinds of beliefs bedrock or hinge.

Third, some concepts or beliefs are necessarily dependent on language in that they are rule-dependent, and there is no independent referent that they can latch onto apart from their use in language. Justification is just such a concept, justification gets its meaning from how it’s used in a language, and only from how it’s used in language. This is very similar to the idea that it’s linguistically impossible to have a private language, which by the way, is very different from using a language privately. The latter is done only after learning a language, the former is supposedly done in a completely private setting. If justification was something that could be done apart from language, then it would also be true that there would be no rules that governed the activity. This follows from the idea that rule-following is necessarily social. Not only would this be true of justification, but it would also be true of truth and knowledge. It’s not you who decide how such words/concepts are used.

Creative seems to believe that justification, truth, and knowledge are prelinguistic. — Sam26

This reflects misunderstanding. No fault here, just reporting the facts. There has been a misunderstanding. What I've been arguing is quite unusual, as far as I know. That said, what follows is an attempt to add a bit of clarity where it's needed.





Regarding the idea of prelinguistic justification...



Creative knows that justification is existentially dependent upon metacognition.

Creative knows that metacognition is existentially dependent upon language.

Creative knows that justification is existentially dependent upon language.

Creative knows that that which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to it.

Creative knows that justification cannot exist prior to language.

Creative knows that that which is pre-linguistic must exist prior to language.

Creative knows that justification cannot be prelinguistic.






Regarding the idea of prelinguistic truth...



Creative knows that true belief can exist prior to language.

Creative knows that that which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it.

Creative knows that true belief that exists prior to language cannot be existentially dependent upon language.

Creative knows that true belief is existentially dependent upon truth.

Creative knows that truth cannot be existentially dependent upon language.

Creative knows that truth exists prior to language.






Regarding the idea of prelinguistic knowledge(justified true belief)...



Creative knows that belief exists prior to language.

Creative knows that being justified is being well-grounded.

Creative knows that the act of justification does not cause the belief statement being argued for to be well-grounded; rather it is the act of providing those grounds.

Creative knows that well-grounded belief is not existentially dependent upon justification.

Creative knows that the attribution/recognition of causality can be well grounded.

Creative knows that a prelinguistic creature can believe that touching fire caused discomfort/pain.

Creative knows that that well grounded belief can happen prior to language.

Creative knows that touching fire causes discomfort.

Creative knows that that particular well-grounded true belief is prior to language.






So, in summary...

Creative knows that justification cannot be pre-linguistic, but well-grounded true belief most certainly can be.

My position is that all epistemological constructs are necessarily dependent on language. — Sam26

My position is that all epistemological constructs are linguistic. Not all things being taken account of are linguistic. Some of our constructs take account of that which exists prior to language.

I'm adding numbers to your statements to make it easier.

Regarding the idea of prelinguistic knowledge(justified true belief)...

1. Creative knows that belief exists prior to language.

2. Creative knows that being justified is being well-grounded.

3. Creative knows that the act of justification does not cause the belief statement being argued for to be well-grounded; rather it is the act of providing those grounds.

4. Creative knows that well-grounded belief is not existentially dependent upon justification.

5. Creative knows that the attribution/recognition of causality can be well grounded.

6. Creative knows that a prelinguistic creature can believe that touching fire caused discomfort/pain.

7. Creative knows that that well grounded belief can happen prior to language.

8. Creative knows that touching fire causes discomfort.

9. Creative knows that that particular well-grounded true belief is prior to language. — creativesoul

Your first premise: I agree that a belief can exist prior to language.

Your second premise: For me justification and being well-grounded are the same. If you can say that I'm justified in believing X, it's the same as saying my belief is well-grounded, both of these are necessarily linguistic. Why is well-grounded prior (maybe because of the causal effect) to language and justification not?

Your third premise: The act of justification doesn't cause any belief, that would be weird. You seem to be saying that the act of justification is different from being well-grounded, in that being well-grounded is causal, or can be causal. I know that I made an argument that prelingistic beliefs are causally generated, but you seem to be taking it one step further, by adding in the idea of being well-grounded. I don't see the need to extend it, it's just another belief that is causally generated, it's not a matter of being well-grounded. By their very nature they are foundational, basic, hinge, or bedrock, there is no need for the idea of being well-grounded. Isn't this a kind of justification. It seems confusing. Moreover, it seems that you're still adding in ideas that are necessarily linguistic.

Your fourth premise: Based on your distinction between justification and being well-grounded I can see how this might follow.

Your fifth premise: I don't know what it means, i.e., "...the attribution/recognition of causality can be well-grounded."

Your sixth premise: I agree.

Your seventh premise: I have a problem as already stated with this idea.

Your eighth premise/conclusion: This seems to be a conclusion, but I'm not sure.

Your ninth statement/conclusion: I disagree, because I have problems with your premises as already stated. Moreover, much of what I said in my previous statement still applies.

Finally, some of this is difficult to follow because of how your defining terms.

the act of justification does not cause the belief statement being argued for to be well-grounded; rather it is the act of providing those grounds. — creativesoul

That seems to be the sticking point...

Justifying one's belief provides the ground for that belief.

Do we agree?

Yes, I agree.

A belief does not need to be argued for in order for it to be well-grounded.

I agree, we express beliefs all the time that can be justified, or that are well-grounded, without putting forth the reasons or evidence for those beliefs. If I express a belief as a true belief, one might ask how it is that I know it's true, then I will respond with my reasons/evidence. However, there are some beliefs that don't fall into this epistemological language-game. Those are Wittgenstein's hinge-propositions or bedrock beliefs. They are grounded, but they are grounded in a way of acting, i.e., my actions show or demonstrate that I have the belief. Is this what you're saying? This kind of grounding seems to be a bit different than what you're saying. Being well-grounded seems to imply something more, not sure, I'll keep reading your explanations.

A belief does not need to be argued for in order for it to be well-grounded. — creativesoul

I agree, we express beliefs all the time that can be justified, or that are well-grounded, without putting forth the reasons or evidence for those beliefs. — Sam26

Good. I suspected that we were in agreement there. We can also further surmise something of importance from this...

Justification is not necessary in order for a belief to be well-grounded. Here, we either must draw and maintain a distinction between what counts as being justified, and what counts as being well-grounded or admit that being justified is not existentially dependent upon justification, because being well-grounded most certainly is not.

However, there are some beliefs that don't fall into this epistemological language-game. Those are Wittgenstein's hinge-propositions or bedrock beliefs. They are grounded, but they are grounded in a way of acting, i.e., my actions show or demonstrate that I have the belief. Is this what you're saying? — Sam26

No. it is not.

This kind of grounding seems to be a bit different than what you're saying. Being well-grounded seems to imply something more, not sure, I'll keep reading your explanations.

Indeed, what I'm arguing isn't exactly along the lines of Witt's hinge propositions. However, I do strongly believe that if there are/is a set of beliefs that all others hinge upon, rest their laurels upon, and/or otherwise serve as/to ground the rest of one's belief system, then the method I'm employing here will help in acquiring knowledge of those, for they must exist prior to all the rest...

p1 Justification is existentially dependent upon metacognition
p2 Metacognition is existentially dependent upon language
C1 Justification is existentially dependent upon language(from p1, p2)
p3 That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to it
C2 Justification cannot exist prior to language(from C1, p3)
p4 That which is pre-linguistic must exist prior to language
C3 Justification cannot be prelinguistic(from C2,p4)

How's that look now Sam?

p1 Some true belief can exist prior to language
p2 That which exists prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon it
C1 Some true belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language(from p1, p2)
p3 All true belief is existentially dependent upon truth
C2 Truth cannot be existentially dependent upon language(from C1, p3)


This one?

p1 Some well grounded belief exists prior to language
p2 Providing ground is existentially dependent upon language
C1 Some well grounded belief is not existentially dependent upon providing grounds(from p1. p2)


... and this one?

Creative, I don't see where you explained what a well-grounded prelinguistic belief is. We agree that there are prelinguistic beliefs. Give an example of a well-grounded prelinguistic belief, and what makes it well-grounded. I just don't see where you've explained this.

A language-less creature can touch fire. Touching fire causes discomfort. Some language-less creatures can touch fire, feel discomfort, and attribute causality by virtue of inferring that touching fire caused the discomfort. All attribution of causality is thought and belief. That creature thinks, believes, and otherwise infers that touching fire caused the discomfort. That creature's belief is true. That creature's belief is well-grounded. That creature's belief cannot consist of language. That creature's belief cannot consist of propositions. That creature's belief cannot be existentially dependent upon language. That creature's belief cannot be existentially dependent upon justification. Not all well-grounded true belief is existentially dependent upon language. Not all well-grounded true belief is existentially dependent upon justification. — creativesoul

That creature's thought, belief, and/or inference consists of correlations drawn between it's own behaviour(touching fire) and the discomfort that followed. None of this is existentially dependent upon language aside from this report itself.

Some well-grounded true belief exists prior to language. All well-grounded true belief is justified true belief(knowledge). Some justified true belief exists prior to language. All justification is existentially dependent upon language. Some well-grounded true belief is not existentially dependent upon justification. — creativesoul

These are the fourth and fifth posts of the thread Sam...