If it's orange but it appears to you as red then you're seeing it wrong. — Michael

Seeing it directly means that it couldn't appear red when it is orange. Only appearance as representation could be wrong, but naive realism denies that perception would be representational. So, evidently, you have yet to understand naive realism.

The "perception" possessed by a brain in a vat would only be representational, i.e. a simulation.

Seeing it directly means that it couldn't appear red when it is orange. Only appearance as representation could be wrong, but naive realism denies that perception would be representational. So, evidently, you have yet to understand naive realism. — jkop

Are you saying that it's impossible for a thing to appear red if it's orange; that if it's orange then ipso facto we will all see it as orange? All perception is veridical?

Or is it possible for an orange thing to appear red and so, on that basis, our perception is mistaken?

Also, you didn't reply to this bit, which is the crux of the matter:

What does it mean to see the real mind-independent apple as it is? Would it be, for example, that we see a red apple, and there's a mind-independent apple that's mind-independently red?

So, evidently, you have yet to understand naive realism.

I already understand it. It's as explained here:

1. There exists a world of material objects.
2. Statements about these objects can be known to be true through sense-experience.
3. These objects exist not only when they are being perceived but also when they are not perceived. The objects of perception are largely, we might want to say, perception-independent.
4. These objects are also able to retain properties of the types we perceive them as having, even when they are not being perceived. Their properties are perception-independent.
5. By means of our senses, we perceive the world directly, and pretty much as it is. In the main, our claims to have knowledge of it are justified.

All perception is veridical, unlike hallucinations, in which nothing is perceived, only experienced. It would be unnecessarily ambiguous to speak of 'non-veridical' cases of visual perception, for example, when there is no vision, only experience of vision. In veridical cases something is both seen and experienced.

Also optical illusions are veridical in the sense that something is both seen and experienced, such as light, reflections, refractions, atmospheric effects and so on. A brain in a vat would never see, for example, the optical illusion in a photo-realistic picture, because seeing the illusion requires seeing something which is really there, such as real light, real patches of paint etc..

To see "..the real mind-independent apple as it is..." means to see it directly. The apple of your mind-dependent experience is the mind-independent apple that you experience.

To see "..the real mind-independent apple as it is..." means to see it directly. The apple of your mind-dependent experience is the mind-independent apple that you experience. — jkop

I like "direct realism" as an opening move in the metaphysical chess game. But doesn't anyone else see (to some degree) that it's largely just a debate about how we should use words? Don't get me wrong. Style matters. There's a different feel to these positions. But that almost seems to be the point: there's an attachment to some end (or perhaps the middle) of the subjective-objective spectrum. Then there's the annoying pragmatist move of trying to jump off the spectrum altogether...

I suppose you could talk about all the real composite parts that make up the dragon being simulated, but I am still not convinced that it makes proper sense to speak about the dragon itself being simulated.

and would completely miss the point that Putnam was making, which is that if the causal constraint on reference is correct then the words "brain" and "vat" as spoken by an envatted person wouldn't refer to real brains and vats but to these virtual-reality brains and vats, and given that we're not virtual brains in vats, our claim "we could be brains in vats" must be false. — Michael

But, it's really the same point. If there were real brains and vats in the real world inhabited by the simualtors, that the virtual reality brains and vats were simulations of, then the words would be causally connected to the real brains and vats insofar as the simulators would have made the simulated brains and vats to look the same and caused us to name them the same. But, in that case even if we and this whole reality were simulated then it would follow that there must be real things that are being simulated, otherwise it makes no sense to speak of simulation. Look at our own virtual realities; we cannot create any virtual reality that does not consist of simulated real things and/or composites made of simulated real things. So the whole silly thought experiment just displaces the problem of what is real one step up.

To see "..the real mind-independent apple as it is..." means to see it directly. The apple of your mind-dependent experience is the mind-independent apple that you experience. — jkop

This is circular. I asked what it means to see a thing directly and you said it's to see a mind-independent thing as it is. I asked you what it means to see a mind-independent thing as it is and you say it's to see a thing directly. So, currently, the very notion of seeing a thing directly – of seeing a mind-independent thing as it is – is vacuous.

The way I understand it is the way I've already described (and mentioned; see point 4 above): we see a thing directly iff the thing we see and the properties we see it to have are perception-independent.

If when we see a red apple we're seeing a mind-independent thing as it is then there's a perception-independent apple that's perception-independently red.

All perception is veridical, unlike hallucinations, in which nothing is perceived, only experienced. It would be unnecessarily ambiguous to speak of 'non-veridical' cases of visual perception, for example, when there is no vision, only experience of vision. In veridical cases something is both seen and experienced.

In which case you're defining perception as "directly experiencing a (mind-independent) object", and so to say that perception is direct is a tautology. Furthermore, if you're defining perception in this way then the argument between the direct and indirect realist isn't over whether or not perception is direct but over whether or not we actually perceive, with the direct realist saying that we do and the indirect realist saying that we only ever have experiences.

(Although this is veering too far off topic)

But, it's really the same point. If there were real brains and vats in the real world inhabited by the simualtors, that the virtual reality brains and vats were simulations of, then the words would be causally connected to the real brains and vats insofar as the simulators would have made the simulated brains and vats to look the same and caused us to name them the same. — John

I don't think that kind of causal connection would allow for such reference-making. The type of causal connection that establishes the referent of the word "brain" is the one between the envatted person's language and the virtual-reality brains that they experience.

As explained, here:

Reference is initially fixed with a dubbing, usually by perception, though also on occasion by description. Reference is fixed via perception when a speaker says, in effect, of a perceived object: "You're to be called 'N'."

The perceived object that they dub "N" (or in our case, "brain") isn't the real brain that they are but the virtual-reality brain. And so the envatted person's word "brain" refers to virtual-reality brains.

I like "direct realism" as an opening move in the metaphysical chess game. But doesn't anyone else see (to some degree) that it's largely just a debate about how we should use words? — Hoo

I agree. It's like looking at the Mona Lisa. One person says "I see a woman", another says "I see a painting of a woman", and a third says "I see paint". They're all correct; they're just different ways of thinking and talking about the same thing. Similarly, one person says "I see an apple", another says "I see a mental representation of an apple", and a third says "I see qualia". They could all be correct; they're just different ways of thinking and talking about the same thing.

This is why I think the substance of the issue – the thing that actually addresses the epistemological question – lies with point 4 above. Do objects retain the properties we perceive them to have even when they're not being perceived? The naive realists were those who answered in the affirmative, and so concluded that our perceptions can be used to justify the claims we make about the objective nature of the world, and the indirect realists were those who answered in the negative, and so concluded that our perceptions can't be used to justify the claims we make about the objective nature of the world.

if you want to say that, then you are claiming that the link between word and object must be intentional, and in terms of the user of the name, not that it must be causal. If we are brains in vats that have been programmed to experience a virtual world with brains and vats, and programmed to call them 'brains' and 'vats' respectively, because that is the name the programmer chose for us virtual 'people' to use, and in fact programmed our en-vatted brains to use, because they are virtual copies of the real brains and vats in the programmers world, then there is the intentional (and causal) relationship between the names and the objects set up by the programmers and the causal relationship between us en-vatted brains and the names we use for what we 'normally' take to be real brains and vats, due to our being programmed to use those names.

If we are brains in vats that have been programmed to experience a virtual world with brains and vats, and programmed to call them 'brains' and 'vats' respectively, because that is the name the programmer chose for us virtual 'people' to use, and in fact programmed our en-vatted brains to use — John

But the language wouldn't have been chosen by the programmer. The programmer only choses what is experienced. The envatted people would develop their own language in the normal way, in response to the things they see and hear.

And besides, imagine that I'm responsible for the people trapped in Plato's cave. I hold up a ball behind them so that a shadow appears on the wall, point to the shadow, and tell them to call it "ball". When they use the word "ball", are they referring to the shadow or to the ball? I'd say the shadow. Are you saying that it would actually refer to the ball?

If that's the way you want to stipulate it, then does the name really matter anyway? The programmers would have chosen brains and vats as perceptible objects in the program, whatever thye might end up being called. Or if you want to stipulate that the program evolved its own brains and vats randomly due to some algorithm, and that the programmer had no idea the program would do that, it seems a bit implausible. Can we program a computer to randomly generate objects that don't even exist, and that are not at least composites of things that exist in 'our' world?

I agree. It's like looking at the Mona Lisa. One person says "I see a woman", another says "I see a painting of a woman", and a third says "I see paint". They're all correct; they're just different ways of thinking and talking about the same thing. Similarly, one person says "I see an apple", another says "I see a mental representation of an apple", and a third says "I see qualia". They could all be correct; they're just different ways of thinking and talking about the same thing. — Michael

Exactly. Because I think we all assume that everyone else is having the same experience of seeing the woman/painting/paint. I was attracted to pragmatism at first for its dissolution of merely linguistic problems.

This is why I think the substance of the issue – the thing that actually addresses the epistemological question – lies with point 4 above. Do objects retain the properties we perceive them to have even when they're not being perceived? — Michael

We could also reframe the question in terms of action. Do we and should we act as if the apple we left on the kitchen table will still be red and delicious (for us, satisfying us) if we bother to walk downstairs? Can we emit strings of marks and noises that will allow us to work toward common goals successfully? I wouldn't exclude the fun of a metaphysical discussion from the set of such goals. It's actually pretty amusing to switch from the woman to the painting to the paint.

If that's the way you want to stipulate it, then does the name really matter anyway? The programmers would have chosen brains and vats as perceptible objects in the program, whatever thye might end up being called. — John

Sure. But it doesn't then follow that that kind of causal relation allows for the envatted person's use of the word "brain" to refer to real brains. However the experienced things came about, whether programmed or random, their words refer to things in the virtual reality, not to whatever things outside the virtual reality they may happen to represent (as per my example of Plato's cave).

But if the virtual brains and vats are modeled on real brains and vats in the programmers world, it wouldn't then seem to matter what words are used, because if the virtual person were somehow to be able to see a real vat he would still recognize it and refer to it with the same word; just as we do the other way around when we see virtual objects and refer to them with the same names as the objects they are simulating. What you are saying doesn't seem to take account of the fact that the same object has different names in different languages.

What you are saying doesn't seem to take account of the fact that the same object has different names in different languages. — John

This isn't a case of the same object having different names. This is a case of different objects having the same name. The envatted person's word "brain" refers to virtual reality brains, because it is virtual reality brains that they experience and dub "brain".

if the virtual person were somehow to be able to see a real vat he would still recognize it and refer to it with the same word

Yes, they'd use the same word, but the referent would be an entirely different thing.

I was saying something along the lines that, for example, if an envatted person calls a vat a 'tull' then if he was able to visit the real world of the programmer and was confronted with a vat, he would say "Oh, look, there's a tull". So the vat in both the virtual world would have the name 'vat' as used by the programmer and the name 'tull' as used by the envatted person.

For me, the salient point is that if vats exist in the programmer's world, and also in the world of the envatted, then they are the same kinds of object; one real and the other virtual. So for the envatted to think "I might be a brain in a tull", is only senseless if there are no real vats in the real world for her or him to be a brain in.

1. There exists a world of material objects.
2. Statements about these objects can be known to be true through sense-experience.

That explanation already has a problem in that second statement. Naive realism isn't a type of truth theory. One could be a naive realist and go with consensus, or coherence, or something else like that for their truth theory, where the truth relation thus has no special relationship to that person's naive realism.

That's the case for me as well. I'm a naive realist, but I have a subjectivist theory of truth (which is a bit of a meta theory that covers all truth relations from coherence to correspondence, etc. etc.) I personally use a correspondence relation for most truths, but since it's a subjectivist theory, it has no special relationship to my naive realism. It would work just the same if I were a representationalist or a solipsist or whatever.

That's like saying, in response to the claim that moral realism is the position that moral propositions are made true by objective features of the world, "moral realism isn't a theory on truth; it's a theory on morality". You can't make a separation like that.

I'd say that it's a contradiction to be a truth-subjectivist but a naive realist.

Furthermore, you can always read that second proposition as something like "the nature of these objects can be known through sense-experience".

And moral realism is indeed not a theory of moral truth. It's a theory of moral ontology.

What would make it true, in your view, that naive realism is indeed a theory about what makes ontological claims (in general) true? In other words, I disagree that naive realism implies anything about what makes claims true. So how do you support that in fact it does imply that?

As I've already explained, the naive realist view is that, in the veridical case, the objects we see and the properties we see them to have are perception-independent. Given that the truth of "there is a red apple" depends on there being a red apple, the truth of "there is a red apple" is perception-independent. This then entails an objective notion of truth, where propositions of the kind "there is a red apple" are true if a perception-independent fact obtains (in this case, the fact that there is a red apple).

What's at issue isn't whether you've already given your characterization of naive realism, or that that's your view of what it is or anything like that.

I'm saying that your characterization is wrong.

You disagree that it's wrong.

So I'm asking you for your support that it's not wrong.

I tried that but it didn't get anywhere as you refused to address the pertinent question. I'm not going through all that again.

Our last exchange had absolutely nothing to do with whether your characterization of naive realism specifically as pertains to its relationship to truth theory was correct or not.

That last exchange grew out of it not being clear that you even understood the difference between naive realism as a theory of perception and an alternative such as representationalism.

I explained in the twice-previous post the relationship between naive realism and truth. If there being a red apple is perception-independent (a requirement for naive realism) then it follows that the truth of "there is a red apple" is perception-independent.

Do you understand that I'm not asking you to explain what you think the relationship is between naive realism and truth (theory)?

it's largely just a debate about how we should use words? — Hoo

If there is ambiguity in our talk we should debate how we should use the words. Or else we'll just end up talking past each other, using words in different senses without realising it.

I thought that you were saying that my characterisation of naive realism was incorrect, and asked me to defend it. I then referred back to our previous discussion where I tried to do just that, and then you responded in a way that suggested that this isn't what you're now asking for, hence why I then assumed that you were referring to my claimed relationship between naive realism and truth.

So, given that apparently I was wrong on both accounts, no, I don't know what you're asking. You're not being very clear at all.

To see "..the real mind-independent apple as it is..." means to see it directly. The apple of your mind-dependent experience is the mind-independent apple that you experience. — jkop

This is circular. I asked what it means to see a thing directly and you said it's to see a mind-independent thing as it is. I asked you what it means to see a mind-independent thing as it is and you say it's to see a thing directly. So, currently, the very notion of seeing a thing directly – of seeing a mind-independent thing as it is – is vacuous. — Michael

There's "currently" a seeming circularity in your refereeing of my replies, but not in my replies.

I thought that you were saying that my characterisation of naive realism was incorrect, and asked me to defend it. — Michael

I'm asking you what makes it correct and to support that it's correct factually. What makes it correct wouldn't simply be that that's how you (and only you) think about naive realism, would it? I would think some sort of empirical evidence would be what would make it correct factually, no?

I agree that ambiguity isn't generally desirable. But the "language on holiday" metaphor may be apt. There's something priestly, scholastic, unworldly in word-math detached from practice. I'm not confident that the fuzziness of language can be tamed except by such an appeal to practice. How do two positions vary as rules for action? We get equivalence classes of theories this way, with presumably more relevant (and by definition more worldly) differences. I want "worldly" philosophy. I like the image of the philosopher as impiety incarnate, the anti-priest, thought as a chisel against the real as that which resists our will. (But then I get my 'unworldly' fix from pure math.)

Seems ridiculous to ask someone for empirical evidence to support the correctness of their characterization of a metaphysical standpoint.Thinking about metaphysical standpoints is done best by testing their coherence and consistency by teasing out what they logically entail.

In attempting to do this, Michael has claimed that the naive realist view that the existence of things is perception-independent logically entails that the truth of all claim of the form " X exists" or "there is an X" must also be perception-independent. I would respond by saying that I think Michael will conflate two senses of perception in purporting to support this claim.

Empirical evidence has nothing to do with it.

Seems ridiculous to ask someone for empirical evidence to support the correctness of their characterization of a metaphysical standpoint.Thinking about metaphysical standpoints is done best by testing their coherence and consistency by teasing out what they logically entail. — John

Aren't we talking about a stance that individuals have? Or in your view are we talking about something that somehow exists aside from that? In other words, can most naive realists believe something (that they're calling "naive realism") that turns out to not be naive realism after all?