Would it be that you had anything of substance to offer as an 'issue thereby raised'. — StreetlightX

So, we're back to this again. And the measure of the substance of an issue is...? Let me guess, something any competent reader automatically knows? Something any level of education beyond first year magically endows you with? Or could it just possibly be that your measure of the 'substance' of an issue has something to do with the degree to which you agree with it?

And the measure of the substance of an issue is...? — Pseudonym

... Unable to be decided in advance of the issue's being articulated and its implications laid out. No doubt this seems like magic to anyone unacquainted with the elementary tenets of reading tout court.

I see. I misunderstood the implications of the way you asked the question. I took your "What's the difference between..." as a rhetorical assertion that there should be one, not an observation there there wasn't.

The difference is, as Horwich discusses, between an observation of what the subject is, the objective of which is to be as inclusive as possible, to capture as much of what goes on as one can; and a edict about what the subject must be, the aim of which is to be exclusive, to reject that which does not fit the theory. One of Horwich's issues with T-philosophy is this tendency to simply reject that which does not fit the theory, rather than adjust the theory to that which is found.

... Unable to be decided in advance of the issue's being articulated and its implications laid out. — StreetlightX

What difference does this make. I obviously think I have articulated it and laid out it's implications (within the very tight constraints of a short forum post), others have certainly done so in book-length detail, it's not a new approach. You're just shifting the subjective judgement, now it's whether the issue has been sufficiently articulated. Sufficient to whose satisfaction? And how do we judge the sufficiency of the articulation?

Sufficient to whose satisfaction? — Pseudonym

Sufficient to the problem as articulated: the physiognomy of our problems, as John so felicitously put it. Do they not teach the basics of immanent criticism any more? That you keep coming to this idea of 'subjectivity judgement' or 'agreement': it simply shows that you simply don't know what you're talking about. Even your questions are badly put; they don't deserve answers because they're not even worthy of their own articulation. Doubly tragic coming from a reader of Wittgenstein.

Sufficient to the problem as articulated: the physiognomy of our problems, — StreetlightX

That doesn't seem to make any sense. You said that the measure of the substance of an issue (substance you claim is lacking in my critique) can be determined once it is sufficiently articulated. I asked you how one judges whether an issue has been sufficiently articulated and you've replied that it should be "sufficient to the problem as articulated". This just re-states the assertion. What is it to be sufficient? What distinguishes an articulation which is sufficient for you to judge it's substance from one which is not?

Any work of philosophy that qualifies as such furnishes its own criteria of assessment - how is this so hard for you to understand?

Any work of philosophy that qualifies as such furnishes its own criteria of assessment — StreetlightX

Fine, what were the criteria of assessment contained within your OP?

Any work of philosophy that qualifies as such furnishes its own criteria of assessment — StreetlightX

Also, who determines what the criteria of assessment are in the case where there is disagreement? Is it again the case that philosophy at large, who can't even agree on the meaning of the first sentence of most philosophical texts nonetheless miraculously come to a unanimous agreement as to what the criteria of assessment contained therein truly are?

So, if I decide the criteria of assessment contained within a work of philosophy are one thing, and you disagree, how is it that I'm wrong?

Is the distinction between two approaches to philosophical systematization well-founded? Does cartographic philosophy meet the challenge of positively responding to the critique of static systems as laid out in the OP? Is that challenge well articulated? (I'd like to think 1) Yes, 2) Mostly, 3) Could be better). If you're a particularly good reader you might be able to see more, much more, in it than the schematic laid out here, and pursue those implications further. Then we'd have an interesting discussion beyond this novice muck.

Any more hand holding you need?

How is "well-founded" a criteria for assessment? How is "meeting a challenge" or being "well articulated" criteria for assessment? You've not specified what would qualify as success in any of these measures. What distinguishes a thing which is "well-founded" from one which is not, what identifies a thing which has met a challenge, what marks something out as being "well articulated" as opposed to poorly articulated?

It's these assumptions that I take issue with. I doubt the honesty with which they are applied. Does it really seem impossible to you that I (or someone much more qualified than me) could not similarly come up with an arbitrary list of 'criteria for assessment' which would render any philosophical investigation a roaring success?

You've not specified what would qualify as success in any of these measures. — Pseudonym

Then it seems you are not a competent speaker of the English language.

if my comparison stands, shouldn't you allow SX what you seem to allow W. with regards to his language-games? — Πετροκότσυφας

This goes back to the distinction I made in my previous post to you. A description of 'what is' aims to be inclusive. Wittgenstein is trying to describe what language is, and so there is no issue with his using language to do so. Its not a judgement, its a description. My issue with the metaphorical linking of cartography with philosophy is not the comparison itself (which I think is fine) it's the manner in which it's exposition goes on to distinguish, rather than define. It sets edicts about what 'must be', what is 'necessary'. This becomes theory, not description. Theories should be open to testing. If something 'must be' the case, then it should be possible to attempt the opposite and demonstrably fail, yet no criteria are set for this.

If a philosophical investigation is akin to a map, crucially (as specified in the OP) one whose utility is only that it be put to 'some use or another'. Then an investigation which serves some use is an act of philosophy no more true than any other. But the author then reserves the right to claim to be an authority on such philosophical cartography, to know with certainty what constraints this sets on the nature of the mapping. What investigations led them to this certainty, and where are the other maps showing different aspects of that same investigation measured only by the use they're put to?

Is this a fair comparison? — Πετροκότσυφας

Definitely. To employ a language-game is simply the minimal criteria of any coherent discourse, let alone philosophy. To set out a language-game in which the distinctions made shed light upon, or help think though, a problematic immanent to the game: that's philosophy. To cite a quote I often return to:

"A philosophical theory is an elaborately developed question, and nothing else; by itself and in itself, it is not the resolution to a problem, but the elaboration, to the very end, of the necessary implications of a formulated question. To criticize the question means showing under what conditions the question is possible and correctly raised; in other words, how things would not be what they are were the question different from the one formulated. This means that these two operations are one and the same; the question is always about the necessary development of the implications of a problem and about giving sense to philosophy as theory. In philosophy, the question and the critique of the question are one; or, if you wish, there is no critique of solutions, there are only critiques of problems". (Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, my emphasis).

That's not the only thing that W. seems to be doing though. He certainly criticises certain linguistic practices (philosophical theories). I think that Horwich, with whom I took you to agree, agrees with that: — Πετροκότσυφας

Yes, but the point Horwich (and indeed Popper) are both making, is that any theorising is done, not in a exclusive sense. Wittgenstein is intending to unsettle us, to show that language is something other, not what it 'must be'. There may well be (indeed are) normative implications of this description, but it is not a normative theory. That's why the motivation is described as normative, not the theory.

So the difference, again, is between some theory which says "all things in this set must be defined thus", and a description whose normative effect is to ask "are you sure all things in this set belong here?"

To be clear. A theory of metaphilosophy which says that philosophy is a bit like map-making, is of this latter kind. It gets us to question any investigations we might have discarded as not showing any contours when we realise that may not have been the intention. By itself, it does not force human activity into artificial categories. Where it become T-philosophy (or T-metaphilosophy) is when it then says that because philosophy is like map-making, it must then be constrained by the same set of necessities as cartography.

My objection is simple.

Philosophy is like cartography - each investigation reveals the aspect of human experience that it is interested in, and its utility is judged by it's being put to some use or another. This is a metaphilosophical position.

Metaphilosophy is an act of philosophy (as your second quote describes).

Therefore a metaphilosophical investigation is also like a map, drawing out those aspects of the field that the cartographer is interested in, and measured by its being put to some use or another.

Therefore it must be the case that the metaphilosophical theory that philosophy is like cartography and so similarly constrained, cannot itself be normative.

Philosophy is like cartography - each investigation reveals the aspect of human experience that it is interested in, and its utility is judged by it's being put to some use or another. This is a metaphilosophical position.

Metaphilosophy is an act of philosophy (as your second quote describes).

Therefore a metaphilosophical investigation is also like a map, drawing out those aspects of the field that the cartographer is interested in, and measured by its being put to some use or another.

Therefore it must be the case that the metaphilosophical theory that philosophy is like cartography and so similarly constrained, cannot itself be normative. — Pseudonym

There's simply no way anyone with any familiarity with Wittgenstein could make this kind of argument with a straight face: as if the metagame is here an act of interpretation. As if every act of philosophy - and hence language - doesn't carry its own metagame on its back in the mode of the practice of that self-same act of philosophy itself. Philosophical competency on holiday.

There's simply no way anyone with any familiarity with Wittgenstein could make this kind of argument with a straight face: as if the metagame is here an act of interpretation. As if every act of philosophy - and hence language - doesn't carry its own metagame on its back in the mode of the practice of that self-same act of philosophy itself — StreetlightX

Ah, so now the conclusions of Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations have become universal truths, the ignorance of which renders any related proposition philosophically incompetent. And I thought they were all just maps, "none more true than any other".

Some maps are not maps at all; just infantile scribblings.

One way of approaching philosophy which has been resonating with me for some time now is as a cartography - the art of map making — StreetlightX

Deleuze and Guattari developed their theory of philosophical cartography, they radically contrasted mapping with tracing:
“Make a map, not a tracing. What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. For it is inaccurate to say that a tracing reproduces the map. It is instead like a photograph or X-ray that begins by selecting or isolating, by artificial means such as
colorations or other restrictive procedures, what it intends to
reproduce. The imitator always creates the model and attracts it. The
tracing has already translated the map into an image; it has already
transformed the rhizome into roots and radicles. It has organized,
stabilized, neutralized the multiplicities according to the axes of
significance and subjectivation belonging to it. It has generated,
structuralized the rhizome, and when it thinks it is reproducing
something else it is in fact only reproducing itself. That is why the
tracing is so dangerous.”

maps can be maps of all sorts of different things: terrain, air pressure, vegetation density, and so on. None of these maps are more true than the other, and maps are useful to the extent that they are used for some purpose or another — StreetlightX

Tracing is a kind of reproduction, following an already established pattern; and using and making maps can also be a kind of calcomania. Whereas the true mapping is about making oneself a part of the rhizome, taking the risk of a becoming with the unknown outcome.

This would all wonderfully be true if philosophy only existed in 3 dimensions. Cartography doesn't account for the fourth dimension that philosophy exists in.

Cartography doesn't account for the fourth dimension that philosophy exists in. — Posty McPostface

But cartography isn't constrained to any particular number of dimensional degrees at all; consider Minard's famous map of Napoleon's campaign in Russia:



It contains at least six points of data: number of troops; distance; temperature; latitude and longitude; direction of travel; and location relative to specific dates. Modern, interactive, digital maps can contain even orders of magnitude larger points of data: in most cases the problem is not to add dimensions, but to cull them in order to be rendered legible in the face of data overload. Philosophical cartography, is at once both easier and harder than this: easier because operates largely in the largely dimensionless world of words (and so perhaps should be called philosophical cartology) which makes it infinitely more malleable, and harder precisely because it is no longer constrained by the graphic and thus much harder to follow. Books - and not just philosophical books - are all maps in their own way; philosophy's distinction is in dealing with the terrain of concepts and of sense. Philosophy plots concepts as maps plot terrain or time.

In fact, picking up on the Wittgenstein thread, one could say that the constraints that function in a philosophical cartologly replace the graphic with the grammatical: to construct a philosophy is to construct a grammar, to the degree that "grammar tells what kind of object anything is" (PI §373); a philosophical map maps the world according to the grammar that it develops, highlighting these relations over those ones, allowing these moves of conceptual translation while disallowing others. If "essence is expressed by grammar" (PI §371), then philosophy's capturing of essences takes place by way of grammar (elsewhere Witty will speak of how "a drop of grammar" can "condense a whole cloud of philosophy" (PI §315)). And just as maps have their own grammar - the grammar of a heat map will differ from the grammar of a river map - so do different philosophies have grammars specific to them.

Thus - for example - the (concept of) Ideas of Plato will differ from the Ideas of Kant will differ from the Ideas of Deleuze: each has a grammar distinct to its 'language-game', locating the 'joints of the world' differently each time, and articulating the world according to the grammar specific to the philosophy (in the original sense of the word the Greek arthron: to join, and hence articulate, both world and word). These maps - these philosophies - each paint the world in a different light, bringing to light these features or those features, being more or less relevant, more or less significant, depending on the context of a particular investigation.

But cartography isn't constrained to any particular number of dimensional degrees at all — StreetlightX

No, to a three dimensional observation, the map can only present itself as an image in two dimensions. Much like how actors in real life look different than on screen.

I'm reminded of saying vs showing distinctions.

The map can only present itself as an image in two dimensions. — Posty McPostface

The point is that dimensionality is not only visual when it comes to maps (or anything else for that matter): a dimension simply designates a variable, and a visually 2 or 3D map can expresses variables far in excess of its visual dimensionality. I.e. the restriction you're trying to gesture toward is not a relevant one.

The point is that dimensionality is not only visual when it comes to maps (or anything else for that matter): a dimension simply designates a variable, and a visually 2 or 3D map can expresses variables far in excess of its visual dimensionality. I.e. the restriction you're trying to gesture toward is not a relevant one. — StreetlightX

Then take the saying, a picture is worth a thousand words. You have that as a common saying, even among ordinary folk.

But, what you're trying to do is reach a limit but never quite converge in my opinion.

Then take the saying, a picture is worth a thousand words. You have that as a common saying, even among ordinary folk.

But, what you're trying to do is reach a limit but never quite converge in my opinion. — Posty McPostface

This is wishy-washy.

This is whishy-washy. — StreetlightX

So, is your description of how changes in dimensionality don't result in increases of information available to the total state space true or false?

Changes in dimensionality don't result in increases of information available to the total state space — Posty McPostface

This isn't a question of information 'availability' as it is expressive power so you 'getting technical' is you talking about something else entirely and again, irrelevant to the discussion.

By sheer irony, 'state space', by the way, is a concept that designates a multi-dimensional array that that can be 'instantiated' in physical dimensions far below the number of dimensions in the actual array (hence hard drives): which is exactly why the changes in visual dimensionality are - within certain bounds - entirely irrelevant. The 'state space' of writing is orders of magnitude larger than that of a picture because it can accomodate - in a way that pictorial representation can only dream of - both abstraction and hierarchical embedding of reference within it.

This isn't a question of information 'availability' as it is expressive power so you 'getting technical' is you talking about something else entirely and again, irrelevant to the discussion. — StreetlightX

I meant to say that an increase in dimensionality increases information. Your point about making a philosophical cartography wouldn't capture the entirety, and probably most important parts, of philosophy.

It's not 'trying to capture philosophy' as if to represent or reconstitute it in some way or another - it is philosophy. I'm not convinced you've read and understood the OP.

It's not 'trying to capture philosophy' as if to represent or reconstitute it in some way or another - it is philosophy. I'm not convinced you've read and understood the OP. — StreetlightX

I still believe there's more to philosophy than a cartography. You expressed this in your subsequent posts to the OP about there being more anatomical features than an anatomist's painting of the human body entails.