So tell me how linguistic analysis can help if nobody agrees on the meaning of the terms? — Marchesk

By shaking the certainty that there is a 'problem' out there which requires anyone's help in that sense.

Talking about that goes even further away from poor Sam26's thread topic — fdrake

I suppose it may.

I'm looking for people who have given significant thought to the issues, but I don't want to keep people out of the discussion. I say this to give some guidelines for what I'm looking for. There is something to be said for studying these ideas at length and coming to a conclusion, but sometimes even then one wonders about the quality of the thoughts or conclusions. — Sam26

I understand, but surely you're not so hubristic to think that your version of 'significant thought' is going to be universally understood? That's why I was wondering if you were hinting at something more objective (like academic qualifications), but that's cleared the question up, thanks.

As many of you know I've spent a lot of time studying philosophy of language, in particular, — Sam26

Question: is the philosophy of language the philosophy of languages? It seems to me that movement from one to another language changes meaning and message. Is it commonality underlying language, or that that is distinctive to a language that you're looking for. (I wouldn't be asking if you had defined your topic above.

I buy, invest heavily, in the value of clarity, but I'm told the Japanese in their language do not, and so it goes.

It seems to me that the analysis of most problems don't turn on the analysis of language. To be sure, being a careful reader and writer is useful for understanding and contributing. — fdrake

For me, most, if not many of these problems are about the concepts used. However, that's not to say that there aren't problems that are not part of what we normally think of as language problems. Let's take for example, the concept time, it seems to me that many of the philosophical problems, and even possibly scientific problems, arise because of the misunderstanding the many uses of the word, and the confusions that arise as a result.

Don't you think that depending on how you define the word creates many philosophical and maybe even scientific confusion?

Talking about that goes even further away from poor Sam26's thread topic. Which, I imagine, is supposed to be a series of vaguely Wittgenstein influenced confessions of how the analysis of language has changed how we think about philosophical issues. Emphasis on the specifics, like 'How reading Wittgenstein made me an anti-theist' or 'How reading Austin turned me off Chomsky's approach to language'. — fdrake

Yes, this is definitely what I'm looking for, but I'm also interested in how you think about philosophy of language, viz., its shortcomings and its benefits.

I understand, but surely you're not so hubristic to think that your version of 'significant thought' is going to be universally understood? That's why I was wondering if you were hinting at something more objective (like academic qualifications), but that's cleared the question up, thanks. — Pseudonym

I was very hesitant to put down very specific qualifications because I didn't want push people away from the discussion.

Don't you think that depending on how you define the word creates many philosophical and maybe even scientific confusion? — Sam26

There's a debate, now mostly settled as far as I know, in feminist theory. It began as an internal tension in feminism; why was it that feminist activity mostly excluded women of colour? This gave rise to theoretical and practical emphasis on 'intersectionality', a view that paying attention to how different marginalised groups interact on a personal (like black transgender) and interpersonal (corporate hierarchies like black women are cleaners, white women are secretarial, white dudes are managerial) level is important in addressing political marginalisation as a whole.

The idea that any of this could have been resolved through supplying an appropriate definition, or impeded forever by supplying inappropriate definitions, is really far off the mark. It was mostly worked through by people hashing it out, and was enabled by the civil rights movements for people of colour and women. Political problems don't arise or go away through the analysis of language, they arise and go away through targeted change of social systems and behavioural change on a large scale. The analysis of these problems and the activity of addressing them concern real social systems, not words.

The story's a bit less clear cut for time, I imagine.

You've just replaced 'decision' with 'commitment', how do the two terms differ in this context? — Pseudonym

The question, lest we lose track of it, is how linguistic analysis will resolve my difference with a determinist? It is not whether linguistic definitions are ultimately circular. I can easily prove that in any finite language, definitions must be ultimately circular. The point of definitions is not to provide replacement words, but to cause the reader to recreate in his or her own mind the concept the word expresses.

Where does one event end and the next one start. This is important because if you can define a single event then you can't say that existence is not one single event which undermines the argument against determinism somewhat. — Pseudonym

I don't agree. The fact that I can define a point without reference to a line does not mean that a line is not a continuous sequence of points. The concept of <continuity> changes the context both of points and events. So if I were to define an event in a way that made no reference to other events, that would not mean that actual events were not part of a continuous flow of events. Thinking otherwise would be an instance of Whitehead's fallacy of misplaced concreteness.

As I said, in any closed language, any series of definitions will ultimately close on itself. So, I make no apology for defining "possible" in terns of "necessary." In fact, it is precisely because language in isolation is closed that we must transcend language and turn our intellectual gaze to being. It is only in relation to being that language has any ultimate meaning.

You have yet to indicate how linguistic analysis will resolve the issue between me and a determinist. The determinist thinks there is one possibility. I think there is more than one. That is a difference as to the nature of reality, not a verbal misunderstanding.

Sounds like a rehash of the ancient skeptical position in modern garb.

Question: is the philosophy of language the philosophy of languages? It seems to me that movement from one to another language changes meaning and message. Is it commonality underlying language, or that that is distinctive to a language that you're looking for. (I wouldn't be asking if you had defined your topic above. — tim wood

I've written heavily on this subject in many of threads (e.g. A Wittgenstein Commentary), but yes, I can see how someone might not understand what in particular I'm talking about.

Wittgenstein was looking at the problems between thought or language, and the world. Questions like: "What is the function of language? What is the structure of language? How is language related to the world? How is it that we can say anything about the world and mean something? What is meaning? These are some of the questions, and there are many more related questions. But not just these questions, but how not understanding how language works causes philosophical (I'm using philosophical in a broad sense to cover all philosophical thought - which is wide and diverse) confusion.

Don't you think that depending on how you define the word creates many philosophical and maybe even scientific confusion? — Sam26

No. I think failing to adequately reflect on its meaning (the reality it indicates, which I take to be a measure of change), is the source of problems involving time. Once you have a clear meaning, applying it consistently resolves any confusion. Then all that is left is different beliefs about the facts.

Implicit is some ground to build up from. Imo, there's definition and consistency and performative utility. Anything else - well - what else is there? If thoughts, what are they? If language, what is that? If meaning, what is...? If the world, ...? It would seem as if the entire endeavor is like climbing a smooth rock face with pitons. You drill and drive them in, in such they'll hold your weight, and there you are.

If you're going to have more, what is that the "more" is made of?

The idea that any of this could have been resolved through supplying an appropriate definition, or impeded forever by supplying inappropriate definitions, is really far off the mark. It was mostly worked through by people hashing it out, and was enabled by the civil rights movements for people of colour and women. Political problems don't arise or go away through the analysis of language, they arise and go away through targeted change of social systems and behavioural change on a large scale. The analysis of these problems and the activity of addressing them concerns real social systems, not words. — fdrake

These kinds of problems sometimes get solved in other ways besides the ones that I might suggest.

I hope that you don't think that I would suggest that a definition correctly understood would somehow solve the problems that Wittgenstein is referring to. I would suggest that some philosophical problems do go away once one understand some of Wittgenstein's points. And even in the example above one could apply Wittgensteinian methods to help clarify concepts.

No. I think failing to adequately reflect on its meaning (the reality it indicates, which I take to be a measure of change), is the source of problems involving time. Once you have a clear meaning, applying it consistently resolves any confusion. Then all that is left is different beliefs about the facts. — Dfpolis

I agree with much of what you're saying, but they're are many definitions (I would say uses) of the word time, that cause confusion. And the way I define it is similar to your definition, it's simply a measurement of change. However, sometimes we look at time like it's a stream, i.e., something we can get in and out of, and it's these kinds of time that can cause confusion.

I think we're getting bogged down into arguing over the same issues, and that's not what I was looking for. I guess I'm looking for more thought provoking issues that arise out of the traditional language problems. For example, what place if any does Wittgenstein's idea that not understanding the logic of language cause problems. Maybe some of you don't think much of the problem, and that's fine, but why?

Implicit is some ground to build up from. Imo, there's definition and consistency and performative utility. Anything else - well - what else is there? If thoughts, what are they? If language, what is that? If meaning, what is...? If the world, ...? It would seem as if the entire endeavor is like climbing a smooth rock face with pitons. You drill and drive them in, in such they'll hold your weight, and there you are.

If you're going to have more, what is that the "more" is made of? — tim wood

I like this Tim, maybe you can explain further.

Maybe my emphasis on Wittgenstein is overblown. If you think that, then explain why, but don't do it if you don't understand Wittgenstein.

Maybe my emphasis on Wittgenstein is overblown. If you think that, then explain why, but don't do it if you don't understand Wittgenstein. — Sam26

Isn't the emphasis on language pretty much the entire analytical enterprise of the past century? The idea that if we can get clear on language, then many philosophical problems can be adequately addressed, and philosophy can be turned into a respectable pursuit, similar to science.

If so, a question arises as to how successful that emphasis has been.

I hope that you don't think that I would suggest that a definition correctly understood would somehow solve the problems that Wittgenstein is referring to. I would suggest that some philosophical problems do go away once one understand some of Wittgenstein's points. And even in the example above one could apply Wittgensteinian methods to help clarify concepts. — Sam26

No, I don't think you take such a reductive view of philosophy. What issues do you think are dissolved, or nearly dissolved, by looking at them through your preferred lens? I don't have a view of philosophy of language in general, but I am rather prejudiced against ordinary language philosophy because at its worst it thinks there are no substantive philosophical issues and because it espouses a kind of 'first philosophy' which is to be done through the analysis of word use.

With reference to the other desired kind of response you wanted, I can think of a few things which reading Wittgenstein left me with.

(1) Pay a lot of attention to how the thing you're looking at works.
(2) Using language with a purpose always has some background upon which it makes sense.

(1) and (2) together form a maxim: once you have a description you have a model.

(3) Rule following is a non-deliberative** component of language use; the 'way of following a rule which is not an interpretation'. As @StreetlightX put it, language is extra-linguistic.
(4) Highlighting the importance of aspect shifting (seeing as).

The interaction of (3) and (4) has been influencing my thoughts and philosophical studies for some time. It's difficult for me to articulate without jargon, but the rough idea is that nature is suggestive. (3) highlights that we're always in the world with the stuff at our fingertips and (4) highlights that the world springs out into structures when we have both language and the stuff at our fingertips.*

As somewhat of a consequence of (1),(2),(3),(4), though the theme is also present in the contrast of early vs late Wittgenstein in terms of the realism of the language he studies.

(5) Good presuppositions facilitate insight, bad ones impede it.

Isn't the emphasis on language pretty much the entire analytical enterprise of the past century? The idea that if we can get clear on language, then many philosophical problems can be adequately addressed, and philosophy can be turned into a respectable pursuit, similar to science. — Marchesk

I agree with this, but I think many people don't understand the "get clear on language" part, what does that mean via Wittgenstein and Austin for example.

No, I don't think you take such a reductive view of philosophy. What issues do you think are dissolved, or nearly dissolved, by looking at them through your preferred lens? I don't have a view of philosophy of language in general, but I am rather prejudiced against ordinary language philosophy because at its worst it thinks there are no substantive philosophical issues and because it espouses a kind of 'first philosophy' which is to be done through the analysis of word use. — fdrake

To answer your first question, the issue I've been working on, viz., parts of the epistemological issues get solved. However, solving the issue doesn't mean that people will agree with it, that's another problem. It also doesn't mean that other problems won't arise within that answer. We see this in science all the time.

The problem with ordinary language philosophy is the way people think of it, viz., that how the ordinary man talks, is the talk that we should strive for, but that's a misunderstanding (not that that is your view). The way I think of ordinary language is how a word, for example, is developed over time in ordinary language. It's home, so to speak, and the use of the word/concept in that setting. For example, some philosophers have come up with a sense/meaning of knowledge that doesn't fit within the ordinary use of the word. Thus, they use the word completely out of it's home. It's akin to calling a car a pencil, as if that use explains cars in a way we haven't previously understood; and that understanding the car now as a pencil gives us new insights.

I guess in some sense it is a "first philosophy" as you say, but that would have to be unpacked a bit.

(3) Rule following is a non-deliberative component of language use; the 'way of following a rule which is not an interpretation'. As StreetlightX put it, language is extra-linguistic.
(4) Highlighting the importance of aspect shifting (seeing as). — fdrake

The rule-following as I interpret Wittgenstein isn't extra-linguistic, i.e., he's saying that rule-following is a necessary feature of language. And it's this feature that tells us much about how language develops in a social setting and not privately. Our private uses of words are meaningless, which further illustrates that language is necessarily social, as seen especially from the rule-following ideas Wittgenstein put forth.

There is a component of Wittgenstein that goes into this idea of "seeing as," i.e., the duck rabbit picture, but I'm not sure of the connection between rule-following and that idea. I would need to hear more.

The interaction of (3) and (4) have been influencing my thoughts and philosophical studies for some time. It's difficult for me to articulate without jargon, but the rough idea is that nature is suggestive. (3) highlights that we're always in the world with the stuff at our fingertips and (4) highlights that the world springs out into structures when we have both at our fingertips.* — fdrake

This last paragraph interests me because I think maybe I've recently being having similar thoughts. Maybe we're coming at it from different angles. Part of this, if I'm not mistaken, is related to to the problem of consciousness.

For example, some philosophers have come up with a sense/meaning of knowledge that doesn't fit within the ordinary use of the word. Thus, they use the word completely out of it's home. — Sam26

Does this apply to ancient or medieval philosophical problems in addition to more modern ones? Because various philosophical problems have been expressed in Greek, Latin, Hindi, Chinese, English, French, German, Arabic, etc.

On an abuse-of-language view, different languages would probably present different forms of abuse. Or so we might expect.

We might also wonder if there's something about ancient Greek that gave rise to ancient metaphysics and epistemology.

Does this apply to ancient or medieval philosophical problems in addition to more modern ones? Because various philosophical problems have been expressed in Greek, Latin, Hindi, Chinese, English, French, German, Arabic, etc.

On an abuse-of-language view, different languages would probably present different forms of abuse. Or so we might expect. — Marchesk

I'm a fan of JTB, and we can trace it back to ancient philosophy, but yes, it does apply to philosophical problems across the board, and throughout history.

Yes, different languages would present different abuses. However, I think for the most part many of the problems are very similar.

I agree with much of what you're saying, but they're are many definitions (I would say uses) of the word time, that cause confusion. — Sam26

Yes, but is it really necessary to study Wittgenstein to spot an equivocal use of terms? Clearly not, for Aristotle discusses different types of equivocation (multiple uses = pollakhos legetai or dikhos legetai). (See, e.g. G. E. L. Owen, "Aristotle on the Snares of Ontology" in R. Bambrough, New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London, 1965), pp. 69-95; Jaakko Hintikka, ""Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity," Inquiry 2 (1959). pp 137-151 and "Different Kinds of Equivocation in Aristotle.," J. Hist. Phil. 9:3, (July 1971) pp. 368-372.)

but the nature of language is itself not lingusitic: it belongs to a wider set of practices and capacities which must also be grasped in their specificity. — StreetlightX

I don't follow this, specifically, "it belongs to a wider set of practices and capacities which must also be grasped in their specificity."

Yes, but is it really necessary to study Wittgenstein to spot an equivocal use of terms? Clearly not, for Aristotle discusses different types of equivocation — Dfpolis

Obviously not, but Wittgenstein goes much much further than this, and it's this wide view that Wittgenstein deals with over the course of his life. I think most philosophers would agree that Wittgenstein's thinking was genius, but most present Wittgenstein in very basic ways. When I hear some of the interpretations of Wittgenstein, they seem to be of those who have only read some of Wittgenstein, but have not really studied Wittgenstein in depth. The comparison would be like me talking biology with an expert in biology. It seems naive.

The reason I say some of this is that Wittgenstein is very difficult, and yet people will give his philosophy a cursory reading and think they understand. But now I'm way off topic.

I've been studying Wittgenstein for about some five or six years now, on and off.

I've come to the conclusion, as did Wittgenstein, that the problems of philosophy are psychological or have their root in the psychology of the speaker. Hence, I've adopted a psychologist attitude towards the therapeutic use of philosophy in elucidating psycholog(ies) of people, and their interactions. One important concept that I stumbled on is the issue of personal identity in regards to life events and other unforeseen consequences of action (think the Butterfly effect).

My stance towards science, religion, and other matters hasn't changed considerably. But, the way I view the use of language-game and analyzing their settings has.

When I hear some of the interpretations of Wittgenstein, they seem to be of those who have only read some of Wittgenstein, but have not really studied Wittgenstein in depth. — Sam26

I am one of those who have read some Wittgenstein and was not unduly impressed. I take responsibility for that. As a student of Aristotle, who is also a genius and often difficult to grasp, I appreciate the need to study a philosopher in depth to fully appreciate his/her genius. So, as I see it, it is a matter of resource allocation. We have limited time, and so we have to judge, after minimal exposure, where to spend it.

One way to overcome this barrier is to have someone show you an instance of the philosopher's genius.