I do actually think that time presents a coherent set of problems, though. — fdrake

As do I! The only thing I'd add is that a coherent problem is a grammatically well-formed one. This does not mean the problem of time is 'merely' linguistic: it simply means that it meets the minimal criteria of being a problem that can be addressed at all. It's like saying: "all problems of vision are problems of light": in some sense, this is true and undeniable - but it is also misleading. The disjunction between "all philosophical problems are linguistic" and "philosophical problems are real" is a fake one: philosophical problems are real - are only real - when they have a well-formulated grammar that makes sense of them.

philosophical problems are real - are only real - when they have a well-formulated grammar that makes sense of them. — StreetlightX

Sure, but that's a lot different than the claim that linguistic analysis can potentially dissolve philosophy problems across the board. That philosophical inquiry is itself an abuse of language. That philosophers for two and half thousand years have been misunderstanding language.

Regarding time, the question was whether a well-formulated grammar would show us that no such philosophical issues actually exist.

I don't know whether Wittgenstein though this was the case for all of philosophy, but some of his proponents have talked as if it were.

Sure, but that's a lot different than the claim that linguistic analysis can potentially dissolve philosophy problems across the board. That philosophical inquiry is itself an abuse of language. — Marchesk

I agree. That's a bunch of wank.

Shitty Russians posing as philosophers of depth. — StreetlightX

Obligatory: In Soviet Russia, dog explains you!

I went through that link rather fast, but it seems to be the writings of a skeptic, in terms of what we think we know. After all there are many ways we can go wrong in our thinking, as the article points out. Much of this needs unpacking, but I would say that I disagree with the article on many levels.

It would take another thread to discuss it.

don't do it if you don't understand Wittgenstein. — Sam26

Does anybody understand Wittgenstein? :wink: :razz:

he question, lest we lose track of it, is how linguistic analysis will resolve my difference with a determinist? — Dfpolis

It won't. What it might do is get you to see that there is nothing further to be resolved. It's like one person describing the field as 'emerald green' and another describing is as 'like a sea of grass' and then you arguing with them assuming they therefore think the grass is blue. Both of you are describing grass, you're just picking out different aspects of it in your language. — Pseudonym

This is the most absurd claim I've read from someone serious in a long while. You're saying that a count of one (actual possibility) and a count of more than one (actual possibility) are simply different ways talking about the same cardinality? Your proposal rejects the Principle of Contradiction as well as basic arithmetic.

The point they disagree on is exactly the point at which actual experience ceases to provide any further data. — Pseudonym

No, this is not the case. The determinist is claiming, against Hume's analysis of necessity in time-sequenced causality, that the temporal sequence of my acts is necessary. I am pointing out that this claim is unjustified by experience, and so we have no reason to believe that my decision is necessitated.

This is neither a linguistic problem, nor one for which there is inadequate experiential data.

It 'feels like' we have choices, but that's as far as we can examine it by self-reflection. — Pseudonym

No, again. "Feels" do not enter into consideration. Experience tells me that it is in my power to go to the store and it is equally in my power to stay home. So, based on experience, two (actually many more) possibilities are equally in my power -- which is my claim.

Like any story, different people will pick out different aspects, and like any description it is contained entirely in language, and is entirely a social act to communicate to another. — Pseudonym

No, it is not like a story. Stories are fictions, which means that they are not tied to our actual experience as philosophical analysis is. Yes, people project different aspects of reality into their conceptual space, but those aspects cannot contradict each other 9they cannot tell us that one is more than one).

How we communicate is indeed a social act. What we communicate need not be culturally or socially determined. The problem of free will, like most philosophical problems, is not about how we communicate, but about the adequacy of the thoughts we communicate to our experience of reality.

The point in highlighting the circularity of definition was not to undermine the concept of defining a word at all, but to emphasise how blunt a tool it is — Pseudonym

Definition is only blunt if one is unwilling to look beyond the words to the reality they point to. If, instead of standing beside me, looking in the same direction as me, and trying to see what I see -- if, instead of that, one remains fixated on the words, seeing language not as a means of indicating intelligibility, but as a closed system, then yes, definitions are a very blunt tool indeed. When to stop is when the dialog partner is unwilling to try to see what one sees.

I admit I was not going to reply until you goaded on further down the replies. I am merely an autodidact after all. So take these thoughts as you will -- the words of Wittgenstein, and a few others (Searl, Austin, and Davidson -- in large part thanks due to @Banno's postings about them in the old forum, especially with respect to Davidson and Austin) have passed through this mind of mine, but I may not have understood them really.

Wittgenstein is one of those philosophers who is fascinating because the very act of reading him seems to have something of a transformative effect on the way I thought after reading him -- even without fully understanding it. And the act of coming to understand him changed the way I thought about some problems. I'm aware of hermeneutic disputes with respect to Wittgenstein, so I am hesitant to say that I am one who understands him still -- because I couldn't confidently take a position with respect to these disputes -- but I have a big picture idea of his thinking, at least.

I'm also naturally resistant to his position, or at least what I take to be a general consensus about his position with respect to philosophy -- that the problems of philosophy dissolve with an analysis of language. In a way I see his philosophy as an examplar case of a lot of 20th century philosophy -- where philosophy comes under philosophical scrutiny -- and his challenge to philosophy is very strong evaluated by those same philosophical values. But even so I've found in my own thinking taking on his criticisms of philosophy as a practice in my own thinking.

So I suppose I see the philosophy of language ala Wittgenstein sort of in the vein that Kant saw his critical philosophy -- as a propaedeutic which outlines common pitfalls in thinking, but which doesn't quite live up to the claim that all the problems of philosophy are resolved through therapy. I'd say that that is more the result of another bad habit of philosophers -- overgeneralization.

You're saying that a count of one (actual possibility) and a count of more than one (actual possibility) are simply different ways talking about the same cardinality? — Dfpolis

Yes, because it's 'one' decision. If I talked about multiple piles of sand, and you spoke of just one big pile, would that be absurd? Is it absurd to say that rather than several oceans, there's only one big sea? There's dozens of situations where cardinality is not clear due to fuzzy definitions. Is a 'decision' to have vanilla ice cream rather than chocolate, or is the decision to eat the flavour you prefer, or is the decision whether to be the sort of person who eats their preferred flavour all the time? Unless you have a complete map of every firing neuron, you have no way of determining what 'decision' is being made. In addition, we don't even know clearly what making a decision is. If I consider all the options and then act in accordance with that balance, have I made a decision, or a calculation?
The way we define 'decision' dictates how we go on to talk about determinism.

I am pointing out that this claim is unjustified by experience, and so we have no reason to believe that my decision is necessitated. — Dfpolis

But don't you see how your 'experience' is not the same as others? Are you really so hubristic as to think that the way you experience the world is exactly as it is and not filtered by your own framework (most of which is built by language).

Experience tells me that it is in my power to go to the store and it is equally in my power to stay home. So, based on experience, two (actually many more) possibilities are equally in my power -- which is my claim. — Dfpolis

No, it can't possibly tell you that because you only did one or the other. Experience tells you it was within your power to do whichever option you actually did. You can't possibly say whether it was in your power to take the other choice because you didn't try it. But this is not a discussion about free will. Sam has quite carefully asked to keep it on topic so I don't we should discuss this further (apologies if I've already taken it to far).

If, instead of standing beside me, looking in the same direction as me, and trying to see what I see — Dfpolis

When to stop is when the dialog partner is unwilling to try to see what one sees. — Dfpolis

Do you realise how arrogant this sounds? Like anyone who doesn't agree with you just isn't trying hard enough. No amount of words can define a thing so accurately as to be assured that what is in your mind is faithfully transferred to mine, so if there's remaining uncertainty, why is it my fault for not trying hard enough. What else am I supposed to try, mind-reading?

You're saying that a count of one (actual possibility) and a count of more than one (actual possibility) are simply different ways talking about the same cardinality? — Dfpolis

Yes, because it's 'one' decision. — Pseudonym

I'm not talking about the count of decisions, but of possible actions.

But don't you see how your 'experience' is not the same as others? — Pseudonym

Of course I see that every individual has different life-experiences. That is not the issue. The issue is that no one has an experience base that can justify the determinist's view of causal necessity against the critique of Hume. Just as we can abstract away the details of what we are counting to come to an understanding of numbers, so we can abstract away the details of individual experiences of event succession to see the soundness of Hume's critique.

No, it can't possibly tell you that because you only did one or the other — Pseudonym

I am talking about what we know before the decision, not what we know after (as you are here). We know what is in our power by seeing (1) what were were able to do in the past and (2) knowing that we have suffered no debilitation or other impediment since then.

You can't possibly say whether it was in your power to take the other choice because you didn't try it. — Pseudonym

This is a nonsensical claim. It misunderstands the nature of potential. Many contradictory outcomes may be possible, not withstanding the fact that only once can be actual.

Do you realise how arrogant this sounds? Like anyone who doesn't agree with you just isn't trying hard enough. — Pseudonym

It is not in the least arrogant. It is how I approach texts. I stand beside the author, trying to see what he or she saw and wants me to see. If you can't bring yourself to do the same, you're not entering into the spirit of dialog, only looking for sniping opportunities.

the origin of those words were based on how people thought the sun moved. — Marchesk

But how are they being used now?

I would also like to highlight that it's probably the case that it's easier to take a bad approach to a complicated problem, making 'language run idle', than it is for the problem itself to have 'must be treated with language on idle' as a property. — fdrake

That sounds interesting. What is it to have the property of being treated with language on idle? Not to be said, but to be shown?

But how are they being used now? — Banno

How the words were used then or now doesn't help us when we want to know whether it's the sun moving or the Earth turning, or something else that accounts for the appearance.

With time, we want to know what accounts for the appearance of regular change, such that we can have yesterdays and tomorrows.

That's a bunch of wank. — StreetlightX

Cheers.

Methodologically, cleaning up language remains a good thing to do.

How the words were used then or now doesn't help us when we want to know whether it's the sun moving or the Earth turning, or something else that accounts for the appearance. — Marchesk

SUre. But asking to meet at sunrise is not about the sun moving; it's about when we meet. Talk of when to meet and talk of planetary dynamics are different.

Don't look to meaning - look to use.

You are right that there is an important issue here, one that stands open after Wittgenstein. It appears on the face of it that Wittgenstein thought language games to be incommensurate; I would argue, following Davidson, that we can't make sense of such incommensurability, and that what we ought do id be aware of which language game we are playing and look to the rules for translating form on to the other.

In the case at hand, it is a simple issue to move from talk of sunrise to planetary dynamics by employing that - admittedly not so simple - descriptions of physics.

Stove. What a bastard. Love his writing.

I like Jung's thoughts on this subject.

I have already discussed the interesting contrast between the "controlled " thoughts we have In waking life and the wealth of imagery produced in dreams. Now you can see another reason for this difference : Because , in our civilized life, we have stripped so many ideas of their emotional energy , we do not really respond to them anymore . We use such ideas
in our speech , and we show a conventional reaction when others use them , but they do not make a very deep impression on us. Something more is needed to bring certain things home to us effectively enough to make us change our attitude and behavior. This is what "dream
language " does; its symbolism has so much psychic energy that we are forced to pay attention to it.
There was, for instance , a lady who was well Known for her stupid prejudices and her stubborn resistance to reasoned argument. One could have argued with her all night to no effect; she would have taken not the slightest notice. Her dreams, however , took a different line of approach. One night , she dreamed she
was attending an important social occasion. She was greeted by the hostess with the words: "How nice that you could come. All your friends are here , and they are waiting for you. "
The hostess then led her to the door and opened it, and the dreamer stepped through --into a cowshed !
This dream language was simple enough to
be understood even by a blockhead . The
woman would not at first admit the point of a dream that struck so directly at her self-importance ; but its message nevertheless went home , and after a time she had to accept it because she could not help seeing the self-inflicted joke .
Such messages from the unconscious are of greater importance than most people realize . In our conscious life, we are exposed to all kinds of influences. Other people stimulate or depress us, events at the office or in our social life distract us. Such things seduce us into following ways that are unsuitable to our individuality .
Whether or not we are aware of the effect they have on our consciousness, it is disturbed by and exposed to them almost without defense .
This is especially the case with a person whose extraverted attitude of mind lays all the emphasis upon external objects, or who harbors feelings of inferiority and doubt concerning his own innermost personality .
The more that consciousness is influenced by prejudices, errors, fantasies, and infantile wishes, the more the already existing gap will widen into a neurotic dissociation and lead to a more or less artificial life, far removed from healthy instincts, nature , and truth .

from man and his symbols by CG Jung

Time is the moving image of eternity

I'm not talking about the count of decisions, but of possible actions. — Dfpolis

This makes no difference. Exactly the same could be said of actions. What constitutes a single action determines entirely the count of 'actions' in any scenario. Is 'going to the store' a single action (count of one), or is it composed of several actions (get up, walk to the door, find keys...). How we define 'action' determines entirely how many such entities we count in any situation.

We know what is in our power by seeing (1) what were were able to do in the past and (2) knowing that we have suffered no debilitation or other impediment since then. — Dfpolis

Again, related to the topic, this depends entirely on what you define as an 'impediment' is not wanting to go to the store and impediment? If so, then we have in fact suffered an impediment since last time, we no longer want to go to the store. We have suffered the loss of our desire to go to the store. What if, in the meantime, I had suffered a debilitating phobia of stores? Would you say I was equally able to go to the store as I was before the phobia set in? No. So how much negative feeling about going to the store counts as an impediment? Slight fear? Minor displeasure?. It all comes back down to definitions.

This is a nonsensical claim. It misunderstands the nature of potential. Many contradictory outcomes may be possible, not withstanding the fact that only once can be actual. — Dfpolis

This is just a bare assertion.

I stand beside the author, trying to see what he or she saw and wants me to see. If you can't bring yourself to do the same, you're not entering into the spirit of dialog, only looking for sniping opportunities. — Dfpolis

No-one's talking about my trying to see what you see though are they? How on earth do you know what I'm trying to do. We're talking about your prejudicial presumption that I'm not trying to see what you see simply on the basis that I haven't agreed with you. That I'm not 'entering into the spirit of dialogue' simply because I disagree with your points. That's the arrogance that I'm referring to. The presumption that I couldn't possible 'see what you see' and yet still think you're wrong.

Thanks Blue Lux, for the most part I'm looking for what people have learned, and your post is in keeping with the spirit of my thread.

The primary reason for creating this thread was to get people to expose their own thinking on the importance of philosophy of language. It may be that it's not that important for some, or it may be of primary importance, or somewhere in between. People tend to gravitate to debating the differences between their ideas, and that's okay, but I was looking for what people have learned as they have studied this particular area of philosophy. This is why I wanted people who have spent a lot of time thinking about philosophy of language. However, I did open it up, because I didn't want to restrict people.

Who's Stove?

Later: Oh, now I remember. DUH

But what if dog didn't do way instain mother? Dog is would be, maybe. But definitely dog wasn't. Would be isn't is and wasn't isn't is, can talk that. But only is is is! Therefore wasn't isn't is and isn't isn't was, and would be isn't is and isn't isn't would be. But isn't is maybe would be some of the time. Would be and wasn't isn't is. — fdrake

I definitely will suspend belief when it comes to these statements. :gasp:

Sure, but that's a lot different than the claim that linguistic analysis can potentially dissolve philosophy problems across the board. That philosophical inquiry is itself an abuse of language. That philosophers for two and half thousand years have been misunderstanding language. — Marchesk

I'm wondering what philosophers have thought this? I know that in Wittgenstein's early writings (The Tractatus) he believed that the major problems of philosophy were a result of not understanding the logic of language (mainly an a priori endeavor). Moreover, in thinking he solved this problem, he thought that he had solved the major problems of philosophy, so this may be true of the early Wittgenstein. Are there others that you're thinking of?

As do I! The only thing I'd add is that a coherent problem is a grammatically well-formed one. This does not mean the problem of time is 'merely' linguistic: it simply means that it meets the minimal criteria of being a problem that can be addressed at all. It's like saying: "all problems of vision are problems of light": in some sense, this is true and undeniable - but it is also misleading. The disjunction between "all philosophical problems are linguistic" and "philosophical problems are real" is a fake one: philosophical problems are real - are only real - when they have a well-formulated grammar that makes sense of them. — StreetlightX

Well said, I concur wholeheartedly.

Does anybody understand Wittgenstein? :wink: :razz: — Pattern-chaser

You do, don't you!? :wink:

No, not me! :smile: :smile: :smile:

I'm wondering what philosophers have thought this? — Sam26

The logical positivists*? Carnap, Quine, Stove?

But I had fans of Wittgenstein in mind, not necessarily professional philosophers.

edit: *positivists not empiricists

Sounds poetic. I like it.

I'm not talking about the count of decisions, but of possible actions. — Dfpolis

This makes no difference — Pseudonym

This is not a sensible response. So, it is time to end this conversation.