I am trying to grasp the grammar of your first sentence as clearly as possible, and I am having a little difficulty. I think this is unfortunate, because this seems like an important statement. Is there another way to phrase it that might help me out more? — angslan
I am surprised at the claim that no offence should logically be taken - you rejected that idea for feminists who claim that addressing trans people compromises or threatens their own gender identity. — angslan
I strongly feel that you should leave this part out of your arguments for the moment - this is a whole nother can of worms to debate whether this technically constitutes a delusion or not. The DSM does not consider gender dysphoria, for example, a delusion. What it does do it start to sound like some sort of attack against trans people, which I think is going to cloud your argument. — angslan
This is why my argument engaged with respect in forms of address and not the universal application of words. None of these words are unique in their variability across times and places and people. — angslan
I don't think either group uses them generally inconsistently or incoherently, though they certainly do not agree with each other. And I think that any strict definition is going to land someone in a logical quagmire where some level of coherency falls apart when using strict definitions to make claims. — angslan
Is this discussion about language? Or relative harms? How to treat each other? Or whether trans people are delusional? — angslan
It is traditionally held that whatever the membership criteria are for the group {women}, they are mutually exclusive to the group {men} (like swimming and non-swimming. Without even having to examine the nature of the membership criteria, we can tell that the trans claim involves this kind of mutual exclusivity because the whole reason for asking people to use a particular term of address is the upset it causes to have the alternative used. It is implied then, that choosing "woman" as the correct term, automatically makes "man" the incorrect one. — Pseudonym
Once you've grasped what I mean above, I hope the fact that offence is reasonable in some situations and unreasonable in others is simple enough to be obvious. — Pseudonym
We are definitely talking about changing the universal meaning of the word 'woman', no doubt about that. — Pseudonym
I've presented an argument in fairly logical rational steps showing that the trans use of the term 'woman' is inconsistent and incoherent — Pseudonym
If you have a counter argument for any of the points I laid out, that's what I'd be interested to hear. — Pseudonym
I think it's about all of them. Language use dictates and expresses a great deal (some would say all) of what we feel about the world and ourselves, including our identity. So language use is inherently tied to relative harms. I'm, broadly speaking, an ethical naturalist, so relative harms are intrinsically tied to how we treat each other (we should try to minimise relative harms). Where our desired treatment clashes, there needs to be some method of seeking compromise, and I believe that method should be rational thought. — Pseudonym
we come back to the (I think false) idea that respect is only one way, that respect constitutes only adhering to the way the addressee wants to hear a word, and not the way the speaker wants to use a word. — Pseudonym
It doesn't make anyone intolerant. — Pseudonym
You said that feelings are best measurement for understanding identity. What are feelings if not a kind of qualia?I see applicability, but I don't think that qualia is the best tactic for understanding identity. Nagel highlights the problem of consciousness, but I don't think the problem of consciousness elucidates interiority or identity as well as others. What I've been drawing from here is mostly Levinas's exposition on interiority in Totality and Infinity. — Moliere
You are inconsistent again, and it's getting old. So, your relationship with your family doesn't make you a niece/nephew, son/daughter, father/mother, etc.? You are aware that we take on different identities and none of them contradict each other?That's not what I have been proposing, so I guess my answer, in turn, is that these things do not determine identity. Physical relationships and physical differences do not determine identity. Your physical relationship in a family doesn't either. Your physical relationship with others doesn't determine identity with respect to marriage, friendship, or coworker-hood.
Species-hood, yes -- physical differences are what makes one a part of the species. And physical differences do not enable participation -- at least at the individual level -- in procreation, especially with human beings. Being a k-selected species makes it so that the purely physical facts don't stop an individual from participating in child-rearing, which is actually more prominent with humans than the mere facts of gestation.
And physical development only determines whether you are a physical child or physical adult. The transition from childhood to adulthood is determined by mental development and social structures -- so that adulthood can be gained as early as 13 or up to 18, in the legal sense. What counts as a mature person varies significantly, though the physical facts remain the same among persons. — Moliere
And the trans-person claims that they understand the feelings that are outside of their experience (ie. a man claiming that he understands what it is to be a woman in order to make the claim that he is a woman.) How is it that the transperson has access to experiences that you don't when you are both same sex?Yeah, definitely. I imagine that it what the trans experience might be like, something I simply can't understand because the feelings are outside of my experience — Pseudonym
You said that feelings are best measurement for understanding identity. What are feelings if not a kind of qualia? — Harry Hindu
your relationship with your family doesn't make you a niece/nephew, son/daughter, father/mother, etc.? — Harry Hindu
You cannot procreate with just females. You need males as well, and each one contributes in it's own unique way to the propagation of the species. Those differences are what make up one of your identities. — Harry Hindu
I don't agree that it is implied that the sets are mutually exclusive from the trans claim. In fact, the claim requires that they are not, as I pointed out earlier. Just because someone identifies as a woman does not mean that they have no qualities associated with the set {men}. In fact, in many instances people who make claims that they are a woman have a penis, so this categorically cannot be part of the claim. — angslan
I mean, we're not. That is abundantly clear from the different and distinct uses that we have currently in discussions of various sorts. — angslan
No you haven't, you have, at every turn, applied your own premises that ignore a fundamental part of trans claims - including the variety of trans claims (e.g. binary, non-binary, spectrum concepts of gender). — angslan
I've repeated it several times, including in this post. At this point I cannot tell if you are receptive to what other people write, because I don't believe you've ever responded to this content in my posts. This is, in fact, quite infuriating. — angslan
I haven't seen an argument from you regarding relative harms that suggests one set of harms is greater than the other, so I really don't know where you stand here. — angslan
I've said that how we treat (and address) people can either respect their interiority/subjectivity/identity or treat them as objects (i.e. defined and categorised by the addresser regardless of the interiority/subjectivity/identity of the addressee). I've made an argument that addressee-oriented addressing preserves self-respect because it preserves that speakers can address themselves (either explicitly and externally or self-reflectively and internally) according to the concepts that they feel are appropriate. — angslan
I think I've done a better idea of proposing a compromise. — angslan
But just because one can reach a different conclusion rationally that doesn't mean that people do do so. Intolerance can be inferred just by the simple fact that trans persons are treated as lesser persons -- they are the butt of jokes, they are objects of violence, they face workplace discrimination, and sometimes families are churches are not as accepting as other communities. Coming out as trans can sever one from friendships or families.
It's one thing to have a question and come to a conclusion but still treat people more or less fairly, and quite another to punish them for their difference. That's intolerance. — Moliere
What premises have I applied which ignore trans claims? — Pseudonym
Where in any of that is there anything about the addressee's respect for the speaker? — Pseudonym
So what have you given up from your original position that people should be addressed by the terms they prefer? You do know what compromise means? — Pseudonym
I said that membership of a set is mutually exclusive on the basis that being labelled as a member of the opposite set is offensive. — Pseudonym
if people disagree on definitions, address-oriented addressing means that both will compromise when addressing the other. — angslan
That doesn't mean that they are exclusive. I literally just wrote on this. — angslan
Did you reply about intersex people and gender identity yet? — angslan
Did you show your principles of compromise? — angslan
Did you respond regarding your concept of what is more harmful in terms of denying identity? — angslan
It's not just about addressing. The terms 'woman' and 'him/her' are not used solely for addressing people. They are terms within a community of language speakers used for all sorts of purposes. For whom are the 'women' s' toilets set aside, those who are physiologically women, or those who think they're women? At whom is a positive discrimination programme requiring 50% women applicants aimed at, those who are physiologically women, or those who think they're women? Which group of people is women's studies investigating, for whom do women's rights campaign, who may join a women's support group, who is included in "women and children first", who is being referenced by the expression "women were traditionally oppressed", who are biblical and other religious texts referring to when they mention 'women', at whom should the WHO aim it's excellent women's health initiative? — Pseudonym
Both you and Willow seem to have this bizarre concept that if you state something is the case that's the end of the debate on the matter, if I still disagree I must have not read you clearly enough.
I disagree with your argument that it doesn't mean they are exclusive, for the reasons given. — Pseudonym
You keep repeating these assertions as if they were arguments. I provided a seven point argument in logic with which you disputed only one point (which I later provided a counter argument to). — Pseudonym
I'm not discussing the claims of intersex people, so why bring it up? — Pseudonym
Yes, trans people (and those who agree with them) use the term as they wish, others use the term as they wish. — Pseudonym
No, I don't agree with your premise that identity is defined by the person to whom it refers — Pseudonym
What logical argument have you got which takes you (in logical steps, without further bare assertion) for interpreting the meaning of the claim "I am a woman", as referring only to non-exclusory membership criteria? — Pseudonym
I was pointing out another one of your inconsistencies when I asked you that question, but you didn't seem to get it.This is just a metaphysical puzzle. What does it matter that we count them as qualia or not? Either way we know what it is to feel, and we know that our feelings are specific to ourselves. You don't feel like I feel at the moment. It's this interiority that's important to the discussion at hand, and not the metaphysical status of feelings. — Moliere
I was talking about biological relationships. Sure, people can adopt and that would make the child their legal son/daughter, and that still supports my claim that relationships define your identity.My physical relationship doesn't make me a niece, son, father, and so forth. What physical quantity would we measure to establish nephew-hood? Genes? But this is a filial relationship established in social practices. Kinship groups vary significantly between cultures. And it is possible to be someone's son while not being their biological child -- such as the case of adoption. It's also possible to be disowned by your family, and find a new group of people who you call family and said family is just as real as those who have physical genetic relationships with one another.
The relationship between persons is what counts, though. The physical, measurable quantities don't. — Moliere
It wouldn't be bright and gay. It would be rather dull and boring with everyone being genetically and behaviorally the same, or modified for specific tasks for Big Brother. There would be no individual identities.In the bright and gloroius gay space luxury communist future this will be superseded with SCIENCE!
:D — Moliere
I already pointed out (and you keep ignoring it (the only thing you are consistent on)) that, if gender-identity is as you have defined it as the feeling and/or need to behave like the opposite sex, then what does it mean to behave like the opposite sex when all sexes can and have historically engaged in those behaviors? The only difference lies in how societies define how certain sexes should behave. And how does one sex know what it feels like to be the other to claim that they identify as the other?In all sincerity, it depends to what extent you identify with your physical capacities. Identity is a mental phenomena. There is a social side to identity, but that's not what we're talking about when talking about gender-identity. — Moliere
My default position in the absence of evidence to the contrary is that it would require a slightly different brain to 'run' a female body than to 'run' a male one. — Pseudonym
What an intractable issue! If only there were some field like intersectional feminism that didn't treat all women as identical, and then this type of categorisation wouldn't be a problem. We can only hope, I guess. — angslan
I critique the foundational point. — angslan
Because it is relevant to the discussion of whether gender categories are exclusive. — angslan
'm interested then, given the proposal I formulated for speaker-oriented and addressee-oriented addressing, why you think one is better than the other. — angslan
I'm not sure I said that. — angslan
Your argument requires a premise that only admit exclusivity - and ignores non-binary and spectrum concepts of gender. — angslan
I am convinced, at this point, that your philosophy on this issue is a rationalisation for how you already feel. — angslan
Yes, and a male-oriented brain running a female body might explain gender dysphoria as something other than a delusion. — Pattern-chaser
What makes an apple remain 'an apple' as if 'apple' is something anywhere other than in ones own personal representations? — Blue Lux
Is this not what I have been saying all along - that this is the result of a defect in the brain (physical and/or psychological)?Yes, and a male-oriented brain running a female body might explain gender dysphoria as something other than a delusion. — Pattern-chaser
It's not a fair point because the intolerance is defined within the very concepts being used.
The moment we understand trans identity be mistaken or non-existent, we are engaged in the discrimination and intolerance against trans people. In our very concepts, we deny their meaning is part of reality which is valuable and respected. An effect which is not limited to instance in which trans identity is genuine. Even people were correct to reject trans identity in this way, they would be just as discriminatory and intolerant of trans people. Treatment of other people isn't defined by whether their identity claims are accurate its about how you treatment. It about how they are valued and treated. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Even {if} people were correct to reject trans identity in this way, they would be just as discriminatory and intolerant of trans people.
Even posing the "alternative" is a form of intolerance because it doesn't respect there is a reason to respect trans identity. It's tries to consider a "neutral" position when the one which is absent intolerance understands there is reason not to reject trans identity..
In this respect, it like getting up and saying: "Well, it might be the case that children aren't valuable Perhaps we don't need to take care or them. Maybe."
The supposed "neutrality" of the position is just a rejection of a reason for taking an action. In the face of something we have a reason for accepting or enacting, it claims we have none.
Such "neutrality" only feeds the intolerant positions. When a position which identifies we have a reason for not being intolerant, "neutrality" supposes this isn't present. It takes no-one has a good reason for rejecting intolerance and the intolerance is just as viable of a position. It the definition of pouring cold water on those trying to point out we have a reason to reject intolerance.
I was pointing out another one of your inconsistencies when I asked you that question, but you didn't seem to get it. — Harry Hindu
I was talking about biological relationships. Sure, people can adopt and that would make the child their legal son/daughter, and that still supports my claim that relationships define your identity. — Harry Hindu
already pointed out (and you keep ignoring it (the only thing you are consistent on)) that, if gender-identity is as you have defined it as the feeling and/or need to behave like the opposite sex, then what does it mean to behave like the opposite sex when all sexes can and have historically engaged in those behaviors? — Harry Hindu
The only difference lies in how societies define how certain sexes should behave. And how does one sex know what it feels like to be the other to claim that they identify as the other?
And the male who claims to have "womanhood" wouldn't know what "womanhood" is to say that he has it. You are attributing special powers to transgenders that they don't have. Why would one man know what "womanhood" is like and another not know what it is like?The closest that would come to would be to say that this man is claiming to be a woman without knowledge of the qualia of womanhood. But I don't think it works that way at all. We don't have knowledge of the male's (to use Banno's language) internal experience. So we can't say that this male does or does not experience what it is to be a woman.
It's as if you want to acknowledge that females have womanhood, and males and manhood, but since this male is claiming womanhood and you know that all males feel malehood they couldn't possibly know womanhood. But, since you aren't a male with womanhood, you yourself wouldn't know that either. — Moliere
But then we have to ask -- how do you determine these relationships? It's not a measurable, physical entity. Biological relationships barely scratch the surface here. So your talk of biological relationships doesn't really explain relationship. What other physical entity would you propose to designate a son who is not a biological son? — Moliere
In other words, it is arbitrary - like "god". Someone's "manhood" could be someone's "womanhood" and then where do those definitions that you and Banno seem so fond of stand? Doesn't that mean that gender is undefinable - non-existent? It's meaningless. Nonsense. Your own definitions and explanations defeat themselves.Your latter supposition is trans-historical, whereas mine is not. What it means depends on circumstance -- micro-circumstance, in some cases, because even between individual families in the same culture these things can differ. — Moliere
Are relationships not established over time, with more time implying a deeper relationship? And what about the actions taken to maintain the relationship? Caring for a child that you adopted is what makes it a relationship as well. Just look at all the things that define your relationship with the people in your life, and how each relationship is different, and they are different as a result of the amount of and kind of things you do for each other. It has to do with the amount and types of actions you do with someone else, along with any physical relationship that might exist. — Harry Hindu
Someone's "manhood" could be someone's "womanhood" and then where do those definitions that you and Banno seem so fond of stand? Doesn't that mean that gender is undefinable - non-existent? It's meaningless. Nonsense. Your own definitions and explanations defeat themselves. — Harry Hindu
The amount of time and types of things you do for each other can be said to be physical quantities. I could even say that feelings are physical as well, but I don't like to use those incoherent terms, "physical" and "mental". Everything is information. Your feelings inform you of the state of your body and can say that they are the relationship between mind and body. Relationships are a process. Nothing is either physical or mental. It is all process/information.This is closer I think. But what differs here is that these aren't physical quantities which are measured. — Moliere
In other words, you need to have faith that people's judgements of their own feelings are accurate - even though experience tells us that that isn't always the case. How - religious.At some point you just have to ask people and believe them. — Moliere
This is just more nonsense. All you are talking about is our own individual preferences, not anything that can be called "manhood" or "womanhood". If anything and everything falls under some umbrella term, then that makes the term meaningless, as everything and anything could be that thing (manhood) and it would be inconsistent to call those things by another, opposite term (womanhood).The "manhood" or "womanhood" (or the "manhood and womanhood") is never going to be another's. In any case, it's a feature of an individual. I can no more have another's "manhood" or "womanhood" than I can be another person. Each person's "manhood" or "womanhood" is only ever their own. No "manhood" or "womanhood" is ever the same.
They aren't made arbitrary by this feature either. In any case, the "manhood" or "womanhood" is its own unique feature of the world (and can be understood by others; I can know who is a man, who is a woman, that the manhood and womanhood of each are different, how they are different, etc.), a feature which stands on its own as a presence in world ("the manhood/womanhood of..."), rather than being some sort of membership granted by having some sort of organs or behaving the right way.
Rather than "manhood" and "womanhood" being traits achieved by following a rule, they are a primary feature of individuals themselves, a significance of the given individual which occurs with their various traits (whatever those might be).
One is a man/women not because of specific biological or behavioural traits, but rather because they are a man/woman in the first instance.
The "arbitrariness" is a misunderstanding drawn from thinking that womanhood or manhood is granted in conforming to some rule of traits which make someone a man/woman. For any man or woman, we are already past any "arbitrariness" because their manhood or womanhood is already who they are. — TheWillowOfDarkness
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