If I don't know the author of the book or Trump's wife then I won't know if referring to them as "Steve" or "Melanie" is a mistake or not, — Michael

Whether you know it is a mistake or not has nothing to do with whether it is. Your view of language is solipsistic. The fact is, it is a mistake. That is not their name.

Surely you can refer to my brother using the name "Andrew" even if his name isn't Andrew. — Michael

If I did that, I would be using the wrong name, and so making a mistake. I would fail to refer to him conventionally, but if someone understood what I meant, they might recover what I meant (and in this sense failed) to say, and so I might succeed in referring in the sense of conveying who it was I wanted to talk about.

It doesn't make a difference if the wrong name is intentional or mistaken. — Michael

That's right – it's an objective linguistic mistake, either way. Hence, the wrong name.

So there must be some explanation that will account for every correct reference and also elucidate every incorrect reference? And if I can find a counterexample to any explanation you attempt, it shows that you are unable to explain reference at all?

If your explanations cannot account even for the simples language - proper names, for gods sake - then you have no credibility as a philosopher...

Why should all reference have only one explanation?

Why should all reference have only one explanation? — Banno

Indeed. There is a reason why Evans's posthumously published masterpiece was titled The Varieties of Reference.

I'm not familiar with Evans.

It's simply that children are able to use proper names without the advantage of being able to articulate a satisfactory explanation.

How can that be?

A subjective probability of 50% would mean in half the possible worlds. — Dfpolis

Rubbish.

The same way they're able to digest food without being able to offer one. Theory about how something that humans do works has nothing to do with whether they themselves have such a theory or understand it.

It's simply that children are able to use proper names without the advantage of being able to articulate a satisfactory explanation.

How can that be? — Banno

Some people can also play the piano "by ear" without being able to say anything about the rules of harmony. I am also reminded of Antonio de Nebrija, who authored and dedicated the first grammar of the Spanish language to Queen Isabella of Spain. She told him: "Why would I want a work like this? I already know the language."

So we note that there is a way of digesting that is not given in an explanation of how one digests, but is shown in the act of turning food into shit.

And there is a way of speaking that is not given in a grammar, but shown in conversation.

And there is a way of referring that is not given by definite descriptions or rigid designation; but is shown in what we do with words.

I'm not seeing the point. This is precisely what we're talking about anyway.

And there is a way of speaking that is not given in a grammar, but shown in conversation.

And there is a way of referring that is not given by definite descriptions or rigid designation; but is shown in what we do with words. — Banno

In all of those cases what is shown and what is said is the very same thing: the very same rules. When Wittgenstein commented in PI that 'there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.' he didn't mean to refer to two different sorts of rules, I don't think, but rather to two different ways of grasping them, where the second one is primary in the sense that it is regress stopping. If there weren't a way to grasp a rule that doesn't rest on an ability to understand a linguistic expression of that rule, then there would be no way of learning the rules of language. But the fact that there is a way to learn those rules through being initiated (or trained) into the practice without the need of explicit instructions doesn't entail that one thereby is learning ineffable rules.

But the fact that there is a way to learn those rules through being initiated into the practice without the need of explicit instructions doesn't entail that one thereby is learning ineffable rules. — Pierre-Normand

A good point; but consider a family resemblance of rules, a set of rules that can never be set out explicitly and entirely.

And a conjecture: given any group of rules for successfully using proper names, it is possible to find an instance of successfully use that is not accounted for by that set of rules.

Consider this as paralleling Gödel; a sort of incompleteness for proper names.

I'm not seeing the point. — Snakes Alive

Yep.

Do you think there is some sort of opposition between describing language as it's used, and describing it using notions like rigid designation?

As if we did not use names as rigid designators!

And a conjecture: given any group of rules for successfully using proper names, it is possible to find an instance of successfully use that is not accounted for by that set of rules. — Banno

I don't have the slightest doubt that this conjecture is true.

That a theory is bound to be incomplete is not an injunction against theorizing. That is a very silly thing to think.

That a theory is bound to be incomplete is not an injunction against theorizing. That is a very silly thing to think. — Snakes Alive

Of course. I quite agree. The purpose of theorizing isn't to provide a blueprint for perfect use. It's rather to foster understanding. Hence, that theories about language use are bound to be incomplete means no more and no less than that our self-understanding, qua language users, is bound to be imperfect.

The purpose of theorizing isn't to provide a blueprint for perfect use. It's rather to foster understanding. Hence, that theories about language use are bound to be incomplete means no more and no less than that our self-understanding, qua language users, is bound to be imperfect. — Pierre-Normand

It's not to provide a blueprint for use at all! It isn't as if we are trying to teach people how to use language 'right.' Language is a natural phenomenon, like digestion, that can be objectively described as to its workings.

It's not to provide a blueprint for use at all! — Snakes Alive

I agree. Which is why I said: "...It's rather to foster understanding..."

Think I wil start a new thread.

Ah, I see. I mistook you as meaning that the point was to 'foster understanding' in the sense of a linguistic community coming into some kind of self-knowledge as to its own practices. That, I think, is also silly – philosophy of language is an abstruse discipline of no more general interest to the populace than biology, as it should be.

that can be objectively described as to its workings. — Snakes Alive

But never completely...

I have the feeling that this situation of indeterminate references is much more common that one might think. Most speech contains shortcuts and omissions. People often use a name for somebody that they don't realise is not the name used for that person amongst those to whom they are speaking. Sometimes this leads to confusion. More often we manage to make sense of what is said. That's why I think concepts like 'failing to refer to someone' miss the whole point of language analysis. That makes it seem as if speaking is a multiple choice exam, for which one gets points for each sentence part that was correctly executed.

In my experience, verbal communication is not like that. Each speech act needs to be assessed as a whole (by speech act I mean the smallest part of speech that conveys an entire idea or proposition, which may usually be a sentence but may occasionally be more or less). It succeeds if the listener grasps the purpose of the act. It fails if the listener has no idea what the speaker is on about.

I can see your point about possible worlds being useful in considering counterfactuals or hypotheticals. I have a different approach involving imagination (although recently I have been wondering exactly what imagination is. It is a very strange concept from a philosophical point of view), but different approaches suit different people.

I concede that Kripke's approach may well be useful in metaphysics. Where I don't see it as being useful is in relation to language. To me it seems to bear almost no relation to the way people actually speak to each other, or how people learn to speak.

A subjective probability of 50% would mean in half the possible worlds. — Dfpolis

Rubbish. — Banno

I wrote Plantiga to that effect, but he declined to respond.

I wrote Plantiga to that effect, but he declined to respond. — Dfpolis

Maybe Pantinga didn't reply to you at the actual world but I'm fairly sure he did at some other possible worlds.

Maybe Pantinga didn't reply to you at the actual world but I'm fairly sure he did at some other possible worlds. — Pierre-Normand

Unfortunately, all my mail comes to the real world.

Not at all. You are welcome to use rigid designators all you like.

I concede that Kripke's approach may well be useful in metaphysics. Where I don't see it as being useful is in relation to language. To me it seems to bear almost no relation to the way people actually speak to each other, or how people learn to speak. — andrewk

Nobody is going to stop you from having whatever opinion you want, but your opinion is ill-informed, and it's frustrating that when confronted with this fact, you continue to choose to double down on your misinformation and ignorance of the topic rather than engage with the material you're attempting to criticize. This makes me think the criticism is not entirely in good faith.

There can't be any criticism without understanding – your current qualms don't even rise to the level required to have a problem with Kripke, since all evidence from your posts points to you not knowing what he said. You don't know what a rigid designator is, and you seem not to know what the function of possible worlds in the modal logic is. You've also repeatedly asked for examples of the notion's empirical application, and when given them, have chosen to double down and ignore. It's not great sportsmanship to waste other people's time when you have no intention of trying to figure out the material.

I'm sorry to hear that you feel that way. Nevertheless, if you want to put forward an argument on the subject matter itself, I will be happy to engage with it.

I'm sorry to hear that you feel that way. — andrewk

Don't "apologize" to me – read the book, or else inquire in good faith, when discussing a topic in the future. The advice is for your benefit, not mine.