A terminology note. The A/B this is more correctly known as A-series and B-series, and they're not a philosophical stance, just a relative vs. more absolute way to speak of time.In the philosophy of time, there are two major positions, the A-theory and the B-theory. The A-theory is often considered to be in line with the traditional view on time, where things change in accord with the passage of time and reality is dynamic. The B-theory on the other hand does not take the passage of time to be real at all and considers all events often taken to be past, present, and future, to be real in a static block universe. — Mr Bee
It is certainly more practical, which is why A-series is used in everyday language and intuition. I can similarly argue that B-series gives a more practical framework in which physics can be discussed. But lacking an empirical distinction between the two, I don't see a proof being likely. Everyday life can be awkwardly described in B-series, and physics can be awkwardly described in A-series.Essentially I want to argue that the A-theory is better at accommodating certain features of time, those which seem to depict it time as flowing series of events, that would give reason to support it. — Mr Bee
I can say the same with slices of space. The word 'history' carries an implication of a past, which is a presentist interpretation.- History: The most defining feature of time is the fact that it describes the different states of the universe. If you were to take one slice of time and another, you would find that they contain the same matter and objects, just organized differently.
Spacetime has connectivity yes. Calling them slices is from the eternalist interpretation. The presentist would only have the one current state of space, with no other 'slices' to connect with it.- Connectivity: There is a relation between adjacent times that we capture through the laws of nature. The slices of time and states of the universe are not just ordered arbitrarily, where each time is completely independent of the other, but they are connected together in specific ways (for instance, the state of the universe in 2018 would not be adjacent to a state very early in the universe's history in time).
It isn't a dimension at all if time flows. 4D spacetime can have all four axes oriented arbitrarily, so yes, there's one time axis, but its orientation is arbitrary within the confines of the speed of light. Rotate beyond that, and a different axis assumes the role of the time axis. Fun factoid: This switching of roles of axes actually happens in black holes, which I think don't exist yet under presentism.- Linearity: We often talk about time as a line going from one end to the other. Unlike space, which contains three dimensions, time is one dimensional.
Entropy defining the direction of the arrow. If entropy stabilizes, there would be no arrow.- Order: Under time there is also a preferred direction, which some refer to as the "arrow of time". We talk of events going from 2000 to 2001 but never the other way around.
Both account for it all just fine.It is these four features of time that I take to be better accounted for in the A-theory than in the B-theory. As far as I am aware of there is no explanation of why time is structured the way that it is in the latter.
??? It isn't in either view. The former has no slices, just a changing 3D state. The latter has a block with no slices other than abstracted considerations that can be oriented any way one chooses, similar to the way the 3D universe has no mandatory choice for the X axis.Why is time a series of slices depicting the history of the same 3D universe?
From what I've read on inflation theory, this is chance. There are a lot of dimensions and some inflation bubbles have different numbers of macroscopic spatial and time dimensions. So maybe one bubble has 2 spatial and 3 time dimensions. Only the 3/1 configuration seems to allow the sort of physical mechanics that permits complex structures like atoms to form. Most of those strangely configured bubbles collapse immediately or explode into featureless fog. That 3/1 bit is part of a much longer list of tunings required to allow us to exist.Why is there only one dimension of time and three (or more if we take string theory into account) of space?
There is still quantum indeterminacy, so no brute fact implied by the block. A lot here depends on your quantum interpretation of choice. Hard determinism seems to be what you're describing here, and both time interpretations allow it but don't assert it.Under the B-theory, all of the features seem to only be taken as a given in the block universe. It seems as though all events are simply laid out the way that they are with the relations between them, as a brute fact.
I prefer the eternal model, but I don't assert that the presentist model is wrong.If you're a B-theorist or at the least are actually familiar with the views, then I am interested in hearing from you.
The philosophical positions you are describing is presentism and eternalism, with the former asserting a flowing preferred moment in time separating all events into 3 distinct ontological states of happened, happening, and yet to happen. The latter gives equal ontological status to all events and disallows references to the nonexistent preferred moment. — noAxioms
It is certainly more practical, which is why A-series is used in everyday language and intuition. I can similarly argue that B-series gives a more practical framework in which physics can be discussed. But lacking an empirical distinction between the two, I don't see a proof being likely. Everyday life can be awkwardly described in B-series, and physics can be awkwardly described in A-series.
I can say the same with slices of space. The word 'history' carries an implication of a past, which is a presentist interpretation.
Spacetime has connectivity yes. Calling them slices is from the eternalist interpretation. The presentist would only have the one current state of space, with no other 'slices' to connect with it.
It isn't a dimension at all if time flows.
4D spacetime can have all four axes oriented arbitrarily, so yes, there's one time axis, but its orientation is arbitrary within the confines of the speed of light. Rotate beyond that, and a different axis assumes the role of the time axis.
Entropy defining the direction of the arrow. If entropy stabilizes, there would be no arrow.
Both account for it all just fine.
??? It isn't in either view.
The former has no slices, just a changing 3D state. The latter has a block with no slices other than abstracted considerations that can be oriented any way one chooses, similar to the way the 3D universe has no mandatory choice for the X axis.
From what I've read on inflation theory, this is chance. There are a lot of dimensions and some inflation bubbles have different numbers of macroscopic spatial and time dimensions. So maybe one bubble has 2 spatial and 3 time dimensions.
Only the 3/1 configuration seems to allow the sort of physical mechanics that permits complex structures like atoms to form. Most of those strangely configured bubbles collapse immediately or explode into featureless fog. That 3/1 bit is part of a much longer list of tunings required to allow us to exist.
There is still quantum indeterminacy, so no brute fact implied by the block. A lot here depends on your quantum interpretation of choice. Hard determinism seems to be what you're describing here, and both time interpretations allow it but don't assert it.
I prefer the eternal model, but I don't assert that the presentist model is wrong.
I said I wasn't arguing for it. Just comparing mostly.Note that first, I am not claiming to provide a proof of the A-theory, just an argument in it's favour.
Second, ...
Finally, third, your argument for the B-theory — Mr Bee
I interpreted the comment wrong. I see what you're saying now.How so? I'm curious to see you try.
It isn't a dimension at all if time flows. — noAxioms
The representation as a dimension would not reflect reality. Yes, it still can be useful to describe it that way.Why? The Presentist (nor the A-theorist) again does not disagree with the representation of time as a linear series of events, so whether they all exist together or occur one by one is irrelevant. It wouldn't be a dimension like space of course but that is not to say that it cannot be described as a dimension at all.
If there were no space, then yes, there would be just this linear series of events. But most pairs of events are ambiguously ordered (at least in the eternal model), so time would then not be a series of events. Time seems to be relevant only to causally related events, so time seem more to be a a product of a structure with causal relationships. That's how I tend to view it at least. YMMV.Really? It seems very obvious that time is a series of events.
The former has no slices, just a changing 3D state. The latter has a block with no slices other than abstracted considerations that can be oriented any way one chooses, similar to the way the 3D universe has no mandatory choice for the X axis. — noAxioms
I would think not. If there is a present, it is an absolute state, however undetectable, and other abstract slices of the block are simply misrepresentations of reality. There is no arbitrary choice about it. An arbitrary guess if something preferred suggests itself, and yes, it does.As stated before, the Presentist would still agree that time can be described with the features mentioned above.
Well, you could slice across one of the other dimensions and get 2D space and 1D time.As for Eternalism, the fact that, under relativity, we can slice spacetime up in practically an inifnite number of ways does not change the fact that no matter how we look at it (under any given slicing), that time is a series of 3D slices of space.
There's a list of stuff that can vary, and a list that cannot. Yes, the cosmological constant is one, and the hardest one to get to a workable value if you're just pulling random values out of your arse. I guess that implies a lot of bubbles.Not sure about this. I've heard inflation being used as a way of solving the cosmological constant problem, but varying constants is not the same as varying dimensions of time.
Try this, which was the first item on my little google of it:People have also spoken about the "dimensionality" varying between universes, but as far as I can tell, this "dimensionality" that people speak about as varying refers strictly to space, not time, which is what I am concerned about. Do you have a reference that says that the time dimension can vary across bubble universes?
Technically the bubbles relate, being part of one QM structure, so different worlds in one universe. But other bubbles have completely different physical laws (especially the classic laws), so most qualify them as other universes.The idea of a multiverse is still debatable (at least of the stronger forms involved here), but if there can be other universes that exist along our own that contain more than one time dimension (or none at all), then that would undermine the linearity feature of my argument.
The article I linked gets into this.This just sounds plainly wrong to me. I don't see why life would require 3+1 dimensions in order to exist.
Yes, but most of them not macroscopic. We're counting the macroscopic ones here.For one, such an idea would falsify string theory on the basis that the latter requires alot more than 3 dimensions of space to even work,
I tried creating a simulation of that, and could only manage it with 1 space dimension.I also fail to see why life would require a single dimension of time in order to operate. Although it isn't clear to me what it would exactly mean to say that there is more than one dimension to time I do not see what about it's nature would preclude conscious beings like us from existing in it.
Makes no sense to me. You seem to describe a photo of a dog, which is not a living thing. It isn't life if there are no dynamics.With respect to a world that contains no time at all, the same reasoning applies. It could be that that some form of temporal solipsism is true, where one 3D slice of time exists and only that time, but that time can in theory describe a world where living animals and conscious beings such as us exist.
Well, take the relational interpretation then, which has no meaningful state except as measured, and nothing measures the universe (the big bang is a point of view that sees nothing), so the universe has no state, just relations. Everett would say it has solutions to Schrodinger equations. Neither of those has meaningful state. The Bohmian interpretation has it (hard, single-outcome determinism), but it does so at the cost of cause before effect (locality). I personally find the latter more offensive, but that's just my taste.Don't see how quantum indeterminacy undermines or accounts for any of the features of time. A block universe with quantum indeterminacy (assuming that an indeterministic interpretation of QM is true) is still just as problematic as one that doesn't have it. Can you explain how it is relevant here?
I prefer the eternal model, but I don't assert that the presentist model is wrong. — noAxioms
No, a presentist would not prefer the opposing model.Then you are a presentist then?
I am a squishy eternalist. I only take firm stances against positions which don't seem self consistent.My assumption is that you're a firm eternalist, but in that case, you would believe that presentism is wrong.
The representation as a dimension would not reflect reality. — noAxioms
If there were no space, then yes, there would be just this linear series of events. But most pairs of events are ambiguously ordered (at least in the eternal model), so time would then not be a series of events.
Time seems to be relevant only to causally related events, so time seem more to be a a product of a structure with causal relationships. That's how I tend to view it at least. YMMV.
I would think not. If there is a present, it is an absolute state, however undetectable, and other abstract slices of the block are simply misrepresentations of reality. There is no arbitrary choice about it. An arbitrary guess if something preferred suggests itself, and yes, it does.
There's a list of stuff that can vary, and a list that cannot. Yes, the cosmological constant is one, and the hardest one to get to a workable value if you're just pulling random values out of your arse. I guess that implies a lot of bubbles.
Try this, which was the first item on my little google of it:
https://www.quora.com/If-there-are-3-physical-space-dimensions-why-arent-there-3-time-dimensions
The article I linked gets into this.
Yes, but most of them not macroscopic. We're counting the macroscopic ones here.
Makes no sense to me. You seem to describe a photo of a dog, which is not a living thing. It isn't life if there are no dynamics.
Well, take the relational interpretation then, which has no meaningful state except as measured, and nothing measures the universe (the big bang is a point of view that sees nothing), so the universe has no state, just relations. Everett would say it has solutions to Schrodinger equations. Neither of those has meaningful state. The Bohmian interpretation has it (hard, single-outcome determinism), but it does so at the cost of cause before effect (locality). I personally find the latter more offensive, but that's just my taste.
I am a squishy eternalist. I only take firm stances against positions which don't seem self consistent.
Try this, which was the first item on my little google of it:
https://www.quora.com/If-there-are-3-physical-space-dimensions-why-arent-there-3-time-dimensions
That isn't what I'm asking for, but it does address the other concern that I had about why we should prefer a 3+1 Universe on anthropic reasons. I am assuming you're referring me to the first answer in the post, which references Tegmark, but if not then please direct me to the appropriate answer. — Mr Bee
The 'tachyons only' choice? You can publish that if you can think of a way for tachyons to interact coherently to be structure, let alone one that is a life form. The author Mauro seems to think so, but he omits Tegmarks commentary on that. I think Mauro is mistaking the condition for 3 space and 1 time, but everything moves faster than light, not slower.I don't think he actually demonstrates that life cannot work in a universe that does not contain one time dimension. In fact, the author seems to indicate that a world that contains 3 time dimensions and 1 space dimensions is possible, albeit very strange, for life.
I think it violates every attempt at a definition of life that I've seen. Perhaps you'd like to give one that would include this timeless configuration of state.Not a photo of a dog, but a state of a universe containing a real dog while it's alive. Perhaps one can debate whether or not a single instant is sufficient for life, but I see no reason why it doesn't.
So yes, can be thought of as one collective determined state. I call that soft determinism since the future measurement of some trivial experiment still cannot be predicted even given perfect knowledge of the system and infinite computing capability. It's determinism only because every possible result happens, and that list of results can be (and already is) computable. The relational interpretation is similar, but says the results that were not measured are not real (they didn't happen 'elsewhere'), and is therefore not a deterministic interpretation.At least with respect to the Many-Worlds interpretation of Everett it would appear that the number of states that exist would be multiplied, since they would all be realized together.
No, there are quantum experiments that seemingly effect past measurements by decisions made in the future of those measurements. The before-before experiment is one of them. Only interpretations with locality explain that without reverse causation. A preferred frame helps not at all. The issue is not ambiguous ordering such as spooky action between two events outside each other's light cones. The issue here is blatant cause after effect between events that are within each other's light cones.As for the Bohmian interpretation, I don't think that adopting non-locality would require rejecting causality, provided one introduce a preferred frame to preserve it.
Fine. I'm an agnostic then, by the way you use the terms.If you're an Eternalist then you think Presentism is wrong. That's what it means to be an Eternalist.
You can also look at Tegmark's paper referenced at the top of that answer. It is 400 pages and I think only deals with the dimensionality aspect. — noAxioms
The 'tachyons only' choice? You can publish that if you can think of a way for tachyons to interact coherently to be structure, let alone one that is a life form. The author Mauro seems to think so, but he omits Tegmarks commentary on that. I think Mauro is mistaking the condition for 3 space and 1 time, but everything moves faster than light, not slower.
I think it violates every attempt at a definition of life that I've seen. Perhaps you'd like to give one that would include this timeless configuration of state.
So yes, can be thought of as one collective determined state. I call that soft determinism since the future measurement of some trivial experiment still cannot be predicted even given perfect knowledge of the system and infinite computing capability. It's determinism only because every possible result happens, and that list of results can be (and already is) computable. The relational interpretation is similar, but says the results that were not measured are not real (they didn't happen 'elsewhere'), and is therefore not a deterministic interpretation.
No, there are quantum experiments that seemingly effect past measurements by decisions made in the future of those measurements. The before-before experiment is one of them. Only interpretations with locality explain that without reverse causation. A preferred frame helps not at all. The issue is not ambiguous ordering such as spooky action between two events outside each other's light cones. The issue here is blatant cause after effect between events that are within each other's light cones.
A good habit to hunt down critique. Helps point out which parts on which focus should be placed. I do it myself for papers whether or not I agree with them. I'll try to look at that link closer, but a good deal of it is beyond me.Regardless, I still checked the citation list for the article to see what others thought of it (a habit of mine), and I found some objections (here is one of them) to the unpredictability argument that Tegmark promotes in his paper. Not sure what to make of it, but I'd thought I'd throw it out for people for those who do understand it to look at for themselves. — Mr Bee
I was actually more concerned with 1D life form, let alone one comprised of only stuff that can't go slow. But who am I to say that just because it is incomprehensibly different that coherent structures cannot form in it. 3D of time, whatever that means, is plenty of room for complexity. But I don't even follow the argument that only tachyons result.Tachyons, though weird, are not completely impossible from what I can tell but I have no idea how they work to say one way or the other.
I was thinking dynamics more than persistence. I cannot think of a single thing distinguishing life from non-life that doesn't involve dynamics (a reference to time).If one is looking for a more practical definition of "life" then sure I am willing to grant that temporal persistence is necessary. But I wasn't trying to argue with those kinds of definitions.
That, if it were a being, would not be conscious. Yes, I had thought of Boltzmann brains when this was brought up, but even those have momentary dynamics. A Boltzmann brain is not a life form, even if it technically qualifies as conscious for a very brief duration.My concern is with the possibility that we could, as conscious beings, be located on a single static moment of time.
Idealism has to do with relations to consciousness. The relational view, being non-anthropocentric, is relative to anything at all. A rock does fine, co-existing with the things with which it interacts. Hence no contradiction about how we came about before we gave existence to what was before us.Hmm, the relational interpretation sounds pretty idealistic to me. From what I've read it seems to suggest that there is nothing to the physical world other than our own observation of it.
Except for the 'we' part, yes. Look up the principle of counterfactual definiteness. It says that the red ball exists even unmeasured. More formally worded, "counterfactual definiteness (CFD) is the ability to speak "meaningfully" of the definiteness of the results of measurements that have not been performed (i.e., the ability to assume the existence of objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured)". That's straight off the wiki page, my bold.That is, there is no noumenon, no red ball in itself, since there is nothing to it if we are not looking at it.
Relation interpretation has collapse. Collapse is what makes the red ball real. MWI does not have collapse.This goes further than the copenhagen interpretation since at least that view allows for the collapse of the wave function.
It relates to the state of the universe in the block, but also in the flowing view. You're right, it doesn't really come into play until you start bringing up determinism, which can be asserted one way or the other with either view of time.I don't know what to make of that (especially since I am qualified to look into it more deeply), but with regards to the topic in the thread, it doesn't seem to undermine the concept of time as we traditionally define it.
Bohmian mechanics is not refuted by any experiment. I never claimed that. It just denies locality, and so allows effect before cause, as does any interpretation that denies locality. That makes the interpretaion invalid only if you assert otherwise.No, I don't think this is correct. Contrary to your claims, it would appear that preferred frames are the only the thing that saves nonlocal interpretations like Bohmian Mechanics from being refuted by the before-before experiment. This paper is very relevant to that.
A good habit to hunt down critique. Helps point out which parts on which focus should be placed. I do it myself for papers whether or not I agree with them. I'll try to look at that link closer, but a good deal of it is beyond me. — noAxioms
Idealism has to do with relations to consciousness. The relational view, being non-anthropocentric, is relative to anything at all.
Relation interpretation has collapse. Collapse is what makes the red ball real. MWI does not have collapse.
Bohmian mechanics is not refuted by any experiment. I never claimed that. It just denies locality, and so allows effect before cause, as does any interpretation that denies locality. That makes the interpretaion invalid only if you assert otherwise.
Neither of those interpretations require the observer to be a living thing. As I said, a rock will do.I never said it was idealistic, just that it has a very idealistic tone to it since it makes everything observer dependent. I suppose the same problems I have with it are similar to that of the copenhagen interpretation. — Mr Bee
It wouldn't be there if you had never looked at it, but it cannot be un-looked at. If you completely stop interacting with it (impossible), it would drop into a superposition of damn-likley existing, but possibly not. It's the moon. It isn't going anywhere. Both relational and copenhagen say this. Even if the moon by chance spontaneously decays into nonexistence, surely that would leave behind some energy wad that would still be the moon.You know that quote about the moon not being there where you're not looking at it? That's what first came to my mind.
Well, after collapse, no state is totally observer independent. Example would be nice I guess so I might comment on the different interpretations. We're getting kind of off-topic here.So it is. What I wanted to say was that I thought the copenhagen interpretation allowed for some observer independent states after collapse, unlike the relational interpretation, but that may not be correct.
Cannot read it. It downloads a pdf with an unreadable font.And if you look at the paper I linked the author seems to suggest otherwise.
I'd have to look to see what you mean by that. Maybe you can find a more readable version.He brings up the problems with the preferred frame view (it's empirical unobservability, the free will problem), but he does not mention the lack of a time order which he considers to refute the other non-local views.
Cannot read it. It downloads a pdf with an unreadable font. — noAxioms
Neither of those interpretations require the observer to be a living thing. As I said, a rock will do.
We're getting kind of off-topic here.
Both chrome and IE show no page, just the download.It should be viewable without download in the link provided. Just scroll down. — Mr Bee
OK, but your thoughts were only that it doesn't have collapse. It does.Just giving my own side thoughts about the relational interpretation since it was brought up and all.
Both chrome and IE show no page, just the download. — noAxioms
OK, but your thoughts were only that it doesn't have collapse. It does. — noAxioms
I might say I support this interpretation, but you'd then say that means I find the other interpretations wrong, and I don't. So I am again agnostic by the way you explain above. To deny other interpretations is to deny that they are inconsistent with themselves. That they are inconsistent with my preferences is evidence of nothing if I have no empirical evidence that my preferences are correct. — noAxioms
I got to the paper finally with the new link you provided. The term Leggett-like model is new to me. I don't see a description of before/before. I see it named, but not described. It interestingly defines a 'realism' as theories where 'results of observations are a consequence of pre-existing properties', i.e. cause before effect.Contrary to your claims, it would appear that preferred frames are the only the thing that saves nonlocal interpretations like Bohmian Mechanics from being refuted by the before-before experiment. This paper is very relevant to that. — Mr Bee
QM is science, and not aided much at all with any interpretation. That is why a QM class will perhaps touch on the various interpretations, but not promote or dwell on one since none of them are QM. The "shut up and calculate" refers to this. Shut up about the interpretations, and calculate what QM theory actually says, because it made most amazingly accurate predictions right from the beginning. Interpretations are philosophy, and the QM class is not teaching philosophy.It depends on what you mean by "support" then. If by the term you meant that you find that interpretation more useful as a practical tool for understanding QM, then that's one thing. — Mr Bee
Agree, so I think that when I say I'm an X-ist, it isn't a statement so strong as to say I assert it is true. Lacking any evidence, it would be a very poor thing to assert. So it remains a mere preference. If there was a way to actually know in the future, I would place my bets on certain views over others, and I suspect as probably many of us do that I would fare better than most in the horses I choose to back.However, if you mean that you believe in one interpretation being true, then if that interpretation is logically incompatible (as in mutually exclusive) with another interpretation, then you believe that other interpretation to be wrong.
I don't see a description of before/before. I see it named, but not described. — noAxioms
Unfortunately, the before-before experiment (which I didn't see described) very much violates time-ordering since the effect measurement events by Alice and Bob are separated from the cause decision event by Victor in a time-like separation, not a space-like separation.
I'm not sure how Bohmian mechanics describes the before-before experiment. I thought it explained spooky-action through hidden variables, not through time ordered non-local influence, but I don't see how hidden variables can explain before-before.
BTW, none of this directly relates to presentism, or A-theory as you call it.
A preferred frame is not a preferred moment, even if a preferred moment seems to require a preferred foliation if not a frame.
No frame, preferred or otherwise puts cause before effect in the Bohmian interpretation of before-before results. So I guess I don't understand where the article addresses that. The two events are separated time-like, so there is no ambiguity to their ordering that can be disambiguated with a preferred frame.The article very explicitly addresses the before-before experiment and clearly states that preferred frame models such as that of Bohmian mechanics do not violate time-ordering. You're free to disagree with that but that is what the article states. — Mr Bee
From what I read, A-theory includes growing block and presentism, which differ in the ontological status of past events, but both posit the flow of a preferred moment, so all my comments about presentism so far also can be applied to growing block. Perhaps you can explain the distinction if it is more than that.Presentism is not equal to the A-theory.
Relativity just says it isn't locally detectable. Non-locally, one does suggest itself, and GR very much acknowledges it. It is the foliation where spatial expansion is symmetric/isomorphic.The reason why Relativity undermines the idea of a preferred moment is because it states that there is no way to choose one frame or foliation of events, and that therefore there isn't any preferred frame/foliation.
The concept of becoming seems required only for the flowing model, but doesn't fit well at all with the block model. That's a good deal of the appeal of the block model is it doesn't need to explain the becoming.Now there appear to be some who dispute this, who claim that a concept of becoming can exist without a global now but for the most part I am just going off of the traditional opinion on the matter.
No frame, preferred or otherwise puts cause before effect in the Bohmian interpretation of before-before results. So I guess I don't understand where the article addresses that. The two events are separated time-like, so there is no ambiguity to their ordering that can be disambiguated with a preferred frame. — noAxioms
From what I read, A-theory includes growing block and presentism, which differ in the ontological status of past events, but both posit the flow of a preferred moment, so all my comments about presentism so far also can be applied to growing block. Perhaps you can explain the distinction if it is more than that.
I'm saying that no QM or relativistic interpretation seems to propose flowing time. I'm probably wrong, but I'm just unaware of one. Some assert a preferred frame, but that isn't flow.
Relativity just says it isn't locally detectable. Non-locally, one does suggest itself, and GR very much acknowledges it. It is the foliation where spatial expansion is symmetric/isomorphic.
The concept of becoming seems required only for the flowing model, but doesn't fit well at all with the block model. That's a good deal of the appeal of the block model is it doesn't need to explain the becoming.
A model is considered time ordered when it proposes that a cause event tomorrow can effect a measurement taken yesterday in the same place? Perhaps I don't know what 'time ordered' means, as used in that article. The one picture in there showed non-local influence arrow in a spooky-action setup, and without a preferred frame, the direction of the arrow would be ambiguous. So maybe that's what they mean by time-ordered: Not that the arrow always points forward, just that it doesn't point either way. In the before-before, it doesn't point in an ambiguous direction. It is consistently pointing backwards.Again, the author refers to the preferred frame model of Bohmian Mechanics explicitly as one that is time ordered, and admits that it's empirical predictions are compatible with the correlations found in the before-before experiment. Take no offense, but at this point, I am more willing to side with his view over yours. — Mr Bee
Well, to be thorough then, there might also be the one where only present and future exists, but the past, being no longer useful, fades away. I think the Langoliers movie depicted something like this.There's also the moving spotlight view of time as well, which says that all events in the universe's history exist but that there is a dynamic spotlight that shines on the set of events that represents the present. This is what I have told you at my first reply.
The Minkowski model is one specifically of a block scenario. It is a straight metaphysical interpretation of time, making no empirical predictions distinct from the flowing model. Einstein drew on the mathematics of this model and Lorentz's work in producing his theory of relativity. But yes, the theory of relativity does not itself assert those metaphysics. It just uses the mathematics of spacetime, and refers regularly to spacetime as a unified whole.No interpretation says anything about the existence of the block universe either. None of them have any direct say on the matters of the metaphysics of time.
Only SR says it is undetectable. GR does not, since it isn't just a local theory. There are non-local tests for an isomorphic foliation, which isn't an inertial frame, but seems to be the most viable candidate for some kind of preferred ordering of all events anywhere.Yeah, the direct implication of Relativity's postulates is that if there were such a preferred frame, it would not be empirically detectable, which some have taken to be evidence of it's nonexistence.
Careful with your wording. The CMB is not a foliation and, being light, is certainly not stationary relative to any frame, but a foliation is suggested by combining the local frames in which the CMB appears to be isomorphic. Hence my calling it the isomorphic foliation.The CMB is taken by some to be a preferred foliation of the universe in a sense,
Really?? Do any of them suggest another, like the frame of the solar system perhaps? That would suit the purpose of some people that would seem to have a requirement for A-theory.but it is debatable whether it is good enough for the A-theorist's purposes.
It does? I wasn't there at the time. Couldn't say. Yes, the A-theorists might say that, but doing so begs a different view. I find becoming to be difficult to explain, with all the uncaused-cause contradictions.I would actually argue that, in rejecting the idea of becoming, the block model has more trouble accounting for why the universe appears to become in time (given its structure), and that this is a weakness of the view relative to its alternative.
A model is considered time ordered when it proposes that a cause event tomorrow can effect a measurement taken yesterday in the same place? Perhaps I don't know what 'time ordered' means, as used in that article. The one picture in there showed non-local influence arrow in a spooky-action setup, and without a preferred frame, the direction of the arrow would be ambiguous. So maybe that's what they mean by time-ordered: Not that the arrow always points forward, just that it doesn't point either way. In the before-before, it doesn't point in an ambiguous direction. It is consistently pointing backwards. — noAxioms
Section 2 considers time-ordered Leggett models assuming thatone event can be considered the cause (occurring before in time), and the other the effect (occurring later in time). — Antoine Suarez
“Nonlocal realism” (as defined in [1, 5]) fails if experiment proves wrong that one of two non-locally correlated events occurs before and is the cause of the other.
Models assuming that the “realistic” mechanism happens in a single preferred frame even in relativistic experiments with devices in motion, are not refuted by the before-before experiment, but such models bear a fundamental oddity: since they assume that each event has a cause preceding it in time, they actually dispose of the freedom of the experimenter.
Thus, if one wishes to save time-ordered causality one is forced to assume that the outcomes are determined at the beam splitters (like De Broglie and Bohm did). — Antoine Suarez
Only SR says it is undetectable. GR does not, since it isn't just a local theory. There are non-local tests for an isomorphic foliation, which isn't an inertial frame, but seems to be the most viable candidate for some kind of preferred ordering of all events anywhere. — noAxioms
For that matter, I don't understand what possible problem is solved by growing block as opposed to presentism. I looked up the wiki page, and it defined it, but went no further in pointing out a single benefit of it. —
The Minkowski model is one specifically of a block scenario. It is a straight metaphysical interpretation of time, making no empirical predictions distinct from the flowing model. Einstein drew on the mathematics of this model and Lorentz's work in producing his theory of relativity. But yes, the theory of relativity does not itself assert those metaphysics. It just uses the mathematics of spacetime, and refers regularly to spacetime as a unified whole.
Really?? Do any of them suggest another, like the frame of the solar system perhaps? That would suit the purpose of some people that would seem to have a requirement for A-theory.
It does? I wasn't there at the time. Couldn't say.
I find becoming to be difficult to explain, with all the uncaused-cause contradictions.
That's why I wonder about before-before, which blatantly puts cause well after effect, and in any reference frame. Or at least it does in non-local interpretations.I feel like you're being obtuse at this point. I see no ambiguity in the use of "time-ordered". It means that causes always precede their effects in time. The author has been pretty clear in referring to time-order in that sense. — Mr Bee
This seems to explain it. If measurements are taken yesterday, and Victor's decision as to how those measurements correlate not yet made, apparently the interpretation is that the results of the measurements cause Victor to decide to correlate them, despite complete separation (no causal path) from measurements made by Alice and Bob to Victor making his decision.they assume that each event has a cause preceding it in time, they actually dispose of the freedom of the experimenter
AgreeAs far as I can tell, the CMB frame is not a physically distinguished frame in the sense that a preferred frame in SR is physically distinguished (as in the laws of physics are observed to be different in that frame). In that sense, so much as it is preferred, such a fact would be undetectable.
OK, that makes some sense. If the past is gone, is "Einstein existed" a true statement? Being a past tense, I don't see why not. It definitely changes the truth value of "Einstein exists".It solves the problem of truthmakers for the past. In saying that the past exists and is real, the Growing Block Theorist has the resources to talk about it unlike the Presentist.
No, none of those seem to depend on any particular interpretation of time. I might be wrong about that.Sorry, I thought you were just referring to QM interpretations
It has that. Is this something different than Lorentz Ether Theory, because I found no mention of flow in any description of it. Maybe Neo-Lorentz adds that on top of LET. Lorentz himself seemed not to see things that way, especially since he set a lot of the groundwork for Minkowski's model.In that case, the alternative interpretations to the Minkowski Spacetime such as the Neo-Lorentz interpretation of SR do include a flow of time as it is supposed to preserve the traditional view of time as a dynamic succession of events in a 3D universe.
How could CMB possibly suggest a preferred moment??? A preferred frame, sure, but not preferred moment. The A-Theorists similarly do not base their definition of the preferred moment on the CMB. Their moment is simply 'now'. Easy-peasy.It's not really the A-theorists who are making that claim, but the B-theorists who are objecting to the CMB as a means of defining a preferred moment because it appears to be arbitrary to do so.
I do not understand these paragraphs. I think you meant to say preferred frame.According to them there is no clear link between the CMB and the preferred moment in metaphysics that should lead us to equate one with the other. In a sense, I can see where they're coming from, as noted above, the CMB is not physically distinguished like we would want it to be. In that regard, we have just as much reason to prefer it over any other alternative foliation of events.
Of course, if the CMB were to be physically distinguished and people are making the same objections then that'd be another story altogether, for one could very well have made such an argument prior to relativity in the 1800s with respect to the absolute time of Newtonian physics. At that point it would be unreasonable to require that there needs to be a neon light sign that says "This is a preferred moment of metaphysics" over the preferred moment picked out by physics in order to say that they are both equivalent.
Maybe I don't understand this notion of becoming. It's not a term I use regularly.This is confusing to me. Becoming conceptually requires no uncaused causation, and even I see nothing contradictory about an uncaused cause.
That's why I wonder about before-before, which blatantly puts cause well after effect, and in any reference frame. Or at least it does in non-local interpretations. — noAxioms
It has that. Is this something different than Lorentz Ether Theory, because I found no mention of flow in any description of it. Maybe Neo-Lorentz adds that on top of LET.
How could CMB possibly suggest a preferred moment??? A preferred frame, sure, but not preferred moment. The A-Theorists similarly do not base their definition of the preferred moment on the CMB. Their moment is simply 'now'. Easy-peasy.
I do not understand these paragraphs. I think you meant to say preferred frame. What is 'physically distinguished'?
All causes seem to be effects of prior causes, but barring an infinite past, there must be a first cause, uncaused. Surely you've heard of that. Block theory has one, but it is just a (perhaps blank) initial condition. Not sure how becoming is expected to fit into that.
I am totally in the dark as to how the CMB would pick out a specific moment.So do you think that the preferred moment should be equated with the set of moments picked out by the CMB? It seems like one moment you think that it should (like in your previous response to me), then the next you think it shouldn't (like you are here). — Mr Bee
How does a selection of a frame suggest there being a special moment in it? The block model has a objective frame, independently discoverable by observers elsewhere, but no preferred moment is similarly discoverable by other observers.Since there is no difference between the CMB frame and any other in that sense, then that should give us reason to not take the former to represent the preferred moment that the A-theorists want.
Yes, that's why I called it an objective foliation, not necessarily a preferred one. By objective, I just mean it can be independently discovered by any observer anywhere. I don't mean a foliation that orders events in actual order. That would perhaps be that preferred frame.At least, this is part of the reason why I feel hesitant to call the CMB frame anything more than one that has some interesting properties.
I don't see how any foliation picks out any particular moment. It is a thing you've arbitrarily decided to add.It would be a different matter if that wasn't the case though. If the laws of physics do single out a particular foliation of events then it seems to be more of a stretch to deny that the present moment picked out by such a foliation is not the same as that of the metaphysical present, at least in my opinion.
Mathematically, I have little problem with either. Have to explain entropy though.I suppose I don't find anything wrong with an infinite past, or infinities in general really, but I don't want to argue that here. There's also the possibility of cyclical time as well, if one doesn't want a first cause or an infinite past
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