What are we to make of "I know how to ride a bike"?
The justification here, if there is one, is in riding the bike. The doing makes the knowing so.
I haven't ridden one for a few years - perhaps I've forgotten how...
Or I suffer an inner ear infection that makes balance impossible, and so cannot demonstrate my skill; do I still know how to ride? — Banno
But despite there not being a something, the game takes place; and has a role. We do things with our talk of pain. — Banno
I'm thinking about this in relation to the following from Snakes Alive:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/214348 — Banno
because it is made distinct from behaviour. I suspect a consequence of the approach Wittgenstein takes is to join mental states and behaviour - but that becomes a clumsy wording and leads to my (and his?) being accused of behaviourism.mental states - behavior - words in social contexts - meaning — Sam26
because it is made distinct from behaviour. I suspect a consequence of the approach Wittgenstein takes is to join mental states and behaviour - but that becomes a clumsy wording and leads to my (and his?) being accused of behaviourism. — Banno
It's more that the state of a brain and the performance of some act, or better, group of similar acts, are related. — Banno
With Witt's strict application of the phrase "I know", aren't there things that we can surmise about his thoughts on the matter that perhaps he had not written down, but was still in process, or some such? — creativesoul
Doesn't Witt claim that knowledge must be dubitable? Wouldn't that condition disqualify Moore's claim all by itself? — creativesoul
Doesn't Witt claim that knowledge must be dubitable? Wouldn't that condition disqualify Moore's claim all by itself?
— creativesoul
Yes, isn't that his point? All knowledge claim are doubtable, and if they're not, like Moore's claims, then there not knowledge claims, they're beliefs of a different sort (bedrock). — Sam26
I watched a pharmacist sort through shelves as she spoke on the phone, looking at this and that, walking around the room, asking questions and listening as she suggested, remembered, discovered...
Her thinking was not seperate from this bodily activity; nor from the items on the shelf, or the phone. Thinking is not just something that happens in minds. — Banno
Her thinking was not seperate from this bodily activity; nor from the items on the shelf, or the phone. Thinking is not just something that happens in minds. — Banno
Why must all knowledge claims(I'm assuming empirical claims) be able to be doubted? — creativesoul
Why must all knowledge claims(I'm assuming empirical claims) be able to be doubted?
— creativesoul
If this wasn't so, then one could infer knowledge from a simple claim that one knows. It has to be more than reasonable that in many situations the knowledge claim is something to be demonstrated. — Sam26
There seems, though, to be something much deeper here, namely, how our mental states are connected with these kinds of beliefs (hinge-propositions or bedrock beliefs). The strength of these beliefs does cause us to act from conviction, and they do give us something fundamental to our language-games. The strength of these beliefs (hinge-propositions or bedrock beliefs) are such that we want to say or make the claim that “We know…,” but, again, Wittgenstein attacks this use of the word know. Moore's claim to knowledge seems to be more in line with his subjective state of certainty, than with real knowledge claims. — Sam26
That's close. I don't see how knowing I have a hand could be purely what's going on in the brain; it must, at the least, also involve a hand....my disagreement with you, I think, lies in the difference between how a concept gets its life and what's going on in the brain. The two are inseparable. — Sam26
Yes, by definition, knowledge is something that is justified. As Wittgenstein says, satisfying oneself is part of the language-game of knowledge. — Sam26
I know how to ride a bike - and can demonstrate my knowledge by riding a bike. I know I have a hand - and can demonstrate my knowledge by waving my hand. Bikes and hands form the world in which such language takes place. — Banno
Now I need to go back to Moore, and have a re-read. Does he mention certainty in his text? I don't recall his doing so. The introduction of certainty into he discussion is I think down to Wittgenstein. — Banno
That's close. I don't see how knowing I have a hand could be purely what's going on in the brain; it must, at the least, also involve a hand. — Banno
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