I consider myself to be an eternal being: From the non-presentist viewpoint (the one your title claims to be arguing for), I didn't start to exist, nor will I cease to exist. And yet I have a birthday and count a finite number of seconds from that moment until the moment I make this post.1. What exactly is an eternal being? — Devans99
Yes, but only two of your 'nails' (5 & 6) talk about that, and one of them argues for it, not against it. — noAxioms
Time is real either way — noAxioms
5. Relativity suggests the existence of multiple presents, whereas Presentism demands one present
Suggests, yes, but not asserts. It works either way. This point is actually about presentism. — noAxioms
Umm... No. There is nothing that 'passes' under eternalism. Maybe you should read up on it,Point 6 asserts that time clearly passes. I'd argue this is true for both Presentism and Eternalism: — Devans99
Thus asserts the presentists, and you seem to be one, despite all your 'nails'. I would say that there is no moment that holds a distinction as 'present', and the existence of a present moment is in no way empirically distinct from the lack of it, so not at all clear.There is clearly some distinction between present, past and future, because we can tell the difference.
There is no flavor of eternalism that recognizes a 'now'. The lack of it is the primary premise. There are only temporal relationships between some pairs of events.So the world must be Presentist or it must be a flavour of Eternalism where there is some sort of 'now' cursor(s) that allow us to recognise the present. So either way, time passes. — Devans99
Begging. You're just asserting your conclusion here.2. Has 'now' existed always?
3. No. Implies a start of time. — Devans99
Logical contradiction. For it to be created, it must not have existed at some point, and later it existed. There is no 'and later' if time is not already there. Creation is a temporal verb.4. Implies time was created.
Presentism doesn't assert that the preferred moment was started at some time in the finite past or was always there. It just asserts that it is currently this moment. As I said, you are clearly a presentist arguing against an infinite past, which is a valid position. But you need to find different labels for your views.6. Implies Presentism does not hold
Yes, multiple approaches (I count three), or interpretations of time, but they are no presents, or one present. No view has multiple presents.As I understand special relativity, it is stipulated that simultaneity is dependent on the frame of reference. There appears to be two approaches to this assertion. One is that there are multiple presents, depending on frame of reference, the other that there is no such thing as the present. So I do not see how you can make special relativity consistent with presentism. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no flavor of eternalism that recognizes a 'now' — noAxioms
Logical contradiction. For it to be created, it must not have existed at some point, and later it existed. There is no 'and later' if time is not already there. Creation is a temporal verb. — noAxioms
Yes, multiple approaches (I count three), or interpretations of time, but they are no presents, or one present. No view has multiple presents. — noAxioms
They both work, but the present view demands a preferred foliation (which typically corresponds to an inertial frame only locally) and only one frame, coupled with a current event, defines local events that currently exist. — noAxioms
SR has no concept of 'now at the present'. You can add that to it, but it doesn't presume it, nor does it forbid it. In fact it makes no mention of it. I says that local physics works in all frames of reference, and that a preferred frame (not to be confused with the preferred moment) if it existed, would be locally undetectable.Suppose "now", the present, is the principle which defines what is happening, the events which are occurring, presently. "Simultaneous" implies that numerous events, are occurring at the same time. The different events are necessarily at different places, if they are at the same time. Under the precepts of special relativity, depending on the frame of reference, the events which are occurring simultaneously, now at the present, vary. — Metaphysician Undercover
No. If there is a present, there is probably only one of them, and a frame that does not correspond to it is simply not the preferred frame. Moments that appear simultaneous in the other frames are not really simultaneous.Therefore the interpretation of now varies according to the frame of reference, such that we can have multiple presents.
No, it doesn't exclude a preferred frame. It just says you can't do a local experiment to detect it, if there is one. Physics works in all of them (principle of relativity) and SR just extended that principle to electromagnetism. GR also says the preferred frame is undetectable. There is a unique frame which has the property of local isomorphism, but there is no way to demonstrate that if there is a preferred local inertial frame, it is that frame, especially since the frame is different everywhere.There is no interpretation of special relativity which renders "one present", because it makes no reference to said present because this implies a preferred frame of reference, which is strictly excluded by special relativity.
Sounds to me like you're attempting to disprove the presentism I know you to hold, while I am defending it despite thinking it wrong.Special relativity specifically disallows a preferred frame of reference, that is the fundamental principle of "relativity". So any interpretation of time which uses such a preferred foliation is inconsistent with special relativity..
Einstein did not assert eternalism in his TOR. I know he held that metaphysical view personally, but the theory was about empirical physics, not metaphysics. The theory is about the map, and the metaphyics is about the territory. Einstein stated that a spacetime map corresponds very well to what we observe, but the theory makes no assertions about the correspondence of that map to the metaphysical territory.If both the following hold true:
- Einstein's Relativity is correct
- There is something that distinguishes 'now' from 'past' and 'future'
Then we need a flavour of eternalism that distinguishes 'now'. — Devans99
If you assert a 'now', then you are discarding the eternal view whose sole premise is non-reality of that very thing — noAxioms
It probably does imply it, but does not assert it.I thought that Special Relativity implied Eternalism — Devans99
No, this is blatantly false.Special Relativity asserts the existence of multiple 'nows'
Also false. It has gives no such distinct status to any event. None of them are 'past' or 'future'. Such labels are only potential relations between two arbitrary events. A preferred frame makes that relation objective, not just potential. Presentism on the other hand makes those labels a property of an event, not a relation between two of them.I disagree; Eternalism is primarily about the existence of past and future.
SR has no concept of 'now at the present'. — noAxioms
No. If there is a present, there is probably only one of them, and a frame that does not correspond to it is simply not the preferred frame. Moments that appear simultaneous in the other frames are not really simultaneous. — noAxioms
No, it doesn't exclude a preferred frame. It just says you can't do a local experiment to detect it, if there is one. — noAxioms
Standard interpretation, yes, but not the only one.Right, that's why the standard interpretation is that of eternalism, no "now". — Metaphysician Undercover
I think what you're described here is an inconsistent set of assertions. You describe an assertion of "the present" like there is one of them, and then go on to describe other different presents, which means there is more than one. That is inconsistent, unless I'm interpreting your words wrong.That is incorrect. If you interpret special relativity with the assumption that there is such a thing as "the present", then "the present" is necessarily specific to the frame of reference. This means that there are multiple "presents" according to multiple frames of reference. Furthermore, events which are simultaneous in other frames, are really simultaneous in those frames. To say this, what you say here, that moments which appear to be simultaneous in other frames "are not really simultaneous" is to violate special relativity which stipulates that they really are simultaneous, according to the frame of reference.
It uses the word 'ontological'? That would be news to me. That would indeed be a metaphyscial statement.Again this is the same incorrect assumption. Special relativity, like all relativity theories, dictates that there is no ontologically "correct" frame.
I think what you're described here is an inconsistent set of assertions. You describe an assertion of "the present" like there is one of them, and then go on to describe other different presents, which means there is more than one. That is inconsistent, unless I'm interpreting your words wrong. — noAxioms
For what I said to be incorrect, it would similarly need to be self-inconsistent. — noAxioms
It uses the word 'ontological'? That would be news to me. That would indeed be a metaphyscial statement. — noAxioms
God is actual infinity. Implicit in that is: he is beyond time (he is everything, there is no change) — BaldMenFighting
l believe all Abrahamic faiths see God as eternal — BaldMenFighting
The bible says god is eternal but apparently does not clarify which meaning. — Devans99
If you insist. Seems to put your presentism on shaky ground then, if relativity contradicts it. It requires you to reject it. Seems harsh.No, it is an incorrect interpretation of special relativity. Special relativity cannot be interpreted as allowing for only one present. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, I stand on the eternalism side of that fence, so it would not bother me to see presentism be contradictory like that, but since I cannot think of a single falsification test for it, I suspect your analysis is in error. If they're incompatible, there must be some test that falsifies one or the other.Either you take the standard interpretation that there is no such thing as the present (eternalism), or if you approach with the assumption that there must be such a thing as "the present", then you find a multiplicity of presents.
I think the only way to understand "eternal' in relation to God, is the second way, outside of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
God is said to be immaterial, and therefore outside of time — Metaphysician Undercover
If you insist. Seems to put your presentism on shaky ground then, if relativity contradicts it. It requires you to reject it. Seems harsh. — noAxioms
Well, I stand on the eternalism side of that fence, so it would not bother me to see presentism be contradictory like that, but since I cannot think of a single falsification test for it, I suspect your analysis is in error. — noAxioms
If they're incompatible, there must be some test that falsifies one or the other. — noAxioms
We can make more progress in analysing God if we assume he's constrained by materialistic rules. — Devans99
Agree, but theory of relativity is not an ontological principle. The standard interpretation is, but you can't use its premises in a different interpretation.In general, competing ontological principles are incompatible and there is no easy test to falsify one or the other. — Metaphysician Undercover
Agree, but theory of relativity is not an ontological principle. — noAxioms
As an ontological principle, it demands a preferred frame. Without that, two events cannot be actually simultaneous. TOR does not assert that preferred frame, so it makes no such ontological assertion.One key principle upon which special theory of relativity rests, is the relativity of simultaneity. As I explained above, it is an ontological principle. — Metaphysician Undercover
As an ontological principle, it demands a preferred frame. Without that, two events cannot be actually simultaneous. TOR does not assert that preferred frame, so it makes no such ontological assertion. — noAxioms
Also, while it does describe relative simultaneity, but it doesn't rest on that. It is a conclusion that follows from the constant speed of light measured against any frame. — noAxioms
7. would only follow from 6. if Presentism and Eternalism were the only two possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover
So time is just a false memory. — TWI
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