Regarding the sensuous, I don't believe anything is non-conceptually "there"; primordially or otherwise. As far as I can see it can be 'there' only in that good old empty formal way of the noumenal. — John

Ah, but surely you believe that feeling and sensation are more than the concept we need to speak about them?

You and I apparently see things very differently when it comes to the pursuit of truth. I think it is a deadly serious matter; whereas you seem to understand it only in terms of the self-images of heroism and the mirage of glamour. A kind of celebrity view of the spiritual quest; it seems to me to be. — John

Continuing the above, how could truth be a serious matter if you didn't feel something about truth. We're aren't (only) word computers.
I used to pursue truth with deadly seriousness. But I was hit by The Irony as I pursued the truth about truth. To question the will to the truth --that's the big move for me. Why truth? If we are in the everyday realm of cats on mats, then truth and utility are almost the same. I depend on this physical truth like anyone. I revere it as a fragile animal who doesn't want to get hit by a truck.

But beyond this realm of physical truth, which science seems to get right-enough, we have the realm of the controversial ideas that are usually tied up with ideals. Politicians live here. Philosophers live here. I don't think it's all that wild to read their lives as an indication of their notion of virtue. Don't we tend to want to be virtuous? So all this "hero myth" jazz is just another way to look at how varying images of virtue deeply inform the disagreements that we don't expect science to settle. Are non-empirical claims usefully investigated in terms of their "ethical" kernel? I think there is some fuzzy vision of virtue at the enter of any "vortext." And rhetoric/sophistry works at the level of these images of virtue. A revolution in this image of virtue is going to unsettle the wooden concept system built around it. But I could just be an A-hole of the first water, framing the spiritual quest as "essentially" narcissistic because I got too much breast milk as a first-born son. At this point, I'm in too deep, though. It's comfortable in this prejudice.

I agree, disagreement is good. We'll keep one another dancing.

For me it's the finality of death. As long as our coming-into-being is mysterious (and it really is) it's hard to understand what death is and how truly final it is. I'm sure "I" die at death, for good, but I'm not so sure something deeper doesn't. Not a serious, adult way of looking at things but I think it's thoroughly reasonable.

Ah, but surely you believe that feeling and sensation are more than the concept we need to speak about them? — Hoo

I really shouldn't still be here responding but I'm sucked in!

I do, but I don't think the concepts we need to speak about them are the same as the concepts that constitute them. I mean, in a certain sense they are, but one kind of concept is implicit and the other kind is explicit. The implicit concept is not even necessarily dependent on linguistic capacities; I think animals also have such concepts of things.

Language makes many more things possible, but it also makes things much more ambiguous. :s

I feel you. I told myself I was going to math tonight. Philosophy is my vice, my sin.

On sensation-emotion, it's probably just differing idiosyncratic terminology then. I was thinking of concepts in a very human sense, intelligible unities that fit into a system of relationships. And that a man born blind fails to "know" something "nonconceptual" about the rose. Then there's this:

since feeling is first
who pays any attention
to the syntax of things
will never wholly kiss you;

wholly to be a fool
while Spring is in the world

my blood approves,
and kisses are better fate
than wisdom
lady i swear by all flowers. Don't cry
—the best gesture of my brain is less than
your eyelids' flutter which says

we are for each other: then
laugh, leaning back in my arms
for life's not a paragraph

And death i think is no parenthesis — cummings

And I have to though this one in:

Me up at does

out of the floor
quietly Stare

a poisoned mouse

still who alive

is asking What
have i done that

You wouldn’t have — cummings

Nice! The second poem made me shiver as I saw the little mousie's eyes, and my blood run cold.

That poem is deep. That little mouse is something like the truth of us, we who evolved from the nocturnal thieves of reptile eggs (or that's something I picked up long ago.) We're always warm. We don't need the sun to move. But we are hungrier than reptiles!

I wish I was a nocturnal thief of reptile eggs; it sounds exciting! I should have said (to make the meaning clearer) "and my blood ran cold with recognition", not to mention compassion, but I think you got it anyway.

I would say, unbridgeable gaps or things that don't meet – privacy, idiosyncrasy, lack of commonality, solipsism, loneliness, worldlessness, that sort of thing.

When making every-day decisions in life, I see myself as a strict rationalist. But I sometimes have a crisis of faith where I wonder if my reasoning is just an excuse I use to justify to myself something that my nature or emotion has, without my knowing, already decided it wants to do, like a confabulation after the fact.

For me that's where philosophy gets exciting. Reason finally looks into itself. Demystification takes a long, hard look in the bathroom mirror.

The idea of instrumentality- the absurd feeling that can be experienced from apprehension of the constant need to put forth energy to pursue goals and actions in waking life. This feeling can make us question the whole human enterprise itself of maintaining mundane repetitive upkeep, maintaining institutions, and pursuing any action that eats up free time simply for the sake of being alive and having no other choice. There is also a feeling of futility as, the linguistic- general processor brain cannot get out of its own circular loop of awareness of this.

The hard problem of consciousness- how it is that experience can come out of non-experience.

It would be helpful if everyone listed their obsessions in their profile. That way one could more efficiently dismiss posters whose obsessions are not a good match with one's own obsessions.

Why don't you start then? :D

Good, you're not a nominalist, phew. — darthbarracuda

Hey now.

Hey now. — Terrapin Station

I mean, you aren't really a nominalist, are you? ;)

I and I are, yes. (Which doesn't mean I'm Jamaican. Rather I at T1 and I and T2.)

I think that the transcendent has its basis in the experience of the transcendent, which isn't altogether uncommon. A beautiful piece of art, falling and being in love, prayer/meditation, values, meaning, etc. - there's lots of possibilities out there for encountering the transcendent. As for why we are attracted to the transcendent - I think Plato was right, and we are a sort of a metaxy - an in-between the world and the transcendent - we have one foot in this world, and another in the world of spirit. So you are right - we can never know the transcendent. But we are still attracted to it, we want to experience it, and be around it. It's part of our nature. Hence we desire to know it, even though we can't ever know it - we are always attached to the Earth. "Significance" that you are talking about, that is merely a feeling, I don't think it's such a thing as a fact. So I'm not sure about the quest for profound significance underlying an intellectual movement - maybe it is the opposite in fact - in front of the transcendent, man is indeed like nothing. — Agustino

The examples you use all describe what takes place in the world (the universe) so I'm not sure we're using "transcendent" in the same way. There's no reason to believe that such experiences suggest or establish the existence of something outside the universe. They may enable us to transcend ourselves or indicate we can do so, but no more.

I don't doubt the existence of such experiences, and think, personally, that there's much about the universe we don't know and that such experiences may be a way to learn more about it and ourselves. But I don't think such experiences can be described by words, though they may be evoked by them. That's done well by certain artists and their works, but not by philosophers or their work, or so I think. Philosophers aren't good artists as a rule. I wonder if this accounts for Plato's dislike of artists.

Unfortunately, it seems the belief in a transcendent God is often associated with the belief we humans are his favored creatures and particular concern, so it isn't clear to me that it's been productive of a feeling of insignificance.

The examples you use all describe what takes place in the world (the universe) so I'm not sure we're using "transcendent" in the same way. — Ciceronianus the White

The experience doesn't seem to be situated in the physical world as I understand it. Some things in the physical world do give rise to, or lead to the experience, that is true, but the experience isn't of something situated anywhere in the world. I look at a beautiful painting, and behold, for a moment I am transfigured, experience the slowing down of time, the forgetfulness of a strong sense of self and the nearby world - and instead I become focused not on the painting itself, but on that which the painting expresses. You can search for the source of that experience anywhere you want in the atomic configuration of the painting and you will not find it.

I wonder if this accounts for Plato's dislike of artists. — Ciceronianus the White

I think Plato himself though was quite an artist - I find his dialogues sublime. Plato disliked artists because he understood how art can be misused to encourage base desires, instead of pursuit of the good. And there were some philosophers who found art to be very significant - such as Schopenhauer.

I'm one of those who think we're in the world along with everything else. So, I think all we do, think, experience, etc. is in the world with us, not somewhere else. What we feel on experiencing a great work of art isn't in the work of art, of course, but is our interaction with the work of art, which also takes place in the world.

I'm afraid I don't find Plato's works as enchanting as it seems you do. But I don't like dialogues in general, though it seems the ancients were fond of them. Plato's dialogues are kind of a lawyer's dream--this lawyer's dream, anyway. Your witness says exactly what you want and expect them to say. Ah, that would indeed be sublime.

Very well - I fail to see how this can account for the vast variety of content of the world, which escapes the physical. For me, the transcendent is clearly part of our experience. We experience the transcendent. Meaning is transcendent for example - nowhere in the purely physical will you find any meaning.

Very well - I fail to see how this can account for the vast variety of content of the world, which escapes the physical. For me, the transcendent is clearly part of our experience. We experience the transcendent. Meaning is transcendent for example - nowhere in the purely physical will you find any meaning. — Agustino

Perhaps we mean different things by "transcendent." For me, what is in and takes place in the universe is not transcendent. That would necessarily include meaning, as meaning like thinking is something we do (find, assign), right here and now as a result of being living organisms of the human kind existing as part of the universe. We can have no idea of the truly transcendent because we can have no idea which doesn't arise from living in the world, as part of the world.

For this reason, I find the idea of an immanent God (like that of the Stoics) more appealing than a transcendent God. I don't think the experiences you refer to are transcendent because if we weren't alive and part of the world we couldn't have them. This view doesn't mean that there's no such thing as that which has been called mystical or spiritual experience, it means rather that they are a part of our life in the world.

Perhaps we mean different things by "transcendent." — Ciceronianus the White

Probably.

For me, what is in and takes place in the universe is not transcendent. — Ciceronianus the White

My only problem with that is that the Universe generally has the connotation of being the sum of everything that physics can account for - and I don't think this includes the whole of existence.

We can have no idea of the truly transcendent because we can have no idea which doesn't arise from living in the world, as part of the world. — Ciceronianus the White

If you define "world" as the whole of existence sure.

I and I are, yes. (Which doesn't mean I'm Jamaican. Rather I at T1 and I and T2.) — Terrapin Station

How do you account for similarity and difference if not by universals. i.e. what if your flavor of nominalism?

I'll skip the usual anti-natalist/efilist schtick and go with a slightly more fundamental problem: to what degree should predictions about actions of other moral agents affect one's ethical decisions?

Examples:

***

• Let's say you're a prisoner of some particularly unsavoury group. Due to this or that, you're ordered to execute another prisoner (maybe they tried to escape, or whatever) to set an example. Your captors proclaim that should you refuse, they'll simply do it themselves but also kill a random third prisoner. You can't know whether they'll follow through with their threat or not, but if they do, it's their choice and fault, not yours.
  
• Let's say you give to a charity delivering aid to civilians of a conflict zone which is prone to having its deliveries stolen by militants. You can't know whether that will happen to whichever truck happens to be carrying the supplies bought with your donation, but if it does, it's the militants' choice and fault, not yours.
  
• Let's say you end up in one of those hypothetical situations where the right thing to do involves a serious crime. If you do the right thing, the legal process can be expected to take you to prison. Yet, the legal process is comprised of moral agents, not robots. Is it your choice if you end up in prison, or is it the collective choice of the people who detain, transport, guard and sentence you?
  
• Let's say you meet someone who has a most peculiar mental disorder which makes them punch themselves in the face if they hear the word "zygheqt", and only through the most intense concentration can they prevent it from happening. If you say the word, is it your choice and fault when they receive a punch in the face if their concentration fails?
  
• Let's say that as part of your job, you have to do something that you feel is slightly wrong. Should you resign, your employer is likely to succeed in simply finding someone else to do it. If you stay because of that, is it your fault and choice that the slightly wrong thing keeps happening?

***

Should I make my choices only aiming to do "my part", and ignore even predictable choices of other moral agents? Or should I forego the idea of treating others as moral agents altogether and aim for what I predict would likely result in the best outcome regardless of whether I'd have to take some blame myself? Both approaches seem to have their own problems, which I don't feel necessary to go into right here and now.

So, that's one of my few philosophical obsessions.

How do you account for similarity and difference if not by universals. — darthbarracuda

That issue has always struck me as one of those "invent-a-problems."

Similarity simply obtains by something being "closer to" x than y in at least some respects, from a particular reference point.

For example, say we're dealing with a universe of "@s"

Well

@@

is more similar to/is closer to

@ @

than it is to

@ @

in terms of the extensional relations between the @s.

That's all that similarity is. There's no need to posit universals for that. We're not saying that any two numerically distinct things,including the "closer to" or "similar" relation, including the extensional relation, etc. are identical in what we said above.

But what makes it the case that they are similar, other than the possession of identical properties? Is it just a brute fact? Why is @@ similar to @ @ but different to %%? How do you account for identity, if not by recognizing the attributes of things?

Just from wikipedia: "In logic, extensionality, or extensional equality, refers to principles that judge objects to be equal if they have the same external properties."

Are these properties not universals? How else should be interpret this as?

If it's a brute fact that things are similar in certain ways, then fine. But I think universals provide a much more useful and appealing theory, especially when it comes to causation.

But what makes it the case that they are similar, — darthbarracuda

In the example you give, for example, % one has a circle to the left of a slanted line as does %, while that's not the case for @ and @. They're not numerically identical circles--obviously, which makes them not identical. It's simply (degree of) resemblance.

Why would you think that o and o are circles by instantiating a numerically identical property of circularity that exists who knows where and that obtains in those circles by who knows what means so that it's just ONE circularity property even though we're talking about two different things? That's just incoherent. It's reifying the fact that we make mental type abstractions.

Re "how do you account for identity," I'm not sure what you're asking. If you're asking about "identity" in the "essence" sense, essences are what someone requires to name some unique existent an F, a type term. I'm guessing that's what you're asking. Otherwise you'd be asking how does one account for the fact that something is itself, in which case it's simply a matter of coherence. It's incoherent to say that something is not itself.

Just from wikipedia: "In logic, extensionality, or extensional equality, refers to principles that judge objects to be equal if they have the same external properties."

That would simply be a matter of whether someone is applying the same type categorization to the items in question.

But I think universals provide a much more useful and appealing theory, especially when it comes to causation.

I don't think that positing real abstracts is useful. It seems rather incoherent to me. The mere idea of nonphysical existents seems incoherent to me.

In the example you give, for example, % one has a circle to the left of a slanted line as does %, while that's not the case for and @. They're not numerically identical circles--obviously, which makes them not identical. It's simply (degree of) resemblance.

Why would you think that o and o are circles by instantiating a numerically identical property of circularity that exists who knows where and that obtains in those circles by who knows what means so that it's just ONE circularity property even though we're talking about two different things? That's just incoherent. It's reifying the fact that we make mental type abstractions. — Terrapin Station

Because without universals similarity or resemblance becomes arbitrary. There is no reason for the way things are - they just are. Brute fact. Language does not constrain reality, reality constrains our language.

There are indeed multiple different things - they are numerically different but not qualitatively different. When you say something is round, why is it round? Why is it a certain way? Without universals, there cannot be any explanation as to why two properties happen to be identical in nature. Two things are round - without universals there doesn't seem to be any way to explain why these two things are both identified as being round. There's no explanation as to why the one round trope is identical to another round trope. What makes them round tropes and not something else?

Without universals, the world becomes totally disorganized and messy. There's no structure to it all, no reason why anything can be reliably predicted or predicated on.

Because without universals similarity or resemblance becomes arbitrary. — darthbarracuda

That's complete nonsense. The idea that either there's some abstractly existing, numerically identical property that's somehow instantiated in multiple things, or resemblance is "random" simply makes zero sense.

Re there being a "reason for the ways things are," that's the case with universals, too. No matter how many reasons you give behind something, no matter what it is, you get to a point where "it's just the way things are." You can't keep giving an infinity of reasons one step back and then another step back and then another step back, etc., right?

There are indeed multiple different things - they are numerically different but not qualitatively different.

What's incoherent is saying that they're not numerically different in terms of the quality or properties. And you have to be saying that the properties in question are numerically identical or you're not talking about universals. You'd be a nominalist then instead.

When you say something is round, why is it round?

Because that's a property that existents can exhibit. They're not somehow "participating" in one thing that exists who-knows-where. The roundness is a property of that unique existent.

Without universals, there cannot be any explanation as to why two properties happen to be identical in nature. — darthbarracuda

You don't need an explanation for that because no two properties are literally identical. Again, you'd simply be reifying type abstractions that we make. Reifying conceptual categories we create as individuals in our minds.

Two things are round - without universals there doesn't seem to be any way to explain why these two things are both identified as being round.

It couldn't be more simple. They both meet your criteria, you mental, conceptual abstraction, for calling them "round" things.

Without universals, the world becomes totally disorganized and messy. — darthbarracuda

No it isn't. Again, "either there are universals or everything is random" is a false dichotomy.

That's complete nonsense. The idea that either there's some abstractly existing, numerically identical property that's somehow instantiated in multiple things, or resemblance is "random" simply makes zero sense. — Terrapin Station

Re there being a "reason for the ways things are," that's the case with universals, too. No matter how many reasons you give behind something, no matter what it is, you get to a point where "it's just the way things are." You can't keep giving an infinity of reasons one step back and then another step back and then another step back, etc., right? — Terrapin Station

Right. The primitives do the work. But in this case you lack sufficient primitives. Relations are ad hoc, brute facts without any real reason. Whereas a unitary, single thing, a universal, explains this far better without being so ad hoc, since it's grounded in one single thing instead of trying to ground it in multiple totally different, yet somehow the same, tropes or classes or something.

What's incoherent is saying that they're not numerically different in terms of the quality or properties. And you have to be saying that the properties in questino are numerically identical or you're not talking about universals. You'd be a nominalist then instead. — Terrapin Station

No, properties are numerically identical because they're universals, transcendental or immanent, take your pick.

Objects are numerically different but qualitatively similar/different in virtue of the numerically-identical universals they share.

You don't need an explanation for that because no two properties are literally identical. Again, you'd simply be reifying type abstractions that we make. Reifying conceptual categories we create as individuals in our minds. — Terrapin Station

Well of course we don't have to say that every book instantiates the universal "book". But they are sufficiently similar to each other as to warrant us to call them books, i.e. their constitution is similar enough, i.e. their basic properties. There's scarce and abundant properties.

It couldn't be more simple. They both meet your criteria, you mental, conceptual abstraction, for calling them "round" things. — Terrapin Station

Are our own mental abstractions universals across humanity? Are we not all utilizing similar abstraction constructs? Are our mental ideas not in some sense universal, allowing language to flourish?

You've removed universals from the world, but only have relocated them in the mind as conceptual constructs.