This mode of discussion, smacks of the new religion of the materialist. One feels as though one is at an inquisition of sorts, questioning the almighty God of modern materialism. The 'which future' rejoinder leads one to a reductio absurdum and cannot be escaped, just as the almightly absurdity of God was medieval ne plus ultra of the dark ages. — Marcus de Brun
Please expand upon what you mean by 'The stationary space-time block' — Marcus de Brun
One does not need QM to prove the absence of free will. Special relatively already achieves this without equivocation. Temporal shifts at high velocity travel have proven special relatively correct. The future already exists and as such free will is precluded. — Marcus de Brun
This is your phrase (not mine), and you have suggested I am happy with it? — Marcus de Brun
Please allow me the courtesy of a definition, prior to the assumption of my contentment with it's philosophical content. — Marcus de Brun
Tom
You have declined to define what you mean by "The stationary space-time block" and yet you are telling me that I am referencing this idea when I write.
"One does not need QM to prove the absence of free will. Special relatively already achieves this without equivocation. Temporal shifts at high velocity travel have proven special relatively correct. The future already exists and as such free will is precluded."
— Marcus de Brun
In this quote I make no reference to this "stationary space time block" of yours. Special relativity is concerned with a relative fluidity of space-time as consequenced by relative motion between observers?
You further state
"It's standard nomenclature for what special relativity (your choice) and its generalization to include gravity, mandates. I take no credit for it."
Special relativity mandates relative temporal dilation or contraction this appears to be the inverse of what you are suggesting.
You call it standard nomenclature and yet I don't find the phrase anywhere in respect of Special Relativity, which in essence would be very unlikely to have a place for stationary time blocks in the context of temporal dilation and contraction relative to motion.
Why the reluctance to define 'your' terms? It certainly does not appear as standard nomenclature, and comes up a blank when put to the brutality of a google search.
Perhaps you are busy? Please define what you mean, rather than conceal it behind this convenient notion of "standard nomenclature"?
M — tom
"[One must] reject the common sop that somehow the indeterminism of quantum physics helps us out here. First, there is no evidence that the neurons of the brain are subject to indeterminancy in the way, say, firing of elections is (and in fact there is much evidence against it); even if that were the case, however ... the indeterminancy of some outcomes in the brain would not help with establishing personal causal origination of actions. For randomness in fact would make us more rather than less subject to unexpected turns of fact. ... — StreetlightX
I suspect you are thinking of physicsforums. Topic like this are shut down there as soon as they come up because it is speculation, not physics.I would post this elsewhere where talk about physics is mentioned; but, other forums aren't as philosophical as this one or allow talk about philosophy. — Posty McPostface
So, to save the PSR all we need to do is say that the agent is the sufficient cause of his or her choice. One can deny this, but not on the ground of the PSR. One simply has to decide if agents can determine their own choices or not. If they can, they are sufficient to the task of making the choice. If they cannot, there is no free will. Either way, the PSR is unviolated. — Dfpolis
Does QM, definitively affirm the concept of a 'free will'?
Too bad they haven't studied philosophy or the would know that the problem was laid to rest by Aristotle in Metaphysics Delta.But university PhD physicist specialists in QM have said that QM lays to rest the notion of an objectively-existent physical world. — Michael Ossipoff
So, to save the PSR all we need to do is say that the agent is the sufficient cause of his or her choice. One can deny this, but not on the ground of the PSR. One simply has to decide if agents can determine their own choices or not. If they can, they are sufficient to the task of making the choice. If they cannot, there is no free will. Either way, the PSR is unviolated. — Dfpolis
As I see no reason to give Kim his principle of causal closure, and many reasons to reject it, I am not bothered by the paradoxes that trouble physicalists. — Dfpolis
I think the issue here is the determination by reason of a causal event. In another topic, I talked about whether QM affirms or denies the concept of causality. — Posty McPostface
If nature cannot be comprehended or even more logically, simulated in a complex enough computer, then it must be the case that the PoSR has failed us somewhere. — Posty McPostface
Hence, if we talk about people having a free will, then it's fruitless to assert the PoSR due to the fact that some mental activity could not be determined. — Posty McPostface
It is fine not to be bothered by problems that exercise proponents of dubious -isms (such as physicalism). I am not overly bothered by them either. But it's even better to provide a rationale as to why one is entitled not to be bothered by their specific objections to our non-physicalist views. — Pierre-Normand
The faulty premise in Kim's argument, on my view, rather is the principle of the nomological character of causation (also famously endorsed by Donald Davidson). — Pierre-Normand
Thus, the objective side of quantitative physical observations lies not in an actual number to be discovered but in the determinate measurability of the natural world. — Dfpolis
As I said, I have many reasons to reject Jaegwon Kim's Principle of Causal Closure, which states that "all physical states have pure physical causes." Kim argues that "If you pick any physical event and trace out its causal ancestry or posterity, that will never take you outside the physical domain. That is, no causal chain will ever cross the boundary between the physical and the nonphysical." (Mind in a Physical World, p. 40) — Dfpolis
The first and simplest reason is that we are able to discuss our intentional acts. If these acts were not involved in a causal chain leading to physical acts of speech and writing, we would be unable to discuss them. One could claim that intentional acts are physical, but doing so not only begs the question, it equivocates on the meaning of "physical" which refers to what is objective, rather than what is subjective. — Dfpolis
The physical world is more "natural" than...what? Human-constructed architecture and pavement? — Michael Ossipoff
You mentioned the objective side, but it's there only by inference from our subjective experience. — Michael Ossipoff
there are physicists who are taking physicalism down by saying that the notion of an objective physical world has gone the way of phlogiston. — Michael Ossipoff
Of course that statement quoted from Kim is true. It's true, and it doesn't contradict Subjective Idealism or Theism. — Michael Ossipoff
In fact, I take it a bit farther, and point say it about metaphysics as well as physical events and causes. Substiture "describable metaphysics" for "physical states", "physical events" and "physical causes". — Michael Ossipoff
We're physical. We're physical animals in a physical world. In other words, our hypothetical life-experience-story is the story of the experience of a physical animal in a physical world. — Michael Ossipoff
The first and simplest reason is that we are able to discuss our intentional acts. If these acts were not involved in a causal chain leading to physical acts of speech and writing, we would be unable to discuss them. One could claim that intentional acts are physical, but doing so not only begs the question, it equivocates on the meaning of "physical" which refers to what is objective, rather than what is subjective. (See my several discussions of the Fundamental Abstraction on this forum, including the precis in my last post in this thread.) Further, if the causes within Kim's enclosure include any being we can discuss, the principle makes no meaningful claim, for it excludes nothing. — Dfpolis
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