You weren't leaving aside the question of whether or not experiences are meaningful when you first asked me what was being interpreted if not for those experiences. — creativesoul

Really? Then quote where I said that experiences are meaningful. And of course, in your usual evasive mode you have failed to answer the question as to what sensation is if it is something other than the kinds of sensory experiences I enumerated, and you have also failed to answer the question as to what gets interpreted if not those kinds of sensory experiences (which is really the same question in a different guise).

Now I am not saying that experiences or sensations are not meaningful; I am merely leaving the question aside while waiting for you to man up and answer the questions posed to you rather than continuing to evade them.

Sensation...

Is it existentially dependent upon language?

I would argue in the negative. — creativesoul

So, are you implying that if having sensation is not dependent on linguistic capability it therefore cannot be meaningful? Or...?

You weren't leaving aside the question of whether or not experiences are meaningful when you first asked me what was being interpreted if not for those experiences.

Sensation...

Is it existentially dependent upon language?

I would argue in the negative. — creativesoul

This bears repeating...

And of course... ...you have failed to answer the question as to what sensation is... — Janus

That's still false.

All meaning requires a plurality of things and a creature capable of making connections between them. So, it is clear that existence precedes meaning, unless one posits some supernatural creator of the first things. I do not.

All interpretation is of something already meaningful. The meaning is precisely what is being interpreted. Sensations aren't meaningful in and of themselves. They are necessary but insufficient for the attribution of meaning.

Sensation is but one part of meaningful experience. It is not equivalent to.

Venus Flytrap.

What is a sensation if not a sensory experience? I see. I hear, I taste, I smell, I feel; those are sensations, experiences. What is interpreted if not those experiences? — Janus

All experience, on my view, must be meaningful to the creature. I do not conflate sensation with experience. Rather, the latter consists, in part at least, of the former, but not the other way around. Physiological sensory perception alone is inadequate/insufficient for meaningful experience as a result of it's being inadequate/insufficient for the attribution of meaning by the creature.

Venus Flytrap.

Do you draw this distinction between sensation and experience?

Sensation...

Is it existentially dependent upon language?

I would argue in the negative.
— creativesoul

So, are you implying that if having sensation is not dependent on linguistic capability it therefore cannot be meaningful? — Janus

No. Meaning is not existentially dependent upon language. Nor is sensation. Sensation is a necessary elemental constituent of both meaning and language.

I'm saying that sensation is not existentially dependent upon language. There are everyday examples of creatures replete with physiological sensory perception that are otherwise incapable of drawing correlations between different things. Where that capability is absent there can be no meaningful attribution.

So you don't believe that an atom of carbon had 6 electrons before someone counted them? That would be pretty outlandish. Those 6 electrons determine carbon's chemical properties without which no humans would come into existence. — litewave

As I said, the example is irrelevant because a set is artificial and an atom is not.

The circle consisted of 360 wedges even before someone called them degrees. — litewave

The point is that those wedges were created, and counted in the act of creating them. The question would be whether the circle had 360 wedges without having been counted as 360. Since there was a reason why the circle was given 360 wedges, rather than some other number of wedges, they were obviously counted prior to assigning 360 to the circle. That's the thing with artificial things, they are created by intentional design, so the count is prior to the existence of the artificial thing.

A set is just a collection of objects. Its existence doesn't depend on whether some human names it or counts the objects. — litewave

Don't be ridiculous.

So sensation is part of experience? You apparently agree with me that it is, so is sensory experience (the sensation part of experience) not, just as with the rest of experience, interpreted?

So sensation is part of experience? You apparently agree with me, so is sensory experience (the sensation part of experience) not, just as with the rest of experience, interpreted? — Janus

Yes, sensation is part of meaningful experience.

No. In and of itself, sensation is utterly meaningless. Venus Flytrap.

A set is just a collection of objects. Its existence doesn't depend on whether some human names it or counts the objects. — litewave

I can see a sense in which we can say that objects are dependent on human perception and understanding, and a sense in which we can say that they are not. I cannot see any sense in which we can say that a collection of objects is not dependent on human perception and understanding.

So what is "sensation in and of itself" apart from sensory experiences?

All meaning is attributed. All attribution of meaning requires a plurality of things and a creature capable of drawing a correlation, connection, and/or association between them. In order draw a correlation between different things, those things must first be perceptible. Physiological sensory perception facilitates this capability to detect the perceptible.

Sensations are detection based The sensation becomes meaningful when the perceiving creature draws a correlation between it and something other than it.

I don't see any reason to believe that "all meaning is attributed". Do you have an argument to support that contention?

I also don't see any need to, or advantage in, employing the kind of anthropomorphic language exemplified in phrases like "drawing a correlation, connection, and/or association between them".

As I see it you commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, by attributing the kinds of conceptualizations to animals (and not just the 'higher" animals either!) that humans are capable of due to their linguistic abilities.

Your view is thus a tissue of confusions, and therefore not helpful in any way.

All meaning is attributed. All attribution of meaning requires a plurality of things and a creature capable of drawing a correlation, connection, and/or association between them. In order draw a correlation between different things, those things must first be perceptible. Physiological sensory perception facilitates this capability to detect the perceptible.

Sensations are detection based The sensation becomes meaningful when the perceiving creature draws a correlation between it and something other than it. — creativesoul

As I indicated way back when this particular topic arose, there are correlations, connections, and associations which are drawn by the living being, at the subconscious level, which are prior to, and necessary for the occurrence of sense perception. So sensation is inherently meaningful.

I don't see any reason to believe that "all meaning is attributed". Do you have an argument to support that? — Janus

Sure. Glad you asked.

Do you have an example of meaning that does not consist of a plurality of different things and a creature capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between them? All meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become significant/symbolized and a creature capable of connecting the two.

That's a strong claim. All it takes is one example to the contrary. It agrees with current convention in terms of theories of meaning, and there are no examples to the contrary. That's more than adequate reason to warrant belief that those statements are true.

I also don't see any need to, or sense in, employing the kind of anthropomorphic language exemplified in phrases like "drawing a correlation, connection, and/or association between them".

As I see it you commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, by attributing the kinds of conceptualizations to animals (and not just the 'higher" animals either!) that humans are capable of due to their linguistic abilities.

You've misunderstood.

A quick perusal of the thread will clearly show the astute reader that I draw and maintain the distinction between that which is existentially dependent upon language and that which is not. Animals without language cannot have the same complexity of thought and belief(conceptualizations) that linguistic animals such as ourselves can have... nor do they need to.

To accuse me of anthropomorphism is to neglect all sorts of things I've been arguing, which amounts to an invalid objection.

Your view is thus a tissue of confusion, and therefore not helpful in any way.

A prima facie example of a conclusion that is false as a result of it's having been based upon false premisses borne of misunderstanding(assuming sincerity in speech).

For what its worth - and I know this isn't quite relevant to the type of cause and effect this thread is about - but cause and effect does kind of work like this, when it comes to people and art. You can't always make sense of a work of art (esp music) or the way you're acting in relation to another person, until a moment later on. Then you see how everything that was happening makes sense in light of a later moment. That's a cool moment. You understand how all these past moments were directed toward enriching the present one, but you couldn't have known at the time.

In terms of QM tho. I mean - I don't know. I'm quite sure that, at most, 2 of us here are qualified to talk about this stuff w/r/t to metaphysical implications, and those 2 are liars.

As I indicated way back when this particular topic arose, there are correlations, connections, and associations which are drawn by the living being, at the subconscious level, which are prior to, and necessary for the occurrence of sense perception. So sensation is inherently meaningful. — Metaphysician Undercover

This presupposes that a creature can draw correlations, connections, and/or associations between things that have yet to have been perceived, sensed, and/or detected.

Impossible.

I can see the conversation getting too loose...

Before long we will need to draw and maintain the distinction between some and all...

How do we know that anything means anything to an animal? We know only because we can observe that they respond to things in appropriate ways. We have no evidence that they "draw correlations, connections, and/or associations between things". Unless you can explain how you know they do that, I will remain convinced that you are indulging in anthropomorphic thinking.

How do we know that anything means anything to an animal? — Janus

By knowing what all examples of meaning are existentially dependent upon(what they all consist of) and the subsequent judicious application of that knowledge as a measuring device to determine whether or not animals are capable of drawing correlations, connections, and/or associations between different things.

This is falsifiable/verifiable. Pavlov's dog, the sound of the bell(the sensation), the drive to eat, and getting fed after hearing the bell.

We know only because we can observe that they respond to things in appropriate ways. We have no evidence that they "draw correlations, connections, and/or associations between things". Unless you can explain how you know they do that, I will remain convinced that you are indulging in anthropomorphic thinking. — Janus

When a specific sound is made just prior to feeding, and it is only made just prior to feeding, then the capable creature will make a connection between the sound and what happens afterwards, assuming enough repetition. We can know that that connection has been made by virtue of careful study. The differences in behaviour prior to and after the connection has been made are undeniable. Involuntary salivation. Going to the food bowl. Etc.

I'm wondering...

Do you have the same skepticism about knowing another human's thought/belief?

We can know that that connection has been made by virtue of careful study — creativesoul

All we know is that the animal has come to habitually respond to the sound. Talk of "connections, "correlations' and "associations" is superfluous and anthropocentric.

You actually haven't added or explained anything, you've just repeated the same old tired refrain.

All we know is that the animal has come to habitually respond to the sound. Talk of "connections, "correlations' and "associations" is superfluous and anthropocentric. — Janus

Your rhetoric is boring.

What counts as "superfluous and anthropocentric"?

You actually haven't... explained anything... — Janus

Pots and kettles...

...you've just repeated the same old tired refrain. — Janus

This coming from someone who has yet to have offered a valid refutation to the argument on any level.

All we know is that the animal has come to habitually respond to the sound... — Janus

Are you actually denying that the sound of the bell is meaningful/significant to Pavlov's dog?

We know only because we can observe that they respond to things in appropriate ways. We have no evidence that they "draw correlations, connections, and/or associations between things". — Janus

Involuntary salivation and heading towards the food bowl is more than adequate evidence that the bell is meaningful/significant to the dog.

What's the word "appropriate" doing here? Being appropriate requires following some pre-existing standard for acceptable behaviour.

This coming from someone who has yet to have offered a valid refutation to the argument on any level. — creativesoul

There is yet to appear any argument from you to refute.

Are you actually denying that the sound of the bell is meaningful/significant to Pavlov's dog? — creativesoul

Where have I denied that?

What's the word "appropriate" doing here? — creativesoul

"Appropriate behavior" here indicates that it is the predicted behavior.

Are you actually denying that the sound of the bell is meaningful/significant to Pavlov's dog?
— creativesoul

Where have I denied that? — Janus

Oh good!

We agree then? The sound of the bell is meaningful/significant to the dog?