3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. 

The written signs 'stand in' for the items in the picture of the world. Hence:

3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’ we ought to put, ‘That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’ 

What is happening is that the picture is presented as signs, using symbols:

3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses. 

What I find difficult here is that the picture theory continued into PI, yet I would have it replaced by use. I wonder what @Sam26 has to say about this.

What I find difficult here is that the picture theory continued into PI, yet I would have it replaced by use. I wonder what Sam26 has to say about this. — Banno

Where do you see that Wittgenstein continued with the picture theory in the PI? If anything he rejects it, although when considering use, and the multiplicity of uses, some statements are pictures in a manner of speaking. It's just that the picture theory doesn't explain all statements. Just as some definitions of the word game don't explain all uses of the word game. Use is primary in the PI, but even use has it's limits.

Where do you see that Wittgenstein continued with the picture theory in the PI? — Sam26

Not just I, but Anthony Kenny, too. In PI Wittgenstein shows how an incorrect picture of the world can be foisted on the unwary philosopher by a twist of grammar. What has carried through is that the picture can be wrong.

The picture, if it is a fact, depicts the form of the world; but it cannot depict this form, it can only display it (2.172 and hereabouts).

The proposition, as it where, depicts (or brings forth?) this logical form.

So we have a picture of the world, and with this at hand we interpret our signs, rendering them as symbols, and setting forth the logical form of the world in propositions...

Yet when I re-read that, I find it unsettling.

You quoted the Tractatus. Where does the PI put forth that view?

In PI Wittgenstein shows how an incorrect picture of the world can be foisted on the unwary philosopher by a twist of grammar. — Banno

⎰520; but there are numerous examples. The picture theory is not absent from PI.

Sorry, but I don't see Wittgenstein putting forth a picture theory in the PI. That said, of course there are places where he talks about how statements put forth a picture, but that's a far cry from saying that Wittgenstein has continued the picture theory in the PI. If anything he criticizes it.

Do his criticisms amount to rejection? I'm not sure they do.

But we ought take care as to what we think the picture theory is. The elements of the picture correspond to the elements in the world; and the structure of the picture is shared with the world. One way of thinking of this is that the picture is a model of the world; that seems to be the way Witti thought of pictures in the Tractatus. I suspect this view is what is rejected in PI, where a picture is more just one way of seeing how things are amongst many other pictures, the choice depending on what one wishes to do. The picture does not model how things are so much as set out what we can do.

I agree he rejected the picture theory as presented in the Tractatus. However, as I've mentioned, that doesn't mean that propositions can't or don't represent a kind of picture in some uses. A statement can be used as a picture, that's one of the uses of statements. There are an array of uses, of which picturing is only one among many uses. Whereas in the Tractatus Wittgenstein was more dogmatic about how statements pictured things in the world.

Yes, picturing is something we do with statements. So I agree with your point. I'm not sure where you think Wittgenstein went wrong in the PI. Picturing is clearly a use in the PI.

I'm not sure where you think Wittgenstein went wrong in the PI. — Sam26

It's just that I would go further that I think he does, and reject the notion of a picture as a model that is distinct from reality. Doing so might lead away from thinking of language games as incommensurate with each other.

But this is all beyond the exegesis of this thread; let it rest.

It's just that I would go further that I think he does, and reject the notion of a picture as a model that is distinct from reality. — Banno

A picture is a fact, and thus part of reality, part of the world.

Sorry guys, I've been pretty apathetic recently, and hope I can come around to this thread again fairly shortly.

That's all on my part. Anyone interested in assuming command of this thread is always welcome too.

Post something when you feel like it. I'll keep the thread bookmarked.

Post something when you feel like it. I'll keep the thread bookmarked. — Srap Tasmaner

Will do. I found this book in my local CC library. It's pretty awesome; but, I've been brain farting too much to entertain it. I'll probably buy it this coming month and use it as a side companion.

Does anyone want to go over the Paris courtroom model to elucidate where Wittgenstein derived his conception of the picture theory?

Anyone still interested in this reading group?

I can cover what has already been covered in some small snippets if necessary.

Edit: I'm thinking about skipping the entire picture theory part, due to its obscure content. Any ideas if this is a good idea?

So, I want to talk about solipsism in the Tractatus, just to spur interest given that a casual chain of progressing from proposition 1 through 7 would require something superhuman or magical to accomplish. So, we will resort to talking about the Tractatus.

Wittgenstein says the following proposition 5.62. Which states:

Thus, we can infer that:

Then, the introductory grand statement will become clearer:

So, what are we to do now? Resort to quietism? That seems like the only logical conclusion from a Tractarian solipsist...
Without going too deep, as to from which philosopher (most notably Kant, and Schopenhauer) was Wittgenstein dialectically opposing or affirming, we can just take what Wittgenstein says on face value. So, the issue becomes about whether Wittgenstein is professing realism or idealism. The clue as to what Wittgenstein chooses is revealing here:

Thus, we are constrained to talk about the limit of thinking and thought. To put this another way, we are all solipsists unaware of our limits. Those who understand their limits with respect to the world as opposed to the perceptual or phenomenological perception of reality will understand the point made by Wittgenstein in talking about leading the fly out of the bottle.

I'll stop here for a moment and post after this later.

Thoughts? I would prefer a dialogue with interested parties.

Thoughts? — Posty McPostface

Philosophy, like mathematics begins with a command. "Think about it like this: ..." "Let x be ..."

"Picture language as a picture of the world."
"picture language as picturing the world"

Perhaps this is the change from TLP to PI, from static to dynamic (see Pirsig). The reflexivity of depicting language as a picture is static; TLP is the correct picture, and having the correct picture 'once and for all' there is nothing more to be said that can be said.

But the command itself is the epitome of doing something with language. I inscribe the world on the world, and the world is changed by it. And this change is not inexpressible after all, but can be further inscribed, so what appears in TLP as the limit to the expression of thought, turns out to be no limit, but a dynamic incompleteness that is always open to further investigation.

Perhaps this is the change from TLP to PI, from static to dynamic (see Pirsig). — unenlightened

What does Prisig have to say about this?

The reflexivity of depicting language as a picture is static; TLP is the correct picture, and having the correct picture 'once and for all' there is nothing more to be said that can be said. — unenlightened

Yes, the TLP is two dimensional. But, that's how language seems to operate.

Pirsig is very hot on the dynamic/static distinction in relation to 'quality'. It's complicated, and a bit off topic.

the TLP is two dimensional. But, that's how language seems to operate. — Posty McPostface

Well there you have it, language is two dimensional, but it operates - and operates recursively, and that makes it dynamic. So there is TLP, the last word in philosophy, and the fact that the limits of expression have been expressed extends the limits of expression, so that they cease to be the limits, though there are still limits. ( I'm struggling at my own limits of expression here, but if I can make this understandable, then it becomes possible to explore further again.) Looking at the picture of language as a picture, I see something that has been unclear, become clear. So my world has changed.

I might have a go at a separate thread if I can find the right levers... I think I'm talking about transformations of insight - awakenings.

Well there you have it, language is two dimensional, but it operates - and operates recursively, and that makes it dynamic. So there is TLP, the last word in philosophy, and the fact that the limits of expression have been expressed extends the limits of expression, so that they cease to be the limits, though there are still limits. ( I'm struggling at my own limits of expression here, but if I can make this understandable, then it becomes possible to explore further again.) Looking at the picture of language as a picture, I see something that has been unclear, become clear. So my world has changed. — unenlightened

Yes, and I think that is what Wittgenstein was getting at with the Tractatus. The only thing left out and latterly added ad hoc in the PI was the fact that we can learn and expand our limits. But, the TLP is beautiful and neatly sealed whereas the PI is open for doubt, which then also gets elaborated on, ad hoc in On Certainty.

But, the issue arises that solipsism never was solved; by which I mean to say that it persists. I might be mistaken about this. Please correct me if I'm wrong.

I might have a go at a separate thread if I can find the right levers... I think I'm talking about transformations of insight - awakenings. — unenlightened

Please do. I think it might be of use to analyze. And if you do, please reference this exchange we had as the template of thought upon which about getting the fly out of the bottle is made possible, or not...

But, the issue arises that solipsism never was solved; by which I mean to say that it persists. I might be mistaken about this. Please correct me if I'm wrong. — Posty McPostface

Not solved, but dissolved. I think what W. arrives at is that solipsism followed through loses its bite. The forum of logical solipsists still has one post responding to another as if 'we' were separate communicators. 'One' simply 'communicates' in 'scare-quotes'.

I'm not following you here. I can't see your beetle, only mine.

Your what? I have no beetle. Or, if I have one, we can't talk about it. But solipsists have no beetle by definition. There is no privacy in solipsism because there is no one to be private from, any more than there is anyone to be intimate with.

Anyone else cares to join us in this discussion?

Or, if I have one, we can't talk about it. — unenlightened

We sure can talk of our beetles. I'm doing that right now. I just can't show you it.

Well you appear to be talking about them, but as a solipsist, you do not believe I have one. As a solipsist, you do not - and this is the crucial point - believe you have one either, because whatever cannot be shown, is invisible to you. But beetles are in any case the whereof one cannot speak, that you (and I) can name and waffle on about but actually say nothing meaningful about, because there is no commonality. And that is why the question of solipsism or non-solipsism drops away, because there is nothing to be said - it makes no difference to you, whether I have a beetle or not, as long as I pass the Turing test.

Well you appear to be talking about them, but as a solipsist, you do not believe I have one. — unenlightened

It's important to note that solipsism has a significant stipulative definition when Wittgenstein uses it. I am not sure you grasp it.

As a solipsist, you do not - and this is the crucial point - believe you have one either, because whatever cannot be shown, is invisible to you. — unenlightened

I can still maintain a solipsist attitude when presented with the issue of other minds. Keep that in mind.

But beetles are in any case the whereof one cannot speak, that you (and I) can name and waffle on about but actually say nothing meaningful about, because there is no commonality. — unenlightened

Commonality? Please explain.

And that is why the question of solipsism or non-solipsism drops away, because there is nothing to be said - it makes no difference to you, whether I have a beetle or not, as long as I pass the Turing test. — unenlightened

That's true. I'm not arguing over the stipulative definition imposed by Wittgenstein on solipsism. I rather embrace it and learn to expand my own limits in my own way. Again, the problem of other minds comes to mind.

I suppose we must now talk about the picture theory of meaning, which is indubitably true in a two-dimensional world.

Hence, what?