I don't know. — Purple Pond

Thank you for your honest answer.

In other words, then, your Materialism posits a brute-fact. — Michael Ossipoff

No, just because I don't have an explanation of the physical universe it doesn't follow that my materialism posits a brute fact. And even if did posit a brute fact, I don't see any reason why there can't be any brute facts.

That’s my answer to your question, Why is there something instead of nothing. — Michael Ossipoff

I did not see a clear and concise answer.

You cannot prove anything using only a dictionary. I repeat you cannot wholly trust the dictionary. People use words Incorrectly and their meanings are often added to the dictionary. https://thewalrus.ca/can-you-trust-your-dictionary/

I certainly do not agree to that. It isnt “like” a religion either. — DingoJones

No, it's just a faith-based belief in a particular version of the ultimate reality. :D

You’d said:
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I don't know. […why there’s the objectively-existent, fundamentally-existent, physical universe on which everything supervenes…that Materialists believe in.]
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I replied:
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Thank you for your honest answer.
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In other words, then, your Materialism posits a brute-fact. — Michael Ossipoff

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You say:
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No, just because I don't have an explanation of the physical universe it doesn't follow that my materialism posits a brute fact.

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Then what do you think “brute-fact” means??
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A brute-fact is an alleged fact whose advocate(s) can’t explain, or tell an origin or cause of.
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In contrast, the metaphysics that I propose doesn’t need, involve or have any brute-fact or assumption.
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(I’ll describe it in more detail in an immediately-subsequent post.)
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And even if did posit a brute fact, I don't see any reason why there can't be any brute facts.

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I didn’t say that there can’t be a brute-fact. I merely said, correctly, that Materialism has and needs one. …or is one.
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…and that my Eliminative Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism metaphysics doesn’t.
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Brute-facts are disapproved-of when they’re unnecessary. If there’s a metaphysics that needs and posits a brute-fact, &/or other assumptions, and if there’s one that doesn’t, then there’s no need for the one that does.
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But no, I can’t prove that your brute-fact isn’t true, because it’s one of those unverifiable, unfalsifiable propositions that we hear about.
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”That’s my answer to your question, Why is there something instead of nothing.” — Michael Ossipoff
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I did not see a clear and concise answer.

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“Clear”:
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In the post that you were replying to, I only briefly referred to my metaphysics. I didn’t fully describe it or really define it. I referred to another thread (“How do you feel about religion?”) where there’s a fuller description.
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So yes, you’re right, that I didn’t really define my metaphysis in the post that you were replying to.
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So, immediately after I post this message, I’ll copy into an immediately-subsequent post, my earlier post that more fully defines and describes my metaphysics.

“Concise”:
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If a description/explanation/definition is complete, it will be fairly long.
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My metaphysics-defining post (to be posted here immediately after this posting) starts out with a concise statement of its premises, followed by a concise statement of the metaphysical proposal. …followed by examples, answers to likely questions, and discussion of details. …things that are needed for a complete and clear explanation. …things that make it fairly long.
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You cannot prove anything using only a dictionary.

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My metaphysics doesn’t depend on anything proved by using a dictionary.
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But, if you’re referring to my statement that Materialism is a religion, then I’ll repeat something that I said about dictionaries:
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Communication requires at least some consensus about what we mean by the words that we use. Dictionaries report the popular usage-consensus as well as possible. Yes of course there are usages in use that, for one reason or another (space-considerations, new-ness, etc.) don’t make it into dictionaries.
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Merriam-Webster is the premier dictionary in the U.S.
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I said that, by definitions of Materialism and religion, in Merriam-Webster and Houghton-Mifflin, Materialism is a religion. I stand by that statement.
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You can disagree with those two dictionaries’ definitions, and that’s fine. But, regardless of definitions, Materialism is a faith-based belief in a certain particular version of ultimate-reality.
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(No one denies that there’s, in some sense, a physical universe that’s real in its own context and in the context of our lives. Materialists take it farther, and want to make it into the ultimate reality, on which all else supervenes. That’s their faith-based belief.)
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As I said, an immediately-subsequent post will more fully define and describe my metaphysics.
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Michael Ossipoff

Here's a definition and description of my metaphysics:

9/29/18

First two premises that we all agree on:
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1. We find ourselves in the experience of a life in which we’re physical animals in a physical universe.
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2. Uncontroversially, there are abstract implications, in the sense that we can speak of and refer to them.
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I claim no other “reality” or “existence” for them.
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By “implication”, I mean the implying of one proposition by another. By “abstract implication”, I mean the implication of one hypothetical proposition by another hypothetical proposition.
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So there are also infinitely-many complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, with the many consistent configurations of mutually-consistent hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions.
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Among that infinity of complex hypothetical logical systems, there’s one that, with suitable naming of its things and propositions, fits the description of your experience in this life.
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I call that your “hypothetical life-experience-story”. As a hypothetical logical system, it timelessly is/was there, in the limited sense that I said that there are abstract implications.
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There’s no reason to believe that your life and experience are other than that hypothetical logical system that I call your hypothetical life-experience-story.
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Just as I claim no “existence” or “reality” for abstract implications, so I claim no “existence” or “reality” for the complex systems of them, including your hypothetical life-experience-story.
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Each of the infinitely-many complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is quite entirely separate, independent and isolated from anything else in the describable realm, including the other such logical systems.
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Each neither has nor needs any reality or existence in any context other than its own local inter-referring context.
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Any “fact” in this physical world implies and corresponds to an implication.
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“There’s a traffic-roundabout at the intersection of 34th & Vine.”
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“If you go to 34th & Vine, you’ll encounter, there, a traffic-roundabout.”
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Every “fact” in this physical world can be regarded as a proposition that is at least part of the antecedent of some implications, and is the consequent of other implications.
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For example:
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A set of hypothetical physical quantity-values, and a hypothetical relation among them (called a “physical hypothesis, theory or law) together comprise the antecedent of a hypothetical implication.
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…except that one of those hypothetical physical quantity-values can be taken as the consequent of that implication.
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A true mathematical theorem is an implication whose antecedent includes at least a set of mathematical axioms.
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Instead of one world of “Is”…
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…infinitely-many worlds of “If”.
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We’re used to declarative, indicative, grammar because it’s convenient. But conditional grammar adequately describes our physical world. We tend to unduly believe our grammar.
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You, as the protagonist of your hypothetical life-experience-story, are complementary with your experiences and surroundings in that story. You and they comprise the two complementary parts of that hypothetical story.
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By definition that story is about your experience. It’s for you, and you’re central to it. It wouldn’t be an experience-story without you. So I suggest that Consciousness is primary in the describable realm, or at least in its own part(s) of it.
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That’s why I say that you’re the reason why you’re in a life. It has nothing to do with your parents, who were only part of the overall physical mechanism in the context of this physical world. Of course consistency in your story requires that there be evidence of a physical mechanism for the origin of the physical animal that you are.
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Among the infinity of hypothetical life-experience-stories, there timelessly is one with you as protagonist. That protagonist, with his inclinations and predispositions, his “Will to Life”, is why you’re in a life.
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The requirement for an experience-story is that it be consistent. …because there are no such things as inconsistent facts, even abstract ones.
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Obviously a person’s experience isn’t just about logic and mathematics. But your story’s requirement for consistency requires that the physical events and things in the physical world that you experience are consistent. That inevitably brings logic into your story.
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And of course, if you closely examine the physical world and is workings, then the mathematical relations in the physical world will be part of your experience. …as they also are when you read about what physicists have found by such close examinations of sthe physical world and its workings.
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There have been times when new physical observations seemed inconsistent with existing physical laws. Again and again, newly discovered physical laws showed a consistent system of which the previously seemingly-inconsistent observations are part. But of course there remain physical observations that still aren’t explained by currently-known physical law. Previous experience suggests that those observations, too, at least potentially, will be encompassed by new physics.
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Likely, physical explanations consisting of physical things and laws that, themselves, will later be explained by newly-discovered physical things and laws, will be an endless open-ended process…at least until such time as, maybe, further examination will be thwarted by inaccessibly small regions, large regions, or high energies. …even though that open-ended explanation is there in principle.
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Michael Ossipoff


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says:

"No, just because I don't have an explanation of the physical universe it doesn't follow that my materialism posits a brute fact. And even if did posit a brute fact, I don't see any reason why there can't be any brute facts."

I don't either. The "brute fact" that I start with is something like reality exists. It's just kind of a given in my thinking, based on the evidence of my life. The thing that has always struck me (and motivated my interest in philosophy) is that reality is profoundly mysterious. The job of philosophy and science are to try to understand it.

Terms like "physical universe" and "materialism" create difficulties. What is the distinction between "physical" and "non-physical"? "What is "matter" and what is "materialism" really asserting?

I guess that materialism originated in the idea that the only thing that exists is tangible "stuff", not unlike the tables and the chairs. So we got those 17'th century theories of mechanistic materialism where reality consists of hard little unchanging lumps like billiard balls and that all change is the result of the dynamical motions of those atoms.

Physicalism seems to be an extension of materialism that holds that reality consists of nothing beyond the inventory of current physical theory. So objects only have physical properties, things like spatial-temporal location, mass, size, shape, motion, hardness, electrical charge, magnetism, and gravity. What's more, all of reality can be understood in terms of those kind of concepts. So reality need not be restricted to little lumps of physical matter (and time and space, I guess), but can also includes things like fields (and even spooky quantum entanglement). A difficulty that arises there is that we can't really know the outermost boundaries of 'physical' conception, what may or may not be posited by future physics.

I suppose that the best justification for a belief like this might be epistemological. Our windows to reality around us seem to be our senses. So one might want to argue that reality only consists of those things that we can know, either directly through our senses or indirectly by inference from sensory information. Empiricism may or may not embody that idea. Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be any good argument for why reality has to be limited to what can be known by beings like us.

So I'm inclined to think that while empiricism is reasonably good justification for the heuristic of methodological naturalism in the physical sciences, it's perhaps weaker as an ontology.

Purple Pond says:

"You cannot prove anything using only a dictionary. I repeat you cannot wholly trust the dictionary. People use words incorrectly and their meanings are often added to the dictionary."

I couldn't agree more. The first thing they tell students studying philosophy at the university level is don't try to philosophize by quoting dictionary definitions. Besides, anyone who has studied the philosophy of religion knows that scholars have been trying to define the word 'religion' for well over a century, without notable success. So I'm hugely skeptical that a dictionary editor is in any position to solve philosophical problems simply by fiat, problems that philosophers (and theologians and anthropologists) have been arguing about for generations.

You quote Blue-Pond:
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"No, just because I don't have an explanation of the physical universe it doesn't follow that my materialism posits a brute fact. And even if did posit a brute fact, I don't see any reason why there can't be any brute facts."—Blue Pond

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I don't either. The "brute fact" that I start with is something like reality exists.

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Nonsense. That’s a definitional truism that no one, of any persuasion, would deny. Reality means “all that is”.
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But Materialists equate reality (as a whole) with this physical universe, claiming that this physical universe is all of reality, and that all supervenes on it. Ask them why there’s this objectively existent, fundamentally-existent physical universe that is the ultimate-reality, and on which all supervenes, and they’ll say, “There just is it.”
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And yes, that’s a brute-fact.
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It's just kind of a given in my thinking

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See above.
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, based on the evidence of my life.

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What he’s trying to say here is that his life gives him evidence that there’s a physical universe (which he calls “reality”, seemlingly without realizing that he’s making a big assumption that this physical universe is all of reality).
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No one, denies that there’s this physical universe. Idealists don’t deny it. I don’t deny it. This physical universe is real and existent in its own context.
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To repeat a question that Materialists seem unable to answer:
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In what context, other than is own, do you want or believe this physical universe to be existent and real?
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Terms like "physical universe" and "materialism" create difficulties.

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Yes, Materialists have trouble defining “physical” or “objectively-existent” or “objectively-real” or “actual” in a way that isn’t circular when they’re claiming that our physical universe is those things.
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As for “Materialism”, written definitions are available, and you might want to check them out.
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What is the distinction between "physical" and "non-physical"? "What is "matter" and what is "materialism" really asserting?

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See above. Sorry you don’t like references to written or agreed-upon definitions, but communication is difficult without agreed-upon definitions.
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I guess that materialism originated in the idea that the only thing that exists is tangible "stuff", not unlike the tables and the chairs. So we got those 17'th century theories of mechanistic materialism where reality consists of hard little unchanging lumps like billiard balls and that all change is the result of the dynamical motions of those atoms.

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Yes, and then physics advanced, and physicists began having a lot to say about fields, and eventually some began calling Materialism “Physicalism”, to emphasize the inclusion of all that’s physical, instead of just matter.
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The problem is that “Physicalism” also refers to a philosophy-of-mind position. I’ve had people here object, for that reason, when I called Materialism “Physicalism”.
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But it’s well-understood now, that when someone says “Materialism”, they’re not saying that matter is all there is, or the basis of all. They’re saying that the physical universe is all there is, and is the basis of all. …in other words, they’re using Materialism to mean the same thing as metaphysical “Physicalism”. …while avoiding “Physicalism” ‘s double-meaning problem.
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So, if I say “Materialism”, take it to mean “metaphysical Physicalism”.
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Physicalism seems to be an extension of materialism that holds that reality consists of nothing beyond the inventory of current physical theory. So objects only have physical properties, things like spatial-temporal location, mass, size, shape, motion, hardness, electrical charge, magnetism, and gravity.

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See above.
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What's more, all of reality can be understood in terms of those kind of concepts.

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He probably isn’t even aware that he’s stating an assumption rather than an established fact. His assumption is called “Materialism” or “metaphysical Physicalism”. It’s faith-based belief in a brute-fact about its version of ultimate-reality.
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Why is there that physical universe that’s the ultimate reality? Why does the ultimate reality consist of a physical universe? It’s called a “brute-fact”.
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So reality need not be restricted to little lumps of physical matter (and time and space, I guess), but can also includes things like fields (and even spooky quantum entanglement). A difficulty that arises there is that we can't really know the outermost boundaries of 'physical' conception, what may or may not be posited by future physics.

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But that doesn’t stop Materialists from declaring this physical universe (including any physically-inter-related multiverse it’s part of) to be the ultimate reality :D
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I suppose that the best justification for a belief like this might be epistemological. Our windows to reality around us seem to be our senses. So one might want to argue that reality only consists of those things that we can know, either directly through our senses or indirectly by inference from sensory information. Empiricism may or may not embody that idea.

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No, physical observation doesn’t support that notion. Physical experiments and observations of the physical universe don’t distinguish between metaphysicses. Idealists don’t deny there’s a physical world, real and existent in its own context. Observation of the physical universe doesn’t provide any support for Materialism.
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An early advocate of Ontic Struturalism was physicist Michael Faraday, in 1844, when he pointed out that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world consists only of mathematical and logical structural-relation, and that there’s no reason to believe in Materialism’s objectively-existent, fundamentally-existent “stuff”.
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So one might want to argue that reality only consists of those things that we can know, either directly through our senses or indirectly by inference from sensory information. Empiricism may or may not embody that idea.

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Yes, one might want to argue for that unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact assumption.
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Unfortunately, there doesn't seem to be any good argument for why reality has to be limited to what can be known by beings like us.

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That doesn’t seem to stop Materialists from declaring that Reality consists of this physical universe (and what supervenes on it and has it as an underlying basis.).
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Purple Pond says:
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"You cannot prove anything using only a dictionary. I repeat you cannot wholly trust the dictionary. People use words incorrectly and their meanings are often added to the dictionary."

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Word meanings have changed tremendously over the centuries. Languages have branched out into different versions that are no longer mutually-intelligible. Continual change is the nature of language. A dictionary is a useful guide to the rough current consensus of meanings.
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I couldn't agree more. The first thing they tell students studying philosophy at the university level is don't try to philosophize by quoting dictionary definitions.

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Your philosophy-teacher was mistaken if he told you that dictionaries don’t (at least make a genuine effort to) keep up with and chronicle and report current usage-consensus. He’d be mistaken if he told you that communication doesn’t need some agreement about definitions.
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And, though I quoted Merriam-Webster’s and Houghton-Mifflin’s definitions, and told their conclusion, I didn’t use dictionary-definitions as philosophical arguments.
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Besides, anyone who has studied the philosophy of religion knows that scholars have been trying to define the word 'religion' for well over a century, without notable success. So I'm hugely skeptical that a dictionary editor is in any position to solve philosophical problems simply by fiat

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Dictionarists don’t write “by fiat”, but rather they do their best to report current usage-consensuses….the ways that a word is currently being widely-used.
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…, problems that philosophers (and theologians and anthropologists) have been arguing about for generations.

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That’s nice, but I was merely stating the popular usages that Merriam-Webster and Houghton-Mifflin report.
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Anyway, as I’ve already said at least twice here: Then don’t worry about the dictionary definitions. Quibbling about the definition of religion won’t change the fact that Materialism posits, or is, a faith-based unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact.
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Michael Ossipoff

A brute-fact is an alleged fact whose advocate(s) can’t explain, or tell an origin or cause of. — Michael Ossipoff

No, a brute is a fact that cannot be explained in principle. A brute fact doesn't mean a fact that yet eludes my explanation.

Brute-facts are disapproved-of when they’re unnecessary. If there’s a metaphysics that needs and posits a brute-fact, &/or other assumptions, and if there’s one that doesn’t, then there’s no need for the one that does. — Michael Ossipoff

This isn't logical. Even if your metaphysics don't posit any brute facts nor assumptions(which I doubt) doesn't give me reason to prefer yours over mine. My metaphysics may be better in other ways.

You can disagree with those two dictionaries’ definitions, and that’s fine. But, regardless of definitions, Materialism is a faith-based belief in a certain particular version of ultimate-reality. — Michael Ossipoff

It's not a faith based belief, but it's a rational belief. What's faith based about not including extraneous things into my ontology until further evidence calls for it?

As for you metaphysics, you'll excuse me for not delving into into your particular metaphysics. I don't have the concentration nor the patience.

:up:

My only experience of 'supernatural' was in the early 70s when I witnessed a 200' long guideline, tied off at both ends, somehow got snagged, gently, on someone's breathing apparatus (fire service)

I was the only one to actually witness it snagging (in poor light) I immediately called a halt but was unable to disentangle it, on inspection it became obvious to the eight or nine of us present that it was physically impossible for the line to have finished up where it did. Oddly just a couple of minutes before the snag I had the most overwhelming de ja vu experience, it lasted a good two minutes and I was transfixed by it.

It was all a very spooky experience, it made me realise 'something' else is going on behind the scenes and totally changed my outlook leading me to pursue the nature of reality, but here's the funny part, I had the distinct and confident feeling that 'I', whoever that really is, somehow engineered the whole thing!

What other examples are there that provides evidence for something supernatural? — Purple Pond

This argument is posted in here, and I've started a blog that starts out with the argument. However, what would convince you depends on many factors, and those factors may have nothing to do with good arguments or good evidence.
https://consciousnessanddeath.quora.com

”A brute-fact is an alleged fact whose advocate(s) can’t explain, or tell an origin or cause of.” — Michael Ossipoff
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No, a brute is a fact that cannot be explained in principle. A brute fact doesn't mean a fact that yet eludes my explanation.

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Using your definition, you’re saying that the objective fundamental existence of this physical universe, as the ultimate-reality, all of reality, and the basis of all else, on which all else supervenes—is something for which an outside reason might, in principle, be found?
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That’s odd, because Materialism, by definition, doesn’t allow for there being anything else by which to explain there being the physical universe that I described in the paragraph before this one.
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By its definition, Materialism, posits a brute-fact, even by your definition of “brute-fact”.
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”Brute-facts are disapproved-of when they’re unnecessary. If there’s a metaphysics that needs and posits a brute-fact, &/or other assumptions, and if there’s one that doesn’t, then there’s no need for the one that does.” — Michael Ossipoff
This isn't logical. Even if your metaphysics don't [He means “doesn’t”] posit any brute facts nor assumptions(which I doubt)…

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Sorry Purple Pond, but saying that you doubt something doesn’t count as an argument against it.
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…doesn't give me reason to prefer yours over mine. My metaphysics may be better in other ways.

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…such as?
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Anyway, I didn’t say that your unfalsifiable brute-fact can’t be superfluously, unverifiably true. I merely said that it’s a brute-fact.
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No one can criticize your faith in it.
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It's not a faith based belief,

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No, it’s just a belief in an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact. :D
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…but it's a rational belief.

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That means supportable by rational argument. It’s easier to say it’s supportable than to actually support it.
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What's faith based about not including extraneous things into my ontology until further evidence calls for it?

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There’s no evidence to support your belief. It’s faith-based because it’s a belief in an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact.
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…where “extraneous” means extraneous to your ontology.
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No one’s suggesting that you “include” any assumptions. The uncontroversial premises of my metaphysics aren’t assumptions, and don’t call for “including” anything. …such as the brute-fact assumption that you “include” and believe in.
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And, by the way, maybe you think that observation of this physical universe is evidence for Materialism. It isn’t. Idealists don’t deny that this physical universe “exists” in its own context, and in the context of our experience and lives. That experience doesn’t contradict Subjective Idealism, such as the Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism that I propose, and it isn’t evidence for Materialism.
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It typically isn’t possible to distinguish between metaphysics on the basis of physical experiments and observation of the physical world. Your Materialism amounts to a brute-fact assumption that is an unfalsifiable proposition.
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As for you metaphysics, you'll excuse me…

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Consider yourself excused.
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..for not delving into into your particular metaphysics.

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Then don’t delve.
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For one thing, my metaphysics and its premises are concisely stated in the first few paragraphs of my posted description of it. The remainder of that post consists of examples, further clarification, details, and answers to objections.
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Yes, tv-watchers want everything in soundbites.
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For another thing, no one asked you to post about my metaphysics. In fact, it would be better if you didn’t post about it without reading it.
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Michael Ossipoff

Using your definition, you’re saying that the objective fundamental existence of this physical universe, as the ultimate-reality, all of reality, and the basis of all else, on which all else supervenes—is something for which an outside reason might, in principle, be found? — Michael Ossipoff

It all depends on what you mean by an "outside reason". If by "an outside reason" you mean something other than what's included in the physical universe i.e. something immaterial, then no. If that's what you mean by an "outside reason", I believe you are equivocating 'any reason at all' with 'an outside reason', because it's not clear at all that they are identical.

That’s odd, because Materialism, by definition, doesn’t allow for there being anything else by which to explain there being the physical universe that I described in the paragraph before this one. — Michael Ossipoff

Again, what do you mean by "anything else"? Do you mean something immaterial? I think you are equivocating here again. Surely there is a difference between "something other than what's in the physical universe", and "any explanation at all".

…such as? — Michael Ossipoff

Such as being more parsimonious.

Sorry Purple Pond, but saying that you doubt something doesn’t count as an argument against it. — Michael Ossipoff

It never was intended to be.

There’s no evidence to support your belief. It’s faith-based because it’s a belief in an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact. — Michael Ossipoff

You keep saying that, as if the more you say it, the more likely it is to be true.

No one’s suggesting that you “include” any assumptions. The uncontroversial premises of my metaphysics aren’t assumptions, and don’t call for “including” anything. …such as the brute-fact assumption that you “include” and believe in. — Michael Ossipoff

You are. You're suggesting that I include immaterial things into my ontology which I see no reason for.

I see that you already made a thread about your metaphysics, yet from what I saw they seem far from uncontroversial as you claim. But I digress, I don't think this the place to discuss your metaphysics. You can discuss it here, obviously, it isn't against the rules, but they will fall on deaf ears.

And, by the way, maybe you think that observation of this physical universe is evidence for Materialism. It isn’t. — Michael Ossipoff

No, but if society observing the universe far and wide for years and years and not finding anything that is immaterial that is a good reason to adapt materialism.

It typically isn’t possible to distinguish between metaphysics on the basis of physical experiments and observation of the physical world. Your Materialism amounts to a brute-fact assumption that is an unfalsifiable proposition. — Michael Ossipoff

This is a non-sequitur.

”Using your definition, you’re saying that the objective fundamental existence of this physical universe, as the ultimate-reality, all of reality, and the basis of all else, on which all else supervenes—is something for which an outside reason might, in principle, be found?” — Michael Ossipoff
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[…]
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“That’s odd, because Materialism, by definition, doesn’t allow for there being anything else by which to explain there being the physical universe that I described in the paragraph before this one.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Again, what do you mean by "anything else"? Do you mean something immaterial? I think you are equivocating here again. Surely there is a difference between "something other than what's in the physical universe", and "any explanation at all".

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Alright, if this physical universe (including any physically-inter-related multiverse that it might be part of) is “all that there is” (to use your wording), then, even in principle, how could there be an explanation for why there is this physical universe.
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By your own definition, without an explanation possible, even in principle, the “existence” of your physical universe is a brute-fact.
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Here’s what you said in your initial post:
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As an atheist I'm trying to think of examples of what would convince me that there is a god and that the physical world is not all there is.

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So, if, as you believe, this physical world is all that there is, then how could there be an explanation for why there is it, even in principle?
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You believe in the existence of something whose existence is unexplainable in principle.
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You believe in a big brute-fact.

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[in response to a statement that there are reasons to believe that your metaphysics (Materialism) is better] :
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“…such as?” — Michael Ossipoff
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Such as being more parsimonious.

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With its brute-fact? …when my metaphysics doesn’t have one? (Oh that’s right—You wouldn’t know about that, because you haven’t read it :D )
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At the beginning of my description of my metaphysics, I stated its two premises, neither of which is a brute-fact.
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One of the premises is that there are abstract implications in the limited sense that we can mention and refer to them. I’m not saying that that means that they exist or are real. I’ve repeatedly emphasized that I make no claim that they, or all the complex inter-referring systems of them, exist or are real, whatever that would mean.
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So the abstract implications can’t be called a brute-fact, if I make no claim that they “exist”.
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There’s no evidence to support your belief. It’s faith-based because it’s a belief in an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact. — Michael Ossipoff
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You keep saying that, as if the more you say it, the more likely it is to be true.

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No, see above, to find out why it’s true.
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”No one’s suggesting that you “include” any assumptions. The uncontroversial premises of my metaphysics aren’t assumptions, and don’t call for “including” anything. …such as the brute-fact assumption that you “include” and believe in.” — Michael Ossipoff
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You are. You're suggesting that I include immaterial things into my ontology which I see no reason for.

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I make no claim for the existence of anything describable, including the immaterial things that you refer to.
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You’re the one with an assertion about “existence”, the brute-fact objective fundamental existence of this physical world, that exists as “all that there is” (to use your words). ….which you believe exists in some unspecified objective way, other than just in its own context.
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I’m not saying that the “immaterial things” are real or existent (whatever that would mean). I’m just saying that there’s no reason to believe that your physical universe consists of more than those “immaterial things”.
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You’re the one who advocates independent and concrete existence for something whose existence is, even in principle, unexplainable.
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I see that you already made a thread about your metaphysics, yet from what I saw they seem [He means “it seems”] far from uncontroversial as you claim.

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My (not original*) suggestion that life and this physical world have such a tenuous metaphysical basis is highly controversial in the sense that it’s contrary to the beliefs of most people, including most people at these forums.
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However, it’s uncontroversial in the sense that it’s supported by uncontroversial statements. If you think that I’ve made a specific incorrect statement, in the premises or argument, or drawn an unwarranted conclusion, then feel free to specify it (Oh, but that’s right, you haven’t read it).
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*It goes back at least to Michael Faraday, in 1844, and has more recently been espoused by Frank Tippler and Max Tegmark (…though they’re Ontic Structural Realists, not Ontic Structural Subjective Idealists).
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In fact, my main argument consists of questions:
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1. If you think this physical world is “objectively-real” or “objectively-existent”, “actual”, “substantive” or “substantial” in a way that makes it more than what I’ve proposed that it is, then feel free to specify in what way, and what you mean by “objectively-real”, “objectively-existent”, “actual”, “substantive”, or “substantial”.
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2. In what context, other than its own, and the context of our lives, do you want or believe this physical universe to exist or be real?
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But I digress, I don't think this the place to discuss your metaphysics.

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No, this isn’t the place to discuss metaphysics, when your initial post asked this:
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As an atheist I'm trying to think of examples of what would convince me that there is a god and that the physical world is not all there is.

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:D
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…but it isn’t permissible to suggest an alternative to your metaphysical belief, even though you asked for examples?
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You also asked me:
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I have a question for you: Why is there something rather than nothing?

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So I was supposed to answer that without speaking of metaphysics? :D
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You can discuss it here, obviously, it isn't against the rules, but they will fall on deaf ears.

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By all means, be deaf if you want to. But someone who doesn’t listen shouldn’t talk so much.
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”And, by the way, maybe you think that observation of this physical universe is evidence for Materialism. It isn’t.” — Michael Ossipoff
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No, but if society observing the universe far and wide for years and years and not finding anything that is immaterial that is a good reason to adapt [He means “adopt”] materialism.

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:D
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Why would you expect observation of the physical universe to find something immaterial?
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No one, including Ontic Structural Subjective Idealists, would deny that, in its own context and in the context of our lives, there is this physical universe.
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But you don’t just believe that. You believe in something that physical observations and experiments don’t establish or even suggest:
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You believe that this physical universe objectively, fundamentally exists, whatever that would mean,, as “all that there is”. (Your wording), …or as other Materialists sometimes word it, as the ultimate-reality, the basis of everything, on which everything supervenes.
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Of course it “exists” in its own context, and that of our lives. But you want to make it into a metaphysics.
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…not supported by any evidence, but faith-based.
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You, typically of Materialists, think that you’re being “scientific”, but your confusion of science with metaphysics amounts to turning science into pseudoscience.
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Michael Ossipoff

I don’t want it to seem as if I’ve evaded the below-quoted passage from Purple Pond. It’s just that I didn’t and don’t know what he was saying. Nevertheless, to avoid an appearance of evasion, I’ll comment on it and answer it, to the extent that I can decipher its meaning:
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”Using your definition, you’re saying that the objective fundamental existence of this physical universe, as the ultimate-reality, all of reality, and the basis of all else, on which all else supervenes—is something for which an outside reason might, in principle, be found?” — Michael Ossipoff
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It all depends on what you mean by an "outside reason". If by "an outside reason" you mean something other than what's included in the physical universe i.e. something immaterial, then no.

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Right, then Purple Pond isn’t saying that, even in principle, this physical universe could have anything else that could give it a reason or explanation. That’s a brute-fact.
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If that's what you mean by an "outside reason", I believe you are equivocating 'any reason at all' with 'an outside reason', because it's not clear at all that they are identical.

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So then, Purple Pond is hinting that, at least in principle, this physical universe has or could have an inside-reason. …that it’s its own reason. That’s quite a claim. …that there’s something about this physical universe, this collection of matter, fields, events and physical laws about their inter-relation, that provides a reason and explanation for why there is it. That sounds quite mystical for a Materialist. He’s saying that maybe this physical universe is somehow its own reason for being.
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…a “necessary material thing”?
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…maybe borrowing from Scholastic religious arguments, but trying to apply them to a thing, a material thing.
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But Purple-Pond isn’t religious, is he. :D
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And remember that this mystical grand principle and necessity to be, this intrinsic necessity to materially exist, must itself be material, because, as a Materialist, Purple-Pond says that material things are all that there is.
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Figure that one out :D
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Michael Ossipoff

When Purple-Pond says that material things are all that there is, then he’s also saying that this physical universe exists in no describable metaphysical context other than its own.
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…which of course is what I’ve been saying.
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And, if it has no other describable metaphysical existence than that, then what would it mean for anyone to say that its existence is “objective’ or a “actual” as opposed to “hypothetical”?

Declaring the lack of any reason or explanation other than itself, Purple-Pond seems to be borrowing from the notion of a necessary being, but positing instead a “necessary bunch of stuff”. :D
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Michael Ossipoff

How about telepathy, telekinesis and black magic? :D

List of prizes for evidence of the paranormal.

"Supernatural" could just be advanced technology. Advanced technology can appear to contradict the laws of physics as we understand them. What would the essence of a supernatural thing be that distinguishes it from natural things? — Harry Hindu

Right, Clarke's 3rd law: any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.
I'd probably bet on tech.