There are thus 'higher' pleasures; that is, rolling around in the mud for a pig is a lower pleasure than, say, listening to Mozart, Bach or Beethoven — Blue Lux

I don't think Mill justified the concept of a higher pleasure.

But that is not what I was referring two. Higher and Lower pleasures were invented to prevent the criticism that people could reach a state of pleasure doing trivial things so that you couldn't differentiate between high and low culture.

What I am referring to is pleasure attached to destructive things.

I think there still is the problem of justifying why Mozart is Better than the worst pop music however.

If pleasure is your metric and foundation of an ethics then that ethics cannot rely on other metrics like differentiating between sources of pleasure and quality of pleasure and still be the same utilitarian ethics.

↪Andrew4Handel the question of why pleasure or pain is good or bad is irrelevant. People prefer pleasure to pain. — Blue Lux

I don't see how it can be irrelevant. If you claim pleasure is good then fail to give a reason for this claim then it is foundationless

My example is how pleasure can be bad for you because the things you are doing are destructive.
For example these Auschwitz personnel seem happy

https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/laughing-at-auschwitz-1942/

I think it is hard to justify the claim that any pleasure or happiness is good. one the reasons is the dubious exploitative circumstances these things arise from. It is hard to imagine a circumstance where pleasure was being derived in an ethical way in a fair society and where pleasure was not overwhelmed by the presence of suffering including just suffering present in nature like predation and disease.

There are shortcomings in every philosophy, including utilitarianism. People prefer pleasure to pain. People prefer happiness than pleasure. I guess we will just have to take that as our premise. Obviously there are contradictions, and that is why it is a rule of thumb.

Say, in the deciding of whether or not a person should steal, if a person considers the happiness they will receive or not receive, and the unhappiness of the person who will be stole from, one can calculate what would be the right thing to do. Chances are, stealing something won't make you happy. It might please you or give a sense of sateity but nothing more. Realizing the unhappiness which would be the result of such an act renders the act immoral.
What will amount to the greatest amount of happiness?

This is not vague. It works sometimes.

What will amount to the greatest amount of happiness? — Blue Lux

I don't think you can measure happiness and add it together. What exactly is being measured and how is it being added together?

Another issue non utilitarian values. If you stole from a huge multinational you could argue no one was being harmed. But people would like to say theft is wrong in principle even if no one appears to be harmed.

A general principle as opposed to a calculation seems more realistic. For example the principle never to hit a child. This means don't hit a child even if somehow in the long run it might be of benefit.