There is no such thing as an illusion of the soul.
— creativesoul

And presumably there's no such thing as an illusion of a ghost? Yet people claim to have seen and believe in ghosts. So at the very least you must accept that believing in something and believing to have seen something is not the same thing as there being the illusion of that thing. — Michael

Well, at the very least I readily admit that believing in something and believing to have seen something is not equivalent to there being an illusion. That's not a problem.

In which case the simple response is that there isn't an external world and so isn't the illusion of an external world, even though people believe in and believe to see an external world.

So believing to see an external world and believing in an external world is not equivalent to an illusion of an external world.

I'm not following your logic to reach the conclusions you have.

All thought and belief is existentially dependent upon an external world. Seeing an illusion of a dog is existentially dependent upon dogs. Thought and belief about dogs is existentially dependent upon dogs. Taking an account of illusory dogs is existentially dependent upon thought and belief about dogs, thought and belief about illusory dogs, as well as dogs and illusions thereof.

The solipsist wants to neglect the fact that we know the difference between an illusion and what the illusion is of.

The notion itself is utterly meaningless if and when it does not necessarily presuppose both, the illusion of X, and X.

It's an abuse of language otherwise.

The fact of the matter is that such talk is an illusion of meaningful language use.

:wink:

Bewitched by nonsense.

If you honestly believe you can deductively prove the mind independent existence of an external world, then I'll leave you to your illusions.

If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality, and a plurality negates solipsism, then solipsism is negated by the way things are... which is the way it should be.

If it is the case that solipsism is a philosophical position, and all philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thought and belief, and all thought and belief is existentially dependent upon an external world, then it is the case that solipsism is existentially dependent upon an external world.

Which argument would you like to discuss? Point out the premiss and offer a relevant and valid objection...

That's the first step.

I'm not following your logic to reach the conclusions you have — creativesoul

They weren't conclusions. They were the skeptic's response to your claim "if there is such thing as an illusion of an external world, then there is an external world." This conditional isn't helpful unless it can be shown that there really is an illusion of an external world. But as the example of ghosts shows us, it's not enough that people claim to see or believe in an external world to conclude that there is at least the illusion of one.

But as the example of ghosts shows us, it's not enough that people claim to see or believe in an external world to conclude that there is at least the illusion of one. — Michael

I'm not clear on why you would say that. It seems that if people claim to see or believe in an external world, that qualifies as there being an illusion of an external world, just in case there is no independently existent (that is apart from the seeing and believing) external world. If there were an independently existent external world then the seeing of and believing in an external world would not be an illusion. So @creativesoul has it backwards when s/he claims that for there to be an illusion of something that something must actually (and completely independently) exist.

On the other hand the seeing of and believing in an external world is not an illusion, unless the question of independent existence is raised. As far as I can see just the same logic applies to ghosts. I think we have every reason to believe in the external world we all see and believe in every day, and also to believe in the independent reality of something that constitutes the conditions for that seeing and believing. But I don't think it makes any sense to speak about an independently existing external world just like the one we see and believe in; the external world we see and believe in is most likely very much the product of human existence.

I'm not clear on why you would say that. — Janus

I'm accepting creative's claim for the sake of argument that a thing is an illusion only if that thing exists (somewhere else) and showing that his argument in favour of there being an external world is still lacking.

It seems that if people claim to see or believe in an external world, that qualifies as there being an illusion of an external world, just in case there is no independently existent (that is apart from the seeing and believing) external world. If there were an independently existent external world then the seeing of and believing in an external world would not be an illusion. — Janus

I think in the case of a brain-in-a-vat type scenario we can say that there is an external world but also that the world we experience is just an illusion of an external world.

I think in the case of a brain-in-a-vat type scenario we can say that there is an external world but also that the world we experience is just an illusion of an external world. — Michael

Sure, but that just pushes the problem of whether there is a human (or whatever reflective percipient) independent external world back one step.

I don't know of any purely deductive argument.

Wittgenstein's language argument is pretty good though.
Novelties indicate a larger world.
I'm not omniscient, since otherwise I'd know that I were (by definition).
A moral person will have to consider others real, cannot act as if others aren't living.

Whatever considerations like these point in one direction.

They weren't conclusions. They were the skeptic's response to your claim "if there is such thing as an illusion of an external world, then there is an external world." This conditional isn't helpful unless it can be shown that there really is an illusion of an external world. But as the example of ghosts shows us, it's not enough that people claim to see or believe in an external world to conclude that there is at least the illusion of one. — Michael

Well belief can be false, and that's another matter altogether, although it must be kept in mind here. So, people can be mistaken about what they believe and/or see. It would only follow that they can be mistaken in their account thereof as well.

So...

Claiming to see and/or believe in X doesn't warrant our belief in X.

Is that what you're saying, prior to going on?

Claiming to see and/or believe in X doesn't warrant our belief in X. — creativesoul

That knife cuts both ways.

An argument for solipsism isn't immune. Therefore, it's an invalid objection. Or... at the very least... it applies equally to both frameworks. Therefore, when considering it's value as an skeptical objection, it is utterly inadequate for supporting either, and equally applicable in it's scope of damnation to both.

Here's what I want to discuss...


If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality, and a plurality negates solipsism, then solipsism is negated by the way things are... which is the way it should be.

If it is the case that solipsism is a philosophical position, and all philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thought and belief, and all thought and belief is existentially dependent upon an external world, then it is the case that solipsism is existentially dependent upon an external world.

Which of the two outlined arguments above would you like to discuss?

I mean fuck... let's do some philosophy.

I'm not clear on why you would say that. It seems that if people claim to see or believe in an external world, that qualifies as there being an illusion of an external world, just in case there is no independently existent (that is apart from the seeing and believing) external world. — Janus

That's an unnecessarily complex attempt at the justification of that which is unjustifiable.

The only sensible coherent use of "illusion" presupposes that an illusion of X is not X.

Here's what I want to discuss...


If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality, and a plurality negates solipsism, then solipsism is negated by the way things are... which is the way it should be.

If it is the case that solipsism is a philosophical position, and all philosophical positions are existentially dependent upon thought and belief, and all thought and belief is existentially dependent upon an external world, then it is the case that solipsism is existentially dependent upon an external world.

Which of the two outlined arguments above would you like to discuss?

The only sensible coherent use of "illusion" presupposes that an illusion of X is not X. — creativesoul

So what? An illusion of an external world is not an external world; that much is obvious.

If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality... — creativesoul

I asked before and I don’t think you explained, but what does it mean to be “existentially dependent” on something?

Which of the two outlined arguments above would you like to discuss? — creativesoul

You need to go back to the texts and reconsider Kant’s remark about ‘the scandal of philosophy’. All you’re doing is begging the question, which means, assuming what needs to be proven. You’re simply stating that the reality of the external world is apodictic and then wondering why others aren’t agreeing with you. There’s nothing else at issue here.

I do happen to hold to an attitude rather like Kantian idealism, in this sense - that what we call “the world” isn’t something wholly outside ourselves, something we experience in a completely detached and objective way. It’s something that is created moment by moment in our minds, by piecing together the jumble of unconnected glimpses our senses give us—and we do the 'piecing together' according to a plan that’s partly given us by our biology, partly given us by our culture, and partly a function of our individual life experience. But attempting to understand that process of 'putting together' is very difficult because the very effort of understanding it is also part of that process. That's the sense in which we can't get 'outside it'. — Wayfarer

Wow. Well put. This is my general view, too. We 'are' the sense-making, and this sense-making is 'tied' to a particular body and sees through particular eyes and seems to depend on a particular brain being lit up.

Heidegger replies to the effect that the scandal is not so much that philosophy fails to prove the existence of the external world as that such proofs are expected and attempted over and over and over again. — Janus

For me the scandal/absurdity is just that arguing/proving already assumes an other to be convinced.

While we can't compare the object itself with our cognition of the object, we can and do compare our cognitions of objects with one another. In short the 'object itself' is closely related with a notion of maximal intersubjectivity. I don't want to reduce one to the other. A person alone on an island might be trying to solve a technical problem to get food. Then he would test his cognitions against the results of his attempts to get the food. And on the other end there is the desire for someone to 'get' one's more abstract feeling-tinged cosmic visions (talk about God and love.)

For me the scandal/absurdity is just that arguing/proving already assumes an other to be convinced. — macrosoft

Well, yes of course, there is obviously always the experience of others. I think this is really Heidegger's point: he saw "being-in-the-world' as the most primordial aspect of Dasein. But the point remains that no proof, in any deductive sense, can be given for the existence of the world or of others.

@Creativesoul purported to be offering a proof of the existence of a mind-independent external world, which is something else entirely than Heidegger's notion of "being-in-the-world"; the latter is purely phenomenological and as such "brackets" (as per Husserl) the question of the existence of an external world, or even more radically (as per Heidegger) considers the question to be secondary to, and parasitic upon, the primary experience of being-in-the-world.

Being in the world does not constitute an "external world" in any case; although obviously the experience of embodiment incorporates the sensation of the body, the skin as boundary and a world of things, events and others 'external' to the body.

You need to go back to the texts and reconsider Kant’s remark about ‘the scandal of philosophy’. All you’re doing is begging the question, which means, assuming what needs to be proven. You’re simply stating that the reality of the external world is apodictic and then wondering why others aren’t agreeing with you. There’s nothing else at issue here. — Wayfarer

Why not just address the argument?

...if people claim to see or believe in an external world, that qualifies as there being an illusion of an external world, — Janus

An illusion of an external world is not an external world; that much is obvious. — Janus

Sigh...

If it is the case that all thought and belief are existentially dependent upon a plurality...
— creativesoul

I asked before and I don’t think you explained, but what does it mean to be “existentially dependent” on something? — Michael

When the existence of a thing requires the existence of an other thing.

Why not just address the argument? — creativesoul

I did already, right at the beginning (here). Not going to go through it all again.

You remain convinced that that objection made a difference of some sort or was valid in any way? I don't but...

I'm talking about the most recent two outlines...

Care to directly address them?

While we can't compare the object itself with our cognition of the object... — macrosoft

And yet you've distinguished between the two...

When the existence of a thing requires the existence of an other thing. — creativesoul

So you're saying that the existence of my thoughts require the existence of other things (other thoughts?) Why?

Why is a psychological question.

I'm convinced by virtue of knowing what all thought have in common that makes them thought.