What is it like to actually "be" a process? — schopenhauer1
Heraclitus, who likened the structure of reality to the element of fire, as change is reality and stability is illusion. — schopenhauer1
What is it like to actually "be" a process? — schopenhauer1
So what it's like to be a process is, well, what it's like to be human. All humans have, or are, these characteristics and faculties which are constantly interacting and changing, in constant flux. The point of Buddhist practice is to become aware of its transient nature instead of being fixated on it or identifying with it. And Buddhist philosophy extends this process view to everything - there is said to be no unchanging element of any kind. The tendency to try and seize on some element of experience as permanent and stable is a source of frustration. — Wayfarer
Yet we are most definitely participants. We aren't separate from the process/event...we only think we are; thought forms are lain over it and then assume an agency or reality of their own. It doesn't matter what the dogmatic point of departure, science or religion, the truth of the event/process is there regardless of what we think about it. And you are it dreaming of your separateness; even though it seems less illusive, our individual agency is a prime barrier to understanding process/event, and so much more so with any collective agency hobgoblinry. It's far more woo to go on believing something other than that has already been debunked by the new physics: the observer is inseparable from the observed: but I'd say a pure act of observation becomes dumb and mute, inasmuch as it isn't translatable into language and thereby communicable.Process philosophy itself has been pretty much hijacked as a term by theist philosophers. So that shifts you into a different kind of distinction. You wouldn't be seeking a better description of physical nature but talking about what it is like to be participating in the divine cosmic mind. :grin: — apokrisis
panpsychic claim that there is such a thing as "the mind" and our minds participate in the greater mind that is the Cosmos, or existence, or God's mind, or something. — apokrisis
A claim that there is a mind isn't perspectivally related to panpsychism. — Anthony
You participate with the cosmos through your thought-forms, through a storehouse of memories you take as your self and the order you identify with, all at once. — Anthony
By what definition. Not functionalism, first of all, because every object is truly different from every other, as they do not and cannot occupy the same space-time. — Anthony
Every bottle of my Michelob isn't exactly the same as the next even though it appears that way. — Anthony
If you agree on a definition of mind, then you have to talk about local and nonlocal causality involving mind. Gravity, as a plausible place to start, is action at a distance. Does gravity affect the mind? If gravity can effect the mind at a distance, is there anything else that impels the mind from a distance? — Anthony
Again, are these differences that make a difference to the mind in question? Your response is all over the shop. — apokrisis
I disagree as the same function can be realised at many different places and times. — apokrisis
Martin Heidegger’s early and late philosophy also presents an analytic-interpretive contribution to process philosophy, without speculative formulations of metaphysical ‘laws of development,’ but with a view to the metaphilosophical and practical implications of process metaphysics. In Sein und Zeit (1927) Heidegger presents what could be called an ‘adverbial model’ of process metaphysics; based on an analysis of human existence (“Dasein”) Heidegger shows that what the metaphysical tradition understood as entities or factors standing in relational constellations—e.g., space, world, self, others, possibility, matter, function, meaning, time—can be viewed as ‘adverbial modifications’ of Dasein, as modes and ways in which Dasein occurs, while Dasein itself is the interactivity of “disclosure” or ‘taking as.’ Since Heidegger’s ‘taking as’ is an understanding that is ineradicably practical, his early philosophy bears certain affinities to the pragmatist tendency in twentieth century American process thought. In Heidegger’s later work, however, human understanding is no longer the dynamic ‘locus’ but more a dimension of the process of being (“clearing”). — https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/
It does not emerge as the result of some particular form of process we might hope to describe. — apokrisis
What is it like to actually "be" a process? — schopenhauer1
Can you explain what you mean by 'being' a process more? — Posty McPostface
This sounds like Gregory Bateson. — Anthony
But not the same place and time...so there IS always a difference, fundamentally. — Anthony
There's a big leap from the difference that makes a difference to a function. — Anthony
The mind doesn't function at anything at all. — Anthony
When you're identifying an individual every difference makes a difference. — Metaphysician Undercover
"What" is being emerged from the process? — schopenhauer1
Sure, there is me observing the computer and its results and there is the computer computing. What it like to be "computing"? That is a very basic idea. There are interactions of things in the world- what is it like on the "front lines" of these interactions as opposed to simply observing them? The implications have a lot to do with theory of mind of course. — schopenhauer1
Nonetheless, there can be no cloning of a mental impression, let alone the mind itself. A mental impression would be the concept of functionalism, like an algorithm with a goal. Whereas, a mental impression has no goal. — Anthony
The agency is automatically confounded. Only the process itself or the event itself, inasmuch as it's incomprehensible, can ever be a perfect, non representational image of itself.The whole of this would constitute the psychological function that is the one of modelling the world in a way that minimises its capacity to confound our agential intentions. — apokrisis
So again, you are not being clear about what point you mean to make. — apokrisis
Meter reading, really. Isn't it interesting how the most important meters, physiological processes and biochemical pathways keeping us alive are autonomic/automatic? See, this is where I'd say we must stretch the definition of cognition to include perfect absence of automation.But the mental impression is the evidence whether the functional goal is getting met. — apokrisis
Sure. If you care. But that is epistemology. My claims about process philosophy are ontological. So now it is about the process that is individuation. And nature only seems to care about differences that make a difference in some practical sense. Nature is essentially statistical. — apokrisis
The agency is automatically confounded. — Anthony
Isn't it interesting how the most important meters, physiological processes and biochemical pathways keeping us alive are autonomic/automatic? See, this is where I'd say we must stretch the definition of cognition to include perfect absence of automation. — Anthony
If you're careful in your definitions, you'll notice that there's only one act of cognition/every moment, picosecond, whatever. After this, we have a re-cognition, a re-presentation of what once was. — Anthony
If "nature' was as you say, so that it didn't care about such differences, then why does nature make each individual unique? — Metaphysician Undercover
I see that you have things backward. — Metaphysician Undercover
But ontologically, every individual is different and unique despite the fact that we classify them as the same. — Metaphysician Undercover
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