The actual was once the possible. — creativesoul

Yes.

Would you concur or object? — creativesoul

I would agree with that sentiment.

You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. — aletheist

Can’t it be both? Words can have more than one meaning. “It is true that” and “it is a fact that” seem to be saying the same thing, so the thing which is true in the first case (a proposition?) is the thing which is a fact in the second case.

All propositions are language. — creativesoul

Propositions can be (and often are) expressed in language, but are not themselves language, whatever that would mean. The same proposition can be (and often is) expressed in different languages, so the proposition itself does not depend on those languages for its reality as a general sign, only for its existence in particular replicas. I already gave the example of a weathervane as the expression of a proposition without language, although it can be translated into one, such as "the wind is blowing from that direction."

Are facts states of affairs on your view? — creativesoul

Yes, we established earlier in the thread that facts are real states of affairs or real relations among things; i.e., they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them.

What do false propositions represent? — creativesoul

False propositions purport to represent facts, but do not really do so; i.e., they represent unreal states of affairs or unreal relations among things.

Facts obtain if they're real? — creativesoul

All facts are real, so all facts "obtain." A state of affairs or relation among things that does not "obtain" is not a fact. I tend to avoid the use of "obtain" in this context, because in ordinary usage it carries the idea of getting something not previously possessed.

Words can have more than one meaning. — Michael

Indeed, but in philosophy we often try to narrow down their definitions for the sake of greater conceptual clarity. That is my approach here.

“It is true that” and “it is a fact that” seem to be saying the same thing, so the thing which is true in the first case (a proposition?) is the thing which is a fact in the second case. — Michael

A proposition is true iff it represents a fact, but a fact is not something that can be true or false at all, so a proposition and a fact are not the same thing. When I say, "it is true that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," is true. When I say, "it is a fact that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," represents a fact.

When I say, "it is true that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," is true. When I say, "it is a fact that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," represents a fact. — aletheist

When I say "it is a fact that all dogs are mammals" I am saying that the proposition "all dogs are mammals" is a fact.

Indeed, but in philosophy we often try to narrow down their definitions for the sake of greater conceptual clarity. That is my approach here.

Why does it provide more clarity to use the term "fact" to refer to the thing which a true proposition represents? Is it better somehow to treat "a state of affairs" and "a fact" as synonyms rather than to treat "true" and "a fact" as synonyms?

Why does it provide more clarity to use the term "fact" to refer to the thing which a true proposition represents? Is it better somehow to treat "a state of affairs" and "a fact" as synonyms rather than to treat "true" and "a fact" as synonyms? — Michael

Personally, I find it clearer, perhaps because I consider it important to emphasize the representational nature of a proposition. "Fact" is then a concise term for its object, if it is true.

You evidently have a very different definition of "hypothetical" than I and most others do. If everything is hypothetical, then nothing is actual. — aletheist

As I mentioned in my previous reply to that passage, I don't think we mean different things by "hypothetical".

But yes, the meaning of "actual" is what is in doubt. I don't know what you mean by "actual". I suggest that there's no reason to believe that anything describable is objectively-existent--but I readily admit that I don't know what "objectively-existent" would mean.

This physical world is, of course, fully real and existent in the context of your life

What more existence or reality would anyone want or claim for it? In what other context would anyone want or believe it to be existent and real?

And, if this physical universe is only real and existent in the context of your life, then its reality and existence are a bit more tenuous than a Materialist would have us believe.

If your experience is the basis, in the describable world, for what describably is, then that implies a tenuousness for the existence the describable world and its things.
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Elsewhere in these forums, I've posted a more complete discussion of my suggestion that the basis of the describable realm is your life-experience story, with complementarity between you the protagonist and your physical surroundings of your experience. ...a hypothetical experience story consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications s about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.

...with logic entering that experience-story simply because of the requirement for consistency--because there are no mutually-inconsistent facts.

Michael Ossipoff

A proposition is true iff it represents a fact, but a fact is not something that can be true or false at all, so a proposition and a fact are not the same thing. When I say, "it is true that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," is true. When I say, "it is a fact that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," represents a fact. — aletheist

A raisin is a grape that has been dried. It would be redundant to speak of a raisin that has been dried, because all raisins have been dried. But it's not incorrect to call a raisin a dried grape.

A fact--a state of affairs or relation among things--is (by the definition of "proposition") a true proposition. It would be redundant to speak of a true fact, because every fact is a true proposition. But it's not incorrect to call a fact a true proposition.

These intermediaries of sign, representation, etc aren't incorrect, but they're unnecessary to this topic.

Michael Ossipoff

... there are no mutually-inconsistent facts. — Michael Ossipoff

Why not, if everything is hypothetical? Mere possibilities that are mutually inconsistent are not problematic at all; that is just what contingency means. What constrains facts to be consistent with each other, if nothing is real (as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it) and nothing is actual (reacting with other things)?

A fact--a state of affairs or relation among things--is (by the definition of "proposition") a true proposition. — Michael Ossipoff

So you define a true proposition as a state of affairs or relation among things? Why not just stick with calling the latter a fact? What advantage do you gain by treating "true proposition" and "fact" as synonyms?

These intermediaries of sign, representation, etc aren't incorrect, but they're unnecessary to this topic. — Michael Ossipoff

Perhaps unnecessary, but (in my view) helpful. The benefit of defining a fact as the object of a true proposition is highlighting the representational nature of all propositions.

You've arrived at incoherence(self-contradiction)

Judging by your avatar name, I suspect you do not mind.

You've arrived at incoherence(self-contradiction) — creativesoul

Please point out my self-contradiction, so that I may correct it.

Judging by your avatar name, I suspect you do not mind. — creativesoul

What do you think it means?

False propositions purport to represent facts, but do not really do so; i.e., they represent unreal states of affairs or unreal relations among things.

Facts obtain if they're real?
— creativesoul
All facts are real, so all facts "obtain." A state of affairs or relation among things that does not "obtain" is not a fact. — aletheist

Not all states of affairs are fact. All facts are states of affairs.

Not all states of affairs are fact. All facts are states of affairs. — creativesoul

These two statements are not contradictory. Not all mammals are dogs. All dogs are mammals. In any case, here is what I actually said about facts.

Yes, we established earlier in the thread that facts are real states of affairs or real relations among things; i.e., they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them. — aletheist

Unreal states of affairs are not facts. All facts are real states of affairs. Again, no contradiction.

And by the way, "aletheist" comes from the Greek word "aletheia," which means truth; I am someone who believes in truth.

And by the way, "aletheist" comes from the Greek word "aletheia," which means truth; I am someone who believes in truth. — aletheist

My mistake. Apologies.

Apology accepted, although I am still curious - what did you think it meant, such that you suspected me of being comfortable with incoherence/self-contradiction?

Not all states of affairs are fact. All facts are states of affairs.
— creativesoul
These two statements are not contradictory. Not all mammals are dogs. All dogs are mammals. In any case, here is what I actually said about facts.

Yes, we established earlier in the thread that facts are real states of affairs or real relations among things; i.e., they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them.
— aletheist
Unreal states of affairs are not facts. All facts are real states of affairs. Again, no contradiction. — aletheist

Agreed. Right now, I'm considering what you're arguing...

Not all states of affairs are facts. All facts are states of affairs. There are two kinds of states of affairs then:Real states of affairs and unreal states of affairs. Real states of affairs are fact. Unreal states of affairs are not.

Propositions represent both real and unreal states of affairs.

Are facts states of affairs on your view?
— creativesoul
Yes, we established earlier in the thread that facts are real states of affairs or real relations among things; i.e., they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them. — aletheist

What do false propositions represent?
— creativesoul
False propositions purport to represent facts, but do not really do so; i.e., they represent unreal states of affairs or unreal relations among things. — aletheist

So some propositions represent nonexistent(unreal) states of affairs, while others represent states of affairs.

How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.

Facts obtain if they're real?
— creativesoul
All facts are real, so all facts "obtain." A state of affairs or relation among things that does not "obtain" is not a fact. I tend to avoid the use of "obtain" in this context, because in ordinary usage it carries the idea of getting something not previously possessed. — aletheist

Exactly. So you do not use this notion of 'facts obtaining'?

...what did you think it meant, such that you suspected me of being comfortable with incoherence/self-contradiction? — aletheist

I was confused... dialetheism... para-consistent logic... true contradictions...

You've arrived at incoherence(self-contradiction) — creativesoul

I'm tempering my judgment... a little late, but the above very well may be wrong.

All propositions are language.
— creativesoul
Propositions can be (and often are) expressed in language, but are not themselves language, whatever that would mean. The same proposition can be (and often is) expressed in different languages, so the proposition itself does not depend on those languages for its reality as a general sign, only for its existence in particular replicas. I already gave the example of a weathervane as the expression of a proposition without language, although it can be translated into one, such as "the wind is blowing from that direction." — aletheist

So, this admits - good or bad - that propositions are not existentially dependent upon language?

I have significant trouble accepting that.

It does not follow from the fact that the same proposition can be expressed in different languages that propositions exist independently of language.

Multiple languages can talk about the same thing. If we are going to claim that whatever they are talking about exists independently of language, then we ought at least get what they're talking about right. They're not talking about the proposition. They're talking about the states of affairs. Some states of affairs can exist independently of language. Others cannot. Relationships as well...

I already gave the example of a weathervane as the expression of a proposition without language, although it can be translated into one, such as "the wind is blowing from that direction." — aletheist

Without language there is no propositional meaning, on my view. Translation presupposes pre existing meaning, a plurality of languages, and someone who can translate what the one says into the other.

The same proposition can be (and often is) expressed in different languages, so the proposition itself does not depend on those languages for its reality as a general sign, only for its existence in particular replicas. — aletheist

Propositions exist in more than one way?

How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent. — creativesoul

This happens all the time. Shakespeare wrote a play that represents a man named Hamlet who was prince of Denmark. No such person ever actually existed. Signs can represent possibilities and necessities, not just actualities. Reality is not coextensive with existence (more below).

So you do not use this notion of 'facts obtaining'? — creativesoul

Like I said, I tend to avoid it as potentially fostering confusion.

I was confused... dialetheism... para-consistent logic... true contradictions... — creativesoul

Ah, I see. That would have made sense if I had called myself "dialetheist." :grin:

It does not follow from the fact that the same proposition can be expressed in different languages that propositions exist independently of language. — creativesoul

True, but I have not claimed otherwise. Much hinges on what we mean by "exist" in this context. Following Peirce, I define it as reacting with other things. Propositions and other signs do not exist in this sense apart from their embodiment in languages or other sign systems. However, the reality of a proposition does not depend on any (or all) of its actual embodiments - the proposition itself, as a general type rather than an individual token, is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it.

Some states of affairs can exist independently of language. Others cannot. Relationships as well... — creativesoul

Agreed. That is basically what I mean by real states of affairs and real relations among things - they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks (or says, or writes) about them (in a language or other sign system). Some real states/relations also exist - if they are involved in, correspond to, or govern reactions between things.

I find myself in agreement with much of what you have proposed. Not all.

I'll outline our agreements first, if you'd care to elaborate with me.

”there are no mutually-inconsistent facts.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Why not, if everything is hypothetical?

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I said that the propositions, and the things that they’re about are hypothetical. In that sense, the story itself is hypothetical. I didn’t say that everything is hypothetical.
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There’s no such thing as a fact that’s hypothetical. …unless you mean “proposition” instead of “fact”.
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If you want to say that propositions are hypothetical facts, that would wrongly imply that all propositions are facts. Better to say that a proposition is a thing that has a truth-value of True or False, and has a truth-value of True if and only if it’s a fact, and, if not a fact, would be one if its truth-value were True.
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…or some such wording.
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Maybe just say that a proposition is something that purports to be a fact.
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Abstract implications are facts, and, as such, they’re true propositions. They aren’t hypothetical. The propositions that they’re about are hypothetical.
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Mere possibilities that are mutually inconsistent are not problematic at all; that is just what contingency means.

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Yes, there are mutually-inconsistent propositions:
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“There’s a watermelon on that [some particular] table.” “There isn’t a watermelon on that table.”
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What constrains facts to be consistent with each other

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For two alleged facts (propositions) to be mutually-inconsistent means that one of them implies the falsity of the other.
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So, saying that there aren’t mutually-inconsistent facts is the same as saying that there aren’t true and false propositions.
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Saying that there isn’t a true and false proposition is the same as saying (for one thing):
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“If a proposition isn’t true then it isn’t true.”
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That’s an obvious truism, a tautology, and, as such, doesn’t need any proof.
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Saying that two facts are contradictory, or that there’s a true and false proposition, would contradict that tautology.
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, if nothing is real (as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it)

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…as what is? Your meaning there isn’t obvious.
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and nothing is actual (reacting with other things)?

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If “actual” means “reacting with other things”, then all the things in the logical system that I speak of are actual, because they interact.
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A good definition of “actual” is:
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“Physical; and part of, in, or consisting of, the physical universe in which the speaker resides.”
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But yes, I agree that defining “actual”, “real”, “existent”, “substantial” and “substantive” is a big problem for objectors to my metaphysical proposal.
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I ask people, if they think that this physical world is somehow more than just the hypothetical setting for a life-experience-story consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things—then in what way is it more than that?
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“Actual”, “real”, “existent”, “substantial”, or “substantive”? Then what do you mean by that?
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And, in what context, other than its own, do you think that this physical world exists and is real, so as to distinguish it from what I propose?
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But yes, largely because “existent” and “real” don’t have a consensus definition in metaphysics, I make no claim that anything in the describable realm (including abstract implications and physical universes) is real or existent (other than in its own context or the context of someone’s life).
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A fact--a state of affairs or relation among things--is (by the definition of "proposition") a true proposition.” — Michael Ossipoff
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So you define a true proposition as a state of affairs or relation among things? Why not just stick with calling the latter a fact? What advantage do you gain by treating "true proposition" and "fact" as synonyms?

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Well, there needs to be a word for something that purports to be a fact. Some such things are facts and some aren’t.
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But yes, that makes for some awkward wording for the definition of “proposition”. I don’t object to first defining a proposition as a statement, and then defining a fact as what a statement asserts. Either is alright.
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But isn’t there something redundant about the statement and what it asserts? What it asserts is a state-of-affairs or relation among things. A statement or proposition could be “There’s a watermelon on the table”. What does it assert? This: There’s a watermelon on the table. Then what’s the difference between that proposition and the fact that it asserts? (other that some propositions aren’t facts) That’s a good reason to say that a true proposition is a fact. Propositions and the facts that they assert are certainly indistinguishable when written. Their only difference is that some propositions aren't facts.
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So, that’s why I like the definition-system that I’ve suggested, in spite of the awkwardness in wording a definition for “proposition”. That awkwardness seems inevitable.
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In the definition-system that I’ve been speaking of, I define a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, but I don’t deny that alternative definition-systems can be helpful. I don’t even claim that an alternative one isn’t better, in important ways, than the kind that I’ve been suggesting.
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Michael Ossipoff

Then what’s the difference between that proposition and the fact that it asserts? — Michael Ossipoff

You answered your own question in how you asked it - the proposition asserts a (purported) fact, rather than being a (purported) fact. The difference is between that which represents (proposition) and that which is represented (state of affairs or relation among things) - i.e., between a sign and its object.

How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.
— creativesoul

This happens all the time. Shakespeare wrote a play that represents a man named Hamlet who was prince of Denmark. No such person ever actually existed. Signs can represent possibilities and necessities, not just actualities. Reality is not coextensive with existence (more below). — aletheist

In order for A to represent B, A must stand in place for B.

Let Hamlet(the play) be A and a man named Hamlet who was the prince of Denmark be B...

Hamlet(the play) doesn't represent(stand in place for) a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark. Rather it creates him. B is existentially dependent upon A. That cannot be the case when A represents B. There must first be something to represent before it can be represented. The sign "Hamlet" represents both, the play and the main character. These things are existentially dependent upon one another. Without the sign "Hamlet" there could be no play or character.

Calling that a case of A representing B neglects/ignores the existential dependency.

Let A be "Shakespeare" and B be the person we call such. "Shakespeare" represents a particular person. Remove the name and the person remains...

That is a case of A representing B.

The thing we call a "tree" and a tree. Etc...

Hamlet (the play) doesn't represent a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark. Rather it creates him. — creativesoul

The play itself cannot and does not create anything. Shakespeare created the idea of a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark, and then wrote about it in the play, which represents that idea. That is why Hamlet (the man) is not real - he is as he is entirely because of what Shakespeare thought (and wrote) about him, rather than being as he is regardless of what anyone thinks about him.

Shakespeare created the idea of a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark, and then wrote about it in the play, which represents that idea. — aletheist

If A represents B, then B must exist prior to A otherwise there's nothing to represent. It only follows that A is existentially dependent upon B. That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to that something else.

Let the play Hamlet be A. Let B be Shakespeare's idea.

There is no way possible that the entire play Hamlet was complete in Shakespeare's thought prior to pen. Seems to me that the play and the idea are pretty much one in the same.

How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.
— creativesoul
This happens all the time. — aletheist

Shakespeare wrote a play that represents a man named Hamlet who was prince of Denmark. — aletheist

Shakespeare created the idea of a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark, and then wrote about it in the play, which represents that idea. — aletheist

:yikes:

So some propositions represent nonexistent(unreal) states of affairs, while others represent states of affairs.

How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent. — creativesoul

How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.

Hamlet didn't suffice...

A supposed "state-of-affairs" that doesn't obtain isn't a state of affairs. — Michael Ossipoff

Nonsense; people often refer to imagined scenarios (states of affairs).