How do you define "fact" and "thing"? Here's my definitions:

Fact: true proposition — Relativist

But then "proposition" needs a definition. I suppose, in that definitional-system, "proposition" could be defined as "statement" or "subject of a statement".

It's just as valid, and maybe better, to define "fact" directly, as a state-of-affairs, or as a relation among things. ...and a proposition as a thing that has truth-value, and is a fact iff its truth-value is "True", and which, if not a fact, would be one if its truth-value were "True".

But either definition-system is fine.

Thing: an existent

That's meaninglessly-vague, because "exist" isn't metaphysically-defined.

Things are what can be defined, described and referred to. It's a broad term.

So by my definitions, the statement is false. The world consists of things. Facts describe things, their properties, and relations between things.

Things can by hypothetical. Propositions can be about hypothetical things. Facts can by about hypothetical (not necessarily true) propositions.

There's no particular reason to believe that there are non-hypothetical, objectively-existent things.

What are the facts about?
I can only see one answer. — Sir2u

State-of-affairs, or relation among things (which can be hypothetical).

As I said above, there's no reason to believe that there are objectively existent things, things that are something other than hypothetical.

But then the question seems to remain as to whether objects (or things) are something over and above their relations — Janus

Materialists assume that they are, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.

Michael Ossipoff

If the first then facts are independent of the mind. If the second, it would seem that the world needs us to exist. — Sir2u

This. Fact's exist relative to an observer. It's a fact.

But then the question seems to remain as to whether objects (or things) are something over and above their relations — Janus


Materialists assume that they are, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact. — Michael Ossipoff

Idealists would say they are not, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.

Idealists would say they are not, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact. — Janus

I'm not sure I'm getting the drift here. Objects populate the world and can be called names, their relations are asserting a different kind of truth in a state space of sorts. Dimensionality is not captured by a 2D-image, you need to resort to a higher dimension. As you zoom out, you can tell the forest for the trees.

This. Fact's exist relative to an observer. It's a fact. — Posty McPostface

So, no observer no facts, therefore nothing exists unless it is observed. I like that. :up:

”But then the question seems to remain as to whether objects (or things) are something over and above their relations “— Janus

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”Materialists assume that they are, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Idealists would say they are not, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.

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No, not really.
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I merely point out that, as Michael Faraday said in 1844, that there’s no particular reason to believe that there are those “objects (or things) that are something over and above their relations”.
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That isn’t an assumption, and it’s supportable and supported, and it doesn’t entail a brute-fact.
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The alternative explanation, that abstract implications are all that the describable world consists of, doesn’t require an assumption or a brute fact. No one denies that there are abstract implications, at least in the limited sense that they can be mentioned and referred to. Nothing new, controversial or un-supported, or brute-fact, is being posited by Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism.
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As I always disclaim, I can’t prove that Materialism’s objectively and fundamentally existent physical world doesn’t exist as an unverifiable, unfalsifiable, unparsimonious brute-fact.
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I’ve replied to those who claimed that there could have not been abstract implications.
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Michael Ossipoff

That isn’t an assumption, and it’s supportable and supported, and it doesn’t entail a brute-fact. — Michael Ossipoff

Of course it is an assumption, and of course it would entail the brute fact, (if it were true) that objects are not anything over and above their relations. It would be a brute, i.e. inexplicable, fact either way.

Can either of you please suggest a good book in the secondary literature as an introduction to Wittgenstein?

Can either of you please suggest a good book in the secondary literature as an introduction to Wittgenstein? — bloodninja

Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy by K. T. Fann - you can get it used for a few dollars.

Are facts necessarily about things? What if things are defined by the facts about them?

Are facts necessarily about things? What if things are defined by the facts about them? — BlueBanana

Astute observation. I can't disagree with any of it, unfortunately. :)

It means that you can't just do an inventory of the "things"/objects in the world and have a complete picture of it. For example, you can't just list "cats, dogs, trees," etc. Relations and processes (dynamic relations) are necessary for a description of it, too. So you have "This cat is the parent of that cat," "This cat is to the right of that cat from perspective x," "That cat is running" etc.

Those things are facts.

So the world isn't just a totality of things, it's a totality of facts (things in (dynamic) relations).

Welcome back!

I agree; but, think that facts stand above things also.

”But then the question seems to remain as to whether objects (or things) are something over and above their relations.” — Janus

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“Materialists assume that they are […that “things are something over and above their relations], but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.” — Michael Ossipoff
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“Idealists would say they are not, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.--Janus
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“That isn’t an assumption, and it’s supportable and supported, and it doesn’t entail a brute-fact.” — Michael Ossipoff
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“Of course it is an assumption, and of course it would entail the brute fact, (if it were true) that objects are not anything over and above their relations. It would be a brute, i.e. inexplicable, fact either way.”—Janus

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Yes, I didn’t say what I meant.
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No metaphysics can be proved, because an unfalsifiable proposition like Materialism can’t, even in principle, be disproved. (...because that’s what “unfalsifiable proposition”means.)
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So yes, any claim asserting a metaphysics asks you to accept an assumption.
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That’s why I’ve repeatedly been admitting that I can’t prove that the physical world doesn’t have some unspecified “objective existence” or “objective reality” that isn’t had by the hypothetical logical system that I describe.
…and that’s why assert only that an assumption of that “objective reality” or “objective existence” of this physical world is an assumption of a brute-fact.
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But:
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It’s important to distinguish between an assumption implied by the assertion of a metaphysics (I’m not asserting one), as opposed to an assumption that a metaphysics itself makes or needs, or a brute-fact that it entails.
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Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism doesn’t have or need any assumption or brute fact.
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It has, as a premise, that there are abstract-implications, in the limited sense that they can be mention and referred to. I don’t make, and my metaphysical proposal doesn’t need, any assumption that the abstract-implications, or the complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications, or anything in the describable-realm, is “objectively-real” or “objectively existent”, whatever that would mean.
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…or that a complex system of inter-referring abstract-implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is real or existent in any context other than its own inter-referring context.
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I merely ask:
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1. What reason there is to believe that our physical world is other than such a system.
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2. …and, if you say that our physical world is “objectively-existent” &/or “objectively-real”, then what do you mean by that (…in a way that the hypothetical logical system that I propose isn’t those things)?
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3. …and in what context you want or believe this physical world to be real and existent, other than its own context and that of our lives.
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4. What physics experiment can a Materialist cite that establishes that the physical world is other than the system that I’ve described?
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5. What assumption do you think is needed by the metaphysics that I’ve been proposing? …and what brute-fact do you think that it entails…when it doesn’t claim the “existence” (whatever that would mean) of its abstract-implications, or anything else describable?
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[end of those 5 questions]
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None of the Materialist critics of my metaphysical proposal have answered those questions. Their silence has been conspicuous, to say the least.
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When I ask those questions, that’s when the discussion always ends. …angrily on the part of the Materialist.
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I don’t assert that Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism is true. …only that alternatives to it, such as Materialism, unparsimoniously depend on assumptions and brute-facts.
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I assert that the metaphysics that I propose, Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism, is the parsimonious metaphysics.
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Michael Ossipoff

Are facts necessarily about things? What if things are defined by the facts about them? — BlueBanana

Exactly. Hypothetical things.

...with abstract-implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. There's no reason to believe that this phyisical world, and inf fact the whole describable world, consist of more.

Of course, to assert that that's all there describably is,, or to assert any metaphysics, would be to ask people to accept an assumption. It can't be proven, and no metaphysics can be proven.

But a metaphysics built on abstract-facts, such as abstract implications, is the unparsimonious metaphiysics, because it doesn't assume or claim the "existence" (whatever that would mean) of anything describable. There's no need for those abstract implications, and any inter-referring system of them, and this physical world, to be real or existent in any context other than their own.

Michael Ossipoff

We create things, facts aren't created. They exist prior to their discovery, or the possibility of their discovery, and cannot be altered by any creation subsequent to their discovery. Facts are unalterable, things are.

But, after all the world is the totality of facts, not things. — Posty McPostface

Claiming no expertise here, but will bumble forward anyway...

Facts seem a very small business. Electro-chemical patterns in the minds of a single species on one planet in one of billions of galaxies. I'm not sure why we would call the world the "totality of facts", but it's quite likely I don't understand what's being discussed.

If I understand, and I probably don't, there seems to be some general agreement that things are an illusion created by the human mind. Given that, by this theory, separate things don't actually exist anywhere but in our minds, again seems a very small business, and not "the world".

I'm not sure what is meant by "the world" but, to me, there is a single unified reality and all apparent divisions contained within are a property of the observer and not what is being observed.

there seems to be some general agreement that things are an illusion created by the human mind — Jake

Count me out of that general agreement. ;-)

But a metaphysics built on abstract-facts, such as abstract implications, is the unparsimonious metaphiysics, because it doesn't assume or claim the "existence" (whatever that would mean) of anything describable. — Michael Ossipoff

How would those abstractions be undescribable? And do you mean this system would be the one where the universe is defined as the totality of its things or facts?

How would those abstractions be undescribable? — BlueBanana

They wouldn't.

And do you mean this system would be the one where the universe is defined as the totality of its things or facts?

Just its facts. Abstract implications in particular.

I propose that all that this physical universe consists of, is the setting of your hypothetical life-experience-story, which is a complex system of inter-referring abstract facts about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.

That universe, and your life, are real enough in their own contexts. In what other context would you like or believe them to be real &/or existent (whatever that would mean)?

I suggest that you're in a life because you're the protagonist in a hypothetical life-experience-story (as described in the paragraph before this one).

What you can be sure of is your experience. All you know about anything else is from your experience.

Your life is hypothetical. It starts with: "I'd have the experiences that I need or want if...". And then away it goes--your hypothetical life-experience-story consisting of a story of "If", set in a world of "If".

Obviously the one requirement of your hypothetical life-experience-story is consistency. ...because there are no such things as mutually-inconsistent facts...even abstract ones.. That brings logic, and a system of mutually-consistent abstract-implications, into your experience of your "physical" surroundings.

Michael Ossipoff

How would those abstractions be undescribable? And do you mean this system would be the one where the universe is defined as the totality of its things or facts? — BlueBanana

Abstractions are moot. Facts remain supreme.

Are facts necessarily about things? What if things are defined by the facts about them? — BlueBanana

That was my question earlier. What came first, the facts or the objects?

That was my question earlier. What came first, the facts or the objects? — Sir2u

Both. You can't discern facts without objects and the other way around.