Potentially yes. And I don't know how I'd believe that there are things that I can't describe. I don't know how to make any sense of that. What would I believe, after all?.Some vague I don't-know-what? — Terrapin Station
I didn't say anything about "complete descriptions." I don't know what that would be referring to. What makes a description "comploete" versus "incomplete"? — Terrapin Station
So how about the question I asked. Do you believe things exist that you can't describe? — Terrapin Station
How about this: "A description is complete if it describes every aspect of what it describes." — Michael Ossipoff
Vacuous because there's no way to quantify "aspects." — Terrapin Station
Why aren't you answering the question I asked you, by the way?
I only assert about describable metaphysics. — Michael Ossipoff
Yeah, "complete description" just seems like a nonsensical phrase to me (hence why I didn't say anything about "complete descriptions"). — Terrapin Station
What I was asking you wasn't as broad as what you paraphrased. I asked if you personally believe in anything you can't describe. — Terrapin Station
So that would suggest the answer to my question is "no."
I wouldn't say that. See above.
— Terrapin Station
Would you say there is a describable metaphysics of nonphysicals?
Yeah, "complete description" just seems like a nonsensical phrase to me (hence why I didn't say anything about "complete descriptions"). — Terrapin Station
If you're an identity theorist as I am, those two are not contradictory. Not that I share the view. I think that only some physical "stuff" is mental stuff, I'm not a property dualist, etc. — Terrapin Station
I don't think that it's unmeaningful to speak of what can defined, and referred to, and can be, in principle, described in all their aspects. (even if those aspects can't always be counted or enumerated.) — Michael Ossipoff
Of course. I'm modest enough to admit that there are all sorts of topics with things that I'm not qualified to describe. For example, I'm pretty much entirely ignorant of gardening practices and situations unique to Madagascar. — Michael Ossipoff
Just as there are the abstract facts — Michael Ossipoff
I'm curious, would an identity theorist have to reject Chalmers p-zombie world as being conceivable? — Marchesk
wouldn't convey what it's like, to someone who hadn't smelled mint. — Michael Ossipoff
We could say, "It's conceivable that everything is identical re the ice, temperature, etc. yet the ice wouldn't be slippery." P-zombies are "conceivable" in the same way as that. — Terrapin Station
I don't think that's a fair analogy. Perhaps Chalmers would suggest this as a better analogy: It is conceivable that something looks and feels exactly like slippery ice, and yet it is not ice. (Which, of course, is easily conceivable and even plausible.) But I am not sure that this is a fair analogy either. — SophistiCat
”I don't think that it's unmeaningful to speak of what can defined, and referred to, and can be, in principle, described in all their aspects. (even if those aspects can't always be counted or enumerated.)” — Michael Ossipoff
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I wouldn't say that it ever makes sense to talk about "all aspects" of anything.
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…and, to avoid that objection, I later said:
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What's completely describable is what doesn't have anything about it that can't, in principle, be known and described by humans.
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.”Of course. I'm modest enough to admit that there are all sorts of topics with things that I'm not qualified to describe. For example, I'm pretty much entirely ignorant of gardening practices and situations unique to Madagascar.” — Michael Ossipoff
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But you just described "gardening practices and situations unique to Madagascar,"
.…so that would be something you believe in that you can describe.
.”Just as there are the abstract facts” — Michael Ossipoff
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The only "abstract facts" there are are things like "Joe has formulated an abstraction (in other words, he's done something mentally, his brain has been in process in particular ways) re a concept of 'love'."
.”…wouldn't convey what it's like, to someone who hadn't smelled mint.” — Michael Ossipoff
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It's a truism about descriptions that they never convey what anything is like, experientially, to someone who hasn't experienced the thing in question. That's not a flaw of descriptions, it's a property of them. After all, they're just sets of words that people assign whatever personal meanings and concepts etc to. That's not going to amount to what any experience is like to anyone. Experiences aren't like words, or meanings, or concepts (especially not those formulated on other experiences) or other, different experiences that someone has had in general.
So, according to you, even by saying that you can’t describe something, you’re saying something about it, and thereby describing it. You know that that makes nonsense out of the word “describe”. — Michael Ossipoff
"Gardening practices" isn't a description of something? — Terrapin Station
No. It's the name of a topic, not a description of one. — Michael Ossipoff
The reason it's a fair analogy is that we're saying that:
(a) The physical make-up of x is exactly the same
and yet
(b) The properties of physical stuff x are different — Terrapin Station
I was wrong, and your (a) is right. But your (b) is not quite right: Chalmers (following Kripke) stipulates that zombies are identical to humans in all physical respects. But since slipperiness is a physical property, just as being made up of water molecules is, your analogy does not work either. It would be hard to come up with an analogy of the zombie argument for something like ice, because after you take away everything that is physical about it, it seems that nothing is left over. Chalmers wants you to believe that it is at least conceivable that phenomenal consciousness is an optional extra to all the physical stuff. I don't buy his argument, but I think it's not so obvious that you can just shrug it off. — SophistiCat
However, I think that "phenomenal consciousness" or "qualia" is a harder nut to crack than vitalism. Again, I am not agreeing with Chalmers et al., I just don't think that it is as obvious, as you say. There is something odd about consciousness that calls for a careful conceptual analysis. — SophistiCat
We could say, "It's conceivable that everything is identical re the ice, temperature, etc. yet the ice wouldn't be slippery." P-zombies are "conceivable" in the same way as that. — Terrapin Station
Identity theorists say that consciousness is identical to certain mental states. But for sake of argument, I can image a physically identical world lacking that identity. It's called all the other theories of consciousness. — Marchesk
I think it was T. H. Huxley (though I cannot find the quote), while critiquing vitalism, compared it to the belief that there is some essential "traininess" in a steam locomotive — SophistiCat
I'm fairly sure you're talking about his "on the hypothesis that animals are automata" essay, and it's comparing it to a steam whistle having no effect on its machinery. — JupiterJess
"Those folks are engaged in practices"
"What sort of practices?"
"Gardening practices"
--you just described something. — Terrapin Station
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