On one view of philosophical method, we are concerned with words rather than things, whether we realize it or not. — Welkin Rogue
Sometimes you see philosophers push back against language-first view, and insist that they are interested in X, rather than the meaning of ‘X’. But what do they mean? — Welkin Rogue
Sometimes folks (philosophers and others) try to basically "wave away" an issue by claiming that it's only a terminological dispute. As if they're implying that everyone really agrees on the non-linguistic stuff, but they just have disagreements about how to use language/which words to use. — Terrapin Station
But it's not the case for a lot of disputes that they're merely terminological. People are really disagreeing about what the world is like, independent of language. — Terrapin Station
Maybe the person just doesn't want to get into a dispute that they're tired of, or that they find silly, or futile, or whatever. — Terrapin Station
Maybe they're insular (and/or arrogant) enough that they actually have a difficult time understanding that someone could disagree with them about what the world is like. — Terrapin Station
And of course, sometimes disagreements are only terminological, — Terrapin Station
I am struggling to make sense of the distinction that seems to be assumed in such remarks between matters of language and matters of fact, as it is sometimes put. So again, I ask, what does it mean to be interested in (or to investigate) X, rather than in the meaning of ‘X’? Or to be talking about X, rather than talking about the meaning of ‘X’? — Welkin Rogue
There is a linguistic theory proposed by Louis Hjelmslev and developed furtherThe mysterious version of the <self> concept doesn’t refer not because there is nothing in the world that satisfies its conditions, but because its conditions are unspecified! — Welkin Rogue
Yes, philosophy seems an attempt to arrange the symbols in our mind to represent reality as accurately as possible. If/when we shift the focus from arranging the symbols to reality itself, that's the end of philosophy, a prospect which may understandably be unpopular with many philosophers. — Jake
As example, to observe an apple to the greatest degree possible we have to set aside all distractions, such as for instance, our ideas about apples. Observing an apple, and observing symbols which point to the apple, two different things. — Jake
Sometimes folks (philosophers and others) try to basically "wave away" an issue by claiming that it's only a terminological dispute. As if they're implying that everyone really agrees on the non-linguistic stuff, but they just have disagreements about how to use language/which words to use.
But it's not the case for a lot of disputes that they're merely terminological. People are really disagreeing about what the world is like, independent of language.
There could be various reasons for trying to wave away disputes as if they're only terminological. Maybe the person just doesn't want to get into a dispute that they're tired of, or that they find silly, or futile, or whatever. Maybe they're insular (and/or arrogant) enough that they actually have a difficult time understanding that someone could disagree with them about what the world is like. And of course, sometimes disagreements are only terminological, but that often doesn't seem to be the case. — Terrapin Station
The “things” have their own form – the state of things, or all actually existing separate bodies with their use, means of production, use, dispose of, etc. So, the word chair, as well as I, have been used simultaneously in two separate registers. — Number2018
Maybe the person just doesn't want to get into a dispute that they're tired of, or that they find silly, or futile, or whatever.
— Terrapin Station
Indeed. Or counterproductive, moving in the wrong direction, starting off on the wrong foot, with the wrong method. — macrosoft
Yes I bet people do throw around the accusation that some dispute is terminological quite loosely. But that's pretty lazy. It seems to me that there are various ways of a dispute being defective, and being 'terminological' or 'merely verbal' is just one of them. — Welkin Rogue
The “things” have their own form – the state of things, or all actually existing separate bodies with their use, means of production, use, dispose of, etc. So, the word chair, as well as I, have been used simultaneously in two separate registers.
— Number2018
Is 'thing' just the ordinary sense of 'thing' here? What does it add to say ""things" have their own form"?
What are the two registers of use for the word 'chair'? — Welkin Rogue
One could trace the etymology of the word chair, the use of it in different texts, dictionaries, situations, manufacture, marketing, and ergonomics instructions. On the contrary, the physical item “chair” does belong to the world of practical and aesthetic use, design, and production. Therefore, when one is in front of this given chair, it is not just about visual and tactile perceptions of it, one deals with a set of implicit cultural, economic, and social practices. — Number2018
If someone thinks of the it as a precise science like watch-making, then of course it's all about the details. But if someone thinks of it as an attempt to get a grasp on existence as a whole, then it's better to try to work backward from the big picture of the other person --and to help them do the same by emphasizing your own sense of the big picture. — macrosoft
Could I rephrase this thought in terms of Kuhnian paradigms? Philosophy as a "precise science" is philosophy as prosecuted by 'technicians' within a given paradigm; philosophy as something broader is a discussion between individuals occupying different paradigms (or, within a single individual entertaining multiple paradigms). This picture would suggest that the latter kind of philosophy is much more vulnerable to merely verbal disagreements, insofar as different 'paradigms' involve different systems of language. — Welkin Rogue
Nice way of saying it and good point. But how about this situation: two individuals are both on the lookout for merely verbal disagreements, though otherwise quite different. — macrosoft
Sometimes you see philosophers push back against language-first view, and insist that they are interested in X, rather than the meaning of ‘X’. — Welkin Rogue
You say two contradictory things - or at least two things which appear to be in tension. On the one hand, you seem to claim that discourses involving certain words, and things featuring in our forms of life, interact with one another. That's not surprising, since the way we talk and what we do are intimately related. How I think and talk about chairs partly determines what I do with chairs; what I do with chairs partly determined how I think and talk about chairs. But on the other hand, you claim there is an "abyss" between the two. — Welkin Rogue
In such cases, I think parties will need to carefully translate each other's utterances, and try to see what sorts of questions their interlocuters are asking. When we come from different paradigms, or have different perspectives (on a smaller, less systematic scale), we tend to ask different sorts of questions. This needs to be kept in mind. — Welkin Rogue
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