Whatever I experience I experience as an idea in my mind. — philosophy
However, I can never experience this object itself since this object is by definition independent of my experience. — philosophy
Your position would commit you to the existence of a thing (i.e. an external object) which you cannot experience. — philosophy
How can you prove the existence of that which you cannot experience? As far as I am aware, no philosopher has ever succeeded in this. — philosophy
But that's precisely the point - the idealist's claim (original post) that the existence of the external world cannot be proved is irrefutable. — philosophy
Do you think such a view can be refuted? — philosophy
But the realist position commits one to perceiving an unperceived object — philosophy
The idealist simply asks: How could you possibly know that? — philosophy
The idealist doesn't deny that one is perceiving an object. — philosophy
This pen in front of me that I am perceiving now is external to my body but it is not external to my mind. — philosophy
I have no idea what the relation between mind and body is — philosophy
I am not aware that I have made a claim about relative extension? — philosophy
The pen is external to the body in that it is outside my body. The pen is not external to my mind since it is being perceived, — philosophy
Sorry, could you clarify how you would distinguish between a locational and a non-locational view of externality? I have an idea of what you mean but I'd prefer you clarify to make sure I've understood. — philosophy
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