So you don't make distinctions between the idea of igneous rocks and actual igneous rocks. Got it.Yes, it is. — Terrapin Station
So you don't make distinctions between the idea of igneous rocks and actual igneous rocks. Got it. — Harry Hindu
Again, there is a distinction between words about some idea and words about some state-of-affairs.Not re aboutness, and if you do, you have no comprehension of aboutness. — Terrapin Station
Again, there is a distinction between words about some idea and words about some state-of-affairs. — Harry Hindu
You are the one that said you can only make statements of belief. — Harry Hindu
This is just not true. Think of how a child learns to use the word cup. The child has no idea what a rule is, but by learning to use the word in social settings they implicitly learn to follow rules. The two go hand-in-hand. — Sam26
No, you have just made an invalid inference. You claim that if the child has learned how to use the word "cup", this implies that the child has learned how to follow rules. That is begging the question. It's only true if using language requires following rules. But that's what you need to prove, not assume. You will never prove it though, because the converse is obviously what is true. — Metaphysician Undercover
Some, sure. But it makes little sense to say philosophy belongs, or ought to belong to that subclass. The rules of chess are more or less utterly contingent and utterly arbitrary after all (constrained only by the - already contingent - choice of an 8x8 grid, our physionomy, and our intelligence and history). Insofar as philosophy asks after how things in reality hang together in the broad sense, the constraints which govern its discourse ought to be far more significant that than those which govern a frivolity like chess. — StreetlightX
Once the rules, say, of syntax are arbitrarily decided, then whether we use such rules correctly or not can be seen objectively. — Sam26
The ability to agree with each other tells us there is some consistency between our realities, but in some aspects our realities may be widely different, I may experience things that you don't and vice versa, so how do we communicate about it then?
There are things we seem to be able to communicate through looking into someone's eyes, through some behavior, that we can't communicate with words.
The way we use language rests on a bunch of implicit assumptions, yet we feel as if we can talk about the whole of reality by using words, but we're just fooling ourselves. — leo
When you learn to use a word, then you have also learned how to follow a rule. — Sam26
There is an implicit rule involved in using the word correctly, it goes hand-in-hand with language. — Sam26
So, to learn to use a word, as in my e.g., is to learn a rule about how to use the word. — Sam26
Premise (1): If all languages are rule-governed, then necessarily, learning to use a word is a rule-governed activity.
Premise (2): All languages are rule governed.
Conclusion: Therefore, necessarily, learning to use a word is a rule-governed activity. — Sam26
There is an implicit rule involved in using the word correctly, it goes hand-in-hand with language — Sam26
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