I don't either. Rather it's the complete lack of evidence of any other relevant phenomena that means that the preferences are all that's going on. — Terrapin Station

Sorry, were you the person I was talking to about the hammer?
I think you are right in noticing preference is often soley present, but I think there are also instances where there is objective utility as well. A ball is objectively good at rolling, as opposed to a box. Whether a preference for rolling exists or not, whether a mind is there to categorise/notice or not, the ball still rolls and the box does not.
It doesnt seem like your view here is accepting there are exceptions to your observation about the presence of preference.

I think a possible difference between preference and morality is that you could change someones moral ideas by argument but you are unlikely to change someones dislike of pork or their sexuality through argument.

What type of 'society' could you and I build where you may have your way and where I must agree to it, or not? — gloaming

The problem is that the only way a society is validated is by simply existing and not by passing some kind of moral test. If someone tries to change a society to suit his or her notion of good they are attempting to use persuasion or force to make another set of behaviors more prevalent.

I think moral nihilism can lead to caution in making moral assertions and would require actions to have stronger justifications. If justification for an action turns out to be simply preference that would undermine moral claims.

I don't see how you can resolve a moral dispute by preferences because then that ends up as morality by brute force or survival of the fittest. — Andrew4Handel

Let me just clarify, first, what an example would be in your view of resolving a moral dispute? I can propose examples, but I want to make sure that we're addressing the sort of thing you have in mind.

Is it not based then on preexisting moral ideas. — Andrew4Handel

I'm not sure what you have in mind there, either.

What I was getting at is that we're naming a limited set of things "morality," and one of the criteria for limiting the set there is that we're talking about interpersonal behavior. Another criterion is that we're talking about interpersonal behavior that people consider more significant than just etiquette.

I think a possible difference between preference and morality is that you could change someones moral ideas by argument but you are unlikely to change someones dislike of pork or their sexuality through argument. — Andrew4Handel

Even assuming that would be the case, and not exploring what's going on further, that would simply tell us that moral preferences are changeable, but some other sorts of preferences are not.

The way you change someone's moral ideas by argument is that you get to the root preferences as well as the person is aware of their root preferences, then you show that some consequent judgments they're making are not consistent with what their root preferences supposedly are.

The way that would work with food with be analogous to this:

Joe loves chicken, mushrooms and red wine, say
You suggest taking Joe to a French restaurant. You want him to try the coq au vin.
Joe says, "Ew, no! I'm not going to like that. I don't like French food!"
You say, "But coq au vin is just chicken and mushrooms cooked in red wine--you love all of those!"

That doesn't imply that whether Joe likes (or rather winds up liking) coq au vin is not a preference that he has. It's just that if he dislikes coq au vin it seems inconsistent with his root likes--chicken, mushrooms, red wine. Maybe Joe will wind up liking coq au vin after all. But if he doesn't, then we (and Joe perhaps) simply have to refine our knowledge of Joe's preferences.

Sorry, were you the person I was talking to about the hammer?
I think you are right in noticing preference is often soley present, but I think there are also instances where there is objective utility as well. A ball is objectively good at rolling, as opposed to a box. Whether a preference for rolling exists or not, whether a mind is there to categorise/notice or not, the ball still rolls and the box does not.
It doesnt seem like your view here is accepting there are exceptions to your observation about the presence of preference. — DingoJones

Yes re the hammer.

A ball isn't objectively "good" at rolling. It has certain objective properties when it's rolling, and certain objective properties when it's in a box. A hammer s certain objective properties when it's tumbling down an incline, too, and certain objective properties when it's in a box. None of those are objectively good or bad. They just objectively ARE whatever they are.

whether a mind is there to categorise/notice or not, the ball still rolls and the box does not. — DingoJones

Yes. What's not the case is that any of those properties are objectively good or bad.

The way you have changed someones moral preferences is by giving a moral argument. Whether there preference changes is based on the success of the argument.

On the other hand if someone dislikes pork and you cook it in a delicious sauce you could disguise the fact it was pork and make them appreciate it that way. But I don't think moral arguments aim to change peoples preferences by subterfuge. (an emotive argument might however)

So I don't moral arguments are simply an attempt to change peoples preferences but rather to invoke reason

Let me just clarify, first, what an example would be in your view of resolving a moral dispute? — Terrapin Station

I would ideally like to be able to show someone that their behaviors or beliefs were wrong. I would want to persuade them based on reason.

I am currently a moral nihilist because I think it is not possible to prove a behavior or attitude is wrong.

What I was getting at is that we're naming a limited set of things "morality," and one of the criteria for limiting the set there is that we're talking about interpersonal behavior. — Terrapin Station

But where are we getting the initial concept of morality from?

A moral sense seems to entail someone believes something is objectively wrong even if this turns out to be a preference or mistake.

I am not sure to what extent we can disentangle ourselves from our upbringing and cultural influences but still we do have some strong moral intuitions.

I think by doing moral philosophy we might lose our intuitions. If morality turns out to be simply a product of culture that is very worrying leading to arbitrary fluctuating principles.

I would say that the word "moral" means "feels good" or "will lead to feeling good" in however many ways you can fathom it, and "immoral" means "causes pain". So the very dichotomy comes from the dichotomy of the pleasure-pain axis.
Force comes into it because obviously, without the use of force, no morality can exist; with no might you cannot make anything right, and so moral decisions can only be made by those using force. Just that some act in favour of their own pleasure-pain axis and against those of others.

I see, using “good” differently. I had in mind something like “well suited”. Eventually we can discuss the morality issue, I was intending to make this point first and should have chosen my words more carefully.
That is, unless you are no more satisfied with “well suited” than with morally good....?

"Morality Versus Action"
All morality depends on action.
For morality to mean anything, force has to be used. Otherwise it is just a plea for the T-rex not to eat you. If you or a third party cannot bring force to bear against the T-rex to get it to relent, then morality is just a whimper for mercy.
And even any moral system that denounces "force" or "violence", it would have to arbitrate its claims using violent force.

I see, using “good” differently. I had in mind something like “well suited”. — DingoJones

Say that you have two ball-like objects.

One is so round, so smooth, with so little friction, that we can just tap it lightly and it will roll for a mile.

The other is so bumpy, with so much friction, that it takes a tremendous amount of effort to roll at all. It will roll, but it takes a lot of force to barely get one revolution out of it.

Which one is more "well-suited" to roll?

All morality depends on action. — Hallucinogen

Morality can mean and probably usually means not acting.

Not stealing, not lying not causing harm. The problem is convincing other people not to do these actions as well.

Positive moral actions probably means altruism and charity. But one might also be concerned with ones own attitudes and beliefs such as trying not hold prejudice beliefs.

However this all seems problematic if there are no moral truths to pursue.

Morality can mean and probably usually means not acting. — Andrew4Handel

So the problem then is what is the point of calling behavior immoral if it has already happened?I think moral judgement are used to judge the past and influence future action. In this sense it is abstract.

I would say that the word "moral" means "feels good" or "will lead to feeling good" in however many ways you can fathom it, and "immoral" means "causes pain". So the very dichotomy comes from the dichotomy of the pleasure-pain axis. — Hallucinogen

The problem is we can judge some pain as good and some pleasure as bad.

We can judge painful life saving surgery as good and we can see the pleasure from drugs and alcohol or over eating as bad. Or we can simply not judge pain or pleasure morally.

i think virtue ethics focuses on character and the motivation of the person acting.

On the other hand deontology see morality as obedience and following laws.

Personally I think minimizing suffering is very desirable regardless of moral convictions. I can't see the benefit of excess suffering. I don't think minimizing suffering is moral as opposed to pragmatic or a strong almost inevitable preference

Say that you have two ball-like objects.

One is so round, so smooth, with so little friction, that we can just tap it lightly and it will roll for a mile.

The other is so bumpy, with so much friction, that it takes a tremendous amount of effort to roll at all. It will roll, but it takes a lot of force to barely get one revolution out of it.

Which one is more "well-suited" to roll? — Terrapin Station

The one that has the most traits that are well suited to rolling. In your example it sounds like the smooth, mile rolling one. These traits are mind independent. They exist and are condusive to rolling regardless of why the ball is rolled, or what any mind thinks of as good rolling traits. Maybe the person rolling the ball is an idiot, and thinks that the bumpy one is the better roller. It doesnt matter what he thinks.
Same with the hammer and the dead fish. Regardless of any subjective opinion or belief or any other subjective thing the hammer will hammer the nail better than the dead fish. Even if you take two hammers and its impossible to tell which is better suited at hammering, it would only strengthen my claim. There is a fact of the matter about which hammer is better, or ball, or hammer to dead fish or whatever else...traits suited for things are that way whether humans know, or care or whatever subjective phenomenon you have in mind. Thats objective as you are using it here, is it not? Its worth repeating that I dont think we are dealing with mutually exclusive concepts here, it seems to me that there is overlap. Figuring out where the boundries are require me to convince you of this bit of mind independence first. Did it work? Do you think that the traits themselves that things possess are mind independent? If so, then the interactions between or of these mind independent things can likewise be mind independent, even though they wont always be so such as in the case of a person making a mistake about whether or not a trait of an object is in fact mind independent.

The one that has the most traits that are well suited to rolling. In your example it sounds like the smooth, mile rolling one. These traits are mind independent. — DingoJones

Okay, so the next question is, why is rolling via less force, further, with less friction, more distance etc. "more well-suited to rolling"? You're claiming that's objectively the case. What makes rolling via less force, etc. the "well-suited" rolling versus rolling via more force, less distance, etc.?

Okay, so the next question is, why is rolling via less force, further, with less friction, more distance etc. "more well-suited to rolling"? You're claiming that's objectively the case. What makes rolling via less force, etc. the "well-suited" rolling versus rolling via more force, less distance, etc.? — Terrapin Station

I edited that last post a bit fyi.
Well this is the overlap. I think it is precisely where a human being would make a mistake un assigning an objective trait, by inserting some human end like knocking down pins on a bowling lane. One could just as easily invent a game where bumpy ball is better suited, strengthening your own point. The traits valued are subjective.
However, “rolling” is something that happens objectively, and however you define the term “rolling” there are going to be traits better suited to it and traits not as well suited.

However, “rolling” is something that happens objectively, and however you define the term “rolling” there are going to be traits better suited to it — DingoJones

Hence me asking why is rolling via less force, further, with less friction, more distance etc. "more well-suited to rolling" versus rolling via more force, less distance, etc.? What's the answer to that?

Hence me asking why is rolling via less force, further, with less friction, more distance etc. "more well-suited to rolling" versus rolling via more force, less distance, etc.? What's the answer to that? — Terrapin Station

I was hoping it would be obvious from my last comment that your question is ignoring an important distinction.
Lets do it your way though. I will happily answer your question but I need to know what you mean by “rolling”. Whatever your answer is, there will be a scale of well suited to less well suited traits. Something that cannot roll for example, cannot sensibly be said to be well suited to rolling.

I need to know what you mean by “rolling”. — DingoJones

The standard dictionary definition will do: "moving by turning over and over on an axis."

So what's the answer to the question I asked you?

Ok, well your definition of rolling doesnt include anything about force or further or friction etc etc, so it seems like a poorly worded question now that you have provided how you want to mean “rolling”. As I explained (tried ), my answer will simply be an accounting of what the best traits are for what “rolling” means. I suspect you will not find that satisfactory, but Im not trying to dodge here. I feel like ive provided an argument that makes your question irrelevant.

Come on, now. You said you'd answer if I gave a definition of "rolling." I did that. The definition of "rolling" doesn't actually matter for the question, but I gave one because you asked. I'm fine with you suggesting a different definition.

Re "my answer will simply be an accounting of what the best traits are for what 'rolling' means," so how about actually giving an answer rather than only teasing what your answer would be like?

You miss the point Im afriad. It doesnt matter how rolling is defined, thats why I asked you fir yours, to show that my argument doesnt require a specific definition. You arent engaging with much of what im saying, do you intend to at some point?
Anyway, You are right I had said I would do it your way.
My answer: rolling via less force, further, with less friction, more distance etc are NOT better suited traits for rolling becuase none of those things are encompassed in the definition of rolling.
Now what?

Sure, so in the scenario I presented, neither option is objectively better suited for rolling in your opinion?

No, none of those traits (thats what you meant by “option”?) are traits that are strictly “rolling”
Traits, and thats not my opinion its yours. (Your definition of rolling excluded them).

In your hammer and fish example, is one thing objectively more well-suited to hammering nails? If so, what definition of "hammering" does that depend on?

Lol, ball analogy not working out? The principals are the same, switching to hammers or other examples won’t change that.
Your turn, have you any responses to my actual arguements above? I don’t know that we necessarily disagree on much, but as far as I can tell my points above stand.

But you just said that neither ball is more objectively well-suited to rolling. So if the principles are the same . . . ? The goal here isn't to score points, it's to explain something to you.