I guess my concern is that I don't believe in objects. — macrosoft

Well, then I don't know what to say. Objects are what populate logical space.

Can you expand on this? It's quite interesting... — Posty McPostface

Well, I come from linguistics, not philosophy, here. In linguistics, there are (at least) two major ideas of meaning:

The first is the semantic triangle: We talk about the real world. We see a thing, we associate a conept with it, and then we encode that in a word - then the word is decoded into a concept and the concept related back to a thing. (That's Ogden/Richards.)

The second is the structuralist approach, where a word consists of signifier (a sign) and a signified (a concept). The structuralist approach keeps reference within the word, and words derive meaning from the difference between words rather than the real world. The common way to illustrate is that if you point to a tree and say "tree", you can't possibly know that what the other person actually means is "tree". He could be saying "big," or "plant", or "look!"...

Both approaches have their limitiations, but I find them both useful. Neither of them go deeply into what constitutes real life, though. And that's what's sort of difficult here:

When we use words to define other words, we're firmly in the structuralist territory. You say "Posty McPostface" is your alter ego, but by saying that as Posty McPostface you imply some level of overlap. That overlap is an overlap of signfireds, though, of concepts. We can play a game: "Posty McPostface is a person." Ture or false? A series of such questions can make the meaning more clear, but all the while I have no access whatsoever to any referent - there's only my imagination. And while you <i>do</i> have access to the referent, it doesn't seem like you care much about it: in fact, you seem to be taking it for granted and try to make some difference that you can't count on others going along with. But that's only possible because there's a body out there that carries both tags (according to social levels of appropriateness).

Now when it comes to the thingly layer, I find Husserlian phenomenology attractive: it's unaccessible in pure form; all we know are phenomena. That complicates things for the current issue:

Back to the structuralist pointing at a tree: he's seeing a phenomenon, something that presents itself as a tree. It's not that the tree isn't a tree, and while others might not know whether he says "tree", he himself does. My "tree" may not be your "tree", but there's a referent out there, a thing, that arbitrates between us. We can run into trees, for example, they're solid. We should have similar experiences.

So the question is: Is this putative referent, the thing behind the phenomenon that serves as referent, relevant to "naming"?

A name is also a type of phenomenon: it's a tag. When I read a post by "Posty McPostface", I contrue a continuity there - a person behind the post. I have no other access whatsoever to you, nor do I seek one. But because of the meaning I attach to "person" I assume that there is a phenomenon out there that correlates to Posty McPostface in the same way that Dawnstrom correlates to "me" (which is the only fist person experience I have access to). As such, "Posty McPostface" is primary to me, and if we were ever to meet by accident and uncover our mutual identies (alter-egos, if you will), then that's the only shared history we have, and it should dominate our real-world interactions, too. It's all about day-to-day relevance structure: which name applies does not change according to who we are; it changes according to who we are with or in what context we move. Meanwhile, there is no other body who can bear the label of "Posty McPostface" and no other body than mine who can bear the lable of "Dawnstorm". The names say nothing about us; they just identify us phenomena. Because we know the meaning of a name, and because we apply the name, a persony thing becomes a bit more of a person.

Your "Posty McPostface" persona may differ from your other personae in many ways; but it's no less what you're doing with your body. And that's what makes negotiating when to use what name possible in the first place. It's a perspective game: if I meet you in real life, Posty McPostface is the only label I have for you, and you have to decide whether you're fine with that, or whether you don't want that name in that context. But none of that is a question of whether or not I have the right referent. Similarly, if I meet you in real life, and I refer to you as Posty McPostface, I'm clearly not reducing you to your online posts. I can't meet your online-posts in any other way than on a computer screen. The only thing that the name would imply is that this person before me at one point in the past made those posts. You're Posty McPostface if that's true, and you're not Posty McPostface if that's not.

Your online name and your offline name(s) have only one thingly referent - there can be no other.

Now when it comes to the thingly layer, I find Husserlian phenomenology attractive: it's unaccessible in pure form; all we know are phenomena. — Dawnstorm

Indeed. What are "thinglys" as you describe them?

Your online name and your offline name(s) have only one thingly referent - there can be no other. — Dawnstorm

But, ontologically I exist as a concept in your mind made possible through our context of my interactions with you on this forum. The thingly is a concept as you have noted, no?

Yes. Since it's perceptive after all.

Yes. Since it's perceptive after all. — NuncAmissa

So, then, how is meaning obtained from examples like Pegasus, Harry Potter, Luke Skywalker? Context, yes? This also touches on how is meaning shared?

Yes. It becomes perceptive because these contexts may vary from one individual to another.

Yes. It becomes perceptive because these contexts may vary from one individual to another. — NuncAmissa

So, then Posty McPostface is just another empty name, no? The meaning as per other examples is derived from associating the name with a concept in your mind...

Why should a name have to refer to a concrete entity in order not to be considered "empty"? I mean what possible effective difference could the concrete, as opposed to say fictional, existence of an entity have on the name itself? What if a name refers to someone everyone thinks really exists/existed but in fact does not/ did not; would that mean that the name is "empty" (whatever that might mean) even though no one knows that its referent is fictive? Or is the name "full" unless and until it is discovered that its referent does not concretely exist or has not concretely existed, whereupon it suddenly becomes 'empty'. That would seem to make no sense at all.

What are "thinglys" as you describe them? — Posty McPostface

"Thingly" is merely an adjective that means "of or related to things". I'm not sure philosophers use the term; I don't read a lot.

But, ontologically I exist as a concept in your mind made possible through our context of my interactions with you on this forum. — Posty McPostface

Yes. And that's the only mode of your existance that's accessible to me. I do think that's not the full extent of your existance, though.

The thingly is a concept as you have noted, no?

Well, the divisions between concept/thing and between phenomenon/thing are themselves concepts, but within that concept, things are things, not concepts, and only accessible as phenomena.

Phenomena are things as they appear, and the as-they-appear part is what connects things to concepts, though concepts exist even if no things appear. It's a little messy.

The name "Posty McPostface" denotes you, a person whom all of us are having an intelligent conversation with. I argue that if you never had that name I couldn't quote you. It maybe "empty" but not necessarily meaningless.

Why should a name have to refer to a concrete entity in order not to be considered "empty"? — Janus

Well, if we're on the same page, meaning that we are 'realists' in some sense, then that would mean that proper names have to have rigid designators to be called proper names in the first place.

I mean what possible effective difference could the concrete, as opposed to say fictional, existence of an entity have on the name itself? — Janus

None, with respect to the name itself. Just an issue if we're trying to discern meaning derived from empty names, that are contextually bound to have meaning and not as a 'fact' or 'proposition' that one could analyze and claim is valid.

What if a name refers to someone everyone thinks really exists/existed but in fact does not/ did not; would that mean that the name is "empty" (whatever that might mean) even though no one knows that its referent is fictive? — Janus

Yes, that's the Santa Clause paradox in a nutshell. Children genuinely believe in Santa Claus as the old man that gives presents for being a good Samaritan.

Yes. And that's the only mode of your existance that's accessible to me. I do think that's not the full extent of your existance, though. — Dawnstorm

I agree, and think that Posty McPostface is just a persona on these forums. Nothing more to it given the limitations of this form of communication between us. If I were to meet you in real life, I could tell you my real name.

Phenomena are things as they appear, and the as-they-appear part is what connects things to concepts, though concepts exist even if no things appear. It's a little messy. — Dawnstorm

I think I'm getting it. If you were a direct realist and didn't believe in any homunculus or representative realism, then that would be true. But, given the nature of thought, which makes me assume a indirect realist position, then I don't think this person known as Posty McPostface is my real character or personality. It's just an alter-ego.

It maybe "empty" but not necessarily meaningless. — NuncAmissa

Yes, so we're stuck at square one. How do empty names have meaning?

It's really circular from what you can figure out by now.

then that would mean that proper names have to have rigid designators to be called proper names in the first place. — Posty McPostface

Do names "have" rigid designators or are they not themselves thought to be rigid designators? As I understand it ( which is not much!) the alternative to rigid designation is definite description: and I have sometimes wondered how what is designated by any proper name could, in the absence of direct ostension, be determined at all without the aid of definite description.

Do names "have" rigid designators or are they not themselves thought to be rigid designators? — Janus

Depends on how you view things. Again, if I were an indirect realist (which I am), then objects are akin to noumena, and their representations or 'concepts' are what actually integrate their meaning from. Borrowing from Wittgenstein, if I lion could speak, we wouldn't be able to understand it, even. Dunno if that was irrelevant but felt like the right thing to say in this regard.

A direct realist would assert that we have immediate access to objects in the world, and the phenomenology of their perception is irrelevant. I don't agree with this for the matter.

In my opinion, it's basically perceptive and opinionated. Empty names have meanings based on the contexts they were taken from. If there was no context or previous knowledge, then the name is meaningless. Like how the name "Santa Claus" would not bring up the image of a fat red dude bringing presents for a young child who did not learn about him.

So, the alternative to names being rigid designators is that they have rigid designators? Since what is designated by a name cannot itself be the designator of a name, then what could the rigid designator the name is held to have be? Also, I can't really see what the noumenal could have to do with naming, since it is defined as that which lies beyond the limits of language altogether.

The distinction isn't apparent in my mind. Care to expand on what you have said?

I'm not sure what distinction you are referring to.

So, the alternative to names being rigid designators is that they have rigid designators? — Janus

About this is what I'm having trouble understanding. Are you saying they're distinct or the same?

I agree, and think that Posty McPostface is just a persona on these forums. Nothing more to it given the limitations of this form of communication between us. If I were to meet you in real life, I could tell you my real name. — Posty McPostface

Okay, let's say I lie so convincingly that you end up thinking my hobby is polishing tomatoes. Since that's a rather unusual hobby you remember it. So we meet, and you say "Ah, you're that guy who's hobby it is to polish tomatoes." You'd be wrong, but you'd be referring to the right person.

Proper names work like that. They identify unique things; they don't describe them. Sure, I can ask the question with the meaning you have in mind, too: "Are you Posty McPostface?" But that's a derived usuage that means something "Is that really how you are?" It's a philosophical question about identity and little to do with naming. "Are you Posty McPostface?" is equivent to the question "Are you the person who posts on thephilosophyforum.com under the name Posty McPostface?" It has no other meaning. That you can add a nomen-est-omen layer to the question and transform it into something else isn't relevant for determining reference.

So, the alternative to names being rigid designators is that they have rigid designators? — Janus


About this is what I'm having trouble understanding. Are you saying they're distinct or the same? — Posty McPostface

Well, I am trying to understand whether you think there is a difference between names "having rigid designators" (your phrase) and being rigid designators (the usual locution). Personally, think the logic of the two expressions precludes them from being the same, so they must be distinct. But what matters is what you think since it was you used the unusual phrase.

In my mind there's no difference between the two. Although, now I'll refrain from using having where being is more appropriate.

Okay, let's say I lie so convincingly that you end up thinking my hobby is polishing tomatoes. Since that's a rather unusual hobby you remember it. So we meet, and you say "Ah, you're that guy who's hobby it is to polish tomatoes." You'd be wrong, but you'd be referring to the right person. — Dawnstorm

I'm a tomato polisher too. How awesome to meet someone with the same hobby. :)

"Are you Posty McPostface?" is equivent to the question "Are you the person who posts on thephilosophyforum.com under the name Posty McPostface?" It has no other meaning. — Dawnstorm

But you just created meaning right now by referring to the place where I post under the guise of "Posty McPostface".

I invite anyone to reply.

While it's fascinating to try to pin down what proper names are, I think it's at least noteworthy that seems to be like trying to pin down the infinite system of language down in a few finite paragraphs. Can we exhaust what it is to name? No doubt we can brighten the space of the question.

Sometimes discussions on language remind me of a knight who goes to fight a dragon without his shield, thinking he has only to deal with a chameleon. With language we get massive complexity and flexibility, mostly automatic. Somehow the words pour out and somehow we understand this pouring. We understand 'proposition' in context. We can replace it with other words ('statement','judgment'). But if we keep going we find that we are chasing the meaning of 'one' word across the vast space of the language as a whole.

But you just created meaning right now by referring to the place where I post under the guise of "Posty McPostface". — Posty McPostface

Rather than "it has no other meaning," I should have probably said, "it has no other type of meaning," or something like that? It's not that easy to talk about - names identify, they don't describe. That would be pretty straightforward, if you didn't need some sort of description to identify things.

The point is this: as long as I have enough information to identify you, it doesn't matter how accurate my picture of you is.

Also, I just squished a tomato a little, and now it's got a rather ugly brownish spot. I need to get better at judging pressure.

Hmm. I think the correspondence theory of truth fails us here. What does Pegasus correspond to?

The point is this: as long as I have enough information to identify you, it doesn't matter how accurate my picture of you is. — Dawnstorm

I don't know about that. You can always be wrong about me being a nice Posty McPostface and am evil instead. When is "enough information" accurate in forming a picture about someone?