^ example "Santa Clause" refer to the story of an old man who give present to good children on Christmas. That concept is indeed real, and the name "Santa Clause" is indeed have meaning (Even though the person don't). When we said "I want to dress up like santa-clause on christmas" and ZERO people know what we are talking about like "Who is Santa clause?" you can say, that name have "Empty Meaning". But people now what Santa Clause is, the person it's not real, the concept are.

get the gist of it? It's the same with Harry

There's something divine and mystical about reason and logos, noesis, and such. — Posty McPostface

But to me that's the passion! Passion is not just sexual lust and hunger. There is a passion for something lofty, call it what we will. That's why pragmatism can be such a turn off, though some pragmatists found a way to grasp at the higher with it. (For me the higher is mostly a feeling that we strive to attain and hold onto.) Philosophy is from that perspective a music of concepts.

The limits of my language are the limits of my world; but, then I learn something new and expand on those limits. — Posty McPostface

I agree. The circle. We push against its limits and stretch it.

Yes, so it's all mental constructs then and webs of belief, yes? Meaning that is.

^Yes :D, I think when we said "Empty Names" just because there are no value in the mix of alphabet is not helpful. EXCEPT you believe the concept of "Oh we want our child to be a great ruler so we want to name him "Kaiser" and not "Bob"

all mental constructs then and webs of belief, yes? Meaning that is. — Posty McPostface

^Btw, if you are hateful toward the definition of meaning, be careful to not fall to nihilistic trap k :D

There are things that we derive meaning from that are and never will be subject to appraisals. Like the Mona Lisa or Bach's Sheep May Safely Graze. I used to be a utilitarian; but, setting up the criteria upon which we could appraise value is a hopeless and soullessness task.

There are things that we derive meaning from that are and never will be subject to appraisals. Like the Mona Lisa or Bach's Sheep May Safely Graze. I used to be a utilitarian; but, setting up the criteria upon which we could appraise value is a hopeless and soullessness task. — Posty McPostface

Yeah, well said. Trying to fit everything into a scheme and calling that the height of being human seems wrong to me. Or not wrong but just an inferior music. For me the goal is vaguely to turn the music up, light more candles, live with more depth and flow. Philosophy is just one way to do that better, a way focused on the conceptual aspect of existence. Since I love the conceptual, it's at the very top --right next to music and of course being with others in the best kind of way.

Amen.

Amen indeed. I have these little moments in my life. People I work with. Friends-at-work. There is a restrained tenderness in smiles exchanged. 'Love hides.' The world ain't so dead. We just have learned caution, those who are tuned in in some kind of vague way to what it vaguely is all about. And I think that is all of us sometimes. And that maybe there is a natural tendency toward getting better at that. 'Philosophy...is an activity.' It's not a set of dead propositions, etc. Books are treasures, but the First Book is life itself.

One thing I must throw in is that this is no denial or what is evil or terrible about existence. Blah blah. We love in spite of that, and not without hating at moments too. Obvious things, but any kind of positive spiel looks naive to those not currently plugged in to a sense of wonder. Sometimes it's not cool to not know and to know that one doesn't know in a knowing way. Complex stuff, and people are devilishly complex, too complex for their own understanding of themselves except in terms of a few general principles perhaps.

One name isn't more "real" than another.

Rather than "real," some distinctions that make sense are whether it's your legal name, whether it's your birth name, whether it's your married name, whether it's a dba name ("doing business as"), whether it's an assumed name or alias (those are more general "known as" names where there has been no legal name change), whether it's a pseudonym, etc.

Exactly. All names are entirely arbitrary, even those so-called understood as one's 'real name'. The line between reality and fiction does not run between anything so shallow and fickle as a name. Thinking otherwise is to be conned by grammar.

So, what are abstract descriptive concepts like Pegasus, Posty McPostface, and Harry Potter? — Posty McPostface

Those are proper names, not descriptions. Proper names aren't types or tokens of a type.

A type is something like a music CD--it's a category of things, there are many different music CDs. A token is an individual CD.

Those are proper names, not descriptions. Proper names aren't types or tokens of a type. — Terrapin Station

Ah, I'm sorry for the mistake. I meant to imply that 'proper names' (if they can be called that without a denoting token) such as "Posty McPostface" is an entity that exists on these forums or that "Harry Potter" is the main fictional character of the Harry Potter franchise.

Does that make better sense?

It doesn't make sense because you're trying to make proper names fit an idea that they don't fit. Proper names are neither types nor tokens of some type.

Think of it this way. Types are kind of like sets with many members. So you have something like the set of all trees, or the set of all computers, or whatever. Tokens are particular members of one of those sets. So a particular tree, a particular computer, and so on.

Proper names aren't sets or members of a set. They're more like simply sounds that we grunt out in response to a particular thing. "Plunard"--and you point that that particular thing so that whenever you see it, you're going to make that sound to represent it to yourself and others, to call it, etc.

Just because a name isn't the name that someone goes by in every situation, or just because it's the name of a fictional character or whatever, that doesn't mean that it's not a proper name or that it's a type of thing or a token of a type.

Interesting point. I wonder what other members think.

Proper names aren't sets or members of a set. — Terrapin Station

The can be rigid designators that denote an "object that instantiates concepts", though.

The can be rigid designators that denote an "object the instantiates concepts", though. — Posty McPostface

Which wouldn't be proper names, however.

Then what are objects that instantiate concepts?

Then what are objects that instantiate concepts? — Posty McPostface

It seems almost like you're not even reading what you're writing. The answer here is tokens.

I'm basically asking you why aren't proper names also referred to as tokens for things? Is this an issue?

It seems clear to me that types are the descriptive content of tokens. So why not include token under the monkier of proper names which would designate that descriptive content?

Re proper names as tokens, what set would you say a proper name belongs to?

It's simply just the label of a/the set. Not the set itself.

It's simply just the label of a/the set. Not the set itself. — Posty McPostface

What? Did you understand what i said earlier about how types/tokens are similar to a set and members of a set?

Yes, I did. But what is the name of a set? Its proper name or rigid designator?

I'm basically asking you why aren't proper names also referred to as tokens for things? Is this an issue? — Posty McPostface

Consider the following exchange:

A: Am I speaking with John Smith?
B: Yes. How can I help you?
A: Please sign this receipt for...
B: Oh no, you want my uncle.
A: No, I want John Smith. That's you right.
B: I'm also a John Smith, but the John Smith who sold....

In this exchange, A uses "John Smith" exclusively as a proper name, but B, in the last line of the exchange, uses "John Smith" as type/token word with the meaning "people named John Smith".

Words generally have meanings, and then you check whether an object qualifies for those meanings.

Proper names don't work like that. There's a 1:1 relationship of reference between the name and a single object. The object can change completely; what matters is that it retains the name, and that's a matter of social convention and not meaning. You don't have to fulfill any sort of semantic criterea to qualify for any proper name attached to you; the continuity of the relationship between the name and the ting itself is what matters, and it's also what's invoked when you say the name.

It seems clear to me that types are the descriptive content of tokens. So why not include token under the monkier of proper names which would designate that descriptive content?

Because there's no descriptive content in a proper name. "Harry Potter" describes nothing - it's just the name assigned to a fictional character. I assume there are Harry Potters in real life, and they don't have to be anything like the fictional character. I could call my favourite coffe cup "Harry Potter", if I wanted to. The act of assigning a name is all that matters for proper names. That you henceforth associate the proper name with the person/thing in question and expect certain features of the person/thing to remain constant has little to do with the name itself.

I'm not sure the example gets to the difference between type/token and proper names. It seems to me that both speakers there are using proper names. the only possible type/token implication is that one could see the lexical entity 'john smith' as a type for the two token names "John Smith [1]" and "John Smith [2]" given the name is a homonym. I think the more nature description though would just be say there's any ambiguity in the name: they just sound alike but in fact reference two different things, like a river 'bank' vs. a financial 'bank'.

I haven’t read the entire thread, so I apologize if someone else talked about this. I recommend reading “Naming and Necessity” by Saul Kripke. He is seen as the preeminent authority on this subject.

I will jump in without reading the entire thread. Sorry for being lazy and sorry if someone else mentioned this.

You should read "Naming and Necessity" by Saul Kripke. He is widely recognized as the preeminent authority on this topic.

I have considered reading that book but don't have the ability to read long books. Can you summarize what you think is pertinent to this topic with respect to that book?

It's really not a long book. Just a series of lectures. Weren't you considering majoring in philosophy?

It's been years since I've read it myself, and I don't remember his arguments any more, but I DO know that you would be well-served reading Kripke if you truly want an understanding of the topic.