That would only settle the truthfulness of statements about the properties of Holmes within the stories. — Herg

(a) Within the stories and (b) re how people think about him, catalyzed by the stories, for example. Again, (b) is about whether particular things follow from an imagining, consistent with the concepts employed, etc. (though this can always be overridden by a particular imaginer).

That's all there is to these things.

MindForged says that Holmes is more famous than any other detective, meaning that he's more famous than any real detective. This seems prima facie to be true, and yet if there is no such object as Holmes, as I claim, then it looks as if it can't be true, because if there is no object, then there can be no properties of the object such as being famous. — Herg

"X is more famous than y" is about whether more people are familiar with x than y. X can easily be something fictional. The mistake you'd be making is thinking that "X is more famous than y" has to imply that x is a real-world object that has real-world properties (such as being more famous than).

Even if we're talking about "The Beatles are more famous than King's X" we're not talking about a property that "The Beatles" have. We're merely saying that more people are familiar with the Beatles than they are King's X. That's a property of the people in question--namely it's about their mental activities (and even more specifically, simply the fact that far more people sometimes think about the Beatles (including simply being familiar with them, familiar with the name, etc.) than sometimes think about King's X).

how can more people have heard of Holmes than of any other detective if there's no such object as Holmes? — Herg

How can that question seem difficult to anyone? We'd seriously be wondering how it can be that people are familiar with fictions? People read fiction, they watch fictional films, they hear others tell stories, they hear others talk about fictions, refer to them, allude to them, etc. How in the world would that be a mystery to anyone?

That's all you need for Holmes to have become the most famous detective in the world. You don't need nonexistent objects. — Herg

If he's positing nonexistent objects in a Meinongian sense, that's simply stemming from having a nonworkable philosophy of language/semantics that one doesn't want to abandon. So it leads to positing stupid things to save the theory. It's a form of what I call "theory worship."

If you posit a theory of language/meaning that claims that things work, in principle, by referring to some real-world (mind-independent) entity that you then attribute properties to, then you quickly run into problems as soon as you get to fictions. You don't fix that by saying, "Yeah, my theory was necessarily correct/I'm worshipping my theory. It's that fictions are referring to 'real-world nonexistent entities' blah blah blah." You fix it by saying, "Oops! I guess I screwed up. I need to revise my theory, because it's at least the case that not all language/meaning works by referring to real-world entities."

(a) Within the stories and (b) re how people think about him, catalyzed by the stories, for example. — Terrapin Station

Part of the problem, I think, comes from supposing that there is identity between your Holmes and mine. Since there is no Holmes, there can't be; but it's very easy to write about Holmes as if he is a single object possessing self-identity, as you just did when you said, 'how people think about him'. There's actually no 'him'; there's just a bundle of concepts in my mind to which I attach the name 'Holmes', and a bundle of concepts in your mind to which you attach the name 'Holmes', and a mechanism (Conan Doyle's stories) that ensures that our bundles are similar enough to fool us into thinking there's a single, self-identical object.

I don't think you and I have any significant areas of disagreement on this issue. I will be interested to see what MindForged has to say.

Part of the problem, I think, comes from supposing that there is identity between your Holmes and mine. Since there is no Holmes, there can't be; but it's very easy to write about Holmes as if he is a single object possessing self-identity, as you just did when you said, 'how people think about him'. There's actually no 'him'; there's just a bundle of concepts in my mind to which I attach the name 'Holmes', and a bundle of concepts in your mind to which you attach the name 'Holmes', and a mechanism (Conan Doyle's stories) that ensures that our bundles are similar enough to fool us into thinking there's a single, self-identical object. — Herg

I'd say there actually IS a him; it's actually just a bundle of concepts in your mind. That doesn't imply that "there isn't actually a him," unless one insists on reading language in a completely untenable way. That theory of language is WRONG. Language doesn't actually work so that we can only refer to real-world objects. (And so that we subsequently have to posit nonexistent real world objects).

Re identity, there's obviously not when we're talking about different persons' imaginings--and no one suggested an identity there. Re "him" in this context, yeah, it's obviously relative to who we're talking about (doing the imagining). I detailed all of that in my longer post above.

When we're talking about, say, what Doyle wrote, or what Guy Ritchie presented, etc. then of course there is an identity there when multiple people are talking about it.

I don't think you and I have any significant areas of disagreement on this issue. — Herg

Right

I'd say there actually IS a him; it's actually just a bundle of concepts in your mind. That doesn't imply that "there isn't actually a him," unless one insists on reading language in a completely untenable way. That theory of language is WRONG. Language doesn't actually work so that we can only refer to real-world objects. (And so that we subsequently have to posit nonexistent real world objects). — Terrapin Station

We still evidently have some disagreements on the detail (unless you are merely being a little loose in the way you express yourself). Viz:

I agree that language doesn't restrict us to real world objects; how could we refer to Holmes if it did? But I don't think we can say that what's referred to by 'him' is the bundle of concepts. A nonexistent object is not a bundle of concepts, any more than a real world object is: rather, it's what the concepts are instantiated or exemplified in as properties.

Nor do I agree that Holmes is 'in your mind'. He is not mental; he is nonexistent.

When I said "there's actually no 'him'", I meant what I said: in the actual world (which, not being a David Lewis-type modal realist, I take to be the same as the real world), there's no 'him'. In the case of Holmes, I think that 'him' only has reference in Griffin's context of supposition, in which Holmes exists; in the real world, 'him' in the case of Holmes has no reference, any more than 'Holmes' does.

Holmes is not in the actual or real world in any way whatsoever. He is only in the context of supposition, the context in which we suppose or pretend that there is such an object as him.

Apologies if I am labouring the point to the extent that I irritate you. Always a risk in these discussions.

The reason that people present fictional things is almost never "to explain how we can speak truthfully about such things." — Terrapin Station

That's not what I said. I said the proposal to believe non existent things (Meinongianism) have some sort of being is proposed to explain how we speak truthfully about fictional things. I did not say fictional things are created so that we can speak truthfully about them. In other words, tan explanation for why I can say true things about Sherlock Holmes is the theory that non-existent objects corresponding to these things exist.

I assume that MindForged means that the chief reason philosophers propose non-existent objects is to explain how we can speak truthfully about such things; it's clearly not why novelists present them.

The disagreement between MindForged and myself is about the status of non-existent objects as it is hypothesised by philosophers (not by novelists, who mostly probably don't think about it). MindForged holds that we need there to be non-existent objects to explain how we can speak truthfully about them; I disagree. — Herg

This is correct.

It's easy to have the wrong idea about what you're doing when you think about non-existent objects. Both Meinong and Russell got it wrong. Russell thought that when he wrote 'the present King of France is bald', he was claiming, falsely, that there was a real present King of France. However, he was not; he was pretending that there was a real present King of France. — Herg

Sure, but the theory of definite descriptions is on shakier grounds these days when compared to Meinongianism, which has had an unexpected resurgence. The proposal (whether you accept it or not) is that the best explanation for the truth-aptness the relevant sentences is an appeal to non-existent objects. When you phrase it as "pretending" is sounds like you're calling me deceptive rather than misguided. If that wasn't the implication my mistake.

If you say 'Sherlock Holmes is the world's greatest detective', this is not a true statement. We only pretend that it is true, just as we pretend that there is such an object as Sherlock Holmes. — Herg

I think the sentence was "Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any detective" or something like that, but disregard that. To say the sentence is false seems to require adopting something like Russell's theory of definite descriptions. After all, few would hear me say "Sherlock Holmes is the most famous detective" and interpret that as me saying Holmes exists. Because that's how Russell's theory would interpret that. And obviously that assumption is false and thus the sentence that assumes it.

If that's not how you are determining it isn't true, the only recourse that comes to mind is a restriction of either the Principle of Excluded Middle or of Bivalence. So we're either in many-valued logic or some kind of constructive logic. I'm not opposed to those (I'm a pluralist about logic) but I don't think it's the an easy bullet to bite. That said, I'll check out the paper you mention.

What do you think about objects in dreams? If you dream about a horse, do you hold that there is a horse? I hold that there is not.

A non-existent horse, yes. An existent horse, no. If one holds to Meinongianism, "there is" is not the same thing as "exists". Being has been partitioned into different kinds so if I speak truthfully about the horse in my dream I'm not committing myself to the existence of the dream horse. It has enough being to predicate things of it but it's a thin sort of being, not physical.

That's not what I said. I said the proposal to believe non existent things (Meinongianism) have some sort of being is proposed to explain how we speak truthfully about fictional things. I did not say fictional things are created so that we can speak truthfully about them. In other words, tan explanation for why I can say true things about Sherlock Holmes is the theory that non-existent objects corresponding to these things exist. — MindForged

As I explained above, we say true things about the way that people imagine fictional things, about the way they write about them, or create films about them, etc. As something imagined, they're not objective entities/phenomena but subjective entities/phenomena.

But I don't think we can say that what's referred to by 'him' is the bundle of concepts.A nonexistent object is not a bundle of concepts, — Herg

It's something that doesn't exist mind-independently. But it exists mind-dependently. And mind-dependently, it's a "bundle of concepts," and that's what we're referring to by "him."

The phrase "nonexistent object" is throwing things off.

Nor do I agree that Holmes is 'in your mind'. He is not mental; he is nonexistent. — Herg

What a ridiculous thing to say. Holmes is something we're imagining (aside from talking about Holmes as a character someone is playing, etc.) That means that Holmes is indeed in your mind. You're not being Aspie-ish about that, are you? Thinking that people are saying literally that some person is in your mind? Holmes is mental content--something imagined. You're imagining a person. It's not literally a person.

When I said "there's actually no 'him'", I meant what I said: in the actual world (which, not being a David Lewis-type modal realist, I take to be the same as the real world), there's no 'him'. — Herg

Minds are part of the actual world.

In the case of Holmes, I think that 'him' only has reference in Griffin's context of supposition, — Herg

Why would you think that, though? It's very simple. "Him" in most contexts here is going to refer to what individuals are thinking of.

Holmes is not in the actual or real world in any way whatsoever. — Herg

False. Again, minds are part of the actual world.

Again, the terms are misleading you here. There's a historical way of using "real" that makes it effectively the same as mind-independent. But minds are part of the actual world. Minds are real in a more modern sense of that term.

When you phrase it as "pretending" is sounds like you're calling me deceptive rather than misguided. If that wasn't the implication my mistake. — MindForged

Good lord. No, that was not my intention. What I was trying to suggest is that you and I, when we read a story about Sherlock Holmes, play along with Conan Doyle's game, which he indulged in himself when he wrote the stories, of pretending that there is a real Holmes in the real world. You and I (and everyone else who knows that Holmes is fictitious) at the same time know that this is not the case; and since behaving as if something were the case while knowing that it is not the case usually goes under the name 'pretending', that was the word I naturally chose. But given your reaction, maybe it would be safer if I used the word 'imagining' - or, as Griffin does, 'supposing'.

I think the sentence was "Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any detective" or something like that, but disregard that. To say the sentence is false seems to require adopting something like Russell's theory of definite descriptions. After all, few would hear me say "Sherlock Holmes is the most famous detective" and interpret that as me saying Holmes exists. Because that's how Russell's theory would interpret that. And obviously that assumption is false and thus the sentence that assumes it.

If that's not how you are determining it isn't true, the only recourse that comes to mind is a restriction of either the Principle of Excluded Middle or of Bivalence. — MindForged

I owe you an apology here, because I have not been explicit enough in saying what I think. Let me try again.

Holmes is an object only in a context of supposition, not in the real world; in the real world, Holmes is not an object but a fictional character. (Fictional characters are not strictly objects, they are complexes made up of words on the page and people's thoughts when they read those words.) Statements that refer to Holmes can be true only in the context in which Holmes has the status - object or fictional character - required for the statement to be true. In some cases the statement, in order to be true, may require him to be both a fictional character and an object in the real world; in such cases the statement 'reaches into' the context of supposition in order to access the properties Holmes has in that context.

Some examples:
'Holmes is a character in books by Conan Doyle' (true in the real world)
'Holmes lives in Baker Street' (true in a context of supposition)
'Holmes is the world's greatest detective' (true in a context of supposition)
'Holmes is a detective in stories by Conan Doyle' (true in the real world, but reaches into the context of supposition to access the property 'detective')
'Holmes is the most famous detective in the world' (true in the real world, because that is where he is famous; but again, reaches into the context of supposition to access the property 'detective')

I hope this clarifies my position.

What do you think about objects in dreams? If you dream about a horse, do you hold that there is a horse? I hold that there is not.

A non-existent horse, yes. An existent horse, no. If one holds to Meinongianism, "there is" is not the same thing as "exists". Being has been partitioned into different kinds so if I speak truthfully about the horse in my dream I'm not committing myself to the existence of the dream horse. It has enough being to predicate things of it but it's a thin sort of being, not physical. — MindForged

I take the same view of dream objects as I do of imaginary objects. I don't believe in different kinds of being. There is a horse in my dream, but in the real world, there is no horse at all, only me dreaming.

Nor do I agree that Holmes is 'in your mind'. He is not mental; he is nonexistent.
— Herg

What a ridiculous thing to say. Holmes is something we're imagining (aside from talking about Holmes as a character someone is playing, etc.) That means that Holmes is indeed in your mind. You're not being Aspie-ish about that, are you? Thinking that people are saying literally that some person is in your mind? Holmes is mental content--something imagined. You're imagining a person. It's not literally a person. — Terrapin Station

Evidently when I said we had no significant areas of disagreement, I was jumping the gun.

Holmes is not mental content. The mental content here is the thoughts someone has when they read a story about Holmes, or in some other situation imagines that there is such a person as Holmes.

Holmes can't be mental content, because he is a physical object. He is six feet tall, he lives in Baker Street, he injects himself with cocaine, he plays the violin, he is a member of the species homo sapiens. Mental content cannot have any of these properties, only a physical object can, and therefore Holmes is a physical object.

However, he is not a physical object in anyone's mind (which, as you rightly say, would mean that he is in the real world), because physical objects (as you again rightly observe) cannot be in people's minds. As an object (as opposed to as a fictional character - see my answer to MindForged above), he is not in the real world in any way whatsoever. He is - he exists - only in some context of supposition, which is just a way of saying that someone at some time supposes or imagines that there is such an object as Holmes.

Holmes can't be mental content, because he is a physical object. He is six feet tall, he lives in Baker Street, he injects himself with cocaine, he plays the violin, he is a member of the species homo sapiens. Mental content cannot have any of these properties, only a physical object can, and therefore Holmes is a physical object. — Herg

All mental content is physical first off.

But there isn't a Holmes who is six feet tall. Someone imagines him to be six feet tall, someone has written him to be six feet tall, or an actor playing him may either actually be six feet tall or the actors (and scriptwriter etc.) might be pretending that he's six feet tall. When we say that Holmes is six feet tall, one of the above (or something similar) is all that it amounts to.

All mental content is physical first off. — Terrapin Station

Not sure what you mean. If you mean that mental content is brain content and is therefore physical because the brain is physical, that may be so, but it has nothing to do with the way in which Holmes is physical; he is physical in his own right, as a human being, not as part of anyone's brain. But because he exists only in a context of supposition and not in the real world, he is physical only in the context of supposition, not in the real world.

But there isn't a Holmes who is six feet tall. — Terrapin Station

Not in the real world, no. But there is in one of Griffin's contexts of supposition.

Someone imagines him to be six feet tall, someone has written him to be six feet tall, or an actor playing him may either actually be six feet tall or the actors (and scriptwriter etc.) might be pretending that he's six feet tall. When we say that Holmes is six feet tall, one of the above (or something similar) is all that it amounts to. — Terrapin Station

Of these alternatives, the first is closest to what Griffin is suggesting. To put it more precisely: someone imagines that there exists, in the real world, an object which is Holmes and which is six feet tall. That is all that Griffin means when he says that Holmes exists and is six feet tall in a context of supposition.

The "nonexistent" adjective applies to the question of whether they also occur as something in the world external-to-minds. — Terrapin Station

I agree that some kind of externality is at play, but maybe it's best frame as external to the individual imagination. Does the white house exist? If we strip away everything mental, piece by piece, then I think we are left with nothing. Anything you could say we were left with would still be intelligible or mental. Bunch of waves and particles? What are they but concepts and mathematics, very mental. 'External-to-minds' is parasitic upon the idea of junk in our absence which still has a shape, a boundary, some border that cuts it out from its background.

In short, 'external-to-mind' is sensible in its vagueness but breaks down as we really follow its logic. Saying that everything is in a particular mind also breaks down, so it's not about opposing one such position to another but lighting up the aporia that results from any sharp naming of our situation.

*I do agree that whatever we talk about exists in some sense, which I think you hint at in some of your posts above. In certain contexts people mean only physics junk or public junk 'exists.'

I agree that some kind of externality is at play, but maybe it's best frame as external to the individual imagination. Does the white house exist? If we strip away everything mental, piece by piece, then I think we are left with nothing. Anything you could say we were left with would still be intelligible or mental. Bunch of waves and particles? What are they but concepts and mathematics, very mental. 'External-to-minds' is parasitic upon the idea of junk in our absence which still has a shape, a boundary, some border that cuts it out from its background. — macrosoft

To me, stuff like this seems like philosophers obsessing over people qua people, so that they can't allow themselves to address anything other than people, people's perspectives, etc. I see it as a case of not being able to move past seeing oneself as the "center of the world," or thinking that the "world revolves around them."

I don't at all agree that if we strip away everything mental we are left with nothing. I think it's rather absurd to suggest that somehow the world didn't exist at all prior to us, and then we just popped into existence as whatever it might be that you think we are, exactly, and created the world wholesale simply because we popped into existence.. I don't think stuff like that is anything even remotely like a philosophical insight. I think it's more akin to being developmentally stuck at a stage that most people grow out of by the time they pass toddlerhood,or at best, it's rather sophomoric and/or off-the-charts self-centered.

To me, stuff like this seems like philosophers obsessing over people qua people, so that they can't allow themselves to address anything other than people, people's perspectives, etc. I see it as a case of not being able to move past seeing oneself as the "center of the world," or thinking that the "world revolves around them." — Terrapin Station

I understand why one might say that. But a person might ask what the motive away from the human is really about. It is itself a typical human motive, the quest for a god's eye view. As I see it, there are two grounds of the prestige of science. The first is practical power in the 'manifest image' or everyday world. If science didn't give technology and accurate predictions, it would collapse into sci-fi or pure math. The second is the quasi-religious urge to grasp Reality. IMV the metaphysical addition to the pragmatic value of science is 'religious' in its motivations. The idea of getting beyond the human is like the idea of getting beyond experience.

Another issue for me is that science doesn't need philosophy. Science is not grounded by the quasi-theological musings of the philosophers. It is, IMV, palpably grounded in worldly power. And the man on the street might express this as science being 'real' and philosophy being 'just a bunch of opinions in fancy words.' How do scientists feel about philosophy? Here is one opinion.

This is not to deny all value to philosophy, much of which has nothing to
do with science. I do not even mean to deny all value to the philosophy of science, which at its best
seems to me a pleasing gloss on the history and discoveries of science. But we should not expect it
to provide today's scientists with any useful guidance about how to go about their work or about
what they are likely to find. — Weinberg

http://emilkirkegaard.dk/en/wp-content/uploads/Steven-Weinberg-%E2%80%9CAgainst-Philosophy%E2%80%9D.pdf

I don't at all agree that if we strip away everything mental we are left with nothing. I think it's rather absurd to suggest that somehow the world didn't exist at all prior to us, and then we just popped into existence as whatever it might be that you think we are, exactly, and created the world wholesale simply because we popped into existence. — Terrapin Station

Of course such an idea is absurd, and it is not at all what I am saying. That you would think that indicates to me that maybe you really haven't grasped the 'aporia.' It's the old critique of Kant. I understand your view to be vaguely Kantian. Assuming that there is some kind of physics-stuff that precedes the emergence of human consciousness (which I indeed believe), we can't say anything about it. It has no conceptual content. Any concept it could have would be the addition of consciousness. So the vague sense that the non-mentally physically real is 'energy' or 'fields' is contradictory, ignoring as it does that our interpretation of the world in terms of physics is not essentially different than seeing it in terms of furniture and people. In short, you are ignoring the problem that Kant ran into of giving sense to 'things-in-themselves.'

I don't think stuff like that is anything even remotely like a philosophical insight. I think it's more akin to being developmentally stuck at a stage that most people grow out of by the time they pass toddlerhood,or at best, it's rather sophomoric and/or off-the-charts self-centered. — Terrapin Station

Not to be insulting, but your readiness to think that that is what people are getting at is itself self-centered. I can't think of anyone who claims that, period. Things that sound that absurd are almost always being misinterpreted. Our readiness to take such misinterpretations as what is intended is self-flattering. 'Oh these fools,' we say, 'these children,' as we naively stop with lazy interpretation that ensures we never have to painfully absorb criticism. I'm no saint on these matters, btw.

I understand why one might say that. But a person might ask what the motive away from the human is really about. — macrosoft

Simply being interested in things other than ourselves.

The idea of getting beyond the human is like the idea of getting beyond experience. — macrosoft

Well, or it's just that you can observe a rock, or the ocean, or whatever, and be interested in it and talk about it instead of just talking about ourselves all the time.

Assuming that there is some kind of physics-stuff that precedes the emergence of human consciousness (which I indeed believe), we can't say anything about it. — macrosoft

Of course we can say things about it. Why on Earth would we believe that we are not able to?

I'm not at all a Kantian, by the way. By and large, I dislike Kant as much as I dislike Hegel, Heidegger, etc. I wouldn't say I don't agree with Kant on anything, but I'm probably close to disagreeing with him on everything. Plus he was an awful writer.

Any concept it could have — macrosoft

The stuff we're talking about doesn't "have concepts." Concepts are mental phenomena. That doesn't mean that we can't say anything about the stuff that's not us.

Not to be insulting, but your readiness to think that that is what people are getting at is itself self-centered. I can't think of anyone who claims that, period. — macrosoft

?? I didn't say anyone says that. I said it's what's going on in those situations. It's like a kind of developmental retardation, and I don't at all mind if anyone reads that as insulting.

Of course we can say things about it. Why on Earth would we believe that we are not able to? — Terrapin Station

If you are trying to talk about something beyond human conceptualization (mind-independent reality), then you would seem to have to strip all conceptual addition from experience. To think that talk about fields or electrons is talk about the mind-independent reality is IMV to make a mistake. Just as breaking the visual field into ordinary objects is a useful kind of modeling, so is finding patterns in measurements with the aid of intellectual objects like electrons. It's just more modelling 'within' the life-world. We know in a rough sense that our life-world has a foundation that precedes us. But whatever try and say about it already stuffs it with mind-dependence. We would believe we were not able to because we would see the problems or contradictions in our way of speaking.

Bunch of waves and particles? What are they but concepts and mathematics, very mental. — macrosoft

Mathematics is not mental in the sense you mean. It is grasped by the mental, but it is not constituted by the mental, because it is external to us.

If you are trying to talk about something beyond human conceptualization (mind-independent reality), — macrosoft

Mind independent reality isn't beyond human conceptualization in the slightest. Why would anyone believe that it is?

The stuff we're talking about doesn't "have concepts." Concepts are mental phenomena. That doesn't mean that we can't say anything about the stuff that's not us. — Terrapin Station

To say things about this stuff is just to 'project' concepts on it. Even if you don't agree, it would be good if you could grasp the idea that projecting a 'table' on some piece of mind-independent reality is arguably no different than projecting an arrangement of atoms. It's the same kind of shared meaning or conceptual interpretation. The 'atoms' story has an additional glamour that seems to derive from the worldly power of science.

Mathematics is not mental in the sense you mean. It is grasped by the mental, but it is not constituted by the mental, because it is external to us. — Herg

That is an arguable position, but I'm not a default Platonist. The problem is just repeated here. What is this 'external' to us? IMV, we have unclarifed language here.

Mind independent reality isn't beyond human conceptualization in the slightest. Why would anyone believe that it is? — Terrapin Station

I think you are missing the fundamental difficultly in cashing out 'mind-independent.' Nobody doubts that there is mind-independent reality of 'some' kind. The problem is giving this phrase content.

For instance, tell me about mind-independent reality.

I think you are missing the fundamental difficultly in cashing out 'mind-independent.' — macrosoft

I think you're completely avoiding the need to support the notion that there is some fundamental difficulty to it.

?? I didn't say anyone says that. I said it's what's going on in those situations. It's like a kind of developmental retardation, and I don't at all mind if anyone reads that as insulting. — Terrapin Station

It's very much your choice if you want to toss around 'development retardation.' But then some of the famous philosophers are developmentally retarded. I don't think that you are a crank, but this kind of attitude is common in cranks. We usually see it in anti-science cranks, but this isn't the only kind of crankiness. The general structure of the crank is seeing fools in high places --high places where the crank rightfully belongs.

I think you're completely avoiding the need to support the notion that thereis some fundamental difficulty to it. — Terrapin Station

I am willing to do so. I think the best way is to ask you to say something about mind-independent reality. Then I will try to point out the contradictions.

But then some of the famous philosophers are developmentally retarded — macrosoft

Lord yes.

I'm more of an iconoclast. Most philosophers have said some phenomenally stupid things. Some made doing that their bread and butter.

Mathematics is not mental in the sense you mean. It is grasped by the mental, but it is not constituted by the mental, because it is external to us.
— Herg

That is an arguable position, but I'm not a default Platonist. The problem is just repeated here. What is this 'external' to us? IMV, we have unclarifed language here. — macrosoft

I'm not a Platonist either. And 'external to us' is perfectly comprehensible: I don't see your difficulty.

Are you trying to sell us idealism? Because idealism is hopeless. It's a philosophical dead end.

I'm not a Platonist either. And 'external to us' is perfectly comprehensible: I don't see your difficulty.

Are you trying to sell us idealism? Because idealism is hopeless. It's a philosophical dead end. — Herg

Nope. Not idealism. I agree it's a dead end. And so is its opposite. That kind of categorical thinking is naive, IMV. I have to disagree that 'external to us' is 'perfectly comprehensible.' If that were the case, we would not have centuries of argument about it. It's not like we just here and now wandered in to a new issue. This is old stuff.

I am willing to do so. I think the best way is to ask you to say something about mind-independent reality. Then I will try to point out the contradictions. — macrosoft

Sure. Okay, here's something about it. "There are lots of rocks on the Appalachian Trail near the Pennsylvania-New Jersey border."

Sure. Okay, here's something about it. "There are lots of rocks on the Appalachian Trail near the Pennsylvania-New Jersey border." — Terrapin Station

All of this is loaded with the mental. We have the idea of a rock. We have proper names that exist within an historical context. I'd call this public or non-controversial reality. In short, this is talk about the human world, intelligible to humans. Does New Jersey exist independently as New Jersey independently from us ?

We are probably bickering over terminology.