In fact, it was in this semester which inaugurated his phenomenological decade that he first discovered his root metaphor of the 'way' to describe his very kinetic sense of philosophy. Philosophy is not theory, outstrips any theory or conceptual system it may develop, because it can only approximate and never really comprehend the immediate experience it wishes to articulate. That which is nearest to us in experience is farthest removed from our comprehension. Philosophy in its 'poverty of thought' is ultimately reduced to maintaining its proximating orientation toward the pre-theoretical origin which is its subject matter. Philosophy is accordingly an orienting comportment, a praxis of striving, and a protreptic encouraging such a striving. Its expressions are only 'formal indications' which smooth the way toward intensifying the sense of the immediate in which we find ourselves. It is always precursory in its pronouncements,a forerunner of insights, a harbinger and hermeneutic herald of life's possibilities of understanding and articulation. In short, philosophy is more a form of life on the edge of expression than a science. That phenomenology is more a preconceptual, provisory comportment than a conceptual science, that the formally indicating 'concepts' are first intended to serve life rather than science, becomes transparent only after the turn...
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Philosophy is 'philosophizing', being 'on the way to language,' ways ---not works.
— Heidegger/Kiesel
Heidegger attempted and failed at understanding the role language has in one's world-view. — creativesoul
Life is sufficient to Itself, Ekhart already said. The trick is to get to this level and stay with it, thereby reaping the harvest of its self-expression. For factic life also gives itself in the deformation of the objectification, which must first be dismantled in order to get to its initial moment of articulation.
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Such an intuition immersed in the 'immanent historicity of life' must reach back into its motivation and forward into its tendency in order to form those special concepts which are accordingly called recepts (retrospective grips) and precepts (prospective grips), without of course lapsing into old-fashioned objectifying concepts. Heidegger will later improve upon this dualism suggested in the hermeneutic type of concept by having the single term pre-conception imply both retrospection and prospection, which unitively and indifferently stretches itself along the whole of the life stream. In the same vein, a formal indication is sometimes called a 'precursory' indication that 'foreruns' the stream without disruption. Springing from life's own sense of direction, from the indifference of its dynamics in view of its incipient differentiation, the formal indication wishes to point to the phenomenon in extreme generality, indifference, and contentlessness, in order to be able to interpret the phenomenon so indicated without prejudice and standpoints. — K
I’ve yet to find anyone who can provide a concise definition of “dasein” given by Heidegger. If anything the whole work of “Being and Time” is merely a pondering of what “dasein” means to Heidegger. — I like sushi
Philosophy in its 'poverty of thought' is ultimately reduced to maintaining its proximating orientation toward the pre-theoretical origin which is its subject matter. Philosophy is accordingly an orienting comportment, a praxis of striving, and a protreptic encouraging such a striving. Its expressions are only 'formal indications' which smooth the way toward intensifying the sense of the immediate in which we find ourselves. It is always precursory in its pronouncements,a forerunner of insights, a harbinger and hermeneutic herald of life's possibilities of understanding and articulation. — Heidegger/Kiesel
I’ve yet to find anyone who can provide a concise definition of “dasein” given by Heidegger. — I like sushi
In short he ignored the phenomenological experience and became absorbed with language. He tried to speak of the unspeakable - and obviously failed to do anything other than confuse and confound, or fool, people into believing they understood something unreached. — I like sushi
The fact that he uses the term “hermeneutics” means he’s focusing on “words” not thought. — I like sushi
The problem there being he doesn’t tell the resder where he is going and pefers to prance around without meaning - or maybe I’m not giving myself credit enough for seeing something others may find hard to grasp? It is possible, as is the possiblilty I am so dim-witted that I missed the entire point of rambling on in a seemingly meaningless and obtuse manner? — I like sushi
I've always had a profound distaste for this kind of 'mysterian' conception of philosophy - if I can call it that - which treats philosophy as though it were just some under-maintained half-way house to Deep Truth or what have you — StreetlightX
At its best, philosophy does always indeed 'point elsewhere', always feels like a matter of 'fore-running', like you've never quite grasped the so-called 'sense of the immediate'. But I think it is a deep and terrible mistake to confuse this feeling with the positivity of philosophy itself which is a self-consciously and actively joyful practice of artifice, of constructing visions that deliberately and wilfully abstract from the real all the better for us to orient ourselves within it. — StreetlightX
It's one of the reasons why Heidegger is so utterly bereft of a sense of humour, and why the whole Heideggarian artifice feels like walking in a blackened, Gothic church, creaking with every step. — StreetlightX
Life is sufficient to Itself, Ekhart already said. — K
↪macrosoft For openers (a Poker term), Heidegger is somewhat narrow in his views in that in his book "Being And Time" he states that we can only be sure of our own existence.
This is contrary to Modern British Empiricism in that the existence of others is a given since they can harm you or kill you.
So Heidegger's thinking is flawed. Ergo he is easy to dismiss.
I look for major flaws and then I dismiss the source. It is my method of doing philosophy. — hks
he states that we can only be sure of our own existence. — hks
I think he's riffing on the eye's inability to see itself. What does it mean to you? — frank
rambling on in a seemingly meaningless and obtuse manner — I like sushi
The pieces don't yet gel together perfectly. Individually many of them have already made reading Heidegger well worth my time. I'd say give this one a try: The Concept of Time. The intro on Dilthey/Yorck really sets up what Heidegger is trying to do. — macrosoft
To me he's basically sketching one kind of heroic lifestyle. — macrosoft
Remember Plato has Socrates say that every philosopher's greatest wish is to die so as to gain a vantage point on life in this world. There is no such vantage point from within it. Existentialism provides no fix for that, but it focuses on that which is (in a sense) most real. — frank
As soon as we begin to speak, we're already in a reflective state, dismantling that which exists united. So as I speak now, I appear to conjure up some world beyond our grasp. As Heidegger mentioned, it's not far away. There's nothing closer. — frank
"“If time finds its meaning in eternity, then it must be understood starting from eternity. The point of departure and path of this inquiry are thereby indicated in advance: from eternity to time… If our access to God is faith and if involving oneself with eternity is nothing other than this faith, then philosophy will never have eternity… Philosophy can never be relieved of this perplexity. The theologian, then, is the legitimate expert on time — Terrapin Station
But really you should probably look at the other text called The Concept of Time. — macrosoft
What sort of gobbledygook is that? "History as an object of contemplation for method"?? What in the world is that supposed to be saying? — Terrapin Station
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